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Should We Care, and What Are the Options?
An expanding economy no longer seems a panacea, allowing us to reduce 
poverty while we all become richer. 
 —Rebecca Blank, a member of the Clinton administration’s Council of 
 Economic Advisers, speaking about how poverty rose in the 1980s
The best antipoverty program is still a job. 
 —President Bill Clinton at a 1996 news conference on welfare legislation
The intergenerational poverty that troubles us so much today is predominantly 
a poverty of values. 
 —Vice President Dan Quayle in his famous 1992 “Murphy Brown” speech, 
 arguing that a lack of personal values is the primary cause of poverty
Concern about the well-being of the least fortunate Americans has 
ebbed	 and	flowed	over	 the	 last	 century.	The	New	Deal	 initiatives	 of	
the 1930s stimulated interest in helping those hit hardest by the Great 
Depression. During the war years and the prosperous 1950s, the pres-
ence of the poor faded from the consciousness of many Americans, but 
concern	for	their	plight	again	intensified	during	Lyndon	Johnson’s	War	
on Poverty in the 1960s. Since then, interest in reducing poverty has 
continued to experience ups and downs: poverty rates are no lower to-
day than when the War on Poverty ended in the late 1960s; on the con-
trary, high poverty exists in many regions of the country. To be sure, the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina once again reminded Americans that 
concentrations of high poverty remain within our borders.
 Much of the current popular discourse is driven by the view that 
public efforts to reduce poverty are not worthwhile, let alone effective 
(Moore 1997). One result of this skepticism was the landmark 1996 
reform of federal welfare policy, which greatly increased the personal 
responsibility of the disadvantaged for their own well-being. In fact, 
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reducing overall poverty was not even an explicit goal of the 1996 wel-
fare reform legislation (Ellwood and Blank 2001). Policies designed 
to eliminate regional pockets of poverty have been criticized on the 
grounds that it would be more effective to direct policies at individuals 
and not at places (Peters and Fisher 2002).
Even as interest in antipoverty efforts waned and skepticism grew, 
the U.S. poverty rate fell to 11.3 percent in 2000 (the lowest it had been 
since 1974), including a record low average rate of 13.4 percent in non-
metropolitan areas (ERS 2004). This could be interpreted as being the 
result of a favorable link between growth and poverty-rate reduction 
that had seemingly been nonexistent from the 1970s through the early 
1990s but that had reestablished itself since then (Blank and Card 1993; 
Freeman 2001). The Council of Economic Advisers (1999) and O’Neill 
and Hill (2001) argue that welfare reform was the impetus behind the 
reduced number of welfare caseloads, which may then have contributed 
to lower poverty. Yet others note the potential interaction between a 
strong	economy	and	the	success	of	welfare	reform	(e.g.,	Moffitt	1999).
Despite the nationwide antipoverty gains of the 1990s, poverty 
rates remained high in many metropolitan central cities and inner sub-
urbs (Jargowsky 2003) and in remote nonmetropolitan areas (Miller 
and Weber 2004). This raises the question of whether these areas ex-
perienced subpar economic performance compared to the nation or 
whether there was less of a connection between local economic growth 
and poverty in these areas. The answer to this question would relate to 
whether there is a need for place-based policies and would help inform 
their design.
In	 the	 remainder	 of	 this	 chapter,	we	 first	 provide	 a	 rationale	 for	
society to become more engaged in reducing poverty, including at the 
regional	level.	We	then	briefly	review	the	evidence	on	the	connection	
between employment growth, welfare reform, and poverty at the na-
tional level. The implications of the national trends for regional poverty 
follow; we particularly consider the relative merits of place-based and 
person-based policies for evening out spatial concentrations of poverty. 
This includes a discussion of the role space plays in poverty outcomes, 
because national growth policies alone may do little to ameliorate per-
sistent regional pockets of poverty. We introduce the possibility that 
local economic growth, using place-based employment supports, may 
be a needed tool for reducing poverty. The chapter concludes with an 
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overview of the remainder of the book, whose primary emphasis is the 
spatial dimension of the relationship between economic performance 
and poverty, including an examination of competing explanations such 
as federal and state welfare reform. 
WHy SOCIETy SHOuLD CARE ABOuT POvERTy
There are both philosophical and practical reasons why the Ameri-
can public should be concerned with the well-being of its poorest mem-
bers. For one, according to the Rawlsian view, if individuals in a group 
selected a distribution of income for the members of the group before 
they knew how each of them would fare—i.e., if they had a “veil of 
ignorance” concerning the outcome—risk-averse individuals would 
pick the distribution that maximized the well-being of the least-well-off 
member of the group (Rawls 1971). In our wealthy society, application 
of Rawlsian logic would eliminate poverty. Nevertheless, while the no-
tion that individuals are risk-averse and interested in justice before the 
fact is thought-provoking, public policy does not work in the realm of 
the “veil of ignorance.” Rather, it is affected by politicians reliant on 
voters who are fully aware of their actual or most probable place in the 
income distribution. 
Beyond the abstractions of philosophical arguments, Americans are 
well grounded in notions of justice, equity, and a sense of fair play. 
Madden (2000) presents evidence showing that a strong majority of the 
U.S. public prefers a more equal distribution of income. However, the 
catch is that the public tends to be very skeptical of whether government 
intervention is the proper vehicle to satisfy its desire for equity. Indeed, 
the	issue	reflects	a	fundamental	tenet	of	neoclassical	economics,	which	
is	that	there	is	an	equity-efficiency	tradeoff	(Okun	1975):	societies	can	
achieve more equity and less poverty through redistribution of income, 
but by blunting economic incentives, attaining this goal comes at the 
expense	of	economic	efficiency	and	growth.	Yet	other	economists	argue	
against the existence of an inverse relationship between equity and ef-
ficiency,	instead	contending	that	greater	inequality	reduces	growth	by	
producing	societal	upheaval,	inefficient	government	redistribution,	and	
suboptimal investment in human and physical capital.1
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Besides notions of equity and fairness, there are practical reasons 
for society to be concerned about the well-being of its lowest-income 
members. For example, lower poverty may encourage disadvantaged 
segments of the population to become more civilly engaged in their 
communities because they feel they are legitimate stakeholders. High-
er poverty, on the other hand, adversely affects the physical health of 
the workforce, which, besides reducing poor people’s quality of life, 
reduces their workplace productivity and ultimately increases public 
health care expenditures and their reliance on other government pro-
grams (Scott 2005). If poverty is reduced through improved labor mar-
ket participation, then benefactors will enjoy long-term gains through 
enhanced labor market experience, increased skills upgrading, and, in 
turn, higher future earnings (Bartik 2001). 
Perhaps the largest societal gains from poverty reduction occur 
through intergenerational linkages. The environment created by fami-
lies	facing	severe	financial	stress	is	not	optimal	for	raising	children,	par-
ticularly for developing their cognitive and noncognitive skills. There 
are	significant	ramifications	in	adulthood	when	children	from	difficult	
circumstances fall behind early. There is growing consensus in the lit-
erature that the income of a child’s family has long-term impacts on that 
child’s health, education, nutrition, and future income and welfare as 
an adult (Carneiro and Heckman 2003; Case, Fertig, and Paxson 2003; 
Karoly et al. 1998). These intergenerational effects suggest the potential 
benefits	from	poverty	reduction	can	be	large	simply	in	terms	of	future	
earnings and health care savings from the children of disadvantaged fam-
ilies. In contrast, Carneiro and Heckman (2003) note that later interven-
tions, such as tuition policies for underprivileged college students, likely 
have smaller marginal effects on improving future earnings.
Another	indirect	benefit	of	poverty	reduction	relates	to	the	link	be-
tween labor market conditions and crime (Freeman 2001; Freeman and 
Rodgers 1999; Raphael and Winter-Ember 2001). These studies suggest 
that 33–40 percent of the large decrease in crime during the 1990s can 
be attributed to the strong economy of those years.2 This effect implies 
large	antipoverty	benefits	in	terms	of	savings	from	reduced	victimiza-
tion, lower expenditures on protective measures, and lower incarcera-
tion costs associated with reduced recidivism.
In	 summary,	 reducing	poverty	can	provide	 substantial	benefits	 in	
many ways: improved social engagement, higher economic potential, 
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greater long-term earnings for positively affected individuals, lower 
crime,	and	significant	long-term	gains	for	affected	children	in	terms	of	
health, education, and income in adulthood. Associated gains include 
eventual reductions in government expenditures for public assistance, 
health care, and the criminal justice system. Along with even modest 
concerns for equity and fairness, these advantages provide continued 
justification	for	aggressively	fighting	poverty.	And	the	potential	gains	
are likely greatest where poverty is geographically most concentrated.
NATIONAL POvERTy AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Numerous measures of poverty exist, each with relative advantages 
and	disadvantages.	We	use	 the	 official	 federal	 poverty	 rate	 (see	Box	
1.1), which is not perfect but is well known and has been consistently 
measured	over	 time.	Also	 to	 its	advantage,	 the	official	 federal	 rate	 is	
used both in assessing and in setting government policy. As an example 
of	 the	 federal	 definition	 of	 poverty,	 a	 household	with	 one	 adult	 (un-
der 65 years of age) and two children had to have earned more than 
$14,824 to be above the poverty line in 2003, while a household con-
taining two adults (under 65) and two children had to have earned more 
than $18,660. 
As shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, there were remarkable reductions 
in poverty during the 1960s and early 1970s. This was true regardless of 
whether one considered person or family poverty rates (Figure 1.1), or 
even female-headed-family poverty rates (Figure 1.2). With that prog-
ress, an observer in the early 1970s had reason to be optimistic that 
the War on Poverty would ultimately be won. Nevertheless, subsequent 
trends show that poverty has remained a persistent element of American 
society.
Even though the 1980s and 1990s had two of the three longest eco-
nomic expansions on record, the person and family poverty rates in 
2002 were little changed from what they were when the War on Poverty 
ended more than 30 years ago (Figure 1.1). In fact, U.S. Census Bureau 
(2004a) data suggest that while real median-family income rose by 7 
percent between 1973 and 1993, the person poverty rate increased from 
11.1 percent to 15.1 percent (the second highest rate since 1965). Figure 
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 Box 1.1  Official Federal Poverty Thresholds
Social Security Administration economist Mollie Orshansky 
originally	developed	the	official	federal	poverty	criteria	in	1963–
1964 (U.S. Census Bureau 2004h; Fisher 1997). Orshansky cal-
culated the economy food budgetary requirements of 58 family 
types based on age and family size (currently 48 family types are 
used).	For	each	family	type,	she	simply	multiplied	this	figure	by	
three to obtain what is now called the poverty threshold. For the 
most	part,	Orshansky’s	definition	has	remained	unchanged	except	
that	it	is	adjusted	upward	for	inflation	every	year.
In determining poverty status, before-tax income is used, in-
cluding	public	assistance	but	not	capital	gains.	The	official	poverty	
rate is not adjusted for several factors such as the Earned Income 
Tax Credit or in-kind public welfare programs like Medicaid. Nor 
is it adjusted for regional cost-of-living differences. To give a feel 
for the resulting thresholds, we present the following examples: a 
three-person household with one adult (under 65 years of age) and 
two children needed to earn more than $15,219 to be above the 
poverty line in 2004, while a two-adult (under 65) and two-child 
household needed to earn more than $19,157. Comparable three- 
and four-person households needed to earn $13,423 and $16,895 
in	1999	and	$9,990	and	$12,575	 in	1989—the	 increase	 reflects	
inflation	(U.S.	Census	Bureau	2005e).
The	official	definition	can	be	criticized	for	not	adjusting	for	
taxes and in-kind contributions. It also does not account for the 
notion that poverty is often viewed as a relative concept: what is 
considered economic deprivation changes over time with rising 
living standards.a For example, an upper-middle-class standard of 
living a century ago would now be one devoid of modern conve-
niences. Nonetheless, developing alternative measures of poverty 
rates is full of pitfalls in that they can be ad hoc and they may not 
capture true conceptions of poverty. For more details on alterna-
tive poverty measures, see U.S. Census Bureau (2003). 
Despite	 these	 concerns,	 the	 official	 poverty	 rate	measure	 is	
used because it is well known, has been consistent over time, and 
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1.2 shows that the poverty rate increased for female-headed families 
during this 20-year period from 32.2 to 35.6 percent, or slightly less 
than the increases in overall rates in Figure 1.1. This reversal in trend 
led many experts to question whether economic growth was continu-
ing to trickle down to the poor (Blank and Card 1993; Cutler and Katz 
1991). 
With the link between growth and poverty seemingly broken and 
poverty rates stagnant or rising, questions arose as to whether govern-
mental efforts to eliminate poverty had instead made matters worse. 
Indeed, Stephen Moore (1997) contended that the “War on Poverty, 
launched by Lyndon Johnson thirty years ago, has probably been the 
most destructive government concept ever invented.” However, the ar-
gument that growth was no longer “lifting all boats” also did not go un-
challenged. For instance, Bartik (2001) argues that it is counterintuitive 
to expect economic growth not to reduce the poverty rate unless there is 
an accompanying increase in income inequality.
Even as the debate raged about the role of economic growth in re-
ducing poverty, the poverty rate began a precipitous decline near the 
Box 1.1  (continued)
 
is used in both assessing and setting government policy. Even more 
important is that it is widely reported for various demographic 
groups and geographical areas. To be sure, the Census Bureau has 
recently reported a variety of alternative poverty rate thresholds. 
Yet these are not as widely reported across geographical areas, 
and their data usually only cover a short time span, dating back to 
the latter 1990s. Moreover, at least in terms of the change in pov-
erty rates, the alternative poverty rate measures tend to follow the 
official	one	quite	closely	(see,	for	example,	U.S.	Census	Bureau	
2003). That is, while the actual poverty rate percentage may de-
pend on the particular alternative used, the more critical measure, 
change in poverty rate, is approximately the same over time.
a See	Slesnick	(1993)	for	a	detailed	discussion	of	problems	with	official	poverty	
thresholds.
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end of the 1990s economic expansion, as shown in Figure 1.1. It fell 
from 15.1 percent in 1993 to 11.3 percent in 2000 (the lowest mark 
since 1974). Subsequently, however, sluggish economic conditions and 
rising unemployment yielded a modest increase in poverty from 2001 
to 2003. One possible explanation for the seemingly closer link with 
economic	conditions	is	that	growth	has	its	strongest	influence	on	lifting	
households out of poverty when the unemployment rate falls to levels 
so low that businesses are forced to hire the chronically unemployed 
and less skilled (Freeman 2001). This reasoning may explain the suc-
cesses of the 1960s and latter 1990s, as the unemployment rate fell 
below 4 percent in both cases. The disappointing persistence of the pov-
erty level during the expansions of the latter 1970s and 1980s may have 
resulted	from	relatively	loose	labor	markets.	Although	firms	may	have	
been	hiring	workers	during	 those	 times,	 there	was	a	 sufficient	queue	
of applicants that employers never had to reach down to hire the more 
disadvantaged.	Such	a	nonlinear	response	suggests	that	the	influence	of	
policies on poverty will vary depending on labor market conditions.
Figure 1.3 shows the changes in the U.S. individual and family 
poverty rates from 1960 to 2003, along with the annual changes in the 
unemployment rate. While the correlation is not perfect, there appears 
to be a clear, positive relationship between the change in the unemploy-
Figure 1.1  u.S. Family and Person Poverty Rates, 1959–2003 (%)
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2004a).







1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001
Family poverty rate Overall poverty ratePerson
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Figure 1.3  Change in u.S. Poverty and unemployment Rates, 









1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000
Change in family poverty rate
Change in person poverty rate
Change in unemployment rate












1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001
Figure 1.2  Female-Headed Family Poverty Rate, 1959–2003 (%)
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2004b).
SOURCE: Person rate, U.S. Census Bureau (2004a); family rate, U.S. Census Bureau 
(2004b); unemployment rate, BLS (2006c).
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ment rate and changes in poverty rates. The simple correlation between 
the change in unemployment and the change in family poverty is 0.66, 
while the corresponding correlation between the change in unemploy-
ment and the change in person poverty is 0.65. 
Welfare Reform and Policy Changes in the 1990s
The	1990s	was	a	period	of	significant	public	policy	change,	as	 it	
related	to	the	working	and	nonworking	poor.	The	first	change	was	the	
expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which greatly in-
creased work incentives. Then came the Clinton administration’s accel-
erated issuance of state waivers from the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) program, beginning in 1993 (Council of Economic 
Advisers 1999; Ellwood and Blank 2001). Most waivers made welfare 
more restrictive, such as by adding sanctions for non-compliance with 
work	requirements	and	by	adding	time	limits	for	receiving	benefits.
A third initiative was the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which replaced AFDC 
with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. 
Known as “welfare reform,” the 1996 act eliminated the welfare en-
titlement and placed a strict 60-month federal lifetime limit on most 
recipients; it also put stringent requirements on states to shift most re-
cipients into work by 2002 (Blank 2002; Ellwood and Blank 2001). 
New legal immigrants faced restrictions in using TANF, and there were 
other changes to help reduce births to unwed mothers. Financing was 
changed to a federal block grant, and states were given great latitude to 
set	program	parameters,	including	those	for	benefits	and	eligibility.
Between August 1996, when welfare reform was signed, and Sep-
tember 2001, the number of recipients declined by a remarkable 56 per-
cent (Administration for Children and Families [ACF] 2002a). Even 
with the sluggish economy, the number of welfare recipients fell slight-
ly in Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003 (ACF 2002b, 2004). Congress has 
periodically worked on renewing welfare reform, but progress has been 
slow. Most indications are that the act will remain largely unchanged; 
however, some likely changes include increased child care support, 
greater	flexibility	for	states	in	counting	“work-related”	activities,	and	a	
modest increase in work requirements (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services [DHHS] 2004).
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Many economists argue that welfare reform and the work-promo-
tion effects of the expanded EITC were key factors behind the almost 
10-percentage-point increase between 1994 and 2000 in the labor force 
participation of unmarried females with children (Blank and Schmidt 
2001). The Council of Economic Advisers (1999) and O’Neill and Hill 
(2001) hold that welfare reform was the impetus for reducing the num-
ber of welfare recipients. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) conclude that 
60 percent of the increase in employment of single mothers relative 
to single women without children over the 1984–1996 period was at-
tributable to the federal and state EITC and other tax changes, whereas 
welfare	reforms	over	the	12-year	period	were	much	less	important―al-
though	they	did	have	significant	effects.	Yet	others	contend	that	welfare	
reform’s supposed initial success had little to do with policy and is more 
of an artifact of the robust economy of the late 1990s.3 A comprehensive 
literature review by Blank (2002) suggests that welfare reform and the 
strong economy both reduced welfare usage. 
Though welfare reform is important, we are ultimately interested 
in whether it affects poverty. The poverty rate for unmarried women 
with children—a key welfare-recipient cohort—fell from 41.9 percent 
in 1996 to 33.0 percent in 2000, before rising to 33.7 percent in 2002 
(U.S. Census Bureau 2004b). Yet this could be more economy-driven 
than welfare-reform driven. Also, even if welfare reform did greatly 
reduce	the	rolls,	it	is	still	possible	that	it	had	little	influence	on	chang-
ing the average household income at the lower end of the distribution; 
it	may	have	merely	reallocated	income	from	welfare	benefits	to	labor	
earnings and the EITC (Blank 2002; Primus 2001).
Welfare reform has also expanded the low-skilled labor supply by 
encouraging work. The increased labor supply should have a deleteri-
ous effect on the wages and employment of low-skilled nonrecipients, 
which would indirectly increase poverty rates (Bartik 2000, 2002a,b). 
The possible indirect spillovers suggest that the impact of welfare re-
form could extend well beyond the most directly affected groups, which 
means aggregate labor market assessments are necessary to explore 
how welfare reform affected the overall poverty rate.
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PERSON- vS. PLACE-BASED POLICy
Despite declining U.S. poverty in the 1990s, the gains were not 
spatially uniform, and many high-poverty pockets remain (Jargowsky 
2003). It is unclear why all geographic areas did not experience the same 
favorable developments as the nation as a whole. It could be that some 
areas experienced lower growth. Alternatively, spatial factors unique 
to certain areas may have affected the connection between growth and 
poverty. If so, person-based antipoverty policies alone may be inad-
equate; instead, what may be required are policies tailored to place.
There is wide debate within the academic and policy communities 
on whether policies aimed at helping the poor should include place-
specific	 elements	 to	 complement	 person-specific	 programs	 (Kraybill	
and Kilkenny 2003). However, critics contend that policies designed to 
help distressed communities or regions with concentrations of poverty 
are misguided and wasteful, and that the best way to aid the disadvan-
taged is to tailor policies to directly help needy individuals (e.g., Peters 
and Fisher 2002). Policies such as providing education, training, job 
and family counseling, relocation assistance, and certain types of health 
care assistance form the core of person-based approaches.
Critics of place-based subsidies contend that they can induce the 
disadvantaged not to migrate to localities with better employment op-
portunities, which creates a culture of dependency in the region (Glae-
ser 1998; Glaeser, Kolko, and Saiz 2001; Kraybill and Kilkenny 2003). 
They contend that virtually all of the newly created jobs will instead go 
to commuters and new residents who already have the necessary skills 
and experience that employers prefer, and not to the intended disadvan-
taged	beneficiaries	(Peters	and	Fisher	2002).	Therefore,	policies	aimed	
at improving a distressed local economy (e.g., tax breaks) may primar-
ily help business and property owners instead of the disadvantaged. 
Critics of place-based policy also point out that economic develop-
ment efforts may fail in high-poverty areas. For example, the small-
scale economies of remote rural areas may hinder their economic 
development:	not	only	may	 there	be	 insufficient	public	 infrastructure	
for such areas to be economically competitive (Lucas 2001; Jalan and 
Ravallion 2002; Glasmeier and Farrigan 2003), but there may be a back-
wash effect of jobs and capital being drawn toward urban centers and 
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away from these areas (Barkley, Henry, and Bao 1996; Henry, Barkley, 
and Bao 1997). Further, the exodus of highly mobile, highly skilled 
labor from high-poverty regions may lower the pay of those remaining 
(Gibbs 1994). 
On the other hand, there are traditional and emerging arguments for 
place-based policies to be part of the optimal policy mix, based on the 
“new economic geography.” As discussed in Chapter 3 of this book, 
equilibrating market responses are impeded if labor is not perfectly mo-
bile, particularly the low-skilled segment of labor, which is the most 
likely to be in poverty (Ravallion and Wodon 1999; Yankow 2003). 
Such arguments form the core of the urban spatial-mismatch models 
(Holzer 1991). Rural areas’ remoteness and greater distance to poten-
tial migration destinations increases the transport and psychic costs for 
those who may wish to relocate (Greenwood 1997). Therefore, while 
remoteness, small scale, or social and geographic isolation may be hin-
drances to successful economic development, they also may lead to dis-
advantaged	residents	garnering	more	of	the	benefits	if	economic	devel-
opment	is	successful,	suggesting	the	potential	efficacy	of	place-based	
antipoverty policies. That is, if job creation occurred in these distressed 
areas,	more	of	the	benefits	would	go	to	the	disadvantaged	because	the	
area’s remoteness would cut down on employment competition from 
new commuters or migrants.
Other arguments for place-based policies include the notion that 
geographical space produces monopolistic power, in which entry and 
exit costs reduce free-market adjustments (Kraybill and Kilkenny 2003). 
New-economic-geography arguments include agglomeration econo-
mies where productivity increases with greater urban scale or arises 
from	the	co-location	of	similar	firms	in	the	same	industry.	Agglomera-
tion economies can arise because of factors such as more specialized in-
put markets, specialized labor supply, and knowledge spillovers across 
firms.	Rural	areas	also	can	experience	agglomerations	when	 industry	
“clusters” co-locate to take advantage of enhanced vertical integration 
of inputs. Place-based policy advocates also argue that economic de-
velopment policies can effectively enhance local growth and reduce 
poverty because of factors such as neighborhood effects, economic role 
models, and knowledge spillovers.
In addition, advocates of place-based policies note that person-
based policies are expensive and that programs such as job training 
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may have relatively low returns, depending upon the location of the 
disadvantaged (Bartik 2001; Carneiro and Heckman 2003). Thus, sole 
reliance on people-based policies may be inadequate in addressing the 
spatial concentration of poverty (Blank 2005). Blank argues that place 
and	related	contextual	effects	influence	economic	vitality	and	shape	the	
character of the people.
The	wide	spatial	variation	in	local	attributes	can	thwart	“one	size	fits	
all” person-based policies. In isolated inner cities and remote rural areas, 
many of the disadvantaged have less access to job training, counseling, 
health care, child care, and transportation, suggesting that government 
service	delivery	should	reflect	these	spatial	differences	(Allard,	Tolman,	
and Rosen 2003). Work-support policies such as the provision of child 
care, transportation, education, and training also may have higher pay-
offs if jobs are nearby. Policies that improve a distressed community’s 
vitality and job accessibility may do more for its disadvantaged resi-
dents than approaches that give them lengthy training and hope they 
eventually	find	work	nearby	where	there	are	very	few	jobs,	or,	failing	
that, hope they move elsewhere (Kraybill and Kilkenny 2003).
Practically speaking, to ignore the spatial dimension of poverty is 
also to overlook the basic fact that most politicians and policymakers 
represent	specific	jurisdictions.	They	may	have	less	interest	in	the	nec-
essary person-based human capital development without the added at-
traction of well-planned (or even poorly planned) policies aimed at par-
ticular locations. Place-based policies also have the simple advantage 
that	governments	may	find	 it	 easier	 to	 target	appropriate	poor	places	
than	to	identify	the	appropriate	poor	households	with	specific	attributes	
(Ravallion and Wodon 1999). Likewise, because of the unpopularity of 
person-based programs such as welfare assistance with voters, it may 
be easier to obtain public support for policies aimed at distressed re-
gions than for policies directed at low-income individuals. 
OvERvIEW OF THIS BOOk
The following chapters explore the spatial dimension of U.S. pover-
ty, stressing differences across states, metropolitan areas, and counties, 
with	an	eye	toward	state	and	local	policy	prescriptions.	We	find	poverty	
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to be very unevenly distributed across the country, varying widely even 
within states and metropolitan areas. The great diversity in poverty out-
comes	leads	us	to	explore	finer	geographical	areas:	within	metropoli-
tan areas, we look at central-city counties and suburbs; beyond metro-
politan areas, we look at metro-adjacent and outlying, nonmetropolitan 
counties. The spatial detail of our study allows us to draw more focused 
policy conclusions. We conclude that the policy prescriptions should 
vary greatly across space.4
In assessing poverty, we explore the underlying spatial, demograph-
ic, and economic contributors to poverty rates. Although we do not 
need elaborate statistical analysis to know that single-mother-headed 
households tend to have high poverty rates and that areas with high 
unemployment also have elevated poverty, we still need to know the 
relative importance of each factor. If personal characteristics such as 
race and the prevalence of married-couple households are the overrid-
ing factor, policy should be focused more on supports to encourage 
stronger families and to mitigate racial discrimination. Alternatively, if 
the uneven geographical location of employment opportunities and an 
unfavorable industry composition are the important causal factors, then 
place-based policies aimed at improving employment opportunities in 
distressed areas would be more effective. Without a detailed statistical 
assessment, we will not be able to ascertain the proper policy mix and 
make informed policy prescriptions for different geographic areas. For 
example, policies that are effective in prosperous suburbs will likely 
differ from those that prove effective in more remote, rural areas.
Our assessment of the geographical diversity of American poverty 
begins in Chapter 2, where we examine the spatial variation of state and 
county poverty rates and their trends over time. Fully understanding the 
spatial distribution of poverty requires examining multiple geographi-
cal aggregations of poverty rates. Analysis of national poverty rates is 
necessary if one wants to determine the overall effectiveness of national 
full employment. Yet to understand the relative importance of econom-
ic growth versus welfare policies, states should be examined, because 
they	form	the	political	entity	 that	greatly	sets	and	defines	differential	
welfare policies. Understanding the underlying causes and policy solu-
tions that differ within metropolitan areas, or between urban centers and 
rural communities, requires analysis of disaggregated regions such as 
counties.
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Chapter 2 notes that state poverty rates vary greatly. The South 
tends to have the highest poverty rates. When examining the state pat-
terns	 over	 the	 period	 of	 1969–1999,	we	 find	 that	 there	 is	 some	 per-
sistence. Yet Southern states generally experienced marked reductions 
in poverty, while others, such as many Western states, had relatively 
lackluster performances.
When	examining	counties,	we	find	even	more	diversity.	First,	there	
are homogeneous low-poverty-rate clusters, such as in the upper Mid-
west, and high-poverty-rate clusters, such as in Appalachia or the Mis-
sissippi Delta. Yet poverty can vary greatly within a given state. For 
example, even in Southeastern states with high average poverty, there 
are low-poverty pockets within each state. Poverty can also take on a 
more haphazard pattern, such as the wide range found within larger 
metropolitan areas. Nevertheless, local poverty rates remain strikingly 
persistent. For example, areas that had higher poverty rates in the 1950s 
tend to have higher poverty rates today.
Chapter 3 discusses the elements of local low-wage labor markets 
that	 provide	 the	 theoretical	 justification	 for	 antipoverty	 policies.	 Lo-
cal labor markets respond differently to policies than does the national 
labor market. Improving the employment opportunities of the disad-
vantaged would seem to be a reasonable solution to persistently high 
poverty rates in certain locales. Yet a major complication is that newly 
created jobs often go to new migrants or commuters from elsewhere. 
The	 intended	beneficiaries—the	original,	poor	 residents—can	end	up	
with few of the new jobs. Hence, the notion that “a rising tide lifts all 
boats,” which seems reasonable in macroeconomic discussions, may 
not apply at the local level, though this differs by local area.
Chapter 4 provides a statistical assessment of the determinants of 
state poverty rates. In it, we emphasize roles of economic growth and 
state public welfare policies. In particular, we try to further determine 
whether the 1996 welfare reform had a major role in the dramatic pov-
erty rate outcomes in the 1990s. If so, this would give us grounds to be 
optimistic that Bush administration efforts to further emphasize work-
first	initiatives	will	be	successful.	We	find	that	state	economic	growth	
is an important cause of change in state poverty rates, and that this ef-
fect	is	especially	large	when	the	labor	market	is	tight.	This	influence	is	
both direct, through enhanced labor market opportunities, and indirect, 
through affecting other outcomes such as teen birthrates. In contrast, we 
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find	that	policies	related	to	welfare	reform	have	virtually	no	statistically	
significant	effect	on	state	poverty	rates.	Any	favorable	effects	on	the	la-
bor force behavior of potential welfare recipients appear to be offset by 
adverse spillovers on other disadvantaged workers through increased 
labor market competition. In Chapter 5, we look at case studies of four 
states,	which	confirm	the	results	of	the	statistical	analysis	and	provide	
context on the nexus between poverty, labor market performance, and 
welfare reform.
Chapter 6 examines 1989 and 1999 poverty rates for more than 
3,000	U.S.	counties.	One	finding	is	of	the	importance	of	family	char-
acteristics such as marital status and education. Female labor market 
participation and male unemployment rates are key labor market fac-
tors.	Yet	we	find	that,	generally,	employment	growth	has	only	a	modest	
impact on local poverty rates. Without some sort of targeting of the 
neediest, this suggests that local policies that increase employment will 
likely have only modest impacts on poverty; it further implies that a 
strong state and national economy are important reinforcing forces. An-
other pattern we see is that areas that had higher shares of foreign im-
migrants arriving in the latter 1990s also had higher 1999 poverty rates. 
This was a distinct change from the 1980s, when immigrant shares had 
no	detectable	influence.
One weakness of the empirical models in Chapter 6 is that they do 
not fully capture the geographical diversity of low-wage labor markets. 
Chapters 7 and 8 address this concern by separately considering metro-
politan and nonmetropolitan counties. One conclusion of Chapter 7 is 
that metropolitan areas are not a monolithic block that should be exam-
ined in unison. Rather, they are often composed of a mosaic of distinct 
central-city and suburban counties. Labor market conditions appear to 
have	an	even	weaker	influence	on	metropolitan	poverty	rates	than	on	
the nation as a whole. But this overlooks the greater responsiveness of 
poverty rates in central-city counties to changes in labor market condi-
tions.	Conversely,	new	suburban	jobs	are	so	regularly	filled	by	in-com-
muters	 that	poverty	 rates	 are	hardly	 influenced	by	 job	growth.	Thus,	
we argue that economic development policies can help disadvantaged 
central-city residents, as job accessibility appears to be a constraint, but 
that such policies will likely be ineffective in the suburbs. We describe 
job-creation strategies for central-city counties and indicate how they 
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can	be	targeted	to	ensure	that	the	intended	disadvantaged	beneficiaries	
capture	more	of	the	benefits.
Chapter 8 explores the dimensions of nonmetropolitan and rural 
poverty. Examination of rural poverty has been a relatively neglected 
field.	A	key	determinant	of	rural	poverty	is	whether	a	nonmetropolitan	
county is adjacent to a metropolitan area. Residents of nonmetropoli-
tan	counties	that	border	on	metropolitan	areas	have	significantly	better	
access to jobs, child care, and government services. Because remote 
nonmetropolitan counties are more isolated, it is not surprising that lo-
cal labor market conditions are much more important there. Moreover, 
if local employment growth is concentrated in industries that are faring 
well	at	the	national	level,	there	will	be	even	more	significant	declines	
in rural poverty rates. Hence, all other things being equal, we argue that 
economic	development	policies	likely	have	their	largest	benefits	in	rural	
areas, though these policies may be more expensive to implement in re-
mote areas. In contrast, we contend that the countless billions that have 
been	 spent	on	 specific	 resource-based	 industries,	 such	as	 agriculture,	
have had less-than-spectacular results on overall rural economic growth 
and should be redirected to higher-valued uses for rural America.
Chapter	9	summarizes	our	empirical	findings	and	policy	prescrip-
tions.	 Our	 foremost	 finding	 is	 that,	 while	 labor	 market	 conditions	
have modest impacts on poverty in general, they can have important 
impacts in central-city counties and in remote rural counties. Hence, 
place-based policies aimed at improving the employment prospects of 
disadvantaged workers in those places are in order. We describe how 
providing tax credits for newly created jobs and wage subsidies for low-
wage	workers	are	two	ways	of	targeting	the	intended	beneficiaries.	We	
also	stress	the	importance	of	first-source	or	community-based	organi-
zations in brokering and facilitating job creation. Other policies, such 
as offering relocation assistance to disadvantaged families, are most 
likely to work in central cities, but even there, the impact will likely be 
modest. On the other hand, we argue that child care assistance is more 
likely to be needed in remote rural areas. As with the role of economic 
development	policies,	we	conclude	that	a	one-size-fits-all	geographical	
approach to person-based policy is misguided. Each area may instead 
require a unique combination of place-based and person-based antipov-
erty policies.
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Notes
The	 first	 epigraph	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 chapter	 comes	 from	Gene	Koretz	 (1992),	
“Trickle-Down Economics May Not Help the Poor,” in Business Week. The second epi-
graph comes from the New York Times (1996) article “The Welfare Bill.” The third comes 
from a speech made to the Commonwealth Club of California by Quayle (1992). 
 1.  Whether inequality reduces economic growth is a hotly debated topic among 
economists. For example, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini 
(1994)	find	evidence	that	it	reduces	growth,	while	Forbes	(2000)	and	Partridge	
(1997,	2005)	find	the	opposite.
 2. The 1990s saw the property crime rate drop by nearly 50 percent and the violent 
crime rate drop by nearly 40 percent (U.S. Department of Justice 2005).
 3.  For examples of discussion of the link between economic growth and welfare 
roles, see Bartik and Eberts (1999); Figlio and Ziliak (1999); Hoynes (2000b); 
and Bennett, Lu, and Song (2002).
 4. This book does not empirically examine subcounty poverty rates such as those 
found in poverty clusters that can exist at the neighborhood level (Weinberg, 
Reagan, and Yankow 2004). For example, rather than asking why a west-side 
Chicago neighborhood has higher poverty than a wealthy Highland Park neigh-
borhood in the northern suburbs, we instead ask geographically broader ques-
tions, such as “Why do Chicago suburbs have lower poverty rates than the 
metropolitan area’s central-city county?” This focus allows us to more directly 
consider economic development, which is inherently more widespread than a 
neighborhood.
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The national poverty trends depicted in Chapter 1 obscure remark-
able geographical diversity in the poverty rate outcomes across the 
United States. This diversity extends beyond the familiar broad region-
al patterns of high poverty rates in the South and comparatively low 
rates in the upper Midwest. For one thing, poverty varies greatly within 
broad regions. Even within narrower areas such as states or metropoli-
tan areas, clusters of high and low poverty often exist in relatively close 
proximity. Second, at the state or, more broadly, the regional level, there 
can be large relative changes in poverty rates over time, but at the disag-
gregated county level, relative poverty is often quite persistent. 
Census 2000 data reveal broad regional diversity in poverty rates. 
In 1999, the South had the highest poverty rate of any region, at 13.9 
percent, well above the national average of 12.4 percent.1 The Midwest 
had the lowest regional poverty rate, at 10.2 percent, followed by the 
Northeast at 11.4 percent and the West at 13.0 percent. Yet, within these 
regions, there is tremendous variation in poverty rates across states and 
substate areas. Southern poverty rates ranged from 8.5 percent in Mary-
land to 19.9 percent in Mississippi (the District of Columbia had a 20.2 
percent rate). As an example of within-state variation, Virginia’s pov-
erty rates ranged from a low of 2.8 percent in Loudoun County to a high 
of 31.4 percent in Radford. Thus, Virginia’s low overall rate of poverty, 
9.6 percent, does not mean poverty is not a concern for the state. A simi-
lar story can be told for almost every state.
There have been wide disparities in regional poverty trends over 
time, as well. For example, the South made remarkable gains in reduc-
ing poverty over the latter part of the twentieth century, while the West 
and the Northeast had more lackluster performances. Indeed, during 
the period from 1969 to 1999, in which the U.S. poverty rate fell by 
1.3 percentage points, the poverty rates for Arkansas and Mississippi 
fell by 12.0 and 15.5 points. By way of contrast, during the same 30-
year period, poverty rates rose by 3.2 and 3.5 percentage points in the 
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District of Columbia and New York. However, as described later in the 
chapter,	while	 there	have	been	some	significant	changes	at	 the	broad	
regional level, we see a strong trend of relative persistence when exam-
ining counties. Counties that had higher poverty rates in the past tend to 
have higher poverty rates today, and counties that had lower rates in the 
past tend to have lower rates today.
The overall national poverty rate also obscures tremendous differ-
ences in the rate of poverty across demographic groups. For instance, 
the 2002 poverty rate for families headed by a married couple stood at 
5.3 percent, but it was a remarkable 26.5 percent for families headed by 
a female. Children also are considerably more likely to live in poverty. 
The poverty rate for children less than 18 years of age is 16.7 percent, 
whereas it is only 10.6 percent for adults 18–64 and 10.4 percent for 
adults 65 years and over. Poverty also varies greatly by racial and ethnic 
origin. In 2002, poverty rates for White non-Hispanics equaled 8.0 per-
cent. The poverty rate among Asians was 10.1 percent, and among Afri-
can Americans and American Indians it was 24.1 percent each. Among 
all Hispanics, it was 21.8 percent.2 
In addition, as will be seen in this chapter, demographic groups are 
not equally represented in all geographic areas. The diverse spatial and 
demographic patterns suggest that poverty eradication efforts need to 
be tailored to both person and place. This chapter explores in more de-
tail the spatial patterns of poverty, including potentially related spatial 
differences in the demographic composition of the population, employ-
ment growth, and welfare reform.
PATTERNS AND TRENDS IN STATE POvERTy 
As shown in Figure 2.1, the historical pattern of high Southern pov-
erty was strongly evident in 1969.3 Of the 16 states that had poverty 
rates of 16 percent or greater, all but New Mexico and South Dako-
ta were in the U.S. Census Bureau’s South region (Region 3). Nine 
states had poverty rates below 10 percent, and all but Nevada were in 
the Census Bureau’s Northeast or Midwest regions (Regions 1 and 2). 
Following the national trend, by 1999 only six states had poverty rates 
in the high category (16 percent or greater), while 17 states had poverty 
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rates in the low category, below 10 percent (Figure 2.2). Despite these 
trends, poverty generally remained higher in the South, which contained 
four of the six high-poverty states, while the low-poverty states were 
still mostly found in the Northeast or Midwest. In fact, the correlation 
between the 1969 and 1999 state poverty rates equals 0.80.
The change in poverty rates from 1969 to 1999 is shown in Fig-
ure 2.3. All but 16 states experienced reductions in their poverty rates. 
Except for South Dakota, the largest reductions occurred in the South, 
where states had had high poverty rates in 1969. Many Northern in-
dustrial states experienced the largest increases in poverty. They were 
joined by states in the West, particularly those on the coast.
As shown in Figure 2.4, even during the robust economic period 
of the 1990s, 14 states saw their poverty rates rise: 10 Northeastern 
states (including the District of Columbia, which we count as a state 
for the purposes of our discussion), Nevada, California, Alaska, and 
Hawaii. This again illustrates the spatial diversity of poverty outcomes. 
Within the South, poverty rate declines during the 1990s were less dra-
matic in the states of the South Atlantic division of the census (Division 
5); larger declines occurred in the East South Central and West South 
Central divisions (Divisions 6 and 7). In contrast to the overall period 
of 1969–1999, Midwestern states uniformly experienced greater than 
average reductions in poverty in the 1990s.
To begin to understand spatial poverty trends in the 1990s, we turn 
to the annual state poverty rates compiled from the Current Population 
Survey, or CPS (U.S. Census Bureau 2004d). Annual data allows for 
examination of the relation between economic growth and poverty in 
the late 1990s. Annual data also then allows for examining the potential 
link between the timing of the 1996 welfare reform and poverty rates.
One apparent pattern in the decennial census poverty estimates dis-
cussed above is the predominance of poverty declines in states with 
high	initial	levels	of	poverty.	Using	the	CPS	data	for	1984–2000,	we	fit	
a regression line through a scatter plot of changes in poverty rates and 
the average poverty rate over the period (Figure 2.5).4 The regression 
line	reveals	a	negative	and	significant	relationship:	the	states	that	had	
higher poverty tended to be those that experienced the greatest reduc-
tions.5
A comparison of state poverty rate changes to state unemployment 
rate	changes	for	1984–2000	(Figure	2.6)	confirms	the	national	findings	
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shown in Figure 1.3. As Figure 2.6 shows, states with greater reduc-
tions in unemployment rates tended to experience greater poverty rate 
declines.	The	positive	relationship	shown	by	the	regression	line	fitted	
through	the	scatter	plot	is	statistically	significant	and	appears	to	be	con-
sistent throughout the sample.6 For example, the three states with the 
largest reduction in poverty rates also experienced dramatic declines in 
unemployment: Mississippi, Kentucky, and Iowa. Likewise, states with 
the largest unemployment declines, such as West Virginia and Michi-
gan, experienced large reductions in their poverty rates.
A similar comparison can be made for states that implemented their 
TANF welfare reforms in 1996 vs. those that implemented them af-
terwards. Figure 2.7 shows the (unweighted) average poverty rate in 
states that implemented TANF sometime during 1996 and the average 
poverty	 rate	 of	 states	 that	 first	 implemented	TANF	 after	 1996.	Both	
groups	of	states	experienced	significant	poverty	rate	declines	in	the	late	
1990s. However, the poverty rate dropped every year beginning with 
1993 in states that implemented TANF in 1996, whereas for the remain-
ing states, the average poverty rate leveled off between 1994 and 1996 
before again declining.
Although there was a greater total decline for early TANF imple-
menters from 1993 to 2000, most of the relative improvement came 
during 1994 and 1995, before implementation of TANF. This might be 
attributable to an announcement effect, in that welfare recipients may 
have anticipated the policy change and may have begun to transition 
to work, or it may have been that these states were the ones that had 
experimented with AFDC waivers. However, the correlation between a 
state having an AFDC waiver in effect in 1995 and one implementing 
TANF in 1996 was only 0.1, which calls into question the existence of 
such effects.7 The result also may have been due to economic condi-
tions becoming relatively more favorable, around 1994–1995, for states 
implementing TANF in 1996. The average poverty rate decline for 
these states is 1.84 percentage points between 1996 and 2000; the cor-
responding	figure	for	the	remaining	states	is	2.64.8 This further suggests 
that welfare reform was not a causal factor in overall reduced poverty 
rates, but rather that stronger economies in the late TANF-implement-
ing states may have underpinned their greater poverty declines. The 
narrow window of welfare reform implementation at the state level, 
combined with other policy changes and with the strengthening of the 
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U.S.	economy,	make	it	difficult	to	draw	definitive	conclusions	regarding	
the relative impacts of welfare reform and state economic performance. 
This issue is explored more extensively in Chapters 4 and 5.
PATTERNS AND TRENDS IN COuNTy POvERTy RATES
As illustrated by the 1979, 1989, and 1999 county poverty rates in 
Figures 2.8–2.10, considerable variation in poverty rates continued to 
exist in recent decades within states as well, and this variation showed 
clear patterns of relative poverty persistence. Solely examining states 
would mask the considerable variation in substate experiences.9 The 
lowest poverty rates are consistently found in the upper Midwest and 
along the northeast coastline. Poverty is consistently highest in central 
Appalachia, the lower Mississippi delta, the historic Cotton Belt in the 
Southeast, counties along the Rio Grande and the Mexican border, and 
on Native American reservations in the West and Great Plains. Indeed, 
large regions can be characterized as having high or low poverty clus-
ters that often extend across state boundaries.
However, characterizing the spatial dimension of poverty only in 
terms of clusters is overly simplistic for many localities, including most 
large metropolitan areas. The Washington, DC, metropolitan area ex-
hibits one commonly found pattern. Close up, it looks like a doughnut, 
in that it has high poverty rates in the central city and extremely low 
poverty rates in almost all surrounding suburban counties. There are 
also metropolitan areas like St. Louis, which has more of a checker-
board pattern—in its case characterized by high poverty rates in the 
central city, more moderate rates in its eastern suburban counties in Illi-
nois, and quite low rates in its western suburban counties in Missouri. 
Figures 2.11 and 2.12 show the 1989–1999 and 1979–1999 changes 
in	county	poverty	rates.	The	maps	reveal	significant	increases	in	county	
poverty rates in Western states and in central Appalachia. There are 
some notable decreases during the 20-year period in the upper Mid-
western states and in some Southeastern Atlantic states. However, all 
regions of the country had some counties with strong performances and 
others with weak ones. Another overarching feature is one of persis-
tence in relative poverty rates. In fact, the correlation of county poverty 
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rate levels between 1979 and 1999 equals 0.84. Thus, there are endur-
ing features in most localities that either facilitate or hinder the well- 
being of disadvantaged populations.
We explored the spatial dimension of poverty in terms of a place’s 
metropolitan or nonmetropolitan status. Table 2.1 reports, for both 1989 
and 1999, population-weighted poverty rate statistics for the entire sam-
ple	by	five	categories:	1)	metropolitan	vs.	nonmetropolitan	designation	
of the county, 2) age, 3) family type, 4) race/ethnicity, and 5) poverty 
severity.10 Metropolitan counties are further examined in terms of the 
size of the metropolitan area (MSA) and whether they are in the central 
city or suburbs.11 Likewise, nonmetropolitan counties are grouped into 
those adjacent to an MSA and those nonadjacent. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 re-
port, for 1989 and 1999, population-weighted poverty rate statistics for 
these categories of metro and nonmetro counties by age, family type, 
race/ethnicity, and poverty severity. Figure 2.13 summarizes the poverty 
rate trends for 1989–1999 across the different county types, and Figure 
2.14 summarizes the corresponding trends by demographic group.
Table 2.1 and Figure 2.13 reveal that the population-weighted coun-
ty poverty rate declined from 13.2 percent in 1989 to 12.4 percent in 
1999.12 Although poverty rates were higher in nonmetropolitan coun-
ties in both years, over the decade the poverty rate declined by only 0.3 
percentage points in metropolitan counties, while in nonmetropolitan 
counties it declined by 2.4 points. Yet these statistics mask heterogene-
ity in poverty trends within metro and nonmetro regions.
From Table 2.2 and Figure 2.13 we see that smaller metropolitan-
area counties (those with a population of less than one million) on aver-
age had a poverty rate that declined from 13.7 to 12.8 percent, while 
the average poverty rate in larger metropolitan-area counties remained 
unchanged at 11.4 percent. The average poverty rate barely changed in 
MSA counties containing a central city, inching down from 13.3 to 13.2 
percent.13 Suburban counties fared better; there, poverty declined from 
8.5 to 7.8 percent.14 This shows that the more urbanized areas did not 
share equally in the prosperity of the 1990s.
Table 2.3 and Figure 2.13 report population-weighted average over-
all nonmetro county poverty rates, along with average poverty rates 
for nonmetro counties that directly border metro areas and those for 
more remote nonmetro counties. Nonmetropolitan counties on average 
had higher poverty rates than their metropolitan counterparts, which 
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somewhat counters the emphasis policymakers and much of the public 
places on the issue of urban poverty. Among nonmetro counties, those 
not adjacent to metropolitan areas had higher average poverty rates in 
both 1989 and 1999. Counties adjacent to metro areas posted a decline 
in the average poverty rate from 15.9 to 13.7 percent, while nonadja-
cent counties recorded a decline in the average rate from 18.8 to 16.0 
percent. Compared to MSA counties, average poverty rates fell more in 
nonmetropolitan counties in both relative and absolute terms, especially 
in more isolated nonmetropolitan counties. The pattern of nonmetropol-
itan	counties	faring	better	is	consistent	with	Jargowsky’s	(2003)	finding	
that the number of nonmetropolitan residents living in “high poverty” 
neighborhoods—those with poverty rates exceeding 40 percent—de-
clined by almost one-half during the 1990s, which is a more dramatic 
decline than that which occurred in MSAs. 
DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERNS AND TRENDS IN COuNTy 
POvERTy
Tables 2.1 to 2.3 also report average county poverty rates for vari-
ous demographic categories, which are summarized in Figure 2.14. As 
reported, the average poverty rate of those under the age of 18 declined 
from 1989 to 1999 across all county categories. For those 18 to 64 years 
of age, the average all-county poverty rate was unchanged. Yet this 
group’s average poverty rate increased in large MSA and central-city 
counties while it decreased slightly in suburban counties. The decrease 
in 18- to 64-year-old poverty rates in nonmetro counties was greater 
in counties that were not adjacent to metro areas. Because the 18- to 
64-year-old group encompasses the prime working years, the rise in 
poverty rates in large MSAs is somewhat surprising given the robust 
labor market of the late 1990s and its labor shortages. One explanation 
for this unexpected pattern is labor market spillovers from welfare re-
form depressed wages for low-skilled workers (Bartik 2002a,b), which 
more	than	offset	 the	benefits	derived	from	the	strong	labor	market	at	
the end of the 1990s. Finally, for those 65 years and older, the average 
poverty rate declined in all categories, with dramatic declines occurring 
in nonmetropolitan counties.
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Table 2.1 shows that the national-average county poverty rate for all 
selected family types declined from 1989 to 1999. In terms of percent-
age points, the greatest reduction occurred among single-female-head-
ed families with children. Besides the importance of a strong economy, 
this decline underlies the contention of supporters of welfare reform 
that	 its	work-first	 emphasis	 successfully	 encouraged	potential	 recipi-
ents to enter the workforce, which acted to reduce poverty rates (Blank 
2002; Haskins 2001; Pear 2003).
The poverty rates by household type in Table 2.2 continue to point 
to the disappointing performance in large MSAs during the 1990s. 
Poverty rates for married-couple families and married-couple families 
with children increased in central-city counties and in counties located 
in large MSAs. Conversely, poverty rates showed consistent declines 
across all family types in small MSAs and in suburban counties. Pov-
erty rates across all family types also declined in nonmetropolitan coun-
ties regardless of adjacency to MSAs.
Following the overall poverty rate trend, the weighted county aver-
age percent of the population living below 50 percent of the poverty 
line also decreased from 1989 to 1999, from 5.8 to 5.6 percent. It de-
creased from 6.9 to 6.1 percent in nonmetro counties while remaining 
unchanged at 5.5 percent in metro counties. The average population 
share below 50 percent of the poverty threshold increased by 0.1 per-
centage points in central-city counties and in counties located in large 
MSAs. These results reinforce the general pattern of larger metropoli-
tan areas not faring as well as nonmetropolitan areas in terms of reduc-
ing poverty.
Table 2.1 also indicates that poverty rates declined more rapidly 
during the 1990s across all racial and ethnic minority groups. However, 
direct comparisons across the two decades cannot be made because 
the 2000 census introduced a new racial category of “two or more.” 
Nonetheless, the Hispanic ethnic group is generally comparable across 
decades, and it, too, suggests a decline between 1989 and 1999. While 
the results should be cautiously interpreted, it is noteworthy, in Table 
2.2, that “white/Caucasian” is the only racial/ethnic group for which 
average poverty rates increased in large MSAs and central-city counties 
during the 1990s. This pattern weakly suggests that in large metro areas, 
minorities were able to buck the overall trend and make some inroads 
reducing poverty rates. Some of these gains may relate to falling labor 
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market discrimination in the 1990s (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2003). 
Likewise, spillovers due to welfare reform may have had an adverse 
impact on less-skilled but employed whites if a disproportionate share 
of the new job seekers induced to join the labor market were members 
of minority populations.
COuNTy PATTERNS IN EMPLOyMENT GROWTH
Figure 2.15 addresses the role of economic performance in the dif-
ferences in poverty trends across metro and nonmetro county types. 
As shown in Figure 2.15, average job growth equaled 8.6 percent over 
the 1985–1990 period and 9.2 percent over the 1995–2000 period. 
MSA counties experienced greater growth in both periods; however, 
their average growth slowed from 15.4 percent to 13.8 percent. In con-
trast,	average	five-year	employment	growth	in	nonmetropolitan	coun-
ties accelerated by 1.5 percentage points in the 1990s, to 7.5 percent. 
Taken	together,	these	figures	show	that	while	MSA	counties	generally	
remained more vibrant than nonmetropolitan counties in the 1990s, the 
five-year	 employment	 differential	 shrank	 from	 9.4	 to	 6.3	 percentage	
points. Hence, the relative improvement in net nonmetro job creation is 
likely one reason for MSA counties’ better showing in poverty reduc-
tion during the 1990s. While it is too strong a statement to assert that the 
1990s were a decade of rural renaissance, there was clearly a rebound 
from the adversity of the 1980s, a decade that included farm crises and 
other primary-sector shakeouts in energy, mining, and timber.
The largest reduction in MSA employment growth during the 1995–
2000 period compared to the 1985–90 period occurred in metropolitan 
areas of less than one million (13.9 to 11.3 percent) and in central-city 
counties (13.5 to 11.2 percent), though it also decreased in the sub-
urbs as well. The continuing superior net job creation performance in 
suburbs is consistent with the growing movement of jobs away from 
traditional minority residential locations in central cities (Dworak- 
Fisher 2004; Raphael and Stoll 2002). Somewhat surprisingly, job 
growth declined more in small metro areas than in large metro areas, 
which is inconsistent with those two areas’ relative performance in pov-
erty rates. Perhaps in small metro areas, access to jobs is a critical ele-
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ment that produced better poverty rate declines even though there was 
less job growth. 
CONCLuSIONS
There is a remarkable spatial dimension to U.S. poverty that is ob-
scured by focusing solely on national poverty rate trends. Poverty rates 
vary across broad regions, with the South having the highest poverty 
rates and the Midwest having the lowest. Yet within these regions, there 
are	states	with	high	and	low	poverty,	and	there	is	also	significant	geo-
graphical variation within most states. Likewise, there are wide-rang-
ing differences over time: most Southern states experienced large pov-
erty rate declines between 1969 and 1999, whereas many Western and 
Northeastern states experienced modest increases.
At the more detailed county level, the most common pattern is clus-
ters of high and low poverty that often extend across state boundaries. 
In metropolitan areas, there are often more irregular patterns between 
central-city and suburban counties. Although there are exceptions, an-
other general pattern is that relative county poverty tends to be quite 
persistent over time.
Although nonmetropolitan counties consistently had higher poverty 
rates than metropolitan counties, nonmetropolitan counties, on average, 
experienced larger poverty rate declines in the 1990s. Moreover, it was 
the remote nonmetropolitan counties that experienced the greatest de-
clines, not those adjacent to metropolitan areas. For metropolitan coun-
ties, the largest poverty rate declines, on average, occurred in small 
metropolitan and suburban counties. Poverty rates were unchanged in 
large metropolitan-area counties and virtually unchanged for counties 
containing the central city of a metropolitan area.
Poverty rate changes among demographic groups generally fol-
lowed changes in the overall rates for the respective county types. 
“White/Caucasian” was the only racial/ethnic group for which the pov-
erty rate increased in large MSA and central-city counties. Poverty rates 
for those 18 to 64 years of age and for married families likewise in-
creased in large MSA and central-city counties.  A possible explanation 
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for these results is that welfare reform increased labor market competi-
tion for these groups, depressing their wage rates.
Finally, employment growth patterns were not completely consis-
tent with the poverty rate trends in the 1990s. Metro areas continued 
to grow faster than nonmetro areas, particularly metro areas with more 
than one million people. Surprisingly, job growth was less rapid in met-
ropolitan areas with a population of less than one million, which con-
trasts with their better poverty performance. Jobs in suburbs continued 
to grow much faster than those in the central cities. Although slower 
than in suburbs, employment growth also accelerated in nonmetro 
counties, particularly in those not adjacent to metro areas, which may 
in part explain their greater poverty rate reductions.
Notes
 1. The 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 decennial censuses report income and poverty 
data for the year preceding the census, which is why the 10-year census poverty 
rates are from 1969, 1979, 1989, and 1999 (U.S. Census Bureau 2002a; Bishaw 
and Iceland 2003). In this chapter, the decennial census state-level data are taken 
from the U.S. Census Bureau Web site. The county-level poverty data in this 
chapter are from decennial census data described in Chapter 6. 
 2. Beginning with the 2002 Current Population Survey, respondents were given 
the opportunity to identify themselves as belonging to multiple racial categories. 
While the single-race category poverty rates are almost identical to those for the 
categories that include multiple designations, the racial groups are not directly 
comparable to those from earlier years because of the change in method (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2004a,c).
	 3.	 Because	they	would	break	up	the	text	too	much,	the	many	figures	and	tables	for	
this chapter have been grouped at the back of the chapter.
 4.  The t-statistic for the slope equals –3.57. The average poverty rate is used in 
place of the initial poverty rate to avoid Galton’s fallacy of regression to the 
mean.	The	relationship	remains	negative	and	significant	if	the	dependent	vari-
able	 is	defined	as	 the	percentage	change	 in	 the	poverty	rate	rather	 than	as	 the	
percentage point change.
 5.  Black and Sanders (2004) also report a regression to the mean in terms of pov-
erty rates for Appalachian counties.
 6. The slope equals 0.66, and the t-statistic is equal to 3.05.
 7. This pattern is akin to that noted by Blank (2002) regarding the decline in AFDC 
caseloads in 1994, predating implementation of TANF, which led her to be skep-
tical as to whether welfare reform was underlying the decline. 
Partridge.indb   31 7/27/2006   1:40:59 PM
32   Partridge and Rickman
 8. Regressing the poverty rate differential on a time trend, on its square, and on a 
dummy variable that takes a value of unity for 1996–2000 reveals that from 1996 
to 2000 the poverty rate was lower by 1.07 percentage points, in the states that 
did not implement TANF until after 1996, than what would have been expected 
based on the past trend in the differential. The t-statistic for the 1996 dummy 
variables	was	2.51.	The	trend	variables	were	jointly	significant	below	the	0.02	
level based on a Wald test.
 9. As an example of how state data can mask substate trends, Beeson and DeJong 
(2002),	 using	 population	 data,	 find	 that	 state	 patterns	 of	 growth	 convergence	
mask growth divergence at the county level.
 10. The metropolitan designation and the counties used in our analysis mostly fol-
low those used by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) in its 2000 
Regional Economic Information System (REIS). The BEA and Census Bureau 
definitions	are	the	same	except	for	Virginia,	where	the	BEA	combines	some	of	
the independent cities with their neighboring counties to form a more coherent 
measure	of	labor	markets.	In	five	cases	in	Virginia,	we	took	this	one	step	further	
by combining the following BEA groups (Federal Information Processing Stan-
dards Codes in parentheses): 1) York and Poquoson, (FIPS 51958) with Hampton 
(FIPS 51650) and Newport News (FIPS 51700); 2) Halifax County (FIPS 51083) 
and South Boston (FIPS 51780); 3) Fairfax, Fairfax City, and Falls Church (FIPS 
51919) and Alexandria (FIPS 51510); 4) Norfolk Independent City (FIPS 51710) 
and Portsmouth (FIPS 51740); and 5) Roanoke and Salem (FIPS 51944) and 
Roanoke Independent City (FIPS 51770).
 11. For purposes of consistency in this study, we made our 1989–90 MSA areas cor-
respond	to	the	1999	MSA	definitions	that	were	used	for	the	2000	Census.	These	
also were used by Jargowsky (2003) in his study of poverty concentration.
12. Unless indicated, all of the variables are from the 1990 and 2000 censuses, mean-
ing	they	reflect	characteristics	of	the	county’s	residents.	The	county	poverty	rates	
used are from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 decennial census of population, with 
the 1979 poverty measures being taken directly from the U.S. Department of 
Commerce’s CD-ROM USA Counties 1998 (U.S. Census Bureau 2005f).
 13. A central-city county includes the county or counties of the named central city or 
cities	in	the	MSA	definition	in	a	multiple-county	MSA.	Suburban	counties	do	not	
include any of the central city or cities. The source of the central-city boundaries 
is the U.S. Census Bureau publication County and City Data Book: 2000 (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2002b). The advantage of this category is that it fully captures the 
central-city boundaries but also captures the inner-ring suburbs in the “central 
city”	designation.	This	appears	to	reflect	ongoing	patterns	in	metropolitan	areas	
in that inner-ring suburbs are performing more like their less-vibrant central cit-
ies, resulting in a convergence of poverty patterns (Jargowsky 2003). In fact, 
the descriptive statistics will reveal a sharp distinction between these categories, 
illustrating that they are indeed a distinct grouping.
	14.	 At	first	glance,	this	runs	counter	to	Berube	and	Frey’s	(2002)	finding	that	among	
MSAs with a population above 500,000, central-city poverty rates fell slightly 
during the 1990s, while suburban poverty rates increased slightly. This pattern 
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also	somewhat	counters	Jargowsky’s	(2003)	finding	that	the	population	residing	
in	neighborhoods	with	high	poverty	rates—defined	as	those	neighborhoods	hav-
ing poverty rates exceeding 40 percent—declined by 21 percent in central cities 
but by only 4 percent in suburbs. This discrepancy is reconciled by the fact that 
our	 definition	 tends	 to	 include	 inner-ring	 suburbs	 in	 central-city	 counties	 and	
that these suburbs lagged behind the more vibrant outer suburbs. Together, the 
results suggest that poverty became more dispersed in central-city counties, even 
as the average poverty rate declined only slightly. In fact, Jargowsky’s (2003) 
findings	suggest	 that	poverty	became	more	concentrated	in	the	outer	fringe	of	
central cities and in the inner ring of suburbs. Conversely, exclusionary zoning 
and housing affordability in outer suburban counties may have limited the dis-
persion	of	household	poverty	during	the	1990s.	Thus,	our	definition	captures	the	
performance gap between outer suburbs and the more central parts of metropoli-
tan areas.
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Table 2.1  Summary Statistics, 1989 and 1999 County Poverty Rates (%)
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Relative to poverty threshold
























a Weighted by 1990 or 2000 county population. A county is not included when the census did not report any individuals in that group. A 
nonmetropolitan	county	uses	the	2000	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis	REIS	(Regional	Economic	Information	System)	county	definitions.
b Blank = not applicable. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on 1990 and 2000 censuses (U.S. Census Bureau 2006e).
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Table 2.2  Summary Statistics, 1989 and 1999 Metropolitan County Poverty Rates (%)
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Relative to poverty threshold




























































N 824 341 483 391 433 824 341 483 391 433
a Weighted by 1990 or 2000 county population. For some groups, there are fewer counties than listed when the census did not report any individuals in that 
category.	A	metropolitan	county	employs	2000	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis	REIS	county	definitions	using	the	MSA	population	from	the	2000	census.
b Blank = not applicable. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on 1990 and 2000 censuses (U.S. Census Bureau 2006e).
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Relative to poverty threshold




































N 2204 974 1230 2204 974 1230




c Blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on 1990 and 2000 censuses (U.S. Census Bureau 2006e). 
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Figure 2.2  1999 State Poverty Rates
Figure 2.1  1969 State Poverty Rates
NOTE: Tallies of states for Figures 2.1–2.4 sum to 51 and include the District of 
Columbia.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2002a); Bishaw and Iceland (2003).
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2002a); Bishaw and Iceland (2003).
Figure 2.1: 1969 State Poverty Rates 
1969 Poverty Rates
16.0 and above   (16)
13.0 to 15.9   (8)
10.0 to 12.9   (18)
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1969 poverty r
Figure 2.2: 1999 State Poverty Rates 
1999 Poverty Rates
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13.0 to 15.9   (12)
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below 10   (17)
1999 poverty r
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Figure 2.4: 1989-1999 State Poverty Rate Changes 
Poverty Rate Changes
1989-1999
0.1 to 3.3  (14)
-0.8 to -0.1   (8)
-2  to -1.2  (15)
-5.3 to -2.2  (14)
Figure 2.3: 1969-1999 State Poverty Rate Changes 
Poverty Rate Changes
1969-1999
0.1 to 3.5  (16)
-2.7 to -0.2  (12)
-4.4 to -2.8  (12)
-15.5 to -5.5  (11)
Figure 2.3  1969–1999 State Poverty Rate Changes (%)





SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2002a); Bishaw and Iceland (2003).
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2002a); Bishaw and Iceland (2003).
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NOTE: Each diamond represents a state. There are 49 diamonds, as Alaska and Hawaii 
are excluded and the District of Columbia is included.
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Figure 2.7  Poverty in States Implementing TANF in 1996 vs. States 

















TANF '96 TANF '97+
Figure 2.7: Poverty in States Implementing TANF in 1996 vs Remaining States 
NOTE: TANF ’96 indicates states that implemented TANF in 1996. TANF ’97+ indi-
cates states that implemented TANF after 1996.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2002a) and CEA (1999).
Figure 2.6  Changes in State Poverty Rates vs. unemployment Rates, 
1984–2000
NOTE: Each diamond represents a state. There are 49 diamonds, as Alaska and Hawaii 
are excluded and the District of Columbia is included.
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Figure 2.8  united States Poverty Rates, 1979 (%)
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SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2005b).
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Figure 2.9  united States Poverty Rates, 1989 (%)
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SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
Partridge.indb   45
7/27/2006   1:41:13 PM
46   Partridge and R
ickm
an









 – 8 





SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
Partridge.indb   46
7/27/2006   1:41:18 PM
R
ecent Spatial Poverty Trends in A
m
erica   47











.  – 15
 d t
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
Partridge.indb   47
7/27/2006   1:41:24 PM
48   Partridge and R
ickm
an










. 1 – 2.41
. 2 – 18
o data
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2005f, 2006e).
Partridge.indb   48
7/27/2006   1:41:30 PM
Recent Spatial Poverty Trends in America   49
Average Weighted County Poverty Rates MSA and Non-MSA 
























Figure 2.13  Average Weighted County Poverty Rates, MSA and Non-
MSA, 1989–1999 (%)






























Figure 2.14  verage Weighted County Pov rt  Rates by Demographic 
Group, 1989–1999 (%)
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
Nonadjacent 
to MSA
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Figure 2.15  Average Weighted County Employment Growth, 1985–1990 























SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis Local Area Personal Income SA25 series at 

















Performance and Poverty 
What’s the Theoretical Connection?
The lag between job creation and in-migration provides room for jobless locals 
and working locals on the bottom rungs of the occupational ladder either to 
become employed or to move up the occupational ladder.
—Alan Peters and Peter Fisher (2004), “The Failures of Economic Devel-
opment Incentives,” Journal of the American Planning Association
Is the world likely to be very far from an equilibrium in which utility is the 
same everywhere? We believe not, on the grounds that mobility in the United 
States is quite high and information about alternative locations is good. 
—Philip Graves and Thomas Knapp (1988), “Mobility Behavior of the 
Elderly,” Journal of Urban Economics
It is shown that it is difficult to develop a satisfactory explanation for continuing 
net migration which is compatible with the equilibrium assumption, and that 
recent relevant research generally fails to support the idea the U.S. economy 
is in equilibrium. 
—Alan Evans (1990), “The Assumption of Equilibrium in the Analysis of 
Migration and Interregional Differences,” Journal of Regional Science
Chapter 2 illustrated the spatial concentration and persistence of 
poverty in the United States. In many areas, labor market rewards plus 
transfer	payments	left	significant	portions	of	the	population	below	the	
federal	poverty	 line.	Labor	market	rewards	reflect	both	 the	degree	of	
participation in paid work activities and the associated wage rate. The 
justification	and	design	of	antipoverty	policies	that	aim	to	reduce	pov-
erty and eliminate high-poverty clusters depend on the underlying geo-
graphical determinants of poverty.
Central to these issues is the debate encapsulated in the three quo-
tations above, regarding whether the geographic distribution of pov-
erty is the result of regions generally being in continuous economic 
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equilibrium,	or	whether	disequilibrium	persists	for	significant	periods	
of time. A continuous interregional economic equilibrium explanation 
of the spatial distribution of poverty suggests that little can be gained 
from place-based antipoverty policy. However, this chapter reviews the 
interregional equilibrium perspective on poverty and concludes, based 
on both theoretical and empirical considerations, that it is less plausible 
than a disequilibrium perspective. We argue that policy intervention 
could effectively reduce and equalize local poverty levels.
INTERREGIONAL EquILIBRIuM AND DISEquILIBRIuM 
PERSPECTIvES ON POvERTy
Simple neoclassical economic theory suggests that capital locates 
in the place of its highest reward; low-wage regions, then, because they 
reflect	lower	production	costs,	should	attract	capital.	This	increases	the	
demand for labor in these regions and narrows regional differences in 
wages and poverty (Rural Sociological Society Task Force on Persistent 
Rural Poverty [RSS] 1993). A pure neoclassical interregional equilib-
rium would be characterized by an absence of differences between the 
regions in wage rates and the incidence of poverty, because labor move-
ments would quickly eliminate wage differentials.
More complex theories of regional labor markets allow for equi-
librium differences in labor market outcomes by emphasizing the pro-
ductivity and amenity attractiveness of place in wage determination 
(Beeson and Eberts 1989; Roback 1982). Higher productivity raises 
nominal wage rates, greater household-amenity attractiveness lowers 
nominal wage rates, and both increase land costs. Productivity depends 
on factors such as human and physical capital, location, technology, and 
regional public policy. Household amenity attractiveness can depend on 
natural features of the region such as climate and topography, as well as 
man-made features such as cultural attractions, the quality of schools, 
and public infrastructure. Assuming full employment and perfect mo-
bility	of	factors,	wages	should	be	such	that	no	firm	or	household	can	
geographically relocate and improve its economic condition in equi-
librium. Differences in wages and poverty across regions can still exist 
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in	equilibrium,	because	they	reflect	regional	productivity	and	amenity	
differentials.
Equilibrium-based models can accommodate involuntary unem-
ployment and regional equilibrium differentials in unemployment 
rates. In equilibrium, a region may have higher unemployment if there 
are compensating gains in wages or household amenity attractiveness. 
Higher unemployment requires compensation because it represents a 
lower probability of workers receiving a given wage rate (Partridge and 
Rickman 1997a). With frictionless migration, the utility derived from 
each region’s bundle of amenities, wage rates, and unemployment rates 
should be equalized in equilibrium. These equilibrium-based models 
leave little scope for regional changes in labor demand to increase re-
gional household utility.
Frictions in migration can create long-run utility differentials. Sense 
of place, psychic well-being, and moving costs can contribute to equi-
librium differentials in unemployment rates. Partridge and Rickman 
(1997b) argue that these factors hinder households from relocating to 
areas of higher utility, as amenities and expected labor market rewards 
create regional utility differentials. Thus, if there were zero adjustment 
costs, regional shifts in labor demand could increase overall household 
welfare in the nation since households would relocate to areas that pro-
vided higher utility.
These frictions may be greater among those in poverty: histori-
cally lower migration rates have been observed for individuals with 
lower education and skill levels (Schwartz 1976; Yankow 2003), which 
makes it likely that regional pockets of poverty will persist (Partridge 
and Rickman 2003b). This follows from human capital theory, in which 
those with higher levels of human capital are more likely to migrate to 
take advantage of their increased potential for higher returns (Becker 
1962; Borjas 1996; Nord 1998). In addition, job leads and networks 
tend to be more informal for low-skilled workers, whose information 
most likely originates from friends and family (Holzer 1996; Ihlanfeldt 
1997). Further limiting the mobility of low-skilled individuals is that 
they may be more reliant on friends and families for support such as 
transportation or child care, making it risky for them to move (Goetz 
1999).
Empirical evidence on whether the U.S. economy tends to continu-
ously hover near interregional equilibrium is mixed. In estimating ame-
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nity-compensated wage differentials, studies commonly assume that 
the U.S. economy continuously remains in interregional equilibrium 
(Beeson and Eberts 1989; Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn 1988). Al-
though in their study of internal U.S. migration Greenwood et al. (1991) 
questioned the assumption of equilibrium, they were not able to statisti-
cally reject equilibrium for most states. 
Yet the U.S. economy routinely experiences shocks, which may 
produce	heterogeneity	in	regional	fluctuations.	Moreover,	shocks	may	
arise within particular regions (Clark 1998). Empirical studies exam-
ining	the	length	of	disequilibrium	adjustment	provide	conflicting	evi-
dence. Marston (1985) and Blanchard and Katz (1992) conclude that 
regional	labor	markets	re-equilibrate	quickly	as	migration	flows	rapidly	
dissipate the effects of labor demand shocks. More recently, Partridge 
and Rickman (2003b) and Gallin (2004) have found that regional labor 
markets take years to re-equilibrate following shocks to labor demand, 
although equilibrium typically is obtained within 10 years.1
Other theories suggest even more persistent divergence in wages 
and poverty rates, in which differences across regions may even widen. 
Such theories involve cumulative causation, growth poles, and agglom-
eration or localization scale economies (Glaeser et al. 1992; Kaldor 
1970; Krugman 1991). According to these theories, the productivity 
advantages of regions can be endogenous, and expectations of conver-
gence of productivity, incomes, and poverty are replaced with expecta-
tions of divergence. For example, regarding rural development, small 
communities that fall below a population and business-service threshold 
will experience further population losses because they lose the critical 
mass necessary to induce new economic activity, whereas those above 
the threshold will be relatively prosperous.
REGIONALLy ASyMMETRIC LABOR DEMAND SHOCkS 
AND POvERTy: THE ROLE OF MIGRATION AND 
COMMuTING
The equilibrium perspective discussed above suggests little role for 
labor demand in affecting the spatial distribution of poverty. However, 
the theoretical and empirical support for the disequilibrium perspective 
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of regional economies, along with the observed spatial concentration of 
poverty, suggests possibilities for relative labor demand shifts to affect 
regional poverty rates. Below, we outline the potential for this to hap-
pen.
The simple labor market representation in Figure 3.1 can be used 
to illustrate the connection between labor demand shifts and poverty 
rate changes. Two regional economies are represented, Region A and 
Region B. Suppose labor demand shifts outward in Region A and in-
ward in Region B, i.e., there are regionally asymmetric shocks to labor 
demand. 
The outward shift of labor demand in Region A causes the wage 
rate (W) to rise in the short run from its original equilibrium level at 
point A to its new equilibrium level at point B. The economy moves 
upward along the short-run supply curve (LSsr) as unemployment falls 
and labor force participation (L) rises. The combined effect of these 
labor market outcomes, in the short run, is to reduce poverty in the re-
gion. In the longer run, however, the higher regional wage rate induces 
in-migration, which is represented by the short-run labor-supply curve 
(LSsr) shifting out. If, as is consistent with the neoclassical interregional 
equilibrium perspective, labor is perfectly mobile, migration continues 
until the regional wage, unemployment, and labor force participation 
rates are driven back to their original levels (point C), making the long-
run supply curve (LSlr) horizontal.
Correspondingly, the inward labor demand shift in Region B causes 
the wage rate to decline from the original equilibrium point (A) to its 
new equilibrium point (B). In the short run, unemployment rises and 
labor force participation falls, and, in conjunction with the fall in the 
wage rate, the poverty rate increases. In the longer run, the out-migra-
tion to Region A shifts the short-run supply curve inwards until Region 
B’s wage, unemployment, and labor force participation rates return to 
their original levels at point C.
When the equilibrium returns to point C, the relative shift in labor 
demand has no long-run effect on labor market outcomes or the poverty 
rate in either region. In addition, the faster these adjustments come, the 
more short-lived the gains (or losses) are from a favorable (or unfavor-
able) labor demand shock. What the equilibrium relationship suggests 
is that this adjustment from B to C in both panels is very close to instan-
taneous, i.e., that poverty changes very little in the long run as a result 
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of labor market shifts. By way of contrast, the disequilibrium approach 
implies	that	either	the	final	adjustment	ends	somewhere	between	B	and	
C or the movement from B to C is prolonged—perhaps lasting a decade 
or more. Below, we examine theoretical and empirical considerations 
regarding the likelihood of these outcomes for poverty.
In	finding	no	relationship	between	county	employment	growth	and	
poverty, Levernier, Partridge, and Rickman (1998, 2000) argue that the 
absence	of	a	relationship	likely	resulted	from	significant	migration	re-
sponses. Thus, the original residents, particularly those who are low-
skilled	or	marginal	workers,	did	not	benefit	from	increased	employment	
growth, which supports the equilibrium approach. Likewise, as sug-
gested by Blanchard and Katz (1992), perfectly mobile labor precludes 
demand-induced changes in wage rates, unemployment rates, and labor 
force participation rates.
For smaller areas, robust economic growth would also likely attract 
commuters from neighboring areas where growth may be weaker (Ell-
wood and Blank 2001; Peters and Fisher 2002). Businesses may sim-
ply	find	it	more	profitable	to	hire	migrants	and	commuters	that	possess	
higher levels of skills and education (Larson 1989; Sawicki and Moody 
1997).	Thus,	the	original	residents	of	the	area	may	receive	few	benefits	
of strong growth, and poverty rates may be left relatively unaffected. 
In this case, it may be more likely that landowners and local businesses 
largely	benefit	from	growth	(Bartik	1991).	
In addition, when the national labor market is weak, there is greater 
likelihood	that	new	migrants	will	flock	to	localities	where	employment	
is growing (Partridge and Rickman 2002). That is, a growing region will 
be most attractive to potential migrants when the backdrop is a weak 
national economy. Greater migration (and commuting) responsiveness 
implies that differential regional economic growth can produce smaller 
changes in poverty than what would be expected based on national-lev-
el evidence. In particular, when the national economy is weak, it would 
appear as if changes in local job growth (or unemployment rates), other 
things	being	equal,	have	little	influence	on	poverty	rates	because	of	the	
enhanced migration and commuting responses.
Bartik (2001), however, argues that stronger employment growth 
should reduce poverty unless there is an accompanying increase in 
income inequality. He posits that strong employment growth reduces 
poverty	 when	 it	 disproportionately	 benefits	 low-skilled	 workers	 be-
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cause businesses are forced to hire them. Low-skilled workers have 
historically been overrepresented in cyclically sensitive sectors, or sec-
tors	with	low	profit	margins,	making	the	low-skilled	the	most	vulner-
able to economic downturns (Pissarides 1991). For example, Holzer 
and LaLonde (2000) report that unskilled workers are more likely to 
lose	their	jobs	during	a	downturn	and	that	they	have	greater	difficulty	in	
finding	employment	when	they	are	out	of	work.	Moreover,	low-skilled	
individuals have a lower propensity to migrate (Borjas 1996; Yankow 
2003), suggesting that they may be less than perfectly mobile. In other 
words, the long-run supply curve for labor would not be perfectly hori-
zontal as in Figure 3.1. Bound and Holzer (2000) report that low-skilled 
labor market outcomes depend more on local labor demand, which they 
attribute to these workers’ lower mobility. This makes it more likely 
that low-skilled workers experience permanent changes in their wage, 
unemployment, and labor force participation rates in response to labor 
demand shocks. 
A strong national economy also may reduce interstate migration. 
Partridge and Rickman (2002) report that state net-migration rates con-
verged in the red-hot economy of the late 1990s, as workers appeared to 
have less reason to relocate for better economic opportunities. With less 




their hiring standards and enhance workplace support (Holzer 1999; 
Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2003). Thus, local economic growth likely 
reduces subnational poverty rates more during periods of low national 
unemployment.2
The underlying factors driving increased employment growth can 
also affect its relationship to poverty reduction. This can be addressed 
using shift-share analysis, where job growth is decomposed into its 
industry-composition and competitiveness components. Partridge and 
Rickman (1999a) show that net-migration responds differentially to the 
source of employment growth. If above-average regional growth is due 
to having a high composition of industries that are fast-growing nation-
ally (industry-mix growth), then it is much less likely that migrants will 
be attracted to the region, the reason being that potential migrants in 
those industries are probably already fully employed. Because employ-
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ers in the region will then be forced to hire more nonemployed original 
residents, this type of growth is likely to reduce the local unemploy-
ment rate and help disadvantaged residents (Partridge and Rickman 
1995). But if job growth is due to the region itself faring well across all 
or most of its industries (competitiveness growth), then migrants will 
be more likely to relocate to the area from regions that are not faring 
as well as the national average. This type of growth produces a smaller 
impact on unemployment and poverty in the region.3
Employment growth may have additional effects on poverty be-
yond	influencing	unemployment	and	labor	force	participation	rates.	Job	
growth also affects the demand for low-skilled workers simply because 
it is associated with the number of vacancies in a region (Bartik and 
Eberts 1999). Likewise, strong growth may lead workers to upgrade 
from lower to higher paying positions (Felsenstein and Persky 1999), 
particularly if migration is sluggish (Peters and Fisher 2004). Andersson, 
Holzer,	and	Lane	(2002,	2003)	find	that	about	three-quarters	of	those	
who escape persistent low-wage status do so after a job change.
LABOR DEMAND AND METROPOLITAN POvERTy:  
THE SPATIAL MISMATCH HyPOTHESIS
Poverty differences also may exist across smaller areas within 
regions, even when those areas are in equilibrium. Spatial-skills mis-
matches between residence and job location are regularly offered as an 
explanation for the pockets of poverty contained within inner cities.4 A 
trend in North American economies has been the movement of jobs in 
large metropolitan areas from the inner cities to the suburbs (Ingram 
1998). In particular, the deconcentration has occurred among manu-
facturing jobs (Zax and Kain 1996); more generally, it has occurred 
among low-skilled jobs (Stoll 1999). If original residents, particularly 
low-skilled workers, are less willing—or are unable—to migrate or 
commute to areas of newly created jobs, poverty is less likely to be af-
fected by increased metropolitan labor demand, since in-migrants to the 
region will take the new jobs (Sawicki and Moody 1997). Yet this also 
means that lessening the poverty among residents in inner city high-
poverty pockets depends on having nearby labor demand.
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Demand-side explanations for the urban deconcentration of jobs in-
clude innovations in transportation, higher inner-city crime and taxes, 
land price differentials, and suburban proximity to consumer markets 
(Mieszkowski and Mills 1993; Raphael, Stoll, and Holzer 2000).5 Sup-
ply-side factors such as housing discrimination (Brueckner and Martin 
1997; Brueckner and Zenou 2003; Turner 1992) and suburban zoning 
practices (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2003; O’Regan and Quigley 1991) 
may prevent the poor and minorities from relocating to the suburbs. 
Parts of urban areas lack accessible public transportation (Stoll, Holzer, 
and Ihlanfeldt 2000), and many inner-city residents don’t have a car, 
both of which factors limit their commuting responses to the movement 
of jobs to the suburbs. Increasing inner-city residents’ access to auto-
mobiles and public transit has been found to increase employment rates 
among poor minorities (Raphael and Stoll 2002).
In addition, Holzer, Ihlanfeldt, and Sjoquist (1994) observe that in-
ner-city blacks are less likely to lengthen their commutes to offset the 
relocation	 of	 inner-city	 jobs	 to	 suburban	 areas.	 Rogers	 (1997)	 finds	
that unemployment spells are positively related to the distance (hence 
commuting time) from the unemployed worker’s residence to the loca-
tion of job growth. An increased distance also relates to a deteriorat-
ing knowledge by the unemployed worker about work opportunities 
(Ihlanfeldt 1997; Wasmer and Zenou 2002). For example, suburban 
firms	may	only	advertise	locally	(Turner	1997).	Housing	constraints	and	
a lack of transportation may further reduce the scope of job searches by 
poor inner-city residents (Stoll and Raphael 2000; Gobillon, Selod, and 
Zenou	2003).	Smith	and	Zenou	(2003)	argue	that	the	economic	benefit	
of	a	suburban	job	does	not	offset	the	benefits	of	low	land	rent	and	large	
housing consumption in the inner city, which rationally leads to inner-
city residents searching less intensively in suburban locations.
In addition to housing discrimination, inner-city residents may face 
job discrimination by suburban employers (Stoll, Holzer, and Ihlanfeldt 
2000). Inner-city residents may be perceived as being unproductive or 
criminal (Zenou and Boccard 2000); such perceptions may be related 
to their need to commute (Zenou 2002), or they may be related to race 
(Holzer and Reaser 2000). Perceived racial discrimination also may 
cause minorities to search less intensively in the suburbs, which they 
may perceive as being hostile environments (Sjoquist 2001).
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Neighborhood effects such as peer pressure and poor role models 
closely follow on spatial mismatches in explaining inner-city poverty 
(Corcoran et al. 1992; Cutler and Glaeser 1997; Kasinitz and Rosenberg 
1996).	In	fact,	Cutler	and	Glaeser	(1997)	find	that	blacks	are	worse	off	in	
segregated neighborhoods than in integrated neighborhoods. Weinberg, 
Reagan,	and	Yankow	(2004)	similarly	find	that	the	social	characteristics	
of a neighborhood affect the labor market attachment of its residents. 
One often-cited example of this phenomenon is Chicago’s Gautreaux 
program, which, since the 1970s, has relocated thousands of low-in-
come	inner-city	blacks	to	the	more	affluent	suburbs.	Studies	of	this	pro-
gram suggest that families that relocated had higher employment rates, 
better long-term outcomes for their children, and lower public-assis-
tance usage (Rosenbaum and DeLuca 2000). Yet Page and Solon (2003) 
argue that neighborhood effects are mostly spurious, relating more to 
urban-wage advantages and the high propensity to live in an urban area 
if that is where one spent his or her childhood.6
One of the key elements of the spatially concentrated neighborhood 
phenomenon is the possibility that households self-sort on the basis 
of income, race, or other preferences (Sethi and Somanathan 2004). 
Such	Tiebout	sorting	would	make	it	difficult	to	identify	“true”	effects	of	
neighborhood characteristics as opposed to factors associated with self-
selection.7 However, this problem is not very germane here because of 
our focus on much-larger-sized counties rather than on smaller census 
blocks or census tracts, which resemble neighborhoods.
Closely related to neighborhood effects are sociological explana-
tions, including labor and housing-market discrimination, that underlie 
the spatial mismatch hypothesis. However, one prominent sociological 
explanation that will be germane in the county-level analysis in Chap-
ters 6–8 is the connection between the marriage market and poverty 
(Cancian, Danziger, and Gottschalk 1993; Wilson 1987). Not only does 
a lack of employment opportunities directly increase poverty rates, but 
it can indirectly increase poverty rates as well, by reducing the num-
ber of marriageable men, which results in more female-headed house-
holds—households that often lack the necessary resources to rise above 
the poverty threshold. Indeed, one could imagine how such poverty-
reinforcing patterns could be particularly alarming in distressed com-
munities or neighborhoods.
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RuRAL LABOR DEMAND AND POvERTy
Rural antipoverty effects of increased labor demand will differ as 
well, to the extent that migration and commuting responses differ in 
rural areas. To be sure, although urban spatial-skills job mismatches 
have received the most attention, mismatches may be even more severe 
in certain rural settings (Levernier, Partridge, and Rickman 2000). Ru-
ral residents’ geographic isolation and their unwillingness to migrate to 
growth centers may contribute to a spatial mismatch between the skills 
required by the jobs in their area and the skills of these nearby workers 
(Brown and Warner 1991; Leichenko 2003; RSS 1993).
Several factors may contribute to labor demand having differential 
poverty effects in rural areas. First, lower economic or population den-
sity may hamper skills matching in the labor market. Some studies sug-
gest that low density increases the cost of obtaining information about 
jobs (Davis, Connolly, and Weber 2003; Davis and Weber 2002), which 
inhibits the matching of skills. This means that a given shift in labor 
demand will have less effect on the economic outcomes of the original 
residents and on the poverty rate. Another factor that potentially re-
duces labor market matching is that rural residents may have less access 
to job training and placement assistance services (Fletcher et al. 2002; 
Kraybill and Lobao 2001). And, just as in the urban spatial mismatch 
hypothesis, low rural density is often associated with a greater distance 
between where residents live and where the jobs are located. The ab-
sence of public transportation and the lack of dependable automobile 
transportation (Beale 2004) often limits poor rural residents’ access to 
remotely located jobs (Brown and Stommes 2004; Davis, Connolly, and 
Weber 2003). 
Second, the scarcity of child care centers in rural areas restricts 
available formal child care options, which may prevent those in pov-
erty from taking newly created jobs (Gordon and Chase-Lansdale 2001; 
Mills and Hazarika 2003; Weber, Duncan, and Whitener 2001). Third, 
rural jobs may be more apt to be part-time, low paying, or involve non-
standard hours, which creates additional child care concerns (Findeis 
and Jensen 1998; Davis and Weber 2002; Fletcher et al. 2002). For these 
reasons, there may be a weaker relationship between demand-induced 
employment growth and poverty in rural areas.
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On the other hand, there are theoretical reasons to believe that em-
ployment growth may have stronger poverty-reducing impacts on rural 
areas. For one, the smaller scale of rural job markets and the stronger 
informal communication networks could increase the skills matching 
process (Gibbs 2002). This could make the poverty rate more respon-
sive to changing labor demand conditions (Gibbs 2002). For another, 
individuals facing transportation and child care constraints may be 
more likely to choose to live in metro areas, while those more readily 
employable may be more likely to remain in rural areas (Kilkenny and 
Huffman 2003). 
There also may be smaller in-commuting responses from outside 
the area to take newly created jobs in rural areas (Renkow 2003). Low 
economic density can create a larger-than-normal gap between infor-
mation available to local residents on job openings and that available 
to nearby outside residents. Likewise, scarcity of formal child care in 
neighboring rural areas and a lack of public and private transportation 
make in-commuting to the area less likely.
Correspondingly, migration responses to changing labor market 
conditions may be lower in rural areas (Renkow 2003; Renkow and 
Hoover 2000). The low density of the area may limit in-migration re-
sponses to local-area job growth because of a lack of information in 
distant areas about these jobs. Out-migration responses to job losses 
also may be smaller because of residents’ lack of information about jobs 
in other areas.
Smaller in-commuting and migration responses mean the residents 
of the area take a greater share of newly created jobs. The smaller over-
all supply of responses, then—which implies a steeper short-run labor 
supply curve and an upward-sloped long-run supply curve, as in Figure 
3.1—would lead to larger demand-induced wage rate changes. Both 
the larger share of new jobs going to original residents and the larger 
wage gains should lift more individuals above the poverty line. Yet it 
also means that residents in high-poverty areas are more likely to be ad-
versely affected by job declines. Therefore, a stronger link between em-
ployment growth and poverty would be expected in areas that are more 
rural. Thus, the primary arguments by Peters and Fisher (2002) against 
place-based policies—in-migration and in-commuting—are probably 
less applicable in rural areas.
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Cultural and sociological factors also may affect the linkage be-
tween formal labor market outcomes and poverty in rural areas. For ex-
ample, Pickering (2004) reports successes for the Rosebud reservation 
in South Dakota in transitioning TANF recipients into formal market 
jobs, which she attributes to cooperation between the tribe and the gov-
ernment in providing job placement and support services. In contrast, 
on the Pine Ridge reservation in South Dakota, she notes, the existence 
of a strong informal economy weakened the connection between formal 
labor market demand and poverty. Improved governance and enhanced 
social capital may also be important in rural communities in improving 
the prospects for economic development and in ensuring that the ben-
efits	of	economic	development	are	widely	dispersed	to	all	stakeholders	
(Blank 2005).
Potential neighborhood effects are not just restricted to inner cities; 
they also exist in rural poverty-stricken areas, such as on many res-
ervations for Native Americans.8 However, poverty generally is more 
diffused in rural areas than in the inner city (RSS 1993), which would 
suggest fewer negative neighborhood effects and a greater prevalence 
of “middle class values” among low-income households.
POvERTy AND REGIONAL LABOR SuPPLy SHIFTS
Exogenous increases in labor supply are more likely to increase 
poverty than to reduce it. For a given level of labor demand, increased 
labor supply reduces the wage rate. If increased regional labor supply 
is caused by in-migration, then increased unemployment and reduced 
labor force participation rates should result (Partridge and Rickman 
1999b, 2003a). The combined effect of lower average wages and lower 
employment rates is higher poverty.
Innovations in interregional labor force migration primarily rep-
resent a shift in regional labor supply (Partridge and Rickman 2006). 
Although the transfer of associated assets may provide some shift in 
demand, those workers who are early in their careers have the highest 
propensity for migration and are least likely to possess substantial as-
sets. Offsetting the labor-supply-induced wage reduction is a potential 
composition effect: migrants may possess higher ability or motivation 
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(Gabriel and Schmitz 1995), although Bartik (1993b) estimates that 
only	one-fifth	of	labor-force	participation-rate	increases	that	follow	ac-
celerated employment growth can be attributed to the changing compo-
sition of the population associated with migration. On the other hand, 
retired in-migrants, who often possess substantial assets, act more as a 
labor demand shift, which may reduce area poverty.
Another notable labor-supply factor that may affect poverty rates 
is immigration. Immigrants may directly affect poverty by being dis-
proportionately low-skilled compared to native-born workers. The 
U.S. Census Bureau (2001) puts the poverty rate for the foreign-born 
at 16.8 percent, compared to 11.1 percent for the entire population. Yet 
Chapman and Bernstein (2003) argue that during the 1990s this com-
position effect was offset by greater increases in income among im-
migrants than among the general population. Hence they conclude that 
immigration affects poverty less than other labor market factors do. 
However, immigrants may have other, indirect effects on poverty 
rates; for instance, new immigrants might compete for jobs with both 
natives and previous migrants. Borjas (2003) estimates that immigra-
tion	significantly	lowers	the	wages	of	competing	workers	through	in-
creasing	 the	 labor	supply.	Topel	 (1994)	also	finds	 that	wages	decline	
for low-skilled males in response to greater immigration and increased 
labor force participation by females. Likewise, Orrenius and Zavodny 
(2003) report an inverse association between the foreign-born share of 
workers in an occupation and the wages of low-skilled natives.
As	 for	 employment	 impacts,	 if	 immigration	 significantly	 reduces	
real wages, some individuals may exit the labor force. Yet if immigrants 
locate in areas where there are labor shortages, they may simply change 
the size of the economy, not the unemployment rate (Saiz 2003). In 
addition, at the regional level, less-skilled natives may out-migrate in 
response to new immigrants (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1996; Frey 
1995). The offsetting migration mitigates the local wage and unemploy-
ment effects of immigration by dispersing the effects to broader regions 
and across the nation.9
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SuMMARy AND CONCLuSIONS
To the extent that regional economies are continuously near a neo-
classical equilibrium, persistent regional pockets of poverty should be 
rare, and regional labor demand policies would likely be ineffective at 
reducing poverty. Yet there are many theoretical reasons why regional 
economies may not be near a neoclassical equilibrium, so that pockets 
of high poverty persist. This leaves open the possibility that spatially 
targeted labor demand policies can reduce poverty.
Frictions in labor supply responses, particularly among the low-
skilled, can preclude long-run equalization of labor market outcomes 
across regions, making it possible for labor demand redistribution to re-
duce poverty rates. And even if economies converge towards a long-run 
interregional	equilibrium,	significantly	long	disequilibrium	adjustment	
processes provide avenues for increased labor demand in high poverty 
areas having long-lasting or even permanent poverty-reducing effects. 
Migration and commuting responses to asymmetric demand shocks 
may	be	sufficiently	sluggish	or	incomplete	that	the	residents	of	a	region	
are greatly affected by a localized labor demand shock. 
In metropolitan areas, incomplete supply responses to deconcentra-
tion of job growth underpin the spatial mismatch hypothesis. Incomplete 
commuting and migration responses can be derived from a number of 
alternative explanations, including the accessibility of transportation, a 
lack of information on job opportunities, and discrimination in housing 
and hiring. Thus, movement of jobs in large metropolitan areas from 
central cities to their suburbs can create persistent pockets of poverty 
in inner cities. Policies that effectively stimulate the demand for skills 
in central cities that are consistent with the skills of their residents have 
the potential to lift them out of poverty. In our empirical assessment, 
metropolitan area poverty rates will be touched upon in Chapter 6 and 
more directly assessed in Chapter 7.
The low density of rural areas and their lack of transportation, lack 
of formal child care, and constraints on information have been offered 
as explanations both for and against employment growth affecting ru-
ral poverty. To the extent that these factors mostly lead to incomplete 
migration and commuting responses in rural areas, poverty rates can 
become greatly affected by localized rural employment growth. This 
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is most likely to be true in the most remote rural areas, which will be a 
key topic in Chapter 8.
One overriding conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is 
that	local	labor	demand	can	theoretically	be	expected	to	influence	pov-
erty in an area. This relationship is likely to vary by the size, location, 
and	 spatial	 configuration	of	 the	 area.	Thus,	 antipoverty	 policies	may	
likely need to be designed for the particular circumstances of the area. 
Moreover, given that migration and commuting responses are inversely 
related to the geographical extent of the labor market—e.g., workers 
are more likely to travel to the next county for a job than to the next 
state—we also anticipate different poverty-rate responses to employ-
ment growth, depending upon the spatial extent of the labor market. To 
assess these different issues, our empirical analysis begins in the next 
two chapters at the state level, followed by county- and metropolitan-
area level analysis in Chapters 6 through 8.
Notes
Epigraphs. These three quotations appear in Peters and Fisher (2004), p. 28; Graves and 
Knapp (1988), p. 3; and Evans (1990), p. 515.
 1.  These studies do not focus on whether there are persistent effects on poverty, but 
Partridge	and	Rickman	 (2003a)	find	permanent	changes	 in	employment	 rates,	
which could translate into a permanent change in poverty.
 2. These effects are not related to labor supply shocks (such as welfare reform) that 
affect labor force participation, which are discussed in the next chapter.
 3. The larger industry-mix effect on poverty does not relate to a simple multiplier 
effect. All else being equal, the creation of an equal-paying job should have the 
same multiplier response regardless of whether it is attributable to industry mix 
or competitiveness. In addition, because the multiplier employment response 
shows up in the competitiveness term regardless of the exogenous source of the 
increase in jobs, the industry-mix effect is understated when both it and competi-
tiveness are included in a poverty-regression equation. 
 4.  Surveys of the spatial mismatch literature can be found in Gobillon, Selod, and 
Zenou (2003); Holzer (1991); Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1998); and Kain (1992). 
 5.  These also could underlie the population deconcentration to the extent that it 
preceded the shift in jobs.
 6. A related factor that may contribute to spatial concentrations of poor households 
is return migration (see Borjas [1996] for a description of return migration). In 
this case, people who migrated to another location may have failed to establish 
Partridge.indb   67 7/27/2006   1:41:33 PM
68   Partridge and Rickman
themselves or may have been disappointed and returned to their original loca-
tion (other causes for return migration include returning to established social 
networks). Yet it would seem that disadvantaged individuals would be more 
likely to return-migrate because they may be more susceptible to experiencing 
an economic disappointment in their new destination. Nord (1998) argues that 
migration can lead to localized persistence of poverty rates, but he disputes the 
human-capital explanation for this outcome. He instead contends that the poor 
and nonpoor alike tend to migrate to areas that have a favorable occupational 
structure for their skill set. For the poor, that implies an occupational structure 
that requires few skills and many entry-level jobs, all of which may be condu-
cive to a higher poverty rate in a particular place. More affordable housing in 
low-income nonmetro areas reinforces the attraction of the poor to these areas. 
In personal correspondence dated March 31, 2004, Nord notes that the existence 
of job openings for the poor in high-poverty counties is consistent with these 
locales being “good places to survive but poor places to prosper.”
 7. Tiebout sorting is the process whereby individuals choose their location of resi-
dence based on the combination of location characteristics that most suits their 
likes and dislikes. The result of Tiebout sorting is a collection of neighborhoods 
(communities) in which residents of each neighborhood have similar tastes.
	 8.		 Leichenko	 (2003)	finds	 support	 for	 the	 premise	 that	 segregation	 of	American	
Indians leads to lower incomes. But her study argues that the underlying eco-
nomic mechanisms on tribal reservations are poorly understood, and it questions 
whether	traditional	economic	measures	provide	an	accurate	reflection	of	tribal	
community incomes.
 9.  Card (2001) posits that there are few offsetting native migration effects. Instead, 
he	finds	 that	 local	 labor	markets	 in	 gateway	 cities	 respond	 to	 greater	 foreign	
immigration through lower wages. Card’s study suggests that there is not yet a 
consensus regarding the response of native migration to foreign immigration.
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4
An Empirical Analysis 
of State Poverty Trends 
Welfare Reform vs. Economic Growth
Our growing economy is giving more and more families a chance to work their 
way out of poverty. 
—President Clinton, quoted in the New York Times (1998), “Black and 
Hispanic Poverty Falls, Reducing Overall Rate for Nation”
The resulting drop in welfare rolls is without precedent. Historically, welfare 
rolls haven’t declined often, even during economic expansions . . . The real 
reason for the historic decline is that we finally said welfare recipients have to 
work and that work was preferable to getting a government check. 
—Rep. Bill Archer, R-Texas (1998), “Welfare Reform’s Unprecedented 
Success,” Washington Post, August 10, 1998
If thrown into a job market in which others were being laid off, these would-be 
workers would find themselves competing for already-scarce jobs. 
—Daniel P. McMurrer and Isabel V. Sawhill (1997), “Planning for the Best 
of Times,” Washington Post, August 18, 1997
Federal welfare reform and the acceleration of economic growth 
happened in close proximity. The timing led to competing claims that 
each was responsible for declining poverty in the late 1990s. Some held 
that the economy was primarily responsible for the reduction in welfare 
caseloads, while others emphasized the role of welfare reform. Still oth-
ers credited both, citing the interaction between a strong economy and 
welfare	reform	(Moffitt	1999).	
The	near-synchronicity	of	the	two	events	makes	it	difficult	to	dis-
entangle their relative effects on welfare caseloads or poverty reduction 
using national data. Although poverty reduction was not an explicit goal 
of federal welfare reform (Ellwood and Blank 2001), future attempts to 
reduce poverty at the national or regional level should be guided by an 
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understanding of the determinants of the 1990s changes. Using regional 
data along with national data to examine the connections between eco-
nomic growth, welfare reform, and poverty should help to pin down 
those determinants more closely.
Despite the close timing at the national level, not all states imple-
mented the welfare reform measures at the same time, and many states 
experimented with waivers to the AFDC program before passage of 
the 1996 welfare reform act. In addition, not all states shared equally 
in the economic prosperity of the late 1990s. This potentially makes 
state-level analysis more fruitful in disentangling the relative effects 
of welfare reform and a robust economy on poverty reduction. If wel-
fare reform underlies the reduction in poverty, then, other things being 
equal, states that took advantage of AFDC waivers and implemented 
TANF sooner should have experienced greater reductions in poverty. 
State-level variation in economic performance and welfare policy also 
makes it possible to examine whether welfare reform was more suc-
cessful in a strong economy.
It	should	be	cautioned,	however,	 that	failure	 to	find	effects	at	 the	
state level does not automatically translate into an absence of such ef-
fects at the national level. Migration from economically underperform-
ing states to high-performing states reduces both the adverse effects 
on poverty in the poorly performing states and the positive effects on 
poverty in the better performing states. Likewise, strong growth nation-
wide	may	reduce	poverty	 in	all	states,	but	 there	could	be	 insufficient	
variation in poverty-rate performance across states to identify such a 
trend using only state-level data. A similar case could be made for the 
assessment of welfare policy at the state level. Nonetheless, state-level 
analysis remains useful for state policymakers in terms of determining 
what types of growth and labor market outcomes most affect poverty 
in their states.
EMPIRICAL EvIDENCE AT THE NATIONAL LEvEL
As shown in Table 4.1, numerous empirical studies have found a 
positive	relationship	between	the	U.S.	unemployment	rate	and	the	offi-
cial poverty rate. For samples with ending dates prior to 1984, the aver-
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age	unemployment	coefficient	suggests	that	every	percentage	point	re-
duction in the unemployment rate reduces the poverty rate by about 0.5 
percentage points. However, several studies done in the 1980s found a 
weaker	link.	To	be	sure,	the	average	coefficient	for	samples	that	primar-
ily consist of years in the 1980s is about zero, while Blank (1993, 2000) 
and	Powers	(1995)	find	a	slightly	negative	relationship.	This	suggests	
to	researchers	 that	growth	no	 longer	benefited	 those	at	 the	bottom	of	
the	distribution.	Even	for	1990–1998,	Blank	(2000)	finds	only	a	slight	
reversal of the 1980s trend. Freeman (2001) argues that the reason for 
the weaker link between poverty level and economic growth is the re-
duction in real wages for workers with low skills and education.
Table 4.1  National Estimates of u.S. unemployment and Poverty











Blank and Blinder (1986) 1959–1983 0.69
Cutler and Katz (1991)b 1959–1989 0.36–0.45




Donald Freeman (2003) 1979–1999 0.72–0.98












Romer and Romer (1999) 1969–1994 0.44–0.49
Tobin (1994) 1961–1990 0.39
a Estimated percentage-point poverty rate change for a 1.00 percentage point increase 
in the unemployment rate. Some studies simply used the male unemployment rate. 
Where there was a choice between short-run and steady-state estimates, short-run 
estimates were selected.
b A trend variable for 1983–1989 produced estimates from 0.32 to 0.54, indicating an 
unaccounted-for rise in unemployment in the 1980s.
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.
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Haveman	and	Schwabish	(2000),	however,	find	that	the	positive	re-
lationship between unemployment and poverty reestablishes itself dur-
ing	the	1993–1998	period,	as	the	estimated	coefficient	rises	nearly	to	its	
average pre-1980s level. For samples running from the 1960s to at least 
the	 early	1990s,	 the	 authors	find	 the	 average	 increase	 in	 the	poverty	
rate after a one-point increase in the unemployment rate to be about 0.4 
percentage points.
To help reconcile these results, we examine, in Table 4.2, three sim-
ple models that follow the approaches of Blank and Card (1993) and 
Bartik (2001) and that are based on U.S. Census Bureau data (though we 
use national data rather than regional data). Table 4.2 shows regressions 
of the annual change in the overall U.S. poverty rate for 1960–2002 on 
the change in the U.S. unemployment rate, the percent change in U.S. 
real median family income, and three time-period dummies.1 Poverty 
rates are expected to be positively related to changes in unemployment 
rates, while they are expected to be inversely related to changes in me-
dian household income.2
Column (1) reports that a 1.00-point decline in the unemployment 
rate is associated with a 0.25-point fall in the poverty rate, whereas a 
1.00-point increase in median family income results in a 0.15-point fall 
in the poverty rate. The poverty rate declined in these two categories an 
average of 0.57 and 0.26 points faster per year during the 1960–1973 
and 1993–2001 periods than during the 1974–1980 and 1981–1992 pe-
riods (the latter being the omitted period).
To test whether poverty rates are more sensitive to economic condi-
tions when the labor market is especially tight, column (2) adds a low-
unemployment-rate indicator for the 12 years in which the rate was 5 
percent or below, and an interaction of this indicator with the change 
in the unemployment rate. The results are strongly consistent with the 
arguments made by Freeman (2001). A 1.00-point drop in the unem-
ployment rate is associated with a 0.73-point decline in the poverty rate 
when the unemployment rate is less than or equal to 5 percent, but with 
only a 0.23-point decline when the unemployment rate is above 5 per-
cent. To check on whether there was a lagged unemployment response, 
column (3) reports the results obtained when the lagged change in the 
unemployment rate is added to the model. These results indicate that the 
coefficient	corresponding	to	the	lagged	unemployment	rate	is	margin-
ally	significant,	but	that	the	other	results	are	essentially	unchanged.3
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Lag change in unempl. rate 0.11
(1.52)




































Constant 0.22 0.20 0.19
R2 0.77 0.82 0.84
DW 1.95 2.07 2.01
N 43 43 42
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are absolute value of t-statistic. The dependent vari-
able is the 1960–2002 change in the overall poverty rate except in column (3), where 
the	time	period	is	1961–2002.	The	variables	are	measured	in	first-difference	form	to	
mitigate any spurious trends and unit roots. The t-statistics are adjusted to correct 
for heteroscedasticity of an unknown form. The mean (std. dev.) for the change in 
the overall poverty rate is –0.24 (0.78); for the change in the unemployment rate it 
is –0.01 (0.93); and for the percentage change in real median family income it is 1.4 
(2.4). Blank = not applicable.
a The low-unemployment-rate indicator variable is for the 12 years when the unemploy-
ment rate was 5 percent or below.
b When the regression in column (2) included a variable in which the percentage change 
in real median family income interacted with the low-unemployment indicator, it was 
insignificant	(t = −0.40).
c The	year	dummies	reflect	the	War	on	Poverty	and	the	robust	economic	growth	of	the	
1960–1973 period, the sluggish economic growth in the latter 1970s, and the rapid 
economic growth and welfare reform changes that commenced in 1993. The omitted 
period	is	1981–1992,	which	represents	the	years	of	the	Reagan	and	first	Bush	admin-
istrations, a period of rapidly increasing income inequality.
SOURCE: Family poverty rates can be found at U.S. Census Bureau (2004d). Real 
median family household income can be found at U.S. Census Bureau (2006a,g). 
Unemployment rates can be found at BLS (2006c).
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In sum, these simple models lend support to the notion that the ini-
tial strength of the labor market is a key factor in determining whether 
economic growth reduces the poverty rate. It is especially true that a 
rising tide lifts all boats when the tide is already high. Yet, because the 
time dummies only imperfectly control for events such as welfare re-
form, the results should be interpreted with some caution.
STATE-LEvEL EMPIRICAL STuDIES OF LABOR DEMAND 
AND POvERTy
Although national studies typically use the unemployment rate as 
the primary indicator of economic performance, regional studies use a 
wider variety of labor market indicators. This is at least partly attribut-





all samples equals about 0.5. This is remarkably close to the average 
national estimate, given that regional studies typically include more 
variables such as additional labor market indicators. As is consistent 
with the national pattern, Bartik (2001) reports that the poverty-unem-
ployment link is weakened in the 1980s and strengthened in the 1990s, 
while	Freeman	(2003)	also	finds	a	stronger	association	in	the	1990s.	
A smaller number of studies include employment rates or labor 
force participation rates as indicators of labor demand strength. The 
corresponding	reported	coefficients	are	smaller	in	absolute	value	than	
the	 average	 unemployment	 coefficient.	 The	 coefficients	 range	 from	 
–0.12 (Albrecht, Albrecht, and Albrecht 2000) to –0.30 (Levernier, Par-
tridge,	and	Rickman	2000).	The	studies	find	different	responses	across	
gender lines and across metropolitan vs. nonmetropolitan areas.
Although	most	studies	capture	the	influence	of	employment	growth	
indirectly through including unemployment, employment, or labor 
force participation rates, employment growth has also been examined 
for its antipoverty role. In panel studies of metropolitan areas, Bartik 
(1993a,	1996)	finds	a	negative	and	statistically	significant	link	between	
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Study            Sample       Dependent variable               Estimated effectsa





Household poverty rate % females employed full time: 
−0.12
% males employed full time:
				−0.28
Bartik (1993a)c Metropolitan areas 
1973–1989
Person poverty rate  Unemployment rate:  
0.33
 Employment growth: 
blacks:	−0.4 
whites:	−0.1							
Bartik (1996) Metropolitan areas 
1975–1987
Probability of being in 
poverty translated into 
person poverty rate
 Unemployment rate equivalent to 
 employment growth effects: 
female: 0.69 




Bartik (2001) 21 States/regions
    1967–1997
    1967–1979
    1980–1989
    1990–1997





Blank and Card (1993) 9 census divisions 
    1967–1991
Family poverty rate Unemployment rate:  
0.28
 
Table 4.3  Previous Studies of Regional Poverty and Economic Performance
(continued)
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an
Study          Sample    Dependent variable                Estimated effectsa
Crandall and Weber (2004) Census tracts 
1990–2000




DeFina (2004) Panel of states 
1991–2001
Person poverty rate Unemployment rate:  
0.32d
Richard Freeman (2001) Panel of states  
1959–1999 
1989–1998
Person poverty rate Unemployment rate:  
0.27–0.41 
0.37 
Donald Freeman (2003) 9 census divisions 
1979–1989 
1990–1999
Person poverty rate Unemployment rate:  
0.45e 
0.65
Gundersen and Ziliak (2004) State level 
1980–1999
Family poverty Unemployment rate:    
0.50f
1% empl./pop. growth:  
−0.15









Labor force participation rate: 
female:	−0.30	 
male:	−0.13
Table 4.3  (continued)
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Morgan and Kickham (2001) Panel of states  
1987–1996
Child poverty rate Female unemployment: 0.63
Tobin (1994) Changes for states 
1979–1987
Person poverty rate Unemployment rate: 0.71
a Estimated percentage-point poverty rate change for a 1-percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate, employment rate, or labor 
force participation rate, or for a 1 percent increase in employment growth.
b Reported effects are direct effects from the poverty regression and do not include simulated indirect effects from other estimated equa-
tions.





f Calculated using the average U.S. family poverty rate of 11.04 percent for 1980–1999 and estimated elasticities from column 1 of Table 1.
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.
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job growth and the poverty rate. Using a cross section of counties for 
1990,	Levernier,	Partridge,	and	Rickman	(2000)	fail	to	find	a	link	be-
tween lagged employment growth and poverty, even when omitting 
other measures of labor market strength. Even so, Crandall and Weber 
(2004),	using	1990	and	2000	census	tract	data,	find	that	employment	
growth over the decade reduced poverty, and that the largest effects oc-
curred in tracts that had the highest initial levels of poverty.
WELFARE REFORM AND POvERTy
Thirty years of experience with the Great Society should have taught us 
at least one important lesson: welfare reform is not cruel; welfare is. 
—Stephen	Moore	(1997),	director	of	fiscal	policy	studies	at	the	Cato	
Institute, Ending Welfare Reform as We Know It, Cato Institute
The states are ending welfare as we know it—but not poverty. 
—Robert Kuttner (2000), coeditor of the American Prospect, “The 
States Are Ending Welfare as We Know It—but Not Poverty,” 
Business Week, June 12, 2000
Significant	public	policy	changes	related	to	the	working	and	non-
working poor were implemented during the 1990s. One key initiative 
was a major expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit in 1993 (Box 
4.1). Another major change was the Clinton administration’s acceler-
ated issuance of state waivers from AFDC, which also began in 1993 
(CEA 1999; Ellwood and Blank 2001). Most waivers made welfare 
more restrictive, such as by adding sanctions and time limits. Probably 
the decade’s largest initiative was PRWORA, the 1996 welfare reform 
legislation that replaced AFDC with TANF. This reform eliminated the 
welfare entitlement and placed a strict 60-month lifetime welfare limit 
on most recipients, while putting stringent requirements on states to 
shift most recipients into work by 2002 (Ellwood and Blank 2001). Fi-
nally, states were given great freedom to set the parameters of their 
programs.
The CEA (1999) and O’Neill and Hill (2001) argue that welfare 
reform was the impetus behind the reduced number of welfare case-
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loads. Yet Figlio and Ziliak (1999) and Bennett, Lu, and Song (2002) 
conclude that the vast majority of the decline in recipients was due to 
the strong economy and not to welfare reform, which is consistent with 
the	findings	of	Bartik	and	Eberts	(1999)	and	Hoynes	(2000a)	as	well	as	
those cited earlier in this chapter. Blank’s (2002) comprehensive review 
of the literature suggests that welfare reform and the strong economy 
Box 4.1  Earned Income Tax Credit
The federal EITC is a refundable tax credit that dates back to 
1975. It was originally designed to return to low-income work-
ers their share of Social Security taxes, but it has evolved into a 
more aggressive antipoverty program for the working poor with 
children. Its refundable nature gives it powerful effects in reduc-
ing poverty. 
In 2003, the EITC gave a small maximum tax credit of $382 
for childless heads; this credit phased out at an earned income 
level of $11,230 for singles and $12,230 for married couples. For 
couples with children, the EITC was considerably more gener-
ous. For a single or married couple with two children, the 2003 
tax credit equaled 40 percent of earned income until it reached 
a maximum of $4,204 at an earned income of $10,500. After an 
earned income of $13,750 for single parents with two children 
($14,750 for a married couple), the EITC declined at a rate of 
about 21 percent of additional earned income until it was phased 
out at $33,692 ($34,692 for married couples).
In 2004, an additional 18 states had their own EITC, up from 
10 states in 1998. Montgomery County, Maryland, also had its 
own EITC (and Denver had one earlier in the decade). Almost 
all of the states or localities piggyback on the federal EITC. The 
2004 state credit equals between 4 and 43 percent of the federal 
credit	 (15	percent	 is	 about	 the	median).	However,	five	 states—
Iowa, Maine, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Virginia—have nonre-
fundable credits.
SOURCES: Johnson (2001); Johnson and Lazere (1998); Llobrera and Zahradnik 
(2004); IRS (2003).
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both reduced welfare usage, but that interaction between the two makes 
the	precise	shares	difficult	to	determine.
Even if welfare reform did reduce caseloads, welfare programs may 
have	had	only	a	modest	influence	on	overall	poverty	rates,	for	several	
reasons. For one, welfare recipients compose a small fraction of the 
total number of people who live below the poverty threshold (less than 
one-fifth	after	1999).	For	another,	the	TANF	program	may	have	only	re-
distributed	the	income	of	poor	households	from	benefits	to	earnings	and	
the EITC. Despite the high employment rates of women who left wel-
fare (Blank and Schmidt 2001), their incomes are only slightly above 
what	 they	were	when	 those	women	were	welfare	 recipients	 (Moffitt	
2002). 
Schoeni and Blank (2000) report that initially state AFDC waivers 
and TANF together reduced state poverty rates by 2.0–2.5 percentage 
points, all else being equal, though the effects of TANF were not uni-
form. They further report that low-income, female high-school drop-
outs	did	not	benefit	from	implementation	of	TANF.	Likewise,	Bennett,	
Lu,	and	Song	(2002)	find	that	TANF	is	associated	with	lower	income	
among poor male and poor female high-school dropouts. Hence, even 
if TANF reduced poverty rates, it could have done so while at the same 
time hurting the prospects of the poorest of the poor, many of whom 
likely have mental or physical disabilities (Freeman 2001). In fact, Mof-
fitt	(2002)	reports	that	the	women	characterized	by	low	job	skills,	poor	
health, or disabilities that left welfare have lower income than those that 
remain on welfare.
Even if welfare reform has a relatively small average effect on pov-
erty rates, there may be certain administrative policies that have stron-
ger	effects.	For	example,	the	CEA	(1999)	finds	that	the	various	AFDC	
waivers and TANF rules have differing effects on state caseloads. Poli-
cies	 that	sanction	recipients	for	not	finding	work	were	found	to	have	
large effects in reducing welfare caseloads, while caps on welfare pay-
ments to families did not.
Third, welfare reform has spillover effects (Bartik 2002a,b) on other 
groups that are not current or former welfare recipients. Welfare reform 
not	only	pushes	current	welfare	recipients	to	find	employment,	it	also	
discourages	many	qualified	households	from	enrolling	in	the	first	place.	
For example, results from randomized experiments in Florida suggest 
that potential welfare recipients with very young children are more 
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likely than those with older children to remain off public assistance 
in order to conserve its availability for future periods (Grogger and 
Michalopoulos 2003). The combination of those who exited welfare 
programs and those who were discouraged from enrolling in welfare 
programs expanded the low-skilled labor supply from what it would 
have been in the absence of welfare reform. Bartik (2000) estimates 
that welfare reform ultimately increases the labor supply of females 
without a bachelor’s degree by approximately 3 percent, whereas the 
resulting decrease in wages causes other less-skilled workers to exit 
the labor force. His results suggest that for every 10 recipients shifted 
from welfare to the labor market, two or three low-wage workers exit 
the labor force. Hence, poverty rates could actually increase through 
the decline in wages and the related labor force withdrawal. To offset 
these displacement effects, Bartik argues, the U.S. economy needs an 
additional 300,000–400,000 jobs.4
Extending	his	analysis,	Bartik	(2002a,b)	finds	significant	spillover	
effects from welfare reform concentrated among single women and 
among male high school dropouts. The spillovers produce wage de-
clines for these groups, and employment gains by single women from 
welfare reform are almost fully offset by the employment declines of 
male high school dropouts. A clear implication of Bartik’s work is that 
welfare reform will be felt well beyond those directly affected, rein-
forcing the need for broader macro studies rather than studies focusing 
solely	on	former	recipients.	In	fact,	spillovers	may	explain	the	findings	
of Gundersen and Ziliak (2004), which suggest that TANF raised pov-
erty rates for married couples, a group that is less likely to be directly 
affected by welfare programs.
EMPIRICAL MODEL
Our empirical methodology for examining state poverty trends is 
outlined in Box 4.2. Because states vary in their poverty rate trends, 
economic performance, and welfare policies, individual states provide 
independent information, making it possible to disentangle the separate 
effects of the various potential factors underlying poverty. In general 
terms, the approach involves examining whether, on average, changes 
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Box 4.2  Methodology for Examining State Poverty Trends
Basic Model: The basic model can be written as
(i) povst	=	β1	labormktst+	π1welfarest+	η1	demogst+	φ1statecharst 
                           +	σs+	σt+ est , 
where pov is the poverty rate. labormkt is a vector of labor mar-
ket measures including employment growth, unemployment rates 
by gender, employment rates by gender, and industry structure. 
welfare is a vector of variables; it accounts for timing differences 
across states in the implementation of AFDC waivers and TANF. 
Although endogeneity between poverty rates and welfare policy 
adoption	would	bias	 the	 coefficients,	Ziliak	et	 al.	 (2000)	 found	
no statistical difference between states that applied for AFDC 
waivers and those that did not. statechar includes the percent-
age of the state population residing in metropolitan areas. demog 
includes demographic controls such as the age distribution of the 
population, the educational attainment of the adult population 
aged 25 and older, the rate of international immigration, and the 
teen birthrate. 
The	state	fixed	effects,	σs , account for unmeasured variables 
that cause persistent differences across states in poverty rates, 
including long-term demographic effects. Any persistent spatial 
spillovers	across	states	also	would	be	captured	by	the	state	fixed	
effects.	The	year	fixed	effects,	σt , capture common poverty trends 
across the nation, such as those attributable to the business cycle, 
to aging of the baby-boom generation, or to federal policy chang-
es such as expansion in the eitc (or common national effects from 
welfare reform). Some studies that utilize state panel data include 
state-specific	time	trends.	We	believe	that	these	trends	overcontrol	
for missing variables, actually picking up much of the time-vary-
ing	influence	of	the	other	explanatory	variables	(also	see	Wallace	
and	Blank	1999).	The	final	 term,	est , is the stochastic term that 
reflects	random	variation	in	poverty	rates.
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in a variable over time in a given state affect its poverty rate. Regarding 
employment	growth,	the	estimated	relationship	will	reflect,	on	average,	
how much state poverty rates change over time in response to annual 
deviations in job growth rates. Likewise, variables are included that 
reflect	the	timing	of	AFDC	waivers	and	the	implementation	of	TANF.	
Inclusion of other variables (for example, demographic factors) 
helps to isolate the effect of the economy and the effect of welfare re-
form	on	poverty	rates.	Time-fixed	effects	are	 included	 to	account	for	
uniform national effects, leaving only time-series variation across states 
to be explained. The empirical approach also accounts for all persistent 
long-term	state	differences	in	poverty	rates	by	including	fixed	effects	
for	states.	Among	other	things,	these	fixed	effects	account	for	persistent	
differences in poverty that may relate to equilibrium labor market dif-
ferences.
Labor Market variables
Many argue that the unemployment rate, although affected by 
growth, is the best measure of demand for those in the labor force near 
or below the poverty line, because they are the most likely to experience 
unemployment spells (Schoeni and Blank 2000). Though commonly 
used	at	the	national	level,	the	unemployment	rate	does	not	suffice	as	a	
sole measure of the strength of regional labor markets. For one thing, 
regions have different equilibrium unemployment rates (Partridge and 
Rickman 1997b,c). A 5 percent unemployment rate would be a remark-
able achievement for West Virginia but a sign of severe distress in North 
Dakota. Yet, measured in terms of job growth or per capita incomes, 
both states have struggled in recent decades. As a comparative measure, 
their relative unemployment rates are not particularly informative. 
Even in the context of changing labor market conditions, the equilib-
rium unemployment rate can change (Partridge and Rickman 1997b,c), 
and about one-third of newly created jobs are taken by previously non-
employed	individuals,	residents	who	were	not	officially	part	of	the	la-
bor force or counted as unemployed (Partridge 2001). This group is 
particularly important because many less-skilled individuals may only 
be informally attached to the labor market, particularly females and for-
mer welfare recipients. 
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Therefore, Murphy and Topel (1997), Hoynes (2000a), and Levernier, 
Partridge, and Rickman (2000) suggest that the employment-popula-
tion ratio is another important labor market indicator. The employment-
population ratio captures unique effects because it is particularly related 
to the availability of all nonemployed workers and is a measure of the 
potential size of the untapped labor supply. Because women are more 
prone to enter and exit the labor force for household reasons, the female 
employment-population	ratio	particularly	reflects	their	labor	market	at-
tachment. A high employment rate also suggests that the employment 
prospects of marriageable men and women have improved, which may 
improve the marriage market and eventually reduce poverty among 
current single-female household heads (Hoynes 2000a; Ellwood and 
Jencks 2004).
Job growth also is included as an indicator of the labor market. 
Through vacancy and job-chain effects, job growth may have additional 
poverty-reducing effects beyond reducing unemployment or increasing 
labor force participation. Job growth also may be correlated with an in-
creased number of hours worked (such as through overtime) or conver-
sion from part-time to full-time employment status. Strong job growth 
also allows workers to move up the occupational job ladder and increase 
their wage rate (Andersson, Holzer, and Lane 2002, 2003; Felsenstein 
and Persky 1999; Peters and Fisher 2004). Bartik (1996) argues that 
employment	growth	is	more	likely	to	reflect	labor	demand	and	is	based	
on more accurate data than the unemployment rate. But the most impor-
tant reason to include job growth as an indicator in our model is that job 
growth is typically the primary goal of economic development policy 
(Bartik 2001). It is worth knowing whether job growth reduces poverty, 
even if its primary effects are indirect through reducing unemployment 
and increasing labor force participation.
Even though creating high-wage jobs is a common policy goal, 
low-wage jobs often form the entry-level positions that disadvantaged 
individuals need in the early stages of their careers to get accustomed 
to the workforce. By providing needed entry points, job growth in low-
wage industries such as trade or personal services may have a greater 
poverty-reducing effect than overall job growth. For example, former 
welfare recipients are more likely to be employed in food service and re-
tail than in higher-paying jobs (Brauner and Loprest 1999). Andersson, 
Holzer,	and	Lane	(2002,	2003)	find	that	workers	with	persistently	low-
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wage	jobs—defined	as	those	earning	less	than	$12,000	(1998	$)	for	at	
least three consecutive years—tend to be concentrated in various ser-
vice and retail sectors. A high-wage industry composition may primarily 
benefit	the	middle	class	and	may	even	increase	the	size	of	welfare	rolls	
(Bartik 1996, 2001; Bartik and Eberts 1999, p. 138), though Raphael 
(1998) reports mixed results.
On the other hand, wage premiums may play a role in changing 
poverty rates. The loss of manufacturing jobs (Bluestone 1990), a shift 
in demand towards high-skilled occupations (Cutler and Katz 1991), 
and declining unionization (Freeman 1993) have been noted as possible 
causes for increased poverty and income inequality. Using 1993–2000 
national	 data,	 Foster-Bey	 and	Rawlings	 (2002)	 find	 that,	 holding	 all	
else constant, single mothers tend to have higher wages in manufactur-
ing	and	health	services	than	in	other	fields.	The	data	left	Foster-Bey	and	
Rawlings	sufficiently	optimistic	to	conclude	that	it	may	be	worthwhile	
to target certain low-wage sectors as possible employment outlets for 
less-skilled workers.
Greater public-sector employment also may be associated with 
lower poverty (Bartik 2001), which may be the result of high unioniza-
tion and administratively set wage rates in the public sector. Levernier, 
Partridge, and Rickman (2000) also found strong poverty-reducing ef-
fects from having a higher employment share in goods-producing in-
dustries. Besides the direct effects stemming from the possible loss of 
higher-paying jobs, greater industry dislocation in general is associated 
with large declines in postdisplacement earnings (and greater potential 
for long-term joblessness) as workers are forced to switch to occupa-
tions for which they have less training (Carrington and Zaman 1994).
Welfare Reform variables
The effect of welfare reform on state poverty is examined using 
three variables. Following the approaches of the CEA (1999) and Figlio 
and Ziliak (1999), a TANF variable is added that measures the propor-
tion of the year that TANF was in effect. For example, if TANF was 
in effect for the entire year, the variable takes a value of 1.00, while if 
TANF was only in effect for half the number of days in the year, the 
variable takes a value of 0.50. In addition, many states implemented 
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various features of TANF in the form of waivers to the previous pro-
gram, AFDC. 
Thus, a second variable is included; it is calculated as the sum of 
the yearly proportions that various AFDC waivers were in effect before 
TANF implementation.5	The	AFDC	waivers	include	five	types:	1)	the	
imposition	of	 time	 limits	on	 receipt	of	welfare	benefits,	2)	waiver	of	
job exemptions from work requirements for child care, 3) imposition 
of	a	cap	on	the	amount	of	welfare	benefits	that	a	family	can	receive,	4)	
increased earnings disregards, and 5) sanctions for not having a job or 
being engaged in a work-related activity. If these waivers relate to suc-
cessful features of TANF, their implementation likely reduced poverty 
rates in these states. 
The third variable is the natural logarithm of the average monthly 
welfare payment to a family.6	Generosity	of	welfare	benefits	mechani-
cally increases income and reduces poverty, but the adverse effects on a 
person’s incentive to work may more than offset this effect and increase 
poverty	(Moffitt	1999).
Person-Based Poverty Factors
As was described in Chapter 2, poverty rates also contain a demo-
graphic component. For example, poverty rates are higher for female-
headed families nationally, and regions with higher shares of female-
headed families are found to have higher rates of poverty, other things 
being equal (Levernier, Partridge, and Rickman 2000). Female heads 
of families are the sole potential wage earners, are disproportionately 
young, less educated, and face child care constraints that limit full par-
ticipation in the workforce. In a related point, Levernier, Partridge, and 
Rickman also report a positive relationship between a county’s average 
number of children per family and its poverty rate.
Higher poverty also occurs among minorities. Some possible rea-
sons for higher poverty among blacks include discrimination (Ihlanfeldt 
and Young 1996; Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991), their residence 
in inner cities (Corcoran et al. 1992; Cutler and Glaeser 1997; Holzer 
1991), more attractive nonmarket opportunities (Viscusi 1986), and 
low educational attainment (Smith and Welch 1986). Yet Levernier, 
Partridge,	and	Rickman	(2000)	find	that	after	controlling	for	numerous	
county characteristics such as labor market performance, education, 
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and other demographic characteristics, counties with greater shares of 
African Americans had lower poverty. This led the authors to suggest 
that it is the interaction of race with the other characteristics that under-
lies higher poverty among African Americans. For example, Levernier, 
Partridge, and Rickman (2000) found that employment growth and in-
creased educational attainment had greater poverty-reducing effects in 
counties with high African American population shares. Nevertheless, 
they	 report	 finding	 higher	 poverty	 in	 counties	with	 greater	 shares	 of	
non–African American minorities.
Other theories suggest there is an interaction between the economy 
and person-based factors. Higher poverty that results from poor regional 
economic performance may adversely affect family structure (such as 
by increasing single female headship because of a lack of opportunities 
for males), which further perpetuates the poverty cycle. This has been 
argued to underlie both inner-city poverty (Wilson 1987) and rural pov-
erty (Albrecht, Albrecht, and Albrecht 2000). As was discussed in terms 
of spatial mismatch in Chapter 3, inner-city poverty may be perpetuated 
through negative neighborhood effects, such as less exposure to well-
educated and employed residents and more exposure to the unemployed 
and to persons engaged in illicit activities.
REGRESSION RESuLTS
Descriptions of the variables included in the model and descriptive 
statistics can be found in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. The results for alternative 
specifications	of	the	model	shown	in	Box	4.2	appear	in	columns	(1)–(7)	
of Table 4.6.7 Different combinations of explanatory variables produce 
the alternative sets of results: the interpretation of the regression co-
efficients	varies	depending	upon	what	other	explanatory	variables	are	
included in the estimated equation. For example, when unemployment 




the combined explanatory power of the included variables.
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Variable Notes on calculation and data source
% persons in poverty U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey: Historical Poverty Tables: Table 21
Employment growth rate [(Total Empl.)t − (Total Empl.)t−1]/(Total Empl.)t−1. BEA Local Area Personal Income SA25 Series
Male employment rate U.S. Department of Labor, Geographical Profile of Employment and Unemployment, various 
years
Female employment rate U.S. Department of Labor, Geographical Profile of Employment and Unemployment, various 
years
Male unemployment rate U.S. Department of Labor, Geographical Profile of Employment and Unemployment, various 
years
Female unemployment rate U.S. Department of Labor, Geographical Profile of Employment and Unemployment, various 
years
% female-headed households The data is interpolated for intervening periods between census years. U.S. Census Bureau: 
Household and Family Characteristics, STF1, from 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses
Population	share	≤	age	19 U.S. Census Bureau
Population share ages 20–24 U.S. Census Bureau
Population	share	≥	65 U.S. Census Bureau
%	pop.	≥	25,	h.s.	grad,	not	4-yr.	 
college grad
U.S. Census Bureau, USA Counties 1998
%	pop.	≥	25,	4-yr.	college	degree U.S. Census Bureau, USA Counties 1998
% workforce union members Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and Coverage Database from the 
CPS (Documentation). http://www.unionstats.com
% workforce union-covered Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and Coverage Database from the 
CPS (Documentation). http://www.unionstats.com
Tab1e 4.4  Variable Definitions and Data Sources
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# births per 1,000 female teens 15–19 U.S. Census Bureau, USA Counties 1998; and National Center for Health Statistics, National 
Vital Statistics Reports
Relative competitiveness wage rate (Relative Wage Rate)/(Relative Wage Mix). BEA Local Area Personal Income SA07 Series
Relative wage mix Ratio of state employment-weighted U.S. industry wages to U.S. average wage rate. 
BEA Local Area Personal Income SA07 Series
Industry employment sharesa BEA Local Area Personal Income SA25 Series
Proportion of yr. TANF implemented Council of Economic Advisers (1999), Table W-1
Proportion of yr. time limit in effect, 
AFDC waiver
Council of Economic Advisers (1999), Table W-1
Proportion of year family caps in 
effect, AFDC waiver 
Council of Economic Advisers (1999), Table B
Proportion of year job exemption,  
AFDC waiver 
Council of Economic Advisers (1999), Table B
Avg. fam. monthly welfare payment U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
International immigration “Immigrants Admitted, by State of Intended Residence.” Various issues of the Statistical 
Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
a Industry-mix employment growth is calculated by multiplying state employment in each industry by the corresponding national growth 
rate and then summing the products across industries. Competitiveness-employment growth is then total-employment growth minus the 
industry-mix growth.
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.
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Tab1e 4.5  Descriptive Statistics of the 48 Contiguous States and the 




% persons in poverty 13.51 4.21
Employment growth rate 0.022 0.018
Male employment rate 71.55 3.98
Female employment rate 55.71 5.31
Male unemployment rate 5.74 1.81
Female unemployment rate 5.77 1.95
% female-headed households 10.99 2.29
Population	share	≤	age	19 0.29 0.03




% workforce union members 14.03 5.87
% workforce union-covered 16.11 5.99
# births per 1,000 female teens 15–19 52.60 15.12
Relative competitiveness wage rate 0.94 0.15
Relative wage mix 1.00 0.02
Construction employment share 0.05 0.01
Mining employment share 0.01 0.02
Durable goods employment share 0.08 0.03
Nondurable goods employment share 0.06 0.03
Trade sector employment share 0.21 0.02
Farm employment share 0.03 0.03
Low-paying service employment share 0.04 0.03
High-paying service employment share 0.25 0.04
Trans., comm., and pub. util’s empl. share 0.05 0.01
Finance, insurance, and real estate empl. share 0.07 0.02
Proportion of year TANF implemented 0.17 0.36
Proportion of yr. time limit in effect, AFDC waiver 0.01 0.08
Proportion of yr. fam. caps in effect, AFDC waiver 0.03 0.15
Proportion of yr. job exemption, AFDC waiver 0.03 0.15
Average family monthly welfare payment ($) 321.19 115.08
Per capita welfare recipients 0.04 0.02
International immigration/population share 0.007 0.024
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Labor Market Results
The results in column (1) of Table 4.6 indicate that current and 
lagged state employment growth reduce poverty.8 Summing the three 
employment	growth	coefficients	yields	a	sustained	acceleration	of	job	
growth equal to one percentage point, which reduces the poverty rate by 
about one-half of a percentage point.
In terms of the other variables, a greater composition of high-wage 
industries is negatively associated with the poverty rate. High-wage in-
dustries may provide above-poverty wage rates for those who otherwise 
may not be able to obtain them, and may also reduce poverty through 
positive spillovers on wages in other industries and employment multi-
plier effects through higher spending in the area.9 Dropping Wage mix 
and replacing it with variables consisting of employment shares in vari-
ous	Standard	Industrial	Classification	(SIC)	aggregates	does	not	change	
the other results.10
Because factors other than job growth may underlie changes in 
unemployment or labor force participation, unemployment rates and 
employment rates by gender are added to the column (1) model. For 
instance, if growth is primarily supply-driven, then strong employ-
ment growth increases unemployment rates and lowers employment 
rates (Partridge and Rickman 1999b), both of which would increase 
poverty rates; thus, the variables contain independent information. The 
additional labor market variables caused the lagged-employment vari-
ables	 to	become	quite	 insignificant,	so	 these	 lags	were	dropped	from	
the model. 
The results of adding the employment and unemployment rates in 
column (2) reveal relatively stronger labor market effects on poverty for 
females.	Morgan	and	Kickham	(2001)	likewise	found	fluctuations	in	fe-
male unemployment rates to be more important than those in male rates 
in explaining changes in child poverty rates. Given the inclusion of em-
ployment	growth,	the	significance	of	the	female	employment	rate	and	
unemployment rate variables suggests that other poverty-reducing fac-
tors underlie their changes.11 For example, teen birthrates are no longer 
significant	with	the	inclusion	of	the	additional	labor	market	variables,	
suggesting that lower teen birthrates reduce poverty through increasing 
female	employment	rates.	Except	for	the	relative	wage	mix	coefficient	
becoming	insignificant,	results	for	the	other	variables	are	qualitatively	
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Industry mix empl. growth −41.81
(1.26)




















Table 4.6  State Econometric Model Results (%)
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Sum of AFDC waivers −0.03
(0.10)
(continued)
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State	fixed	effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year	fixed	effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87
NOTE: Absolute value of t-statistic is in parentheses. t-statistic	=	1.96	corresponds	to	0.05	significance	level	based	on	a	two-tailed	test.
     t-statistic	=	1.645	corresponds	to	0.05	significance	level	based	on	a	one-tailed	test.	Blank	=	not	applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ generated regression results.
Table 4.6  (continued)
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that employment growth reduces poverty through channels other than 
by reducing unemployment or increasing labor force participation—
e.g., it results in fewer part-time workers.12
In fact, omitting the employment growth variable in column (3) 
causes	 the	male	unemployment	 rate	coefficient	 to	become	significant	
while	 the	 female	 coefficient	 increases	 only	 slightly.	 It	 appears,	 then,	
that the effect of male unemployment on poverty derives primarily from 
the	benefits	of	job	growth.	The	teen	birthrate	coefficient	again	becomes	
significant,	which	 suggests	 that	 strong	 job	 growth	 lowers	 teen	 birth-
rates.
Because job growth in association with in-migration likely has lim-
ited effects on unemployment and employment rates, state employment 
growth is separated into two components: growth that is attributable to 
a state’s composition of fast-growing industries nationally, and growth 
that is idiosyncratic to the state.13 This tests the proposition that idio-
syncratic growth induces greater in-migration (Partridge and Rickman 
1999a) and reduces the employment growth effects on poverty. The 
corresponding results in column (4) indicate stronger poverty-reducing 
effects in industry-mix employment growth vs. idiosyncratic employ-
ment	growth,	though	the	difference	is	not	statistically	significant	at	con-
ventional levels.14
To examine whether there are any differences in a tight labor mar-
ket, we interacted job growth with a dummy variable for 1996–2000, 
a period of strong national economic growth and low unemployment. 
As shown in column (5), when the interaction variable is added to the 
regression, the combined effect of employment growth on poverty for 
1996–2000 is more than three times the magnitude of the other years.15 
This result accords with Partridge and Rickman (2002), who report 
lower interstate net migration shifts in the late 1990s; they argue that 
the uniformly strong economy provided little incentive to regionally 
migrate,	and	that	new	jobs	were	increasingly	likely	to	be	filled	by	less-
skilled original residents.16
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Welfare Policy Results
The TANF variable is found to reduce poverty, but the estimated 
relationship	is	not	close	to	being	statistically	significant	(column	[6]).	
In a sensitivity analysis conducted to examine whether differences in 
TANF implementation strategies affect poverty, the TANF variable in-
teracted with a variable that measured the overall work incentives of 
the state’s TANF program as assessed by Blank and Schmidt (2001). 
Blank and Schmidt rated the work incentives as weak, mixed, or strong; 
these were assigned values of 0, 1, or 2. In results not shown, the inter-
action	term	was	negative	but	statistically	insignificant	(slope	=	−0.13,	 
t = 0.64). Adding separate state-time trend variables or lagged poverty 
rates (also not shown) did not strongly affect the welfare-reform results. 
So,	as	is	consistent	with	the	findings	of	Gundersen	and	Ziliak	(2004)	for	
families, there is no evidence to suggest that implementation of TANF 
led to a reduction in a state’s poverty rate, even if the TANF program 
contained stronger work incentives.
Nevertheless, the uniform effects of TANF across the nation would 
be	captured	in	the	time	fixed	effects,	and	there	may	be	insufficient	time-
series variation across states to tease out a relationship between TANF 
and poverty. Twenty-one states implemented TANF during 1996 for 
an average duration of 0.21 years, whereas 48 states had implemented 
TANF by the end of 1997 for an average duration of 0.86 years. For 
1998, TANF was operational for the entire year in all 49 contiguous 
states (the number counts the District of Columbia as a state). So some 
caution should be exercised in drawing conclusions from these results 
alone, particularly for the effect of welfare reform at the national level.
Nevertheless, the aggregate AFDC waiver and monthly welfare pay-
ment	variables	also	are	not	statistically	related	to	poverty,	confirming	
the	insignificance	of	the	TANF	variable.	The	results	also	barely	change	
when the aggregate AFDC waiver variable is dropped and replaced by 
the proportion of the year that various individual waivers were in effect 
(column [7]).17 
Of the individual AFDC variables, only the time limit variable is 
significant,	but	its	sign	is	positive.	Although	time	constraints	were	un-
likely to be binding by 2000, the waiver may have induced individuals 
to leave welfare, or discouraged others from becoming recipients, to 
avoid exhausting their allotted time. Families also may have entered 
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and exited welfare as a buffer against adverse labor market outcomes, 
in	 a	 manner	 akin	 to	 unemployment	 insurance	 (Moffitt	 and	 Pavetti	
2000).18 Omitting the family payment cap variable and the job exemp-
tion	variable	causes	the	time	limit	coefficient	to	lose	statistical	signifi-
cance, suggesting that collinearity may partially underlie the result.19 
Even dropping the teen birthrate or employment growth variables does 
not alter the welfare policy results.20 TANF and AFDC waiver dummy 
variables that were interacted with employment growth also had insig-
nificant	coefficients.
When the unemployment and employment rate variables are 
dropped,	the	coefficient	on	the	generosity	of	welfare	payments	becomes	
positive	and	significant.21	Thus,	welfare-benefit	generosity	appears	 to	
have adverse labor supply effects on females (Blank and Schmidt 2001; 
Moffitt	1999),	increasing	poverty	(Gundersen	and	Ziliak	2004).	Over-
all,	 besides	 generosity	 of	 welfare	 benefits	 or	 the	 potentially	 adverse	
poverty effects of time limits, there is little evidence to support the hy-
pothesis that welfare reforms altered poverty rates. However, this is 
not to conclude that welfare reforms did not affect welfare dependency 
(Bartik 2002b).22
Demographic Poverty Effects
Increased educational attainment also reduces state poverty rates. 
Column (1) results show that a 1.00-percent increase in the adult popu-
lation holding a high school degree (relative to dropouts) is associated 
with a 0.30-percentage-point reduction in poverty, while a correspond-
ing change in the college graduate share is associated with a 0.33-point 
reduction. Higher shares of population at both ends of the age spectrum 
increase state poverty rates. The share of the state’s population that is 
composed	of	immigrants	is	not	a	significant	factor	underlying	changes	
in state poverty, which may be related to offsetting internal migration. 
Likewise, the share of the population that resides in a metropolitan area 
does	not	have	a	statistically	significant	relationship	to	poverty.
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SIMuLATION OF INDIvIDuAL EFFECTS
Because the estimated relationship between employment growth 
and	poverty	reduction	varies	across	specifications,	a	more	structured	set	
of equations is needed to isolate the total effect of a particular factor, in-
cluding	any	indirect	interrelationships.	Six	equations	are	specified	and	
econometrically estimated. The equations correspond to the following 
dependent variables: 1) the poverty rate, 2) the female unemployment 
rate, 3) the male employment rate, 4) the female employment rate, 5) 
the male employment rate, and 6) the teen birthrate. The simulation 
focuses on the predicted quantitative poverty effects regardless of sta-
tistical	significance.
The estimated poverty equation roughly corresponds to the esti-
mated equation in column (2) of Table 4.6.23 However, as previously 
noted,	because	employment	growth	may	influence	the	rates	for	unem-
ployment,	employment,	and	teen	births,	the	coefficients	corresponding	
to the employment growth variables are likely to understate the pov-
erty-reducing	effects	of	job	growth.	So,	separate	equations	are	specified	
to	account	for	the	influence	of	job	growth	on	these	other	variables.	The	
welfare variables are included in each equation in an attempt to unravel 
their effects on poverty. Other control variables generally thought to be 
exogenous	also	are	added,	including	state	and	time	fixed	effects.
Simulated Employment Growth Effects
The estimated equations (Table 4.7) reveal that employment 
growth lowers unemployment rates and increases employment rates, 
particularly for males.24 Thus, in addition to having a direct poverty- 
reducing effect, job growth also lowers poverty through reducing un-
employment rates and increasing labor force participation. Although job 
growth has larger effects on male labor market outcomes, female labor 
market outcomes are most associated with poverty. So, as shown in Ta-
ble 4.8, the indirect poverty-reducing effects of employment growth are 
larger for females. Summing the unemployment and employment rate 
effects reveals that a 1.0-percent acceleration in job growth indirectly 
lowers poverty rates by nearly 0.3 percentage points, which exceeds the 
estimated	direct	reduction	of	less	than	0.2	points.	This	confirms	the	es-
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timated employment growth effect in Table 4.6 of 0.5 percentage points 
when employment and unemployment rates are omitted from the esti-
mated equation. 
Employment growth also reduces teen birthrates (column [6] of 
Table	4.7),	and	teen	birthrates	influence	poverty	both	directly	and	indi-
rectly through affecting unemployment and employment rates. Column 
(1)	of	Table	4.8	shows	that,	through	its	influence	on	teen	birthrates,	ac-
celeration of employment growth reduces poverty.25
Simulated Effects of Welfare Policies
Similar calculations can be made for implementation of welfare-re-
form measures (Table 4.8). Aside from its direct effects, welfare reform 
can	affect	poverty	through	influencing	labor	market	outcomes	such	as	
employment and unemployment rates. Likewise, welfare reform can 
affect	 poverty	 through	 reducing	 teen	 birthrates,	 which	 can	 influence	
poverty both directly and indirectly through measured labor market 
outcomes.
AFDC waivers directly increased poverty (column [2] of Table 4.8) 
but indirectly reduced poverty through generally improved labor mar-
ket outcomes, such as increased employment rates. On the other hand, 
early implementation of TANF was directly associated with a slight 
reduction in poverty but was indirectly associated with larger increases 
in poverty. Although the estimates (not shown) are generally statisti-
cally	 insignificant,	 implementation	 of	TANF	was	 associated	with	 in-
creased unemployment rates and reduced employment rates. TANF also 
appeared to be positively related to teen birthrates. It is intuitive that 
unemployment rates increase when welfare recipients exit and seek em-
ployment. However, the employment rate effects are counterintuitive 
and	difficult	to	reconcile	with	the	fact	that	many	of	those	leaving	wel-
fare found employment. Nevertheless, the results suggest that if there 
were	any	poverty	benefits	of	TANF,	they	are	not	reflected	in	the	labor	
market outcome estimates in Table 4.7.
The	 remaining	 welfare	 policy	 variable,	 average	 monthly	 benefit	
payment, both directly and indirectly increases poverty (column [4] of 
Table	4.8).	Aside	from	its	influence	on	poverty	through	unemployment	
and labor force participation, a 1.0-percent increase in monthly welfare 
benefits	increases	the	poverty	rate	by	more	than	0.5	percentage	points.	
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Employment growth −10.67 −16.93 −25.10 10.52 12.40 −59.05
Employment	growth(−1) −5.22 −16.74 −23.93 11.05 21.99 −7.90





Population	share	≤	19	years	 28.12 36.45 22.84 −86.17 −30.44 58.95
Population share 20–24 −5.63 0.69 6.56 16.13 38.44 18.40
Population	share	≥	65 64.44 73.18 23.21 −174.65 −151.63 221.30
% population h.s. grad,  
not 4-year college grad
−0.23 −0.12 −0.10 0.13 0.05 −0.19
% population college grad −0.26 −0.09 −0.05 0.16 −0.02 −0.01
Teen birthrate 0.02 −0.02 −0.03 −0.11 −0.01
Wage mix −15.56 10.18 7.17 48.58 31.46 182.35
Proportion of year job exemption, 
AFDC waiver
−0.44 −0.51 −0.32 1.05 0.65 −1.80
Proportion of year family caps, 
AFDC waiver 
−0.24 0.32 0.38 −0.52 −0.13 0.01
Proportion of year time limit,  
AFDC waiver
1.23 0.33 −0.20 0.70 1.19 1.67
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Proportion of year TANF 
implemented
−0.08 0.92 0.83 −2.21 −0.52 3.28
Log(monthly welfare payment) 0.59 0.54 0.71 −1.72 −0.83 3.06
R2 0.869 0.858 0.852 0.944 0.914 0.959
a The	models	include	state	and	year	fixed	effects.
b Blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ generated regression results.
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Higher welfare payments also increase unemployment and reduce labor 
force participation, particularly for females. This translates into an ad-
ditional increase in poverty of more than 0.5 percentage points. Higher 
welfare payments also increase teen birthrates, and this effect increases 
poverty by slightly less than 0.1 points. That includes the indirect teen 
birthrate effects on unemployment and labor force participation. The 
simulation results (summed together in column [4] of Table 4.8) sug-
gest	 that	 a	 1.0-percent	 increase	 in	monthly	welfare	benefit	payments	
increases the poverty rate by approximately 1.2 percentage points.
CONCLuSION
Regression analysis of reduced-form equations over the 1984–2000 
period reveals that state employment growth reduces poverty. There is 
some evidence that the magnitude of effect was greater during 1996–
2000, a period of tight labor markets nationwide. This suggests that 
state economic development policy is more likely to reduce poverty 
when national labor markets are strong. A looser national labor market 
likely engenders greater interregional migration in response to differen-
tial state economic performance, reducing potential poverty-reducing 
effects on disadvantaged original residents. Similarly, there is evidence 
that job growth that is attributable to a favorable industry composition 















Direct −0.187 0.546 −0.075 0.547
Female unempl. −0.105 0.027 0.175 0.104
Male unempl. −0.082 −0.015 0.091 0.080
Fem empl./pop. −0.074 −0.234 0.420 0.321
Male empl./pop. −0.034 −0.103 0.031 0.049
Teen births −0.690 −0.041 0.048 0.076
Total −1.183 0.180 0.690 1.177
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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has a larger estimated effect than competitiveness growth. This likely 
follows because strong nationwide growth in particular industries in-
duces	less	interregional	migration,	forcing	firms	to	hire	locally,	which	
reduces poverty more.
Employment growth reduces poverty through reducing unemploy-
ment and increasing labor force participation. Beyond working through 
these channels, job growth also has direct effects such as those asso-
ciated with more vacancies, increased hours worked among part-time 
employees, and conversion from part-time to full-time employment sta-
tus. Simulations reveal that, both through its direct effect and through 
indirect effects from unemployment and labor force participation, a 
1.0-percent acceleration in employment growth reduces poverty by 
0.5	percentage	points.	Yet	we	find	job	formation	to	be	associated	with	
lower teen birthrates: lower teen birthrates reduce poverty, including 
indirectly through increasing employment rates. After accounting for 
these direct and indirect effects from teen birthrates, the estimated pov-
erty-reducing impact of a 1.0 percent greater employment growth rate 
rises to 1.2 percentage points.
The simulations also suggest that welfare reform does not contrib-
ute to lower poverty rates. Overall, AFDC waivers and TANF increase 
unemployment as recipients are pushed into the labor market, though 
the AFDC waivers also increase the overall employment rate. The sim-
ulated total impact on poverty of a state implementing AFDC waivers 
or TANF is positive. There also is no evidence of welfare reform reduc-
ing teen birthrates, the estimated effect of which is slightly positive. In 
addition, there is no evidence that welfare reform reduces poverty when 
state employment growth is stronger.
Yet	 increasing	 the	 generosity	 of	 welfare	 benefits	 is	 found	 to	 in-
crease	poverty.	Generosity	of	welfare	benefits	is	positively	associated	
with unemployment and negatively associated with labor force partici-
pation. The unemployment effect is stronger for males—likely because 
they have a stronger attachment to the labor force—while labor force 
participation	effects	are	stronger	for	females.	Welfare	benefit	generos-
ity also is positively associated with teen birthrates. Through its direct 
and	indirect	effects,	a	1.0-percent	increase	in	welfare	benefit	generosity	
increases the poverty rate by 1.2 percentage points.
In summary, state-level analysis suggests that job creation reduc-
es poverty. There is some evidence to suggest that a stronger national 
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economy increases the likely effectiveness of state and local job growth 
policies. There is no evidence that AFDC waivers or implementation 
of TANF reduces poverty; in fact, other things being equal, they may 
increase poverty. It is more likely that the continued decline in the pur-
chasing power of the median state average monthly welfare payment re-
duces	poverty	by	increasing	the	net	benefits	of	being	employed	(includ-
ing supplemental government support for such things as housing or child 
care). In fact, the average median-state monthly welfare payment fell 
by	almost	21	percent	on	an	inflation-adjusted	basis	between	1990	and	
2000.26 The results also suggest that employment growth, more so than 
welfare reform, was responsible for the late-1990s decline in poverty.
Although states provide a natural laboratory in which to examine the 
relationships between economic growth, welfare reform, and poverty, 
these relationships at the state level should differ from those observed 
nationally, and added labor market features such as commuting imply 
that the state results would not apply to local labor markets either. This 
cautions against the simple extrapolation of state-level results either to 
national or to local policymaking. Nevertheless, the added nuances of 
state labor markets make it paramount that state-level data be used to 
derive insights regarding state economic development policies, welfare 
reform policies, and poverty. For this reason, the next chapter will con-
sider state case studies in attempting to provide additional context to 
these	findings	and	help	illuminate	how	poverty	rates	are	linked	to	eco-
nomic conditions and state and federal welfare reforms.
Notes
The three epigraphs at the start of the chapter come from the New York Times (1998), 
Archer (1998), and McMurrer and Sawhill (1997). The two epigraphs at the start of the 
section “Welfare Reform and Poverty” come from Moore (1997) and Kuttner (2000).
 1. Other models consider the family poverty rate, but the conclusions are un-
changed, so these models are not reported. The variables of the models reported 
are	measured	 in	first-difference	 form	 to	mitigate	any	spurious	 trends	and	unit	
roots.
	 2.	 The	1960–1973	time-period	dummy	reflects	the	War	on	Poverty	and	expansion	
of	 the	 safety	 net	 during	 the	 period.	The	 1974–1980	dummy	 reflects	 the	 stag-
flation	of	 that	period.	The	1993–2002	 indicator	 captures	 the	 expansion	of	 the	
EITC and the wide-scale welfare reform changes. The omitted category is the 
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1981–1992 period, which represents the Reagan-Bush-I years of scaling back 
the safety net as well as a period of rapidly increasing income inequality. Since 
1981–1992	is	the	omitted	period,	the	time-period	coefficients	are	interpreted	as	
the effects for the periods relative to the effect for the 1981–1992 period.
 3. We also estimated another model (not shown) that added an indicator for the 
1997–2002 period to examine whether the TANF era was different. Yet there 
was no evidence that the effects of the 1993–1996 period differed from 1997–
2002. The F-statistic equaled 0.02 for the null hypothesis that the 1993–1996 and 
1997–2002	coefficients	were	equal.
 4. The additional workers induced into the labor force as a result of welfare reform 
complicate efforts to assess how job growth affects poverty rates. In contrast 
to the 1980s, for people who were both on welfare and above the poverty line, 
job growth may have helped move large numbers of them off welfare without 
dropping them into poverty. Yet the increased labor supply may crowd out some 
welfare-ineligible less-skilled workers from employment, pushing them below 
the poverty threshold. Consistent with this point is that former recipients who 
have left welfare in the post-TANF era have only slightly lower poverty rates 
than	those	remaining	on	TANF	(Moffitt	2002).
 5. We also tried including a binary indicator variable if any AFDC waiver was in 






responding variable on state poverty rates that is not common across the nation.
 8. The lagged employment growth variables for periods beyond two years were 
nowhere	near	being	significant	and	were	omitted	from	the	final	model.
 9.  The wage-composition measure is calculated by weighting national industry 
wages with state employment shares and dividing this by the average national 
wage rate. A value in excess of unity indicates that the state has a greater compo-
sition of high-paying industries than the national average.
	10.		 The	 industry	 employment	 share	 variables	 are	 statistically	 significant	 below	
the 0.01 level. In order of magnitude, the greatest poverty-reducing effects are 
found for increased shares in transportation, communications and public utili-
ties,	mining,	finance,	insurance	and	real	estate,	trade,	manufacturing,	low-skilled	
services, construction, high-skilled services, and government. Low-paying ser-
vices include hotel and motel services, personal services, and private household 
services. The remaining categories of services are considered high-paying.
 11. For comparison to regional studies that used the unemployment rate as the sole 
indicator of labor market conditions, a regression also was run replacing employ-
ment growth with male and female unemployment rates and using column (1) in-
dependent	variables	(except	teen	birthrates).	The	resulting	coefficients	were	0.27	
(t = 3.34) for male unemployment and 0.36 for female unemployment (3.73). 
These estimates lie below the average estimate from the literature of 0.5 reported 
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in Table 4.3. Slope interactions for male and female unemployment rates for 
1993–2000	were	 jointly	 significant	 (p-value = 0.02), in which the 1993–1998 
unemployment effects became 0.41 for males and 0.44 for females. Thus, there 
was	evidence	that	lower	unemployment	rates	became	more	influential	in	reduc-
ing poverty during the 1990s economic expansion compared to the 1980s. 
	12.	 Partridge	 (2003)	finds	 that	 strong	 job	growth	 is	associated	with	 falling	shares	
of the workforce that are involuntarily working part-time for various reasons, 
including economic. Partridge concludes that a strengthening economy means 
that	these	part-time	workers	can	increasingly	find	full-time	work.	Similarly,	he	
finds	that	strong	employment	growth	increases	the	employment	share	that	is	vol-
untarily employed part-time, which also can reduce poverty if this comes from 
the ranks of the jobless.
 13. Employment growth attributable to the state’s composition of industries is cal-
culated by multiplying the state employment share in each industry by the corre-
sponding national growth rate and then summing the products across industries. 
Competitiveness employment growth, then, is total employment growth minus 
the portion attributable to industry composition.
	14.	 A	Wald	test	fails	to	reject	the	equality	of	the	coefficients	for	the	two	growth	com-
ponents (for all years jointly) with a p-value	of	0.16.	Although	the	coefficient	
values differ noticeably, a lack of time-series variation in the industry-mix vari-
ables likely underlies the large standard errors. Recall from Note 3 in Chapter 3, 
however,	 that	 the	coefficient	for	the	industry-mix	employment	variable	under-
states its effect because part of that effect is picked up in the competitiveness 
coefficient.
	15.		 This	is	obtained	by	summing	the	coefficients	of	the	employment	growth	variable	
and the interaction terms to obtain the 1996–2000 effect, then comparing it to the 
employment	growth	coefficient.
 16. An alternative formulation, in which employment growth interacts with a dummy 
variable for 1997–2000, and an additional dummy variable for 1988, 1989, and 
1996,	produced	less	significant	results.	The	reason	for	the	alternative	formulation	
was to determine whether unemployment below 5 percent (as happened in 1997 
and afterwards) had a differential effect from that of around 5.5 percent (such as 
occurred in the years 1988, 1989, and 1996).
 17.  Not all waivers were simultaneously included in the regression because of the 




state family poverty rates.
 18.  Families in Alabama were observed to leave welfare before their time limits 
were reached, using it like unemployment insurance (Crowder 2001).
	19.		 Gundersen	and	Ziliak	(2004)	likewise	find	no	family	poverty-reducing	effects	of	
pre-TANF welfare reform measures, though such measures did reduce the depth 
of poverty for black- and female-headed households.
 20.  Several additional regressions were performed to test the sensitivity of the results 
by adding other variables to the column (6) model. When a variable measuring 
Partridge.indb   106 7/27/2006   1:41:37 PM
An Empirical Analysis of State Poverty Trends   107
structural change in the previous two years was added, it was negative but insig-
nificant,	while	the	other	results	were	unchanged.	Industrial	structure	change	is	
defined	as	one-half	the	sum	of	absolute	changes	in	the	share	of	one-digit	industry	
employment shares between periods t and t-2. It is interpreted as the share of the 
workforce that would have to shift one-digit shares such that the two years have 
the same industrial composition (Levernier, Partridge, and Rickman 2000). In 
another case, a variable measuring percent of employment covered by unions 
was	negative	and	significant	when	it	was	added	to	the	model,	yet	the	other	re-
sults were essentially unchanged. Nevertheless, replacing union coverage with 
the	percentage	of	employees	that	are	union	members	produced	an	insignificant	
result. The share of the population that was African American and the share that 
was	Caucasian	were	insignificant	when	added,	while	the	other	results	were	not	
notably affected. The sample is limited to 1984–1999 when racial categories are 
included because racial categories for 2000 are not directly comparable to those 
used in previous years.
 21.  The t statistic equals 2.76; the largest change results from dropping the female 
employment rate.
 22. We again caution that identifying the effects from TANF is very problematic, 
and	almost	all	of	the	identification	comes	from	pre-	and	post-1997	effects,	since	
that is the year when almost all states implemented TANF (Bitler, Gelbach, and 
Hoynes 2003). With separate time-period effects for the strong economy and 
other changes such as the EITC, it is virtually impossible to identify possible 
trend effects, such as whether the response to TANF changes with the passage of 
time.
 23.  The interaction of employment growth with the 1996–2000 indicator is not used 
because	of	the	marginal	significance	of	the	interaction	term,	and	because	in	the	
remaining	 four	 equations	 the	 interaction	 term	was	 insignificant	 or	 the	wrong	
sign. See Note 20 for results.
24.  Although Hoynes (2000b) reports that metropolitan female employment rates 
are more cyclically sensitive, she examined responses to U.S. cycles, not local 
cycles.
 25. Earlier in the chapter we reported that employment growth reduced poverty rates 
more from 1996 to 2000 relative to the rest of the sample, but the simulation re-
sults are not strongly affected by replacing lagged employment growth variables 
with employment growth that interacts with a dummy variable for 1996–2000. 
When	we	calculate	the	effects	for	the	1996–2000	period,	we	find	that	the	estimat-
ed overall effects of employment growth rise only 0.07 percentage points. De-
spite	larger	direct	poverty-reducing	effects	(e.g.,	the	final	column	in	Table	4.7),	
employment growth generally affected unemployment and employment rates 
less in the 1996–2000 period—though it reduced teen birthrates more—which 




average welfare payment fell almost 20 percent.
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5
State Economic Performance, 
Welfare Reform, and Poverty 
Case Studies from Four States
[The Minnesota Family Investment Program], unlike welfare re-
form programs in many other states, was designed as an antipoverty 
approach to welfare reform, with goals of economic independence and 
self-sufficiency in addition to job placement. 
—Office	 of	 the	 Legislative	Auditor,	 State	 of	 Minnesota	 (2000),	
Welfare Reform
If you look at the number of jobs that we’re creating today, we’re 
leading just about the Southeast in jobs created. We’re going to have a 
positive job increase this year for the first time in four years, and they 
are good paying jobs. I think this administration has made great prog-
ress in moving people out of poverty. 
—Alabama Governor Bob Riley (AP 2004), responding to a report 
from the U.S. Census Bureau that Alabama had the eighth high-
est poverty rate in the nation in 2003
To provide more context and an in-depth understanding of the 
nexus between poverty, the economy, and welfare reform, we exam-
ine four states as case studies. The four states are Alabama, Minnesota, 
New Jersey, and Washington—one from each of the four major census 
regions. We chose these states not only for their geographic diversity 
but because they had varied economic experiences and approaches to 
welfare reform.
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REGRESSION SAMPLE PERIOD ANALySIS
Table 5.1 contains economic, poverty, and welfare-caseload statis-
tics for the 1984–2000 sample period and the welfare reform subperiod 
of 1996–2000. Despite having the largest decline over the entire sam-
ple period, Alabama experienced a more modest poverty rate decline 
during 1996–2000, when poverty decreased from 14.0 to 13.3 percent 
compared to the U.S. decline from 13.7 to 11.3. For the 1996–2000 pe-
riod, Minnesota’s poverty rate declined the most of any state’s; it went 
from 9.8 to 5.7 percent, greatly exceeding the national percentage-point 
decline. Because of that, Minnesota had the second lowest poverty rate 
in the nation in 2000. Washington experienced a more modest poverty 
rate decline during the late 1990s, a decade in which its poverty rate 
actually increased. In fact, Washington’s poverty rate declined to 8.9 
percent in 1998 before climbing back up to 10.8 percent in 2000. New 
Jersey’s poverty rate only declined from 9.2 to 7.3 percent, falling short 
of the national decline in percentage points. Even so, this gave New 
Jersey the third lowest poverty rate in the nation in 2000.
As	 shown	 in	Table	 5.1,	 using	 the	 coefficients	 from	 column	 7	 of	
Table 4.4 and the 1996–2000 reported statistics for employment rates, 
unemployment rates, and employment growth, the predicted poverty 
changes for Alabama, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Washington are 
−0.7,	−1.1,	−1.4,	and	−1.2	percentage	points.1 Except for Minnesota, 
these estimates are remarkably close to the corresponding actual pov-
erty rate changes. In addition, for comparability to the poverty studies 
that solely use unemployment rates, we multiply the unemployment co-
efficients	reported	in	Note	11	of	Chapter	4	for	1996–2000	(i.e.,	0.41	for	
males and 0.44 for females) by the respective changes in state rates. The 
predicted	changes	in	poverty	rates	then	become	−0.4,	−0.6,	−2.1,	and	
−1.2	percentage	points,	respectively.	Although	these	predicted	effects	
are modestly smaller for Alabama and Minnesota and greater for New 
Jersey,	they	are	similar	to	the	first	set	of	estimates.
Alabama
Alabama did not experiment with AFDC waivers; its only pre-
TANF	experimentation	occurred	with	the	Avenues	to	Self-Sufficiency	
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through Employment and Training and Services (ASSETS) program 
in three counties from 1991 to 1994 (Holcomb et al. 2001). Alabama 
implemented TANF on November 15, 1996. Welfare rolls declined 45 
percent from August 1996 to June 2000 (DHHS 2000), and subsequent-
ly leveled off, partly because the cases that remained were the most 
difficult	(AP	2000).	
Table 5.1  State Case Study Statistics by Regression Sample Period  
(% change)
NOTE: Blank = not applicable.
a The poverty rate, employment growth, and welfare cases are reported for the nation. 
The remaining variables are unweighted averages across states in the sample. 
b “Empl. growth” is the annual percentage change in nonfarm employment; “Welfare 
cases” is the percentage change in welfare cases; and the remaining variables give the 
percentage-point difference between the beginning and the end of the period. Thus all 
categories measure percentage change.
c Predicted 1996–2000 change in poverty rates, based on 1996–2000 employment 
growth and changes in male and female unemployment and employment rates. See 
text for more details.
d Measured as the change in the total number of TANF recipients between August 1996 
and June 2000 (ACF 2000).
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.
Ala. Minn. N.J. Wash. U.S.
1984–2000
Poverty ratea −5.8 −3.4 −2.8 −0.5 −3.1
Empl. growthb 2.1 2.3 1.4 2.6 2.3
Male empl./pop. 0.1 1.9 −0.8 3.4 0.7
Fem. empl./ pop. 11.2 8.9 5.1 11.5 8.6
Male unempl. −5.3 −3.5 −2.5 −4.3 −3.3
Fem. unempl. −8.1 −2.4 −2.4 −4.2 −3.5
1996–2000
Pred. poverty ratec −0.7 −1.1 −1.4 −1.2
Actual poverty rate −0.7 −4.1 −1.9 −1.1 −2.4
Empl. growth 1.4 2.4 2.1 2.9 2.2
Male empl./pop. −0.8 0.0 1.9 −1.2 0.6
Fem. empl./pop. 0.9 1.8 0.4 2.7 1.5
Male unempl. −0.4 −1.0 −2.5 −0.7 −1.2
Fem. unempl. −0.6 −0.4 −2.4 −2.0 −1.3
Welfare casesd −45 −31 −55 −46 −53
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According to Holcomb et al. (2001), federal welfare reform led Ala-
bama to initially replace education activities with job search activities 
as the primary focus. Compared to its AFDC program, Alabama im-
posed harsher sanctions and increased enforcement for noncompliance, 
became less lenient in granting exemptions from work requirements to 
care for dependent children, and set the time limit for receiving cash 
assistance at the federal maximum of 60 months. Starting in 1998, a 
broader variety of activities were counted as “work” activities. In fed-
eral Fiscal Year 1998, Alabama had an above-average share of TANF 
recipients engaged in job search or education activities and a below-
average share in unsubsidized employment or in “any activity” (House 
Ways and Means Committee 2000). Overall, Blank and Schmidt (2001) 
rate Alabama as having mixed work incentives and give it low marks 
for low-earnings disregards.
Despite a larger percentage change in TANF program expenditures 
from 1995 to 2000, Alabama’s average expenditure per family in 1999 
was just under 50 percent of the U.S. average. Its average monthly wel-
fare payment rose from $144 in 1996 to $162 in 2000, compared to an 
average increase across the sample of states of $319 to $338 over the 
same period. Only South Carolina ($141) and Mississippi ($117) had 
lower average monthly cash payments in 2000. Yet with the implemen-
tation	of	welfare	 reform	Alabama	began	 spending	 significantly	more	
on child care subsidies for working-poor families than it did on direct 
welfare	benefits	(AP	1999,	2001).	
During the 1996–2000 period, Alabama’s average annual employ-
ment growth decelerated to 1.4 percent, while the average growth across 
states was 2.2 percent. This was associated with a 0.8 percentage-point 
decline in the male employment rate, compared to an unweighted aver-
age employment-rate increase of 0.6 points for “all 49” states (counting 
the District of Columbia and excluding Alaska and Hawaii). The Ala-
bama female employment rate increased 0.9 percentage points, while 
the unweighted state average increased 1.5 points. Although Alabama 
male and female unemployment rates declined by 0.4 and 0.6 percent-
age points, they were well below the corresponding average declines 
across all states. 
Accompanying the deceleration of employment growth in Alabama 
was a decline in manufacturing employment of 5.1 percent from the 
1995 peak to 2000. By comparison, U.S. manufacturing employment 
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growth peaked in 1998 and actually gained 0.1 percent between 1995 
and 2000. The larger percentage decline in Alabama manufacturing, 
combined with a much greater share of employment in manufacturing 
(20.4 vs. 14.7 percent), likely contributed to its less favorable labor 
market performance and weak poverty reduction in the late 1990s. The 
wagemix variable used in the regression models in Chapter 4 declined 
from a peak of 1.4 percent above-average wage composition of indus-
tries in 1994 to only 0.6 percent above by 2000. On a favorable note, 
from 1989 to 1999 the real median hourly wage increased 8.8 percent 
in Alabama, compared to 2.4 percent for the nation. The 20th percentile 
hourly wage increased 9.4 percent, compared to 5.6 percent for the na-
tion (Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt 2001).
Minnesota
Minnesota has traditionally been known for its progressive and 
generous social policies. Minnesota did not implement AFDC waivers 
statewide, but in April 1994 Minnesota began its widely praised Min-
nesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) in seven counties (Bartik 
2001; DHHS 2000). MFIP was expanded statewide in January 1998, 
when it became the state’s TANF program.
MFIP merged the AFDC and Food Stamp programs into the state’s 
cash assistance program. The program also increased the earned-in-
come disregard and mandated employment of its recipients. MFIP’s 
average	monthly	welfare	benefit	and	income	eligibility	for	child	care	
and	health	benefits	were	significantly	above	their	corresponding	U.S.	
averages, while sanctions for noncompliance with the work program 
were less severe than in other states (Tout et al. 2001). Nevertheless, 
the	maximum	monthly	benefit	remained	at	$532	during	the	1996–2000	
period. 
MFIP also subsidized child care costs through the state general fund, 
the federal Child Care Development Fund (CCDF), and federal TANF 
funds. The 2001 annual family income cutoff for child care assistance 
in Minnesota for a one-parent family of three was $42,304, the fourth 
highest	in	the	nation.	The	maximum	benefit	level	for	a	four-year-old	in	
center care in 2001 was $8,208, the sixth highest in the nation (National 
Center for Children in Poverty 2004). 
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Early results from the MFIP pilot program in seven counties suggest 
that it increased employment levels and earnings of long-time welfare 
recipients and reduced poverty (Gennetian, Knox, and Miller 2000), 
while the results for short-term recipients are not as favorable (Tout et 
al.	2001).	MFIP	was	modified,	however,	when	it	was	expanded	state-
wide under TANF. The State of Minnesota lowered the income standard 
for disenrollment from 137 percent of the federal poverty level to 120 
percent, adopted the 60-month time limit, strengthened sanctions for 
noncompliance, and limited education and training possibilities (Tout 
et al. 2001). 
In a critique of the work incentives of Minnesota’s welfare sys-
tem	by	the	Minnesota	Office	of	the	Legislative	Auditor,	the	office	notes	
that from 1994 to 1999, welfare caseloads dropped 39 percent, which 
compared to 50 percent for the nation. Nine of ten neighboring states 
experienced	 larger	 declines	 (Office	 of	 the	 Legislative	Auditor	 2000,	 
p. 25). The report (p. 52) further reveals that although welfare recipients’ 
employment	 rates	and	 the	hours	 they	worked	significantly	 increased,	
during 1998 and 1999 less than one-half of welfare cases had a working 
adult in the home. In many of those that did, the adult worked only part 
time.	Only	one	in	four	had	jobs	with	health	benefits,	and	those	that	had	
first	left	MFIP	were	among	the	more	advantaged.	Blank	and	Schmidt	
(2001) similarly rate Minnesota as having weak overall work incentives. 
Yet	a	study	by	the	Minnesota	Department	of	Human	Services	finds	that	
34 percent of welfare recipients left welfare within twelve months af-
ter MFIP was expanded statewide, and that 64 percent of those who 
left reported that they felt life was better under the new welfare sys-
tem (Hopfensperger 2000). Another evaluation of MFIP concluded that 
employment and earnings increased more for those receiving housing 
subsidies (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2000). 
Between 1996 and 2000, Minnesota’s annual job growth aver-
aged 2.4 percent. Surprisingly, this was associated with no change in 
Minnesota’s male employment rate. Yet the female employment rate in 
Minnesota increased 1.8 percentage points, which was better than the 
average across all states. Although the male and female unemployment 
rates in Minnesota declined by 1.0 and 0.4 percentage points, this was 
less than the corresponding average decline across all states.
Accompanying overall strong employment growth in Minnesota 
was a smaller-than-average decline in manufacturing employment. As 
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in the nation, manufacturing employment in Minnesota peaked in 1998; 
it then declined 0.9 percent from 1998 to 2000. This compares favor-
ably to the larger U.S. decline of 1.7 percent over the same two-year 
period. Minnesota’s wage composition of industries increased through-
out the 1990s, reaching 0.9 percent above the national average by 2000. 
Median average hourly wages increased 12.8 percent from 1989 to 
1999, while average hourly wages at the 20th percentile increased 13.6 
percent (Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt 2001).
Thus it appears that income growth, more than increased employ-
ment rates or reduced unemployment rates, was responsible for Minne-
sota’s greater-than-average reduction in poverty in the late 1990s. Min-
nesota’s labor market was remarkably tight: its employment rate was 
the third highest in the nation in 1996 and by far the highest in 2000 (by 
more than a full percentage point). The 2000 female employment-popu-
lation rate was nearly two percentage points above the closest state (Ne-
braska). Thus, strong job growth appears to have more directly affected 
those at the bottom and manifested itself more in increasing wage rates 
than in states with initially looser labor markets. And although Min-
nesota had lower-than-average reduction in welfare caseloads, its more 
generous assistance programs may have had a greater poverty-reducing 
effect	 than	 those	 of	 other	 states.	To	 be	 sure,	 the	 significantly	 larger-
than-predicted decline in Minnesota’s poverty rate from 1996 to 2000 




jor AFDC waiver; it did so on October 1, 1992, under its Family Devel-
opment Program. New Jersey changed its work exemptions, jobs sanc-
tions,	and	caps	on	family	welfare	payments.	The	state	first	implemented	
TANF on July 1, 1997, as Work First New Jersey (WFNJ). The program 
sought to “help people get off of welfare and into a job” (New Jersey 
Department of Human Services 2006a). WFNJ was combined with oth-
er assistance programs to shift program focus from education and train-
ing to immediately placing recipients into work (Koralek et al. 2001). 
According to Blank and Schmidt (2001), New Jersey’s TANF program 
contains strong work incentives, and compared to other states New Jer-
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sey	has	medium	benefit	generosity,	medium	earnings	disregards,	strict	
sanctions, and moderate time limits. If a recipient is unsuccessful in 
obtaining a job during an initial search, he or she must continue to seek 
work while participating in activities countable as “work” activities un-
der federal law (Koralek et al. 2001).
From August 1996 to September 2000, New Jersey’s welfare case-
loads declined by 55 percent, slightly better than the U.S. average of 53 
percent. Under contract from the state, Mathematica Policy Research 
Inc. tracked a sample of WFNJ families in a series of four surveys over 
approximately four-and-one-half years (Wood, Rangarajan, and Deke 
2003).	The	firm	found	that	50	percent	had	left	TANF,	up	from	34	percent	
three years earlier. Their monthly real income increased from $1,157 a 
year and a half after leaving TANF to $1,543 three years later, and the 
poverty rate among the former recipients declined from 65 to 45 percent 
over	the	final	three	years.	On	a	less	positive	note,	about	one-tenth	were	
off	TANF	and	were	not	able	 to	replace	 the	 lost	welfare	benefits	with	
alternative income sources, though they tended to either go back on 
TANF or obtain employment within a year. Progress also slowed in lat-
er	years	with	the	weak	economy	and	the	greater	difficulty	in	placing	the	
remaining	recipients.	Because	of	temporary	extensions	to	the	five-year	
time limit, very few WFNJ recipients who reached the mandated limit 
had	their	benefits	 terminated.	Individuals	who	reached	their	five-year	
limit	on	cash	assistance	may	have	qualified	for	Supportive	Assistance	to	
Individuals and Families (SAIF), which provided up to 24 more months 
of cash assistance, as well as child care and transportation support (New 
Jersey Department of Human Services 2006b). 
Beginning in 2000, the state created a number of initiatives to as-
sist former and current TANF recipients and low-income families. For 
example, New Jersey phased in a state Earned Income Tax Credit. In 
2001, career advancement vouchers for up to $4,000 were made avail-
able to former recipients for additional training while they are working, 
and a program was started that provides monthly support payments of 
$200 for working recipients to close their cases.
Over the 1996–2000 period, New Jersey’s average annual employ-
ment growth accelerated to 2.1 percent, 50 percent higher than the 1.4 
percent posted for the entire 1984–2000 sample period. This was as-
sociated with a 1.9 percentage-point increase in the male employment 
rate and a 0.4 point increase in the female rate. The reduction in New 
Partridge.indb   116 7/27/2006   1:41:38 PM
State Economic Performance, Welfare Reform, and Poverty   117
Jersey’s male and female unemployment rates from 1996 to 2000 was 
approximately double the unweighted average for all states.
New Jersey experienced a smaller decline in manufacturing em-
ployment from 1998 to 2000 than the nation, though its manufacturing 
employment continued a long-term trend of decline. New Jersey’s real 
median hourly wage decreased 0.5 percent from 1989 to 1999, while its 
20th percentile real hourly wages fell 4.2 percent. Yet the state’s 80th 
percentile real hourly wages increased 4.0 percent, exceeding the na-
tional increase of 3.4 percent (Mishel, Bernstein and Schmitt 2001). Its 
wage composition of industries increased throughout the 1990s until, 
in 2000, it was only 0.4 percent below the national average. Thus, New 
Jersey’s income gains appeared to occur primarily near the top of the 
income ladder.
Washington
The State of Washington has long provided generous support for 
low-income families (Thompson et al. 2001). The only AFDC waiver 
that Washington implemented prior to TANF was a termination limit at 
the beginning of 1996 (DHHS 2000). Washington replaced its AFDC 
program, Success Through Employment Program (STEP), with Work-
First. WorkFirst shifted the focus from education and training to im-
mediate employment (Thompson et al. 2001). WorkFirst contained the 
federal 60-month time limit, generous income disregards, graduated 
sanctions,	and	a	maximum	monthly	benefit	for	a	family	of	three	of	$546	
from 1996–2000. Blank and Schmidt (2001) characterize the overall 
work incentives in Washington’s TANF program as being mixed: its 
high	welfare-benefit	generosity	 and	 lenient	 time	 limits	 provide	weak	
incentives for welfare recipients to obtain employment. WorkFirst also 
initially	included	sufficient	child	care	funding	so	that	there	was	not	a	
child care waiting list (Thompson et al. 2001).
The	stated	aim	of	WorkFirst	is	to	help	“financially	struggling	fami-
lies	find	jobs,	keep	their	jobs,	get	better	jobs	and	build	a	better	life	for	
their children” (Washington WorkFirst 2006). A year after its implemen-
tation, Governor Gary Locke declared that the primary aim of Work-
First was not to get people off of welfare but to “help [them] liberate 
themselves from dependency and poverty” (McDermott 2001). Yet the 
initial	authorizing	legislation	set	specific	goals	only	for	welfare	case-
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load reduction, leaving the development of other outcome measures of 
the status of former recipients to the governor (McDermott 2001).
Welfare caseloads in Washington declined 46 percent from August 
1996 to June 2000, or a little less than the national decline (DHHS 
2000).	The	first	evaluation	of	WorkFirst	compared	outcomes	for	female	
heads of households three quarters after leaving WorkFirst (fourth quar-
ter 1998) to those for female heads three quarters after leaving AFDC 
(fourth quarter 1996). Compared to AFDC, WorkFirst was found to 
significantly	 reduce	 welfare	 use	 while	 increasing	 employment	 rates,	
hours worked, and total earnings (Washington State Institute for Pub-
lic Policy 1999). But according to exit surveys given in 1998, half of 
leavers used Food Stamps after leaving TANF, more than half reported 
monthly cash incomes below the federal poverty threshold, 43 percent 
were cutting back on meal portions sometimes or often, and 24 per-
cent were skipping meals altogether (McDermott 2001). Nevertheless, 
in a study of the postwelfare experiences of 1999 and 2000 TANF re-
cipients, the 1999 recipients reported higher employment rates, wage 
rates,	hours	worked,	and	greater	 likelihood	of	 fringe	benefits	such	as	
health insurance than the 2000 recipients. This suggests that it takes 
time for former recipients to improve their postwelfare economic well-
being (Klawitter, Griffey, and VanNynatten 2002). 
For 1996–2000, Washington’s annual job growth averaged a robust 
2.9 percent. As in the nation, manufacturing employment in the state 
peaked in 1998, but over the next two years Washington experienced 
a steep 8.0 percent decline. One of the hardest-hit sectors was aero-
space product and parts manufacturing, where employment declined 
from 112,000 in 1998 to 86,100 in 2000, a 23.1 percent drop. The losses 
appear to have had particularly adverse effects on males. Conversely, 
strong overall employment growth for the four-year period was asso-
ciated	with	 significant	 improvements	 in	 the	 female	 employment	 and	
unemployment rates.2 Welfare reform likely contributed to an increased 
supply of females, which facilitated greater job growth, but given the 
hourly wages of these jobs, this growth had much more modest effects 
on income.3 Thus, it appears that Washington’s strong employment 
growth and welfare reform in the late 1990s had a more modest effect 
on reducing poverty than did the nation’s.
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CASE STuDy EPILOGuE: POST-2000 TRENDS
Given the change in economic fortunes brought about by the 2001 
U.S. recession and the subsequent long-lasting weakness of the labor 
market, an examination of post-2000 trends in poverty rates, employ-
ment, and welfare caseloads for the case study states may provide ad-
ditional insights. In a general way, they provide a limited out-of-sample 
test of the regression conclusion that the economy—not welfare re-
form—was responsible for the poverty decline in the late 1990s.
As Table 5.2 shows, poverty rates increased after 2000 in all case 
study states, while nonfarm employment (“Empl. growth”) decreased, 
and manufacturing employment declined precipitously. These trends 
held true nationally as well. From the beginning of the recession in Feb-
a “Poverty rate” is the cumulative percentage change in the poverty rate for persons 
from 2000 to 2003.
b “Empl. growth” is the cumulative percentage change in average annual total nonfarm 
employment over the 2000–2003 period, and “Mfg. empl. growth” is the comparable 
measurement for average annual manufacturing employment.
c Male and female employment-population rate change and male and female unemploy-
ment rate change statistics come from BLS (2005).
d “Welfare cases” is measured as the percentage change in the total number of TANF 
cash recipients over the relevant periods. Data from NCSL (2005).
e “Food Stamp cases” is measured as the percentage change in the number of Food 
Stamp caseloads over the period (Llobrera 2004). 
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.
Table 5.2  State Case Study Statistics for Postsample Period (% change)
Ala. Minn. N.J. Wash. U.S.
Poverty ratea 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.8 1.2
Empl. growthb −2.9 −0.9 −0.4 −2.0 −1.4
Mfg. empl. growth −16.4 −13.4 −16.9 −19.5 −15.9
Male empl./pop.c −2.0 −1.2 −3.8 −4.0 −3.0
Female empl./pop. −1.4 −1.4 −0.2 −2.9 −1.4
Male unempl. 0.9 1.9 2.6 3.0 2.4
Female unempl. 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6
Welfare cases, Feb. ’01–Feb. ’04d 2.9 4.0 −7.8 2.9 −4.6
Welfare cases, 2002–2003 6.3 0.3 −1.6 1.9 −0.7
Food Stamp cases, May ’02–’03e 6.1 9.1 8.1 17.8 10.9
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ruary 2001 to three years later in February 2004, welfare caseloads con-
tinued to decline nationally while poverty rose. Thus, as suggested by 
our regression results, a reduction in welfare caseloads does not appear 
to reduce poverty. For example, from Federal Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 to 
FY 2002, the number of U.S. single mothers without jobs increased by 
181,000 (Children’s Defense Fund 2003a). Even the number of welfare 
caseloads barely budged in 2003, decreasing only slightly, which sug-
gests the economy drove both poverty rates and welfare caseloads. 
Despite the reduction in welfare caseloads nationally, Food Stamp 
caseloads increased dramatically, a divergence that appeared with the 
implementation of welfare reform (Ziliak, Gundersen, and Figlio 2003). 
Unlike Food Stamps, welfare caseloads are less variable because they 




Following its pattern from 1996–2000, Alabama’s economy un-
derperformed compared to the nation’s from 2000 to 2003, including 
a slightly greater-than-average percentage loss of manufacturing jobs. 
Despite continued investment by Honda, Mercedes-Benz, and Hyun-
dai, Alabama lost 57,700 manufacturing jobs over the 2000–2003 pe-
riod,	and	its	 losses	were	widespread	across	sectors	(Wingfield	2004).	
The decline in Alabama’s female civilian employment rate (and the in-
crease in the female civilian unemployment rate), which the regression 
analysis shows to be strongly related to higher poverty, followed the 
national trend. This development likely underlies Alabama’s increase 
in poverty. 
Alabama’s increase in the poverty rate exceeded the national in-
crease. Correspondingly, in contrast to the national trend, Alabama’s 
welfare caseloads increased for the three-year period beginning with 
the onset of the 2001 recession, particularly from 2002 to 2003. One 
likely reason for the increase in welfare caseloads is that Alabama raised 
the maximum family welfare payment from $164 to $215, which made 
more families eligible for payments since families previously making 
between $164 and $215 were ineligible because their income was above 
the maximum payment (Crowder 2003). Food Stamp usage increased 
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6.1 percent from May 2002 to May 2003, less than the national average 
(AP 2003). 
Alabama also found that subsidizing child care was more expensive 
than paying welfare. In 2002, Alabama was one of seven states not to 
use available federal day care dollars because they were not matched 
with state money. In fact, a family of three earning $20,000 would not 
qualify for assistance (Children’s Defense Fund 2003b). The next year, 
Alabama’s Department of Human Resources trimmed enrollment in its 
child care subsidy program by not replacing those who had departed 
because	of	insufficient	resources	(Chandler	2003).	Moreover,	with	the	
September 2003 defeat of Governor Riley’s tax and accountability plan, 
the state scaled back its ALL Kids health care plan for poor children 
(Birmingham News 2003). Therefore, lackluster economic perfor-
mance appears to increase poverty through reducing both employment 
opportunities	and	state	financial	assistance	for	those	most	likely	to	be	
affected by the economic downturn.
Minnesota
Post-2000, Minnesota’s poverty rate increased more than the na-
tion’s, and its welfare caseloads also increased, whereas the nation’s 
dropped. In contrast, Minnesota’s labor market performance was not 
as weak, with both nonfarm and manufacturing employment declining 
less than that of the nation (Table 5.2). Minnesota’s male employment 
rate declined less than the nation’s, and its male and female unemploy-
ment rates both increased less than the nation’s. 
Welfare caseloads in Minnesota increased from February 2001 to 
February 2004, differing markedly from the continued nationwide drop. 
This is consistent with the late 1990s experience, in which welfare case-
loads declined relatively less in Minnesota. 
In 2003, the Minnesota legislature approved several major changes 
to MFIP proposed by incoming governor Tim Pawlenty (Minnesota 
Public Radio 2003). The governor’s proposal was based on a pilot 
project in Dakota County that reported success in holding down wel-
fare caseloads (Rosario 2003). Among the changes enacted were these 
three:	 1)	 a	 significant	 reduction	 in	 child	 care	 assistance,	 2)	 counting	
$50 of federal housing subsidy and $125 of Social Security Insurance 
as income against MFIP grants, 3) increasing the maximum sanction 
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from 30 to 100 percent of welfare money withheld after the sixth occur-
rence of noncompliance, and 4) reducing the MFIP exit level from 120 
to 115 percent of the federal poverty line (Minnesota Department of 
Human Services 2003). The child care funding cuts amounted to nearly 
$90 million, and eligibility for assistance for child care was reduced 
from 290 to 170 percent of the federal poverty line for a family of three 
(Children’s Defense Fund 2003a). In terms of income eligibility, this 
reduced Minnesota’s ranking from fourth to twenty-ninth in the nation 
(Howe 2004). 
In contrast to Minnesota’s superb record on reducing poverty in 
the late 1990s despite lower-than-average reduction in welfare case-
loads, Minnesota’s post-2000 reforms were associated with relatively 
poor poverty performance. The post-2000 reforms also did not appear 
to have successfully reduced welfare caseloads; they may have simply 
reduced the income of those receiving assistance. Early results suggest 
the changes have been counterproductive. Yet Minnesota more recently 
has implemented even more sweeping reforms with the state’s Diver-
sionary Work Program. Under the program, participants must wait four 
months before receiving welfare checks, during which time welfare 
checks are replaced with paid rent, Food Stamps, and a small amount of 
expense money. Participants in the program also must spend 35 hours 
a week looking for a job, and unlike diversion programs in other states 
all families applying for welfare assistance must participate (Hopfens-
perger 2005). The uniqueness of the program will help shed light on 
the relative effectiveness of various features of state welfare reform ef-
forts. 
New Jersey
Despite New Jersey’s lower rate of decline in payroll employment 
relative to the nation’s, only its female employment rate fared better 
than that of the nation. As was consistent with the relatively worse out-
comes for male employment and unemployment rates, New Jersey’s 
decline in manufacturing employment exceeded the national decline. 
From February 2001, the beginning of the recession, to February 
2004, New Jersey’s welfare caseloads declined 7.8 percent, which was 
greater than the decline nationally. The decline from 2002 to 2003 also 
exceeded the nation’s, and Food Stamp cases increased less than the 
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national	average.	In	response	to	high	profile	reports	of	child	abuse,	in-
cluding the death of a 7-year-old boy, New Jersey recently overhauled 
its child welfare system (New Jersey Department of Human Services 
2004). The focus of the plan is on providing more resources to handle 
child welfare caseloads and increasing accountability within the system.
Washington
Among the case study states, Washington’s poverty rate increased 
the	most	 from	2000	 to	2003,	perhaps	 reflecting	 its	dramatic	employ-
ment losses. In particular, there was a 23.9 percent decline in aerospace 
product and parts manufacturing employment from 2000 to 2003, which 
was part of a broader decline over the 1998–2003 period of more than 
40 percent. Despite the job losses, Washington maintained strong popu-
lation growth of 12 percent from April 1, 2000, to July 1, 2004 (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2005a). Of this growth, 4.4 percent was attributable to 
immigration, while 2.1 percent was attributable to internal in-migra-
tion. The combination of job losses and population growth dramati-
cally reduced employment rates (and increased unemployment rates), 
particularly for males.
Correspondingly, Washington has experienced an increase in wel-
fare caseloads since the recession, which continued into 2003. Eligibil-
ity for child care assistance was reduced from 225 to 200 percent of 
the federal poverty line (Children’s Defense Fund 2003c). Because of 
a budget shortfall, there were a number of cuts made to WorkFirst in 
2003, including funding cuts to the Child Care Career and Wage Lad-
der Pilot Program (Cook 2003). According to a support services staff 
memo, among the reductions implemented on July 1, 2003, were lower 
allowances for clothing, car repairs, and license fees, and a six-month 
limit for post-TANF recipients to receive support services (Washington 
WorkFirst 2003). Moreover, in May 2004 the sanction for noncompli-
ance	with	WorkFirst	requirements	for	first-time	offenders	increased	to	
a	40	percent	benefit	reduction	for	a	minimum	of	one	month,	and	wel-
fare checks were to be immediately sent to a protective payee to pay 
rent and utilities (J. Martin 2004). Yet in 2003 Washington expanded its 
Targeted Wage Initiative, which does more in-depth assessment to help 
transition TANF recipients into higher-paying jobs, rather than simply 
push	them	into	the	first	available	job	(Stevens	2003).	
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The	case	of	Washington	illustrates	the	strong	influence	of	the	econ-
omy on poverty outcomes, and even its success in reducing welfare 
caseloads. It also reinforces the notion that a declining economy hurts 
the impoverished both directly, through a loss of employment opportu-
nities,	and	indirectly,	through	the	loss	of	state	financial	assistance.
CONCLuSIONS
Case studies of Alabama, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Washington 
generally	confirm	the	empirical	results	examined	in	Chapter	4.	For	ex-
ample, despite Alabama’s stricter welfare program and fair success in 
reducing its caseloads, the state’s progress in reducing poverty stagnat-
ed in the late 1990s as its economy faltered. On the other hand, although 
Minnesota was perceived as having been less successful at reducing 
its welfare caseloads, its strong economy in the late 1990s—particu-
larly as evidenced by strong wage growth—helped that state achieve 
the	second	lowest	poverty	rate	in	the	nation	in	2000.	The	significantly	
greater actual decline in Minnesota poverty relative to that predicted 
by our regression results for 1996–2000 also suggests that Minnesota’s 
welfare program may have played a role in reducing poverty. How-
ever,	Minnesota’s	 scaling	back	of	financial	 assistance	 for	welfare	 re-
cipients correlated with an increase in poverty above that for the nation. 
Washington’s sluggish economy, particularly in manufacturing, led to 
the worst poverty performance among the case study states and an in-
creased number of post-2000 welfare caseloads.
The most positive aspects of welfare reform appear to be those that 
provide work support such as child care and transportation subsidies. 
These help to facilitate transitions from welfare to work and to lift fami-
lies above poverty status. However, the adverse effects of the sluggish 
economy on state budgets made matters worse, as many of the low-
income support programs were cut.4 This made it less likely that those 
who left welfare would be lifted out of poverty, as was evidenced by 
the nationwide post-2000 rise in poverty and by a dramatic rise in Food 
Stamp use. For example, both Minnesota and Washington have made 
their programs stricter. On a favorable note, Washington is increasing 
its efforts to place former recipients into higher-paying jobs.
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In short, the increasing emphasis on pushing welfare recipients into 
jobs	makes	it	imperative	that	there	are	sufficient	job	vacancies,	particu-
larly if state and federal assistance for former recipients is not enough to 
provide training and placement. Otherwise, many former recipients will 
simply be replacing welfare payments with equivalently small gross-
labor-market rewards. In this case, those with the fewest job skills and 
cognitive abilities may experience even more severe forms of poverty. 
Thus, in contrast to recent welfare reforms, given the importance of job 
creation in reducing poverty rates, economic development policies ap-
pear to be an important part of the mix that could be used to reduce pov-
erty, as well as to level out geographic pockets of high poverty. Because 
economic development often occurs at the local level, the next three 
chapters’ emphasis on counties or metropolitan areas will shed light on 




Auditor 2000, p. xii). The second epigraph comes from the Associated Press (2004) 
story “Census: 15.1 Percent of Alabama Residents Live in Poverty,” August 26, 2004.
	 1.		 These	were	obtained	by	first	summing	the	results	of	multiplying	the	coefficients	
in column (7) by the corresponding changes in employment and unemployment 
rates	by	gender.	To	this	was	added	the	product	of	the	coefficient	for	the	employ-
ment-growth interaction term and the 1996–2000 employment-growth rate. A 
final	adjustment	to	the	estimate	was	made	by	adding	the	result	obtained	by	mul-
tiplying	the	employment-growth	coefficient	by	the	change	in	job	growth.	Thus,	
the result assumes that all changes in employment and unemployment rates were 
attributable to the strong economy, an assumption supported by the general lack 
of	significance	of	the	welfare	variables.
 2. For the decade, however, Washington’s median average hourly wages increased 
4.0 percent from 1989 to 1999, while 20th percentile average hourly wages in-
creased 7.5 percent. The corresponding national average increases were 2.4 and 
5.6 percent (Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt 2001).
	 3.	 This	 confirms	 a	 trend	 found	 by	Waldfogel	 and	Mayer	 (2000)	 that	 the	 gender	
gap for low-skilled workers narrowed because of decline in male earnings, not 
increases in the real earnings of low-skilled women.
 4. At least 13 states decreased spending for child care assistance in 2002, while 
others enacted cuts in 2003 (Weinstein and Blank 2003).
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Growth and Poverty 
In previous chapters we found that economic growth reduces pov-
erty at the state and national levels, especially when U.S. unemploy-
ment rates are low. This supports the belief that a “rising tide lifts all 
boats,” particularly approaching high tide, when the tide reaches the 
boats stranded on the beach. We found less evidence that the 1996 fed-
eral welfare reform affected poverty rates. 
However, we have yet to answer some critical questions. For one, 
does economic growth evenly reduce poverty in all localities? Are the 
growth effects on poverty greater in urban areas? Does metropolitan 
growth affect poverty in all parts of the area? Can poverty be reduced 
in remote rural areas?  
Examination of national or even state data overlooks these impor-
tant localized effects. Moreover, understanding how labor markets af-
fect local poverty is complicated by factors such as commuting or mi-
gration within states or metropolitan areas, which affect the ability of 
the poor to get the jobs that lie beyond their immediate vicinity. Local 
responses to economic growth may differ completely from the corre-
sponding national or state responses found in Chapters 1 and 4. Indeed, 
the county-level descriptive statistics in Chapter 2 reveal how poverty 
rates vary greatly across county types. Analysis of smaller geographical 
units is necessary to fully assess the effects of local economic develop-
ment policies on poverty outcomes.
This chapter describes an empirical methodology for the assessment 
of county poverty. The resulting empirical analysis focuses on the “av-
erage” county response across the entire country; we then use the mod-
el to assess the poverty outcomes of various demographic subgroups 
within the county. In a more spatially focused discussion, Chapters 7 
and 8 present separate analyses of metropolitan and nonmetropolitan 
counties. Most of this chapter’s discussion dwells on the links between 
labor markets and county poverty rates; Appendix A describes in more 
detail	the	empirical	approach	and	findings	for	other	key	demographic	
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factors. The appendix also presents several simulations to ascertain the 
influence	of	economic	development	policies	and	employment	growth	
on poverty rates.
WHy ExAMINE COuNTIES OR METROPOLITAN AREAS?
Along with the phenomenon that poverty is locally persistent, there 
are related policymaking and labor market considerations that need to 
be weighed in deciding a study’s geographical scale. For our purposes, 
we believe the optimal local scale on which to assess poverty outcomes 
is the county and metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level.1 One ad-
vantage of examining these geographical units is that they are large 
enough to represent an area in which most residents live and work. 
Correspondingly, economic development policies are usually limited 
in geographical scope, rarely exceeding the size of counties, with an 
entire MSA being about the largest scale in use. Hence, states or nations 
are not the optimal-sized unit for assessing the effects of such policies. 
Decentralization in both the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act and the 1998 Workforce Investment 
Act (Bartik 2001) means that counties and MSAs have a greater role in 
designing welfare and training programs that affect labor markets for 
disadvantaged workers.
Any	 definition	 of	 a	 local	 labor	market	 has	 a	 somewhat	 arbitrary	
nature, which has drawbacks. An illustration of the complications that 
arise in practice can be seen in the view that a labor market can be 
defined	as	a	commuting	zone.	Under	this	definition,	a	neighborhood	is	
far too small to frame a labor market, because its residents don’t need 
to commute—they can simply walk to neighboring job opportunities if 
necessary. At the other extreme, a labor market can extend far beyond 
the boundaries of a commuting zone. Indeed, for university professors, 
one could argue that the appropriate market is national, because the 
participants typically have high mobility and reliable information about 
national employment opportunities.
In most cases, “local” labor markets fall somewhere in between a 
neighborhood and the nation, depending on commuting and informa-
tion	flows.	Yet	there	is	considerable	room	between	a	neighborhood	and	
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the entire nation. The example of university professors illustrates that 
the geographic scope of a labor market likely varies by skill and occu-
pation. Fortunately, analysis of poverty focuses more on the low-skilled 
end of the labor market, which is unlikely to be far-ranging because 
migration rates are typically lower for that end than for skilled profes-
sionals (Borjas 1996), and because low-income residents often have 
commuting limitations stemming from a lack of reliable auto or public 
transportation. Additionally, child care needs further limit the accessibil-
ity of jobs for many low-income residents, especially single mothers. 
Given these considerations, counties should be the units that most 
closely approximate nonmetropolitan labor markets, especially for low-
income households. For one thing, the largest city is usually the county 
seat, which is often centrally located in the county. As well, commut-
ing data support the argument that nonmetropolitan counties generally 
reflect	 labor	markets.	Statistics	reported	in	Appendix	Table	A.2	show	
that in 1999 fully 69 percent of employed residents in a typical non-
metropolitan county worked in their county of residence. Moreover, the 
lower	mobility	of	less-skilled	workers	implies	that	the	figures	are	likely	
higher for them. It should be kept in mind that residents who live near 
the border of their county would likely view employment options in 
neighboring counties as being almost as desirable as a job opportunity 
in their own county. So although conditions in the county of residence 
appear	to	generally	reflect	the	labor	market	options	available	to	most	
nonmetropolitan low-skilled residents, labor market conditions in sur-
rounding counties (with the exception of remote counties) also play a 
role.
In MSAs, the appropriate labor market more likely crosses county 
boundaries, because commuting patterns are more widespread. Yet this 
assumption should not be exaggerated. In the typical MSA county in 
1999,	 63	 percent	 of	 employed	 residents—five	 out	 of	 eight—worked	
in their county of residence. Job accessibility constraints likely mean 
that less-skilled MSA workers have a higher employment share in their 
county of residence.
The issue of job accessibility in larger urban areas spawned the 
spatial mismatch literature described in Chapter 3 (e.g., Kain 1992). It 
becomes increasingly likely in large MSAs that vacant jobs are more 
distant from job seekers; an MSA population of 800,000 appears to re-
flect	a	point	beyond	which	job	accessibility	becomes	increasingly	prob-
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lematic (Bartik 2001). This suggests that aggregate MSA data obscure 
the disparities that often exist between central cities and suburbs, par-
ticularly for large MSAs. Thus, we primarily examine individual MSA 
counties rather than aggregate MSAs; this enables us to explore poten-
tial intra-MSA distinctions.
CONCEPTuAL MODEL OF COuNTy POvERTy
While the county and metropolitan trends and statistics examined 
in Chapter 2 help us understand the underlying patterns from the 1990s, 
they	 are	 insufficient	 alone	 to	 inform	 policymaking.	To	 fully	 analyze	
the degree to which local economic development policies can reduce 
overall poverty or chip away at persistent pockets of poverty, we return 
to	regression	analysis.	We	first	briefly	outline	the	conceptual	determi-
nants of county and MSA poverty rates. In particular, as was described 
in Chapter 3, the smaller geographical size of these local labor markets 
means that the underlying responses differ somewhat from those at the 
state and national levels. The following section outlines the empirical 
methodology used to ascertain the underlying causes of county poverty 
rates.
Labor Demand Factors
As noted in Chapter 3, theory alone does not provide clear guidance 
as to whether greater employment reduces poverty in small geographic 
areas. In responding to an exogenous labor demand shock within a re-
gion, commuters and migrants may eventually take most of the newly 
created jobs (Bartik 2001; Partridge and Rickman 2006). Thus, the re-
gion’s	“original”	 residents	may	receive	 few	benefits,	and	 the	poverty	
rate would be left relatively unaffected. The strength of the business 
cycle also complicates how local economic activity affects the low-
wage labor market. It is not surprising that past poverty studies have 
produced	inconsistent	findings,	as	their	final	conclusions	appear	sensi-
tive to both the geographic scope and the time period used in the study 
(Bartik 1994, 2001; Blank and Card 1993; Freeman 2001; Levernier et 
al. 2000).
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As is consistent with the methodology in previous chapters, labor 
market conditions are measured by variables for employment growth, 
unemployment rates, and employment-population ratios. While these 
three labor market tightness measures capture their own independent 
effects,	they	are	interrelated,	which	can	make	it	difficult	to	draw	ceteris	
paribus conclusions. For example, faster job growth likely raises em-
ployment-population ratios and reduces unemployment rates. Thus, we 
conduct various sensitivity tests and simulations to test the robustness 
of	the	results.	For	some	specifications	we	omit	the	unemployment-	and	
employment-rate measures, which means that the employment growth 
coefficient	should	then	reflect	its	direct	effects	in	reducing	poverty	plus	
its indirect effects through changing the unemployment- and employ-
ment-population rates.
A further complicating factor is the question of whether local pov-
erty rates should be modeled as being in equilibrium. If poverty rates 
follow	an	equilibrium	process,	they	immediately	reflect	the	underlying	
socioeconomic conditions. But if modeled as a disequilibrium process, 
poverty rates may respond sluggishly to changes in the underlying de-
terminants, making them dependent upon past poverty rates. Neither 
the	 theory	 in	 the	field	nor	 the	 literature	offers	clear	guidance	on	 this	
question, and the equilibrium/disequilibrium issue is typically ignored 
by most research.2 
Sluggish disequilibrium adjustment can occur when there are self-
perpetuating effects. For one thing, there is tremendous persistence for 
households that fall into poverty in any given year, and there is also per-
sistence for workers in low-wage jobs.3 Chapter 3 describes how, at the 
neighborhood level, residents in persistently high-poverty areas often 
have few employed role models, which could further inhibit them from 
obtaining long-term employment (Weinberg 2004; Weinberg, Reagan, 
and Yankow 2004). Further reinforcing the persistence of local poverty 
rates	are	migration	patterns:	migration	flows	are	inversely	related	to	ed-
ucation, which implies that disadvantaged households will be less likely 
to leave their current location (Borjas 1996; Bound and Holzer 2000).
Slow adjustment is reinforced by other delayed responses. For in-
stance, in counties that are faring well economically, it may take time 
for employers to realize that the economic upswing is permanent or 
to	 recognize	 that	 job	 openings	 are	 going	 unfilled	 and	 begin	 offering	
jobs to those on the lower rungs of the ladder (Freeman 2001; Holzer, 
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Raphael, and Stoll 2003). Similarly, rapid economic growth may at-
tract new migrants, but only after a delay stemming from imperfect 
information being relayed across regions and from raising the money 
for moving costs.
Related to the equilibrium/disequilibrium issue is the timing of the 
county’s growth-poverty linkage. Poverty rates may be more affected 
by recent economic performance than by conditions that existed for 
many years in the past (Bartik 1993b). Even so, Bartik (1996, 2001) 
contends	that	lags	of	economic	growth	from	the	distant	past	can	benefit	
less-skilled individuals through hysteresis effects.4 A strong economy 
can have persistent effects if, over time, low-skilled workers gain expe-
rience	and	confidence,	receive	training,	and	acquire	good	work	habits	
(Gladden and Taber 2000). However, Levernier et al. (2000) did not 
find	such	local	effects	for	the	1980s,	which	they	attributed	to	the	rela-
tively soft labor market of that decade. It may be, though, that persistent 
effects from economic growth only emerge if the local labor market has 
been	sufficiently	tight	for	many	years,	such	as	in	the	1990s	expansion.
A	final	point	is	that	besides	the	overall	employment	growth	effect	
from the loss of higher-paying jobs, greater industry dislocation is as-
sociated with large declines in employees’ postdisplacement earnings 
and more long-term joblessness (Carrington and Zaman 1994). Indeed, 
adjustments that are due to restructuring and job search could further 
slow the response of poverty rates to current conditions.
Other Factors Affecting County Poverty
Numerous other supply and demand factors potentially affect coun-
ty poverty rates. Examples include demographic factors such as the im-
migrant, racial, and ethnic composition of the population, as well as the 
share of families with children that are headed by single men or wom-
en. Especially for counties, racial composition varies greatly. Higher 
concentrations of minorities tend to reside in inner cities (Corcoran et 
al. 1992; Cutler and Glaeser 1997; Holzer 1991), and these minority 
groups	usually	have	below-average	levels	of	education.	This	deficiency	
reduces their labor market opportunities (Smith and Welch 1986).
County poverty also may be related to population size because 
of factors such as agglomeration economies and skills-matching in 
the labor market, which generally increase wages and reduce poverty 
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(Glaeser et al. 1992; Henderson et al. 1995). Yet congestion may reduce 
productivity, which could increase poverty. Population’s role also de-
pends on how the scale of the urban center affects the distance between 
residence and employment and, hence, how it affects an inhabitant’s 
access to jobs.
EMPIRICAL MODEL OF COuNTy POvERTy RATES
The empirical model nests the equilibrium outcome within the dis-
equilibrium	approach	 and	 tests	 for	 the	 appropriate	 specification.	The	
particular disequilibrium process we implement is the partial adjust-
ment model (Greene 1997). Appendix A more fully develops the empir-
ical	model	and	describes	the	exact	specification.	Descriptive	statistics	
also are reported in Appendix Table A.2.
We separately examine 1989 and 1999 patterns in county poverty 
rates for the lower 48 states and the District of Columbia. Considering 
both decades allows us to compare outcomes when economic growth is 
geographically more uneven, as in the 1980s, versus more widespread, 
as in the late 1990s. The 1990s also straddle the historic 1996 welfare 
reform and other federal policy changes, such as the expansion of the 
EITC. As detailed in Box 6.1, the poverty rate (POV) in county i, state 
s, year t (for 1989 or 1999) will be regressed on various explanatory 
variables intended to capture the direct effects and the interrelationships 
of	the	person-specific	and	place-specific	effects	described	above.
EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF LOCAL POvERTy:  
LOCAL ATTRIBuTES
Sluggish or Rapid Poverty Rate Adjustment?
Table 6.1 presents the regression results for the models described 
above. Columns (1) to (3) report the 1989 results, and columns (4) to 
(6) report the 1999 results. Most of the discussion will focus on the 
1999 labor market results, but comparisons with 1989 will be drawn 
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Box 6.1  County Regression Model
 
The base county model has the poverty rate (POV) in county i, state 
s, year t (1989 or 1999) being regressed on various explanatory factors:
(6.1)  povist	=		α1povist-1	+	β1	cty_typeist	+	γ1	demogist	+	φ1	econist	+	σst	+	εist ,
In Equation (6.1), the X vector from Equation (A.3) is decomposed 
into three subcomponents: cty_type represents the type of county, demog 
denotes demographic characteristics of the population, and econ contains 
measures	related	to	area	economic	performance.	α1	is	(1−	αt) in Equa-
tion	(A.3)	of	the	appendix,	and	reflects	the	sluggish	poverty	adjustment,	





mean 48 zero-one dummy variables that take on a value of 1 when the 
county observation is from that state.a
The	 specific	 explanatory	 variables	 are	 described	 in	 the	 appendix.	
Note	that	the	state	fixed	effects	account	for	the	poverty	effects	of	omitted	
or nonincluded state-level factors that have a common effect across the 
entire state (i.e., they either raise or lower the poverty rate a set amount 
across all counties in a given state). Omitted factors may include cost-
of-living	differences,	amenity	effects,	and	cultural	influences.	State-level	
factors also include state government policies such as welfare programs. 





a One state category is omitted so that all of the state poverty-rate effects are mea-
sured relative to that omitted state.
b Including	state	fixed	effects	or	dummies	 is	 the	equivalent	of	first-differencing	
the explanatory variables around the state mean. In general, if these common 
state effects were correlated with the included independent variables, omitting 
the	state	dummy	variables	would	bias	the	coefficients	of	the	remaining	variables.	
However,	the	state	fixed	effects	may	in	essence	overcontrol	for	other	factors	if	
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when pertinent. Many of the explanatory variables are included to ac-
count for other independent factors. Although interesting, their discus-
sion will be left to Appendix A.5 
Because the matter is closely related to the spatial persistence of 
poverty,	it	should	first	be	determined	whether	local	poverty	adjustment	
is a rapid or a slow process. Columns (1) and (4) present the base dis-
equilibrium adjustment model. Columns (2) and (5) report the equilib-
rium model, in which the only difference is that the lagged poverty rate 
from the previous decade has been omitted. Comparing the disequilib-
rium and equilibrium models indicates that key results are different. 
For	example,	 the	five-year	employment	growth	variables	 take	on	 the	




adjustment process for county poverty rates. Columns (1) and (4) reveal 
that	the	10-year	lagged	poverty	rate	is	highly	statistically	significant	in	
both the 1989 and 1999 models. The large values of the lagged pov-
erty	rate	coefficients	indicate	that	the	underlying	determinants	of	local	
poverty rates have half-lives of almost one decade. Indeed, such persis-
tence	is	consistent	with	the	spatial	patterns	identified	in	the	1979,	1989,	
and 1999 county poverty rate maps shown in Figures 2.8 through 2.10. 
Hence, the remaining discussion focuses on the models that include the 
10-year lagged poverty rate.6
The persistence in county poverty rates likely has two explanations. 
One, households in poverty choose to remain in their original counties, 
and household poverty is persistent. Two, the communities themselves 
have characteristics that are conducive to higher poverty rates regard-
less of an individual’s or a household’s characteristics. Statistics regard-
ing the persistence of individual poverty indicate that place plays a key 
role because individual persistence is less than what would be expected 
if individual behavior were the sole source of the large 10-year lagged-
poverty-rate	coefficient.	For	example,	a	study	by	the	U.S.	Census	Bu-
reau (2003) found that only 51 percent of the population that was in 
poverty in 1996 remained in poverty in 1999, while about 4 percent of 
the population that was not in poverty in 1996 was in poverty in 1999.
The spatial persistence supports the argument that policies designed 
to reduce poverty should include a component to provide development 
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Table 6.1  Poverty Rate Regression Model for all Counties, 1989 and 1999
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Table 6.1  (continued)
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R2 0.94 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.91 0.94
N 3028 3028 3028 3028 3028 3028
NOTE: Absolute values of robust t-statistics	are	in	parentheses.	A	metropolitan	county	is	defined	using	2000	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis	
REIS	county	definitions.	Blank	indicates	the	variables	were	not	included	in	the	regression	for	that	column,	so	there	is	no	result	to	re-
port.  
a Single-county MSA/PMSA, with the exception of Los Angeles and San Diego, which are included as central-county MSAs.
b Central	county	 includes	 the	county	or	counties	of	 the	named	central	city	or	cities	 in	 the	MSA	definition	 in	a	multiple-county	MSA.	
Suburban counties do not include any of the central city or cities. A large MSA had a 2000 population of greater than one million.
c The structural change index is the share of the county’s employment that would have to change sectors in each year so that there would 
be	an	equivalent	industry	structure	in	each	of	the	two	years.	It	is	a	similarity	index	defined	as	one-half	the	sum	of	the	absolute	value	of	




f Hispanics form an ethnic category; thus, Hispanics are also included in white, African American, and “other race” groups. In the 2000 
census,	individuals	who	claim	two	or	more	racial	categories	are	classified	in	the	“other	race”	group.	Because	of	the	two-or-more	racial	
category	in	the	2000	census,	the	1990	and	2000	figures	are	not	comparable.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
Table 6.1  (continued)
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assistance to communities with high poverty rates. At the very least, 
poverty reduction programs should account for the need to tailor their 
assistance	to	individuals	to	fit	the	characteristics	of	their	community,	as	
well	as	to	recognize	that	specific	services	need	to	be	delivered	differ-
ently in particular communities (Allard 2004).
Locational Differences in Poverty Determination
Among the county type indicators, only the two 1999 suburban 
county	indicators	are	significant,	and	no	county	indicators	are	signifi-
cant in the 1989 model. Suburban counties had about 1 percentage point 
lower short-run poverty rates in 1999 compared to nonmetropolitan 
counties.7 Even when one accounts for faster job growth, a popular view 
is that suburbs have other advantages, such as favorable neighborhood 
effects. Thus it is surprising that suburban counties possess such a small 
overall	advantage.	The	specific	causes	for	differing	central-county	and	
suburban-county poverty rates are examined in detail in Chapter 7.
Given	that	job	seekers	may	have	superior	opportunities	to	find	bet-
ter employment matches with higher wages in the suburbs, one might 
expect that poverty rates would be lower in the most populated metro-
politan areas (MSAs), ceteris paribus. However, greater overall MSA 
population is positively related to 1999 MSA-county poverty rates (at 
least at the 10 percent level). Thus, job accessibility and labor market 
information appear to erode in larger MSAs for low-skilled workers, 
which supports claims that job creation needs to be spatially targeted in 
large metro areas.
EMPLOyMENT GROWTH AND POvERTy
Direct Job Growth Impacts
The beginning of this chapter noted that employment growth both 
directly and indirectly affects poverty rates. First we examine employ-
ment growth’s direct impacts, by holding the unemployment- and em-
ployment-population rates constant. In the next subsection, we sum-
marize the indirect effects, by allowing the unemployment and employ-
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ment rates to be affected. In assessing how local job growth affects 
poverty rates, we take into account the underlying variability of county 
employment growth by simulating the impact from a one standard devi-
ation change in job growth. Roughly speaking, a one standard deviation 
change in a variable would generally take a county from the middle of 
the distribution to either one-third above or one-third below the mean.
For	five-year	employment	growth,	Table	A.2	shows	that	a	one	stan-
dard deviation increase equaled 12.2 percent between 1985 and 1990 
and 10.1 percent between 1995 and 2000. Using the results in columns 
(1)	and	(4)	of	Table	6.1,	we	find	that	a	one	standard	deviation	increase	
in	five-year	employment	growth	reduced	the	typical	county’s	short-run	
poverty rate by 0.20 percentage points in 1989 and by 0.14 points in 
1999. This yields 1989 and 1999 long-run poverty-rate reductions of 
0.37 and 0.23 percentage points, suggesting a moderate response.8 In 
other	analysis,	we	find	that	it	takes	time	for	job	growth	to	significantly	
affect poverty, as we discover no evidence that two-year job growth 
reduced county poverty rates.9 
Our conclusion is that strong job growth does not immediately re-
duce poverty; poverty reduction will be delayed until job growth has 
persisted long enough to ensure that employers have to reach down and 
hire the lowest-skilled workers. Earlier in the chapter, we noted that 
long-run job growth allows low-skilled workers to gain work experi-
ence	and	also	allows	these	same	low-skilled	workers	more	time	to	find	
stable employment with longer work hours (a better job match). Hence, 
the	findings	support	various	hysteresis	arguments.	It	may	not	so	much	
have been the strength of the red-hot economy of the late 1990s that 
reduced poverty as it was the length of the expansion: the long duration 




portant than current conditions is somewhat at odds with Richard Free-
man’s (2001) argument that national unemployment needs to fall below 
5 percent before poverty rates sharply decline. However, Freeman did 
not explicitly consider the duration of the economic expansion. One 
way to reconcile these two views is to say that the extremely low na-
tional unemployment rates of the late 1990s were consistent with the 
economic expansion lasting long enough to reach those lows and to 
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reduce poverty rates.10 This interpretation has discouraging implica-
tions for national poverty rates in the near future: a seemingly positive 
outcome of the 2001–2003 economic sluggishness is that the overall 
poverty rate increased only 0.8 percentage points between 2000 and 
2002, compared to the 1.4 and 2.0 point increases for the 1989–1991 




end of the decade—especially for local pockets of poverty. Even in the 
case of the more mild “jobless” recovery after the 1990–1991 recession, 
poverty rates did not start to decline until 1994.
In terms of “generic” local economic development policies, the re-
sults are a little cautionary. First, policies aimed at increasing economic 
activity	 need	 to	 be	 of	 sufficient	 duration	 (greater	 than	 two	 years)	 to	
help the most disadvantaged households. Second, the poverty-reducing 
impacts of a generic 10 percent increase in employment are relatively 
modest. Even this response would require annual employment growth 
to	rise	about	2	percentage	points	more	than	expected	for	five	consecu-
tive years. 
In terms of policy priorities, generic employment growth is more 
effective in reducing poverty rates when it occurs nationally and even 
statewide, at least when the aggregate economy is strong. Using the 
results for national poverty rates in Chapter 4, a one standard deviation, 
1.7 percentage-point increase in annual U.S. employment growth im-
mediately reduces poverty rates about 0.2 percentage points when the 
national unemployment rate is above 5 percent. The U.S. poverty rate 
falls about 0.6 points when the unemployment rate is below 5 percent, 
as was the case in the late 1990s.11 Even the state-level data indicate that 
a one standard deviation increase in employment growth (1.8 percent) 
would have immediately reduced poverty rates about 0.5 points in the 
late 1990s. These results illustrate that if economic growth is statewide 
or national in scope and the economy is already quite strong, poverty 
rates will fall much more quickly and dramatically than if growth is iso-
lated to smaller geographical areas like counties or MSAs. Yet national 
growth alone is less useful for redressing poverty in spatially isolated 
poverty pockets than in the nation as a whole.
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These results clearly reveal that state and national estimates should 
not be simply extrapolated to assess poverty outcomes in local areas. 
This further illustrates the conundrum facing local policymakers: at 
the county or sub-MSA level, commuters and in-migrants can quickly 
take the newly created jobs, leaving fewer jobs for the disadvantaged 
original residents. Moreover, when growth is isolated to a local area, 
low-skilled residents need more time than these outside competitors to 
acquire the necessary training and experience to pull themselves out of 
poverty.	The	county	results	suggest	that	two	to	five	years	of	local	eco-
nomic growth is necessary for that growth to trickle down. The good 
news in a strong national or state economy is that local employers are 
forced to hire low-skilled residents almost immediately because poten-
tial commuters and migrants likely already have suitable job opportuni-
ties in their current location.
The upshot of the dampened poverty-rate response to local condi-
tions is that if local policymakers want their economic development 
activities	to	help	their	disadvantaged	residents,	they	need	to	find	ways	
to focus their strategies directly on their needy residents. For example, 
rather	 than	giving	businesses	 a	 tax	break	 for	 expanding	 in	 a	 specific	
location—in, say, an enterprise zone—give employers a tax break for 
hiring residents (preferably disadvantaged residents) of these zones. 
Chapter 9 describes how an employer tax credit for creating new jobs 
can	be	targeted	towards	disadvantaged	workers,	by	including	a	specific	
residential requirement for hired workers to boost the credit’s poverty-
rate reducing effect. During the early days of the Clinton administra-
tion, there were efforts to include enticements to help the residents of 
targeted low-income communities, but these provisions were not imple-
mented (Bartik 2001).
Indirect Effects of Job Growth
To some extent, the overall effect of job growth on reducing pov-
erty rates may have been understated. Greater job growth may reduce 
poverty rates by also reducing the unemployment rate and increasing 
the employment-population ratio, both of which are implicitly held 
constant in the employment-growth simulations described above. Ap-
pendix Table A.1 presents the results of four different scenarios that 
factor in various indirect effects of job growth on unemployment rates 
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and employment-population ratios. After adjusting for the various in-
direct effects of job growth, the four simulations suggest that the total 
(direct	+	indirect)	short-run	response	of	poverty	rates	ranges	from	−0.13	
to	−0.37	percentage	points	 after	 a	 10	percent	 increase	 in	1995–2000	
employment	growth,	which	is	comparable	to	the	−0.14	percent	short-
run direct impact described above.12 
The Effects of Targeted Employment Growth
Chapter 4 described how targeting state employment growth to 
sectors that are faring well at the national level might have stronger 
poverty-reducing	 impacts.	 For	 counties,	 we	 also	 find	 that	 targeting	
employment growth to rapidly growing industries at the national level 
has	 stronger	 poverty-reducing	 impacts.	 Specifically,	 we	 decomposed	
the	five-year	employment	growth	rate	 into	 its	 industry-mix	and	com-
petitiveness components (not shown).13 On average, when using these 
employment measures, a 10-percentage-point increase in 1995–2000 
industry-mix and competitiveness employment growth induced 0.67 
(t = 1.88) and 0.12 (t = 2.56) percentage point declines, respectively, 
in 1999 county poverty. This shows that if job growth comes primarily 
from a favorable composition of industries, poverty rates would decline 
about sixfold more than if it originated from competitiveness effects.14 
These estimates again likely understate the poverty-reducing effects 
of industry-mix employment growth if it indirectly affects unemploy-
ment, employment-population, and industry structural change in the 
county. In a quasireduced form model that omitted these other labor 
market	 variables,	 a	 10-percentage-point	 increase	 in	 the	 five-year	 in-
dustry-mix and competitiveness growth rates yielded larger short-run 
poverty	rate	changes	of	−1.04	(t	=	2.71)	and	−0.13	(t = 2.29) percentage 
points in 1999.15 
Thus, although merely creating jobs in general may not have large 
impacts on poverty rates, there appears to be promise in directing eco-
nomic development efforts toward creating jobs in industries that are 
faring well nationally. Further focusing incentives and efforts on in-
creasing employment among the low-skilled in nationally fast-growing 
industries would likely reinforce these impacts.
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Other Labor Market Measures
Besides	the	influence	of	long-run	employment	growth,	other	labor	
market variables in Table 6.1 have important roles. First, it appears 
that local labor market churning or restructuring leads to higher pov-
erty rates, even after controlling for job growth, though the interaction 
between	population	and	structural	change	shows	that	the	influence	of	
structural change declines as county population increases. For 1999, 
greater industry realignment increases poverty until the county popula-
tion reaches about 600,000.
With employment growth already included in the regression mod-
els, the unemployment rate and employment-population rate variables 
essentially measure how labor supply availability affects poverty rates. 
As these measures are allowed to change, and job growth is held con-
stant,	original	residents	are	increasingly	assumed	to	fill	the	new	jobs.	
At the margin, when the unemployment rate falls and the employment-
population rate rises, the available local labor pool shrinks and the new-
ly employed will increasingly be less-skilled workers.
With the exception of the female unemployment rate, Table 6.1 
shows that results for the male and female employment-population 
rates and unemployment rates are as expected in the 1999 model. To 
give a sense of the magnitude of the responses, a one standard deviation 
increase in the female employment-population ratio and a one standard 
deviation decrease in the female unemployment rate would have re-
duced short-run poverty rates by 1.31 and 0.11 percentage points in 
1999.16 For men, a one standard deviation decrease in the employment-
population rate and a one standard deviation increase in the unemploy-
ment rate produces a 0.26 and a 0.44 percentage-point increase in the 
1999 short-run poverty rate.17 
These results show that increasing the labor market attachment of 
females is particularly effective in reducing poverty rates. This may be 
accomplished by reducing barriers to female participation, such as by 
providing better child care, transportation, treatment for drug abuse, 
and programs for family violence. Welfare reform has taken steps in 
this direction: 56 percent of welfare expenditures went toward noncash 
work support in Fiscal Year 2003 vs. only 23 percent in 1996 (Pear 
2003). In a result that illustrates child care’s critical role, Blau and Tekin 
(2003) found that among single mothers with a child under the age of 
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13, receiving child care subsidies increased the probability of employ-
ment by about 13 percentage points, after controlling for family char-
acteristics.18 
There	are	still	many	workplace	support	needs	going	unfilled.	For	
example, only about 15 percent of federally eligible children receive 
child care subsidies (Waller and Berube 2002). Nevertheless, results 
from	the	 late	1990s	 illustrate	why	 the	work-first	approach	 to	welfare	
reform did not dramatically increase poverty rates: the associated in-
crease in female participation likely offset other adverse effects. For 
enough female-headed households, labor earnings and the Earned In-
come Tax Credit formed a greater sum than welfare payments alone 
(Haskins 2003).
In	terms	of	its	impact	on	poverty	reduction,	the	rather	small	influ-
ence of female unemployment rates compared to that of female employ-
ment rates indicates that there is no clear distinction between female 
unemployment and nonemployment.19 Hence, it is not so much that 
there are barriers that impede the job search of low-skilled unemployed 
women, but rather that there are barriers inhibiting them from entering 
the labor force. Besides pointing to the need for improved access to 
child	care	and	other	supports,	such	findings	support	 those	who	argue	
that more direct forms of intervention, such as public employment and 
wage subsidies, are necessary if the goal is to employ more low-skilled 
women (Bartik 2001). 
The relatively modest poverty response to changes in the male em-
ployment-population ratio suggests that increasing male labor force 
participation would have only modest impacts on reducing poverty. 
This	finding	 is	 consistent	with	male-headed	households	 already	hav-
ing the resources to be above the poverty line, whether because they 
are in married families or because single male-headed households are 
much less likely to include children than are female-headed households. 
Compared to the female rate, the male unemployment rate has a more 
important impact on poverty rates, illustrating a sharper divide between 
male unemployment and nonemployment. For reducing poverty, it is 
not so much a question of inducing more men into the labor force as it 
is helping unemployed men in their job search to reduce the duration of 
their unemployment spell. Yet it is not clear whether the relatively large 
poverty response to male unemployment is due to a lack of skills or 
whether less-skilled men do not have knowledge of, or access to, jobs. 
Partridge.indb   147 7/27/2006   1:41:42 PM
148   Partridge and Rickman
The literature cited in Chapter 3 indicates that all of these factors likely 
play some role.
The	size	and	the	significance	of	the	industry-share	results	indicate	
that the county’s industry composition of employment strongly affects 
poverty.	With	 one	 exception,	 the	 positive	 industry	 share	 coefficients	
suggest that a larger public-administration employment share (the omit-
ted group) is most associated with lower poverty rates, while larger 
shares in trade and services are associated with higher poverty rates.20 
These patterns are inconsistent with the argument that a greater number 
of entry-level jobs in low-skilled trade and service industries reduce 
poverty, but it does support claims that public-sector employment is one 
avenue to reducing poverty. Because trade and service jobs are gener-
ally	“secondary	sector”	jobs	characterized	by	lower	wages	and	benefits,	
fewer hours, and more erratic spells of employment, this is not an en-
tirely	unexpected	finding.
Our	findings	suggest	that	goods	employment	is	less	of	a	high-wage	
outlet for low-skilled blue-collar workers. Over the 1990s the goods-
employment	 share	 impact	 went	 from	 being	 insignificantly	 different	
from	public	administration	in	1989	to	being	positive	and	significant	in	
1999. Clearly, this pattern could relate to declining unionization, on-
going skill-based technological change, and increasing global compe-
tition, which is pressuring low-skilled intensive manufacturers to cut 
labor costs or relocate abroad. In terms of employment, manufactur-
ers began struggling in early 1998, well before the 2001 recession.21 A 
greater agricultural share also became more associated with higher 1999 
poverty rates.22 Ongoing consolidation in agriculture is likely making it 
more	difficult	for	many	family	farmers	to	have	a	sustainable	livelihood.	
Likewise, the emergence of larger-scale operations such as intensive-
livestock facilities may not be creating stable employment that offers 
adequate wages.
Community Demographic Attributes
It is not surprising that factors such as female headship, education, 
and immigration are statistically related to county poverty rates. Be-
cause most of the results are as expected, they are not described in the 
chapter, but interested readers can consult Appendix A for a detailed 
discussion of their effects. 
Partridge.indb   148 7/27/2006   1:41:42 PM
County Employment Growth and Poverty   149
NEIGHBORING COuNTy SPILLOvERS
Labor and social conditions in neighboring counties likely spill over 
and affect poverty rate outcomes in a given county. We assessed the im-
portance of these spillovers by adding the following four variables to 
the base poverty model: 1) the average surrounding-county poverty rate 
from	 the	previous	 decade,	 2)	 the	five-year	 commuting-zone	 employ-
ment	growth	rate	for	nonmetropolitan	counties,	3)	the	five-year	MSA	
employment growth rate for MSA counties (only for MSAs with two 
or more counties), and 4) the percentage of the county’s workers who 
are employed in the county. The regression results for these models are 
reported in columns (3) and (6) of Table 6.1. With few exceptions, the 
previous results do not change with inclusion of the spatial spillover 
variables.
Clustering of poverty occurs at the county level, even after account-
ing for the particular state. That is, past poverty rates in surrounding 
counties	(1989)	have	a	positive	and	significant	impact	on	current	pover-
ty rates (1999). This clustering likely relates to push and pull factors as-
sociated with household mobility and the spatial persistence of poverty. 
Nearby counties with low poverty rates are the most logical relocation 
choices for residents of a high-poverty county, for whom low poverty 
serves as a pull factor and high poverty as a push factor.23 
To explore the clustering push-pull pattern, the four poverty spill-
over variables and the previous decade’s poverty rate were added to the 
auxiliary employment-population and unemployment rate regressions 
described in Appendix A (not shown). The results show how localized 
poverty can have persistent effects as well as cross-county spillovers. 
Namely, for every one point the weighted 1989 surrounding county 
poverty rate increased, the 1999 male and female employment-popula-
tion rate fell about 0.25 percentage points, while the male and female 
unemployment	 rates	 increased	about	0.10	point	 (all	 are	 significant	at	
the 0.01 level).
There is also support for the argument that localized employment 
growth is a more important determinant of individual metro-county 
poverty rates than economic conditions in the broader metro area. Spe-
cifically,	overall	MSA	employment	growth	had	an	insignificant	impact	
on poverty rates, or overall MSA labor market conditions had no addi-
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tional	influence	on	county	poverty	rates	after	accounting	for	the	MSA’s	
own labor market conditions. Spatial mismatch proponents would not 
be	surprised	by	these	findings.	Chapter	3	described	their	general	con-
tention that factors such as information and transportation constraints, 
as well as exclusionary zoning, limit the ability of the disadvantaged to 
find	or	take	work	across	an	entire	metro	area	(especially	a	larger	one).
The spatial clustering of county poverty rates was clearly revealed 
in Figures 2.8–2.10. Counties with high poverty rates tend to border 
counties with high poverty rates, and vice versa. Although we include 
several variables in an attempt to capture this dependence, spatial au-
tocorrelation of the residuals may still exist.24 Various tests of spatial 
autocorrelation in the residuals for the expanded models in columns 
(3) and (6) uniformly suggested that this could be a concern, especially 
for nonmetropolitan counties.25 Yet when we reestimated the models 
to	correct	for	spatial	autocorrelation,	 the	coefficients	were	essentially	
unchanged, which indicated that the spatial dependence was relatively 
harmless, arising out of the spatial heterogeneity of the model.26 
POvERTy RESPONSES ACROSS kEy  
DEMOGRAPHIC GROuPS
As indicated in the previous chapters, local economic and demo-
graphic characteristics should affect various groups differently. For ex-
ample, while all female-headed families should be similarly affected 
by labor market characteristics associated with female employment, 
female-headed	households	with	children	should	be	more	influenced	by	
welfare policies and responsibilities related to child rearing. Similarly, 
both married families with children and female-headed households with 
children have child care responsibilities. Yet the former group will be 
less affected by welfare policies, and the latter group may be more af-
fected by labor market treatment and discrimination of women.
To examine demographic differences, Tables 6.2 and 6.3 report 
the base 1989 and 1999 model results using poverty rates for various 
subgroups. Columns (1) to (3) report the poverty rate results for fe-
male-headed families with children, female-headed families without 
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children, and married families with children. We primarily focus on the 
1999 results in Table 6.3.
Compared	 to	 the	 overall	 1999	 results	 in	Table	 6.1,	 five-year	 job	
growth	has	a	much	larger	influence	for	the	female-headed	family	with	
children	category	in	column	(1),	but	it	has	a	smaller	influence	on	pov-
erty rates for female-headed families without children and married-cou-
ple families with children. The employment-growth response on single 
female–headed families was also larger in 1999 compared to 1989. The 
greater 1999 poverty effect for female–headed families is consistent 
with welfare reform increasing their exposure to labor market forces.27 
By contrast, the potential for two earners enables married families to 
be	more	diversified	to	protect	against	labor	market	conditions	that	may	
result in dramatic income loss. Compared to 1989, the smaller 1999 
employment effects on females without children and on married-couple 
families with children suggest that there were some welfare reform– 
related supply spillover effects from the increased labor force participa-
tion of single female heads with children. Gundersen and Ziliak (2004) 
also	 find	 that	welfare	 reform	 is	 positively	 (although	weakly)	 associ-
ated with married-couple poverty rates, though they attribute this to the 
changing composition of married-couple households.
It is unsurprising that the female employment rates have much 
stronger impacts on female-head poverty rates than on other groups. 
Conversely, the female-head poverty rates are not statistically affected 
by male unemployment and employment rates. Given the differing oc-
cupational structures of low-skilled men and women, these results are 
consistent with low-skilled men and women not directly competing in 
the labor market. One argument that has been raised to explain high fe-
male-head poverty rates is the lack of marriageable men, especially for 
minority women (Wilson 1987). Yet if this strongly were the case, we 
would expect that male labor market conditions would affect female-
head poverty rates. For married-couple families, female employment 
rates and male unemployment rates have the strongest impact on pov-
erty rates—the same pattern as shown in Table 6.1.
Poverty rate models for children, adults 18–64 years of age, and 
seniors 65 and over are reported in Tables 6.2 and 6.3. It is striking the 
extent to which child poverty, compared to poverty in other age groups, 
is affected by labor market conditions, demographic characteristics, 
and suburban residence. Short-run child poverty rates appear to be even 
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R2 0.66 0.47 0.86 0.91 0.92 0.88 0.89 0.89




a Because of data availability, the total county lagged poverty rate is used in columns (3), (5), (7), and (8), while the overall female-head 
poverty rate is used in columns (1) and (2).
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e) and 1969–2000 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis REIS data (BEA 2002).
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R2 0.71 0.46 0.83 0.90 0.92 0.85 0.89 0.89




SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e) and 1969–2000 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis REIS data (BEA 2002).
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more affected by a county’s labor market conditions than those for the 
18–64 age group, the group actually in the labor market. Not surpris-
ingly, poverty rates for seniors are not very responsive to labor market 
conditions, or to county type.
The	 child	 poverty	findings	 illustrate	 how	 the	welfare	 of	 children	
is affected by the broader well-being of their parents and their com-
munities.	 In	 fact,	 they	may	 reflect	 the	 strongest	 hysteresis	 effects	 of	
all, because current local conditions can have a strong impact on chil-
dren through their family’s income. For this reason, there is a growing 
literature on how a child’s family income has long-term impacts on 
that child’s health, education, nutrition, income, and future welfare as 
an adult (Carneiro and Heckman 2003; Case et al. 2003; Karoly et al. 
1998). These results relate to the emerging literature suggesting that 
early-childhood intervention programs have large short- and long-term 
future returns (Carneiro and Heckman 2003; Currie 2000; Karoly et al. 
1998). A lack of labor market opportunities for poor children’s parents, 
along with the corresponding lack of early-childhood enrichment and 
well-being, may underlie some of the high spatial persistence of pov-
erty rates described earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 2.
The last set of results examines whether the strong labor market 
conditions of the late 1990s and the 1996 federal welfare reform less-
ened the number of people who were very poor vs. the number who 
were less poor. The corresponding dependent variables are 1) the share 
of the population whose household income is less than one-half of the 
poverty threshold, and 2) the share whose household income falls be-
tween 50 and 100 percent of the threshold. If anything, there is weak 
evidence that MSA counties had higher relative shares of the very poor 
in 1999 compared to 1989, all else being constant. Suburbs of large 
metropolitan areas had lower shares of the very poor in 1999—about 
0.8 percentage points lower than nonmetropolitan counties, again all 
else being equal.
In terms of labor market effects, it is notable that there were few dif-
ferences between the very poor and the less poor in 1989, as both groups 
benefited	from	stronger	labor	markets.	By	1999,	this	had	changed.	The	
less poor cohort was much more strongly affected by labor market con-
ditions than the very poor group. Indeed, this is consistent with welfare 
reform primarily prodding those who have some minimum level of skills 
to obtain work. Increasing the exposure of disadvantaged groups to la-
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bor markets was one goal of the 1996 federal welfare reform. However, 
this would leave a very poor cohort that lacks labor market skills, many 
of whom possess physical and mental disabilities that further limit their 
ability	to	take	work	(Freeman	2001;	Moffitt	2002;	Schoeni	and	Blank	
2000).	It	may	be	the	case	that	the	five-year	(or	less)	time	limits	in	TANF	
eventually leave a large number of very poor households without reli-
able	support	and	having	little	realistic	opportunity	to	find	employment.
With the exception of the population share that has an associate 
degree, the very poor poverty share was considerably less affected by 
average educational attainment. Conversely, the very poor share was 
more strongly affected by the share of female-headed and male-headed 
households with children. This is particularly alarming because of the 
short- and long-run implications for the well being of children and their 
community.
SuMMARy OF OvERALL COuNTy FINDINGS
This chapter has examined overall U.S. county-level poverty rates 
using 1990 and 2000 census of population data. The analysis produced 
five	key	findings:
1. Local poverty rates are highly persistent.	We	find	 the	 half-
life of a county’s poverty rate to be almost one decade, a duration that 
seems likely to underlie much of the persistence of local poverty rates 
identified	in	Chapter	2.	These	long-lasting	effects	suggest	that	econom-
ic shocks have lengthy impacts on localized poverty rates, which illus-
trates the need to tailor poverty reduction policies not just to people but 
also to high-poverty places.
2. Employment growth reduces poverty rates after a long dura-
tion.	County	employment	growth	in	the	previous	five	years	had	a	statis-
tically	significant	influence	on	poverty	rates,	while	two-year	job	growth	
did not. This pattern implies a long-term cumulative effect for job cre-
ation that is consistent with the views of those who argue that greater 
labor market experience and the associated increase in wages have in-
dependent effects. Thus, the 1990s economic expansion may have had 
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its greatest impact on poverty through its longevity, not through the 
remarkable labor shortages experienced near its conclusion. Child (and 
their parents’) poverty rates were even more affected by labor market 




3. The link between generic county employment growth and 
poverty rates is moderate. Compared to larger responses found at the 
state	and	national	levels,	these	results	suggest	that	a	five-year	employ-
ment growth increase totaling about 2 percent a year would have di-
rectly reduced the average overall 1999 county poverty rate by a modest 
0.14 percentage points in the near term (and almost double that rate over 
the course of many years). There is another approximately 0.10-per-
centage-point indirect decline in the near term poverty rate that comes 
through increasing the employment-population rate and decreasing the 
unemployment rate.
4. Targeted employment growth can more effectively reduce 
poverty rates. When local job growth is concentrated in industries that 
are faring well at the national level, there is a much stronger poverty-
reducing effect than from generic job growth. We believe that strong 
national performance in an industry reduces the incentive for migra-
tion for workers in that industry and makes it more likely that current 
residents	will	benefit	from	employment	growth.	Thus,	assuming	eco-
nomic development efforts are worthwhile, targeting job growth can 
have a much greater poverty-reducing impact, which would be further 
enhanced	if	firms	had	incentives	to	hire	the	least-well-off	original	resi-
dents.
5. Poverty rates for female-headed families with children are 
most affected by employment growth. Compared to female-headed 
families without children and married-couple families with children, 
female-headed families with children had their poverty rates most af-
fected	 by	 five-year	 employment	 growth.	 Because	 this	 influence	was	
greater in the 1990s, this was taken as evidence that welfare reform 
increasingly exposed these families to labor market forces.
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CONCLuSION
Although the results are suggestive of strong employment growth—
possibly in conjunction with welfare reform—helping to reduce pov-
erty during the 1990s, the results are equally cautionary about the fu-
ture. For example, welfare reform exposed female-headed households 
more to the labor market. With a strong labor market such as occurred 
in the late 1990s, this can be good. But the jobless recovery after the 
2001 recession will likely have detrimental poverty impacts that last 
well into the decade. In fact, there are early signs of adverse effects: 
fewer welfare leavers report that they were employed in 2002 than did 
in 1999, and a larger percentage of leavers report no source of income 
(Loprest 2003).
The results in this chapter suggest how county poverty rates are in-
fluenced	by	local	labor	markets	and	other	local	attributes.	This	chapter	
also shows why it is important to examine different-sized geographical 
groupings. Compared to the national- and state-level responses identi-
fied	in	Chapters	1	and	4,	we	found	that	county	poverty	rates	are	only	
about	one-half	as	responsive	to	greater	job	growth.	These	findings	sug-
gest that 1) extrapolating results to larger or smaller geographical re-
gions can lead to inaccurate conclusions, and 2), it can be challenging 
to eliminate smaller geographic pockets of poverty.
Beyond what was examined in this chapter, there are a host of metro 
and nonmetro distinctions that may affect local poverty rates. For ex-
ample, unlike their rural counterparts, metropolitan counties are likely 
to have their own labor market effects, which relate to transportation, 
housing availability, and information constraints between suburban 
and central counties. Rural labor markets appear to be more spatially 
isolated than their urban cousins, which means labor market shocks in 
rural areas appear to have larger impacts on local wages and produce 
smaller commuting and migration responses (Renkow 2003; Renkow 
and Hoover 2000). As described in Chapter 3, each of these factors 
likely	 influences	 local	poverty	dynamics.	To	 further	capture	 the	geo-
graphical diversity of poverty rates, Chapters 7 and 8 provide more de-
tailed analyses of how local labor market conditions affect poverty in 
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties. 
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Notes 
	 1.	 Metropolitan	 areas	 are	 generally	 defined	 by	 strong	 commuting	 patterns.	 The	
government	definition	of	a	metropolitan	area	is	given	in	Box	A.1.
  2. One exception is Gundersen and Ziliak (2004), who examine annual poverty 
rates	using	state	data.	There	are	other	examples	of	a	dynamic	specification	fol-
lowing from the welfare caseload literature that present evidence that current 
caseloads are affected by past caseload levels (e.g., Ziliak et al. 2000).
  3. Illustrating the persistence in low-skilled labor markets, Andersson et al. (2002) 
find	that	53	percent	of	all	workers	who	earned	below	$12,000	(1998	$)	each	year	
between 1993 and 1995 also earned below $12,000 each year between 1996 and 
1998. Likewise, 54 percent of low-wage workers from 1996 to 1998 remained in 
low-wage jobs from 1999 to 2001 (Andersson et al. 2003). Stevens (1999), also, 
finds	that	about	30	percent	of	the	white	households	and	50	percent	of	the	black	
households that fall into poverty for any one year remain in poverty for at least 5 
of the following 10 years.
 4. Hysteresis refers to a state in which the underlying initial conditions have long-
run effects, and the effects from forces of change are slow to take shape. The 
result is a persistent process with sluggish adjustment.
  5. Not including these variables could create what is called an omitted variable 
bias, in which the included explanatory variables would inadvertently pick up 
some of the excluded variables’ impact.
		6.	 Gundersen	and	Ziliak	(2004)	find	much	smaller	persistence	using	state	data.	Yet	
there are so many differences between our study and theirs that the results are 
not comparable. Besides differences in the use of annual data, using states may 
result in different offsetting aggregation patterns compared to those gotten by 
using counties. As well, Gundersen and Ziliak’s study included measures of state 
income distribution. We do not include income distribution measures because 
there is a high likelihood of reverse causality between the poverty rate and in-
come distribution.
  7. The R2 equaled about 0.94 in both the 1989 and 1999 poverty models. In other 
models that omitted all of the variables except for population measures and the 
state and county type indicators, the R2 value declined to 0.48 and 0.45, respec-
tively, for those two variables, suggesting that the other explanatory variables 
besides	state	of	residence	explain	a	significant	share	of	the	variation	of	the	re-
gression.
  8. As described in this chapter’s appendix, the more immediate impact of a vari-
able	can	be	derived	from	the	corresponding	variable’s	regression	coefficient	in	
columns (1) and (4) of Table 6.1. The disequilibrium model implies that the long-
run response is larger. While we will not regularly discuss the long-run impact, 
using	the	lagged	poverty-rate	coefficient	in	column	(1)	indicates	that	the	1989	
long-run effect is approximately 1.887 times larger than the short-run response, 
while the corresponding measure in column (4) indicates that the 1999 long-run 
response is about 1.639 times larger. 
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  9. Moreover, when the two-year 1988–1990 and 1998–2000 job growth rates were 
added to the respective base models, they were actually positively related to 
poverty rates in both decades, and neither was considered further. In fact, the 
two-year	 job	growth	 term	was	statistically	significant	 in	 the	1999	model.	The	
unexpectedly positive two-year employment growth response indicates that the 
currently	employed	and	new	commuters	can	fill	the	labor	supply	needs	for	short-
term	job	growth	spurts	but	that	low-skilled	workers	will	increasingly	benefit	if	
the local economy remains strong.
		10.	 To	further	examine	whether	the	influence	of	labor	market	conditions	on	poverty	
rates differs in strong or weak conditions, the 1989 and 1999 models were reesti-
mated on subsamples that included counties in either the lower one-third in terms 
of	five-year	job	growth	or	the	upper	two-thirds	in	terms	of	five-year	job	growth.	
There is no clear evidence suggesting the labor market variables had a larger ef-
fect in the strong employment growth counties.
  11. The derivation of the national response is as follows. First, using the same 
USDOL sources as in Table 4.2, we regressed the 1960–2002 change in the na-
tional annual unemployment rate on the percentage change in national annual 
employment from the household survey along with the three time-period dum-
mies shown in the table. Annual growth rates are used because at the national 
level	 lagged	changes	in	the	unemployment	rate	were	insignificant.	The	results	
from this auxiliary regression suggest that a one standard deviation change in job 
growth (1.74 percent) is associated with a 0.87-point fall in the national unem-
ployment rate (i.e., the unemployment rate falls by about 0.50 points for every 
one point increase in job growth). If we go by the results in column (2) of Table 
1.1, a 1.00 percentage point decline in the unemployment rate reduces poverty 
rates by 0.23 percentage points when the unemployment rate is above 5 percent 
and by 0.73 points (0.23 + 0.50) when the unemployment rate falls below 5 
percent. Hence, a 0.20 and a 0.64 percentage point decline in U.S. poverty rates 
after a one standard deviation increase in national employment growth follow 
from taking 0.87 × 0.23 and 0.87 × 0.73.
  12. The scenario we prefer is the implicit reduced-form model that omits the unem-
ployment and employment rate variables from the regression model, allowing 
the	 five-year	 employment	 growth	 coefficient	 to	 reflect	 the	 direct	 and	 indirect	
effects of job growth. This approach suggests short-run poverty rates would de-
cline	by	−0.20	percent.
		13.	 See	Note	13	in	Chapter	4	for	the	formal	definitions	of	industry-mix	and	competi-
tiveness employment growth. We constructed the industry-mix and competitive-
ness employment terms using the 11 industries in the BEA 2000 REIS data; we 
used overall U.S. growth rates to calculate industry-mix totals. In many counties, 
employment was not reported for all industries in a given year because of dis-
closure restrictions. In these cases, industry employment was interpolated and 
extrapolated, while ensuring the sum of employment in the 11 industries equaled 
total county employment. The unweighted mean of the 1985–1990 industry mix 
and	competitiveness	growth	rates	equaled	9.0	percent	and	−0.4	percent	(std.	dev.	
= 3.0 and 11.1). The corresponding 1995–2000 industry-mix and competitive-
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ness	growth	rates	equaled	10.1	percent	and	−0.9	percent	(std.	dev.	=	2.0,	9.5).
  14. For 1989, a 10-percentage-point increase in 1985–1990 industry-mix and com-
petitiveness employment growth induced 0.72 (t = 2.79) and 0.12 (t = 2.41) per-
centage-point	reductions	in	1989	poverty.	The	industry-mix	response	is	signifi-
cantly different from the competitiveness effect in the 1989 model (F = 4.89, 
p = .027), but not in the 1999 model (F = 2.24, p = .134).
		15.	 The	 competitiveness	 and	 industry-mix	 coefficients	 are	 significantly	 different	
from each other. The F-statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the indus-
try-mix	coefficient	equals	the	competitiveness	employment	growth	coefficient	is	
5.41 (p = .020).
  16. The corresponding 1999 long-run poverty rate responses resulting from a one 
standard deviation change in the female employment-population rate and the 
female	unemployment	rate	were	2.15	and	−0.18	percentage	points.	By	way	of	
comparison to earlier chapters, a one-point decline in the 1990 and 2000 female 
unemployment	rates	is	associated	with	a	−0.07	and	a	0.04	point	change	in	the	
1989 and 1999 short-run poverty rates.
  17. The corresponding 1999 long-run poverty rate responses resulting from a one 
standard deviation change in the male employment-population rate and the male 
unemployment rate were 0.43 and 0.71 percentage points. In earlier chapters we 
saw that a one-point decline in the 1990 and 2000 male unemployment rates is 
associated	with	−0.17	and	−0.15	point	changes	in	the	1989	and	1999	short-run	
poverty rates.
  18. Encouraging the disadvantaged to work by improving child care access could 
have adverse effects if the children suffer from poor-quality care. In their as-
sessment	of	this	issue,	Loeb	et	al.	(2003)	find	that	children	from	disadvantaged	
backgrounds experienced positive cognitive effects when enrolled in stable ar-
rangements, involving center-based day care or, to a smaller degree, licensed 
family home–based care. Hence, public support for stable child care arrange-
ments in high-quality centers would appear to have the most favorable outcomes 
for disadvantaged children.
	19.	 Unemployment	is	defined	as	both	being	out	of	work	and	actively	seeking	work,	
whereas	 nonemployment	 is	 defined	 as	 not	working	 regardless	 of	whether	 the	
person is seeking employment.
	20.	 The	 industry-share	coefficients	are	measured	relative	 to	public	administration,	
the omitted category.
 21. Based on USDOL employment data accessed at http://www.bls.gov/data and at 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm (BLS 2006b,c).
 22. Additional analysis indicated that this increase was not related to the large share 
of foreign immigrants engaged in agricultural production. In other analysis (not 
shown), two variables representing the share of the population that had immi-
grated to the United States between the periods of 1990–1994 and 1995–2000 
were	added	to	the	1999	poverty	model,	but	the	agricultural	share	coefficient	was	
only slightly smaller than reported in Table 6.1.
 23. A good example of low-income residents making short moves to neighboring 
areas follows from the welfare literature. Compared to the population share of 
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welfare	recipients	in	the	interior	of	a	high-	(low-)welfare-benefit	state,	McKin-
nish	(2005)	finds	that	there	is	a	significantly	higher	(lower)	share	of	welfare	re-
cipients in bordering counties when those counties share a border with neighbor 
states	that	pay	relatively	low	(high)	benefits.
 24. Spatial dependence can arise for several reasons. For one, spatial autocorrelation 
may exist because a labor-demand shock in a county spills over and affects the 
labor market in neighboring counties. This problem can be corrected by includ-
ing weighted averages of neighboring-county characteristics (e.g., their labor 
market variables) as independent variables and adjusting for the autocorrelation 
in	the	residuals	to	improve	efficiency.	Another	type	of	spatial	dependence	arises	
when there is slight spatial heterogeneity in the underlying parameters, which is 
mostly harmless. For instance, the determinants of poverty rates in rural Missis-
sippi and rural Iowa counties are slightly different. Similarly, there is usually a 
positive spatial correlation in the explanatory variables (e.g., rural Mississippi 
counties tend to have low educational attainment and more minorities, and the 
opposite is true for rural Iowa). In this case, there will also be a positive correla-
tion between the residuals (e.g., the model consistently overforecasts [underfore-
casts] poverty in rural Iowa [Mississippi]), although this has more to do with a 
slight	misspecification	due	to	pooling	than	a	mechanism	of	shocks	spilling	over	
into nearby counties. We pool all counties to obtain the average national effect 
and	increase	efficiency,	but	estimating	a	uniform	national	effect	does	produce	a	
loss of information when there is spatial heterogeneity. Nonetheless, standard 
spatial autocorrelation tests will be unable to identify whether the spatial auto-
correlation	in	the	residuals	is	due	to	spatial	heterogeneity	in	both	the	specifica-
tion and the explanatory variables, to omitted neighboring-county variables, or to 
an economic process of shocks spilling over into nearby counties. For a similar 
discussion, see McMillen (2003, 2004).
 25. Spatial autocorrelation of the residuals was tested with a Lagrange multiplier 
test (Bera and Yoon 1993), using both a Delaunay Triangulation and nearest-
neighbor routines to compute the spatial contiguity weight matrices. The De-
launay Triangulation was computed using a MATLAB program (xy2cont) writ-
ten by Kelly Pace that relied on a Delaunay routine provided by MATLAB. We 
employed the w2 matrix, which is a row-stochastic spatial weight matrix. The 
nearest-neighbor-based contiguity matrices were computed using the MATLAB 
program make_neighborsw, written by James LeSage, in which the number of 
prespecified	nearest	neighbors	ranged	between	four	and	eight.	All	programs	can	
be found at http://www.spatial-econometrics.com.
 26. A spatial error model was estimated using the sem.m MATLAB routine written 
by James LeSage and accessed at http://www.spatial-econometrics.com.
 27. Evidence consistent with welfare reform being a strong impetus for a greater 
1999 labor market response for female-headed families with children is provided 
in analogous 1989 and 1999 regressions using the percentage of the population 
between	100	and	150	percent	of	the	poverty	line	(not	shown).	First,	the	five-year	
employment	growth	had	similar	statistically	significant	negative	effects	in	both	
periods. Yet the percentage of households that were female-headed families with 
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children had virtually no effect in the 1989 model, while it had a positive and 
significant	response	in	the	1999	model.	Hence,	female	heads	with	children—the	
group most affected by welfare reform—was more concentrated among the near-
poor, suggesting that welfare reform may have helped lift many of these families 
above poverty, though this does not rule out offsetting adverse effects on other 
demographic groups.
Partridge.indb   164 7/27/2006   1:41:44 PM
165
7
Poverty in Metropolitan America
That wealth is not their wealth.
—Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Andrew Cuomo, 
during a 1999 visit to Guadalupe, Arizona, contrasting the tremen-
dous growth in the Phoenix metro area with the persistent poverty 
in Guadalupe 
Chapter 2 illustrated the wide variation in poverty rates across 
U.S. counties—both across metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties 
and across central-city and suburban counties. Chapter 6 assessed the 
causes of poverty rates using regression analysis for all U.S. counties. 
While	this	analysis	discovered	a	multitude	of	findings	for	the	“typical”	
U.S. county, it may have overlooked heterogeneities that exist between 
densely populated metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties. For ex-
ample, metropolitan areas may attract more migrants in response to job 
growth, and they are often home to higher shares of minorities. Large 
metro areas also include a disproportionate share of welfare recipients 
(Waller and Berube 2002). Having more than twice as many long-term 
welfare recipients as what would be expected based on population fur-
ther reinforces this high share, giving large MSAs an especially hard-
to-serve disadvantaged population.1
Even	within	metropolitan	areas,	there	is	often	significant	heteroge-
neity between central cities and their suburbs. Chapter 3 described how 
factors such as spatial mismatch and neighborhood effects can produce 
entirely different poverty dynamics. For example, Berube and Frey 
(2002)	find	that	among	the	102	largest	MSAs,	central	cities	had	poverty	
rates that were more than double those found in the suburbs, which 
was also the pattern revealed in Chapter 2.2 This chapter more directly 
assesses the underlying determinants of poverty rates for metropolitan 
areas, leaving it to the next chapter to focus on nonmetropolitan coun-
ties.
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TRENDS IN 1989 AND 1999 METROPOLITAN AREA 
POvERTy RATES
The	2000	census	defined	318	U.S.	metropolitan	areas,	but	we	will	
not consider Anchorage or Honolulu, which leaves 316. As in Chapters 
2 and 6, to ensure consistency we use the same MSA boundaries as the 
2000	census	for	our	definition	of	1990	metro	areas.	We	classify	metro-
politan areas by size groupings; again, we use the same size categories 
for each of the two periods to further ensure consistency.
 Tables 7.1 and 7.2 present 1999 and 1989 descriptive statistics for 
the 15 metropolitan areas with the lowest poverty rates in the top panel 
and the 15 with the highest poverty rates in the bottom panel. Compar-
ing the overall poverty rates in both decades, we see there was little 
change in the overall average for the 15 lowest poverty rates between 
the decades, but the average poverty rate among the 15 highest poverty 
rate MSAs declined by about 3 percentage points. In fact, it is remark-
able that the Brownsville and McAllen-Edinburg metropolitan areas in 
Texas had poverty rates in 1989 above 40 percent, which is the rate 
applied by researchers and federal programs to assess whether an in-
dividual neighborhood or census track has chronically high poverty.3 
While these two MSAs still had high poverty rates in 1999, they both 
had declined by more than 6 percentage points, falling well below the 
40 percent line.
In	1989,	the	metropolitan	areas	with	the	five	lowest	poverty	rates	
were concentrated just outside of New York City, and four others in 
the top 15 were on the northeast coast. The metro areas with the high-
est poverty rates were all located in Sun Belt states, particularly Texas 
and Louisiana. Consistent with the historically high poverty rates in the 
South, 9 of the 15 highest-poverty MSAs were southeastern metropoli-
tan areas, stretching from Gainsville, Florida, to Monroe, Louisiana.
The poverty rate patterns had changed somewhat by 1999. No lon-
ger do the MSAs surrounding New York City dominate the low-poverty 
rankings; the lowest metropolitan-area poverty rates are now more typi-
cally found in the Upper Midwest and Plains states. While certain Tex-
as metropolitan areas are still in the 1999 highest poverty rate group, 
MSAs in central and southern California are now almost as prominent, 
and there are fewer high poverty rate MSAs in the Southeast. In both 
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decades, college towns such as Athens, Georgia; Auburn-Opelika, Ala-
bama; Flagstaff, Arizona; Bryan–College Station, Texas; Gainesville, 
Florida; and Las Cruces, New Mexico, were among the metropolitan 
areas with the highest poverty rates.4
For the key socioeconomic characteristics of these high and low 
poverty rate MSAs, we look at the values in Table 7.1, some of which 
are for 1999 and some of which are for 2000. The 2000 minority popula-
tion	share	(defined	as	100	minus	the	percent	white	[only]	share)	was,	on	
average, about three times higher in high poverty rate counties than in 
low ones. However, Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, New Jersey, had 
the third-lowest 1999 MSA poverty rate even though more than one-
fourth of its population is minority. Not surprisingly, median household 
income in low poverty rate MSAs, on average, was almost two-thirds 
higher than it was in high poverty rate MSAs. The median household 
income was uniformly low in high poverty rate counties, but there are 
metropolitan areas, such as Sioux Falls, South Dakota, that had a rela-
tively low median household income and a low poverty rate.
In high poverty rate counties, both the average share of the 2000 
population that did not graduate from high school and the average 2000 
unemployment rate were more than twice the level found in low poverty 
rate MSAs. There is more uniformity among low poverty rate metropol-
itan areas, though York, Pennsylvania, had a relatively low high-school 
completion rate. Among high poverty rate metro areas, non–high school 
degree attainment ranged from 11.9 percent in Gainesville, Florida, to 
a remarkably high 49.5 percent in McAllen-Edinburg, Texas. Likewise, 
unemployment rates varied from a relatively low 5.8 percent in Auburn-
Opelika, Alabama, to a high 13.1 percent in Merced, California.
Between 1990 and 2000, there were some unexpected changes. In 
2000, there was a much larger gap between low and high poverty rate 
metropolitan areas in terms of percent minority, less-than-high-school 
education, and unemployment rate. The average unemployment rate in 
high poverty rate MSAs was higher in 2000 despite the widespread 
“labor shortages” of the period. While other indicators such as race, 
educational attainment, and unemployment strongly delineated low and 
high poverty rate metro areas in 1999–2000, population and median 
household income were distinguishing features in 1989–1990. Illustrat-
ing	how	the	1990s	boom	filtered	down	to	high	poverty	MSAs,	median	
household income increased, on average, by about 50 percent over the 
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  Table 7.1  Highest and Lowest Metropolitan Area Poverty Rates, 1999
Rank/MSA countya State
Poverty 










1 Sheboygan WI 5.2 112,646 7.5 46,237 15.6 2.6
2 Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah WI 5.4 358,365 5.3 47,687 12.8 3.3
3 Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon NJ 5.4 1,169,641 26.3 67,308 13.5 4.4
4 Nassau-Suffolk NY 5.6 2,753,913 18.0 68,555 13.6 3.8
5 New London–Norwich CT 6.4 259,088 13.1 50,646 14.0 4.1
6 Rochester MN 6.4 124,277 9.7 51,316 8.9 3.7
7 Cedar Rapids IA 6.5 191,701 6.0 46,206 9.4 3.5
8 Wausau WI 6.6 125,834 5.8 45,165 16.2 3.8
9 Monmouth–Ocean City NJ 6.6 1,126,217 11.7 56,183 14.4 4.8
10 Minneapolis–St. Paul MN-WI 6.7 2,968,806 13.9 54,481 9.4 3.5
11 York PA 6.7 381,751 7.2 45,268 19.3 3.6
12 Barnstable–Yarmouth MA 6.9 222,230 5.7 45,933 8.2 5.2
13 Green Bay WI 6.9 226,778 8.8 46,447 13.7 3.8
14 Sioux Falls SD 7.1 172,412 6.5 43,374 11.4 2.8
15 Janesville-Beloit WI 7.3 152,307 8.9 45,517 16.1 5.6
Highest poverty rates
302 Bakersfield CA 20.8 661,645 38.6 35,446 31.5 12.0
303 Lafayette LA 20.9 385,647 30.3 31,177 28.7 7.8
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304 Albany GA 21.4 120,822 53.0 34,554 24.8 8.6
305 Athens GA 21.4 153,444 27.1 34,317 19.9 7.9
306 Merced CA 21.7 210,554 44.2 35,532 36.2 13.1
307 Auburn-Opelika AL 21.8 115,092 26.0 30,952 18.6 5.8
308 Fresno CA 22.7 922,516 44.7 34,933 32.8 12.0
309 Gainesville FL 22.8 217,955 26.5 31,426 11.9 7.0
310 El Paso TX 23.8 679,622 25.9 31,051 34.2 9.5
311 Visalia-Tulare-Porterville CA 23.9 368,021 42.1 33,983 38.3 12.7
312 Las Cruces NM 25.4 174,682 32.1 29,808 30.0 9.2
313 Bryan–College Station TX 26.9 152,415 25.4 29,104 18.7 8.5
314 Laredo TX 31.2 193,117 17.8 28,100 47.0 9.3
315 Brownsville–Harlingen–San Benito TX 33.1 335,227 19.6 26,155 44.8 11.4
316 McAllen-Edinburg TX 35.9 569,463 22.3 24,863 49.5 12.0
Avg. pov. rate, all MSAs (std. dev. = 4.4)                        12.6
NOTE: Poverty rates and median household income are measured for 1999; the other variables are for 2000. Anchorage and Honolulu are 
not included. Percent minority is 100 minus the percentage of persons that consider white/Caucasian to be their single racial group.
a Metropolitan	area	definitions	follow	those	in	place	for	the	2000	census	as	defined	by	the	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis.	For	details,	see	
Chapters 2 and 6.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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1 Nassau-Suffolk NY 4.2 2,609,212 11.5 51,671 16.8 4.5
2 Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon NJ 4.2 1,019,835 15.1 48,906 18.2 4.4
3 Dutchess County NY 5.4 259,462 11.5 42,250 20.2 4.2
4 Monmouth–Ocean City NJ 5.4 986,327 9.1 40,289 20.7 5.5
5 Bergen-Passaic NJ 6.1 1,278,440 18.2 45,119 22.7 5.4
6 York PA 6.3 339,574 4.8 32,605 27.2 3.8
7 New London–Norwich CT 6.4 254,957 8.2 37,488 19.1 6.0
8 Sheboygan WI 6.5 103,877 3.5 31,603 22.6 4.1
9 Washington DC-MD-
VA-WV
6.6 4,223,485 32.6 46,538 15.7 3.7
10 Rochester MN 6.9 106,470 4.1 35,789 12.0 3.4
11 New Haven–Bridgeport–Stamford–
Danbury–Waterbury
CT 7.0 1,631,864 14.8 44,263 20.7 5.6
12 Elkhart-Goshen IN 7.0 156,198 6.3 30,973 27.2 3.7
13 Hartford CT 7.1 1,123,678 13.7 41,446 20.9 4.9
14 Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah WI 7.2 315,121 2.6 32,125 19.1 4.1
15 Ventura CA 7.3 669,016 20.8 45,612 20.6 4.8
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Highest poverty rates
302 Flagstaff AZ-UT 22.7 101,760 33.9 25,859 20.8 8.9
303 Albany GA 22.8 112,561 46.7 24,653 32.1 9.4
304 Gainesville FL 23.5 181,596 22.4 22,084 17.3 5.6
305 Houma LA 23.6 182,842 19.0 21,601 42.0 8.2
306 Pinebluff AR 23.9 85,487 43.9 21,322 34.1 9.9
307 Monroe LA 24.7 142,191 32.0 21,129 28.4 8.7
308 Hattiesburg MS 24.7 98,738 25.8 19,612 27.5 7.8
309 Auburn-Opelika AL 24.9 87,146 25.5 21,227 26.8 6.7
310 Las Cruces NM 26.5 135,510 8.7 21,859 29.6 9.4
311 Lafayette LA 26.6 344,953 28.4 20,074 36.4 9.5
312 Bryan–College Station TX 26.7 121,862 22.2 20,411 20.2 5.7
313 El Paso TX 26.8 591,610 23.4 22,644 36.3 10.7
314 Laredo TX 38.2 133,239 29.5 18,074 52.2 11.6
315 Brownsville–Harlingen–San Benito TX 39.7 260,120 17.6 17,336 50.0 13.3
316 McAllen-Edinburg TX 41.9 383,545 25.2 16,703 53.4 14.3
Avg. pov. rate, all MSAs (std. dev. = 5.1)                             13.6
NOTE: Poverty rates and median household income are measured for 1989; the other variables are for 1990. Anchorage and Honolulu are 
not included. Percent minority is 100 minus the percentage that consider white/Caucasian to be their single racial group.
a Metropolitan	area	definitions	follow	those	in	place	for	the	2000	census	as	defined	by	the	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis.	For	details,	see	
Chapters 2 and 6.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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decade for the high poverty rate metro areas, while the corresponding 
increase for low poverty rate areas was only about 25 percent.5 Hence, 
despite a relative weakening in some indicators over the decade, the 3-
percentage-point average decline in the poverty rate in the high poverty 
group appears to relate to greater household income.
POvERTy RATES By METROPOLITAN SIzE
Tables 7.3 and 7.4 report 1999–2000 and 1989–1990 socioeconom-
ic indicators in large, medium, and small metro areas for the highest 
and	lowest	poverty	rate	MSAs	in	each	size	classification.	Following	the	
classification	criteria	used	in	Chapters	2	and	6,	“large”	metropolitan	ar-
eas are the 61 MSAs with a 2000 population greater than 1 million. For 
these	61	MSAs,	the	lowest	and	highest	five	poverty	rates	are	reported.	
Cities with a 2000 population of less than one million were divided 
into 160 “small” metropolitan areas of less than 300,000 people and 
95 “medium” metropolitan areas of between 300,000 and 1,000,000 
people. For the small and medium MSA groups, the lowest and highest 
10 metropolitan areas in terms of poverty rates are reported.
On the positive side, among the largest metropolitan areas in 1999, 
Minneapolis–St. Paul broke into the lowest poverty group. A more dis-
couraging	finding	for	large	metro	areas	in	1999	is	that	the	two	largest	
U.S. metropolitan areas—New York and Los Angeles–Long Beach—




The medium-sized metropolitan areas with the lowest poverty rates 
in 1999 tend to be concentrated in Pennsylvania, Delaware, and the 
Midwest. Nine of the ten highest poverty rate medium-sized MSAs 
were in Louisiana, Texas, and California, with the highest rates found 
near the Rio Grande. The one outlier—an MSA encompassing Hun-
tington, West Virginia, and Ashland, Ohio—is located in Appalachia. 
Among the smaller metropolitan areas, the lowest poverty rates tend 
to be concentrated in the Upper Midwest. Eight of the ten highest pov-
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erty rates among small metro areas were located in the Deep South and 
Texas, including a strong representation of college towns.
Not surprisingly, a consistent pattern across the three size groups 
is that the highest-poverty metropolitan areas tend to have two to four 
times greater minority population shares than the lowest poverty rate 
MSAs. Yet there are exceptions, such as Huntington-Ashland, which 
had only about a 4 percent minority share even though its 1999 poverty 
rate was over 18 percent. One distinction across the size categories is 
that the highest-poverty large metropolitan areas tend to have lower 
unemployment rates than the corresponding medium and small metro-
politan areas.
Table 7.5 reports the largest and smallest decreases in poverty rates 
between 1989 and 1999 using the same three size categories. One pat-
tern that emerges in Table 7.3 is that areas with high poverty rates in 
1989 had among the largest declines— a reversion to the mean. Across 
the size groupings, the largest declines often occurred in Texas metro 
areas or in other historically high-poverty southern MSAs. Michigan’s 
Rust Belt metropolitan areas were among the group with the greatest 
declines in poverty rates (Detroit, Flint, and Saginaw–Bay City–Mid-
land), and there were rapid declines in high-amenity magnets in Ari-
zona, Colorado, and Utah. Consistently, MSAs that experienced the 
largest poverty rate declines tended to be less populated.
A troubling pattern is that the greatest poverty rate increases were 
clustered near heavily populated New York and Los Angeles. Both ar-
eas struggled in the early 1990s, and their 2000 unemployment rates 
had	grown	from	their	1990	levels.	They	also	experienced	large	influxes	
of foreign immigrants, which may have placed further pressure on the 
wages and opportunities of disadvantaged native workers. Like the 
New York City and Los Angeles MSAs, small and medium-sized New 
York and California metropolitan areas experienced among the highest 
increases in poverty rates. A feature they have in common with the two 
largest cities is that these smaller areas did not appreciably gain from 
the 1990s economic boom.
Perhaps the clearest way an area’s overall health is revealed is 
through	its	net	migration	flows	(Partridge	and	Rickman	2003a).	Table	
7.5 shows that among medium and large metropolitan areas, those hav-
ing the largest decreases in poverty rates in the 1990s also had popula-
tion growth rates about 2 percentage points greater on average than 
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Large: MSA pop. ≥ 1 million
Lowest poverty rates
1 Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon NJ 5.4 1,169,641 26.3 67,308 13.5 4.4
2 Nassau-Suffolk NY 5.6 2,753,913 18.0 68,555 13.6 3.8
3 Monmouth–Ocean City NJ 6.6 1,126,217 11.7 56,183 14.4 4.8
4 Minneapolis–St. Paul MN-WI 6.7 2,968,806 13.9 54,481 9.4 3.5
5 Washington DC-MD-
VA-WV




15.3 1,135,614 47.1 40,101 20.2 6.4
58 Los Angeles–Long Beach CA 17.9 9,519,338 51.4 42,189 30.1 8.2
59 Miami FL 18.0 2,253,362 30.3 35,966 32.1 8.7
60 New Orleans LA 18.4 1,337,726 42.7 35,784 22.3 6.8
61 New York NY 19.5 9,314,235 51.2 42,137 26.0 8.8
Medium: MSA pop. > 300,000 & < 1 million
Lowest poverty rates
1 Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah WI 5.4 358,365 5.3 47,687 12.8 3.3
2 York PA 6.7 381,751 7.2 45,268 19.3 3.6
3 Des Moines IA 7.5 456,022 10.2 46,709 11.4 4.4
4 Lancaster PA 7.8 470,658 8.4 45,507 22.6 3.0
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5 Colorado Springs CO 8.0 516,929 18.7 46,844 8.7 4.7
6 Santa Rosa CA 8.1 458,614 18.5 53,076 15.1 4.3
7 Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle PA 8.1 629,401 12.2 43,172 16.9 3.9
8 Fort Wayne IN 8.2 502,141 11.9 42,876 14.7 4.2
9 Ann Arbor MI 8.2 578,736 14.6 55,101 9.9 3.8
10 Wilmington-Newark DE-MD 8.2 586,216 23.9 52,139 15.2 5.0
Highest poverty rates
86 Corpus Christi TX 18.2 380,783 27.0 35,761 26.1 7.6
87 Huntington-Ashland KY-OH-
WV
18.3 315,538 4.0 29,380 24.4 7.9
88 Shreveport–Bossier City LA 19.2 392,302 40.3 33,079 21.1 8.2
89 Bakersfield CA 20.8 661,645 38.6 35,446 31.5 12.0
90 Lafayette LA 20.9 385,647 30.3 31,177 28.7 7.8
91 Fresno CA 22.7 922,516 44.7 34,933 32.8 12.0
92 El Paso TX 23.8 679,622 25.9 31,051 34.2 9.5
93 Visalia-Tulare-Porterville CA 23.9 368,021 42.1 33,983 38.3 12.7
94 Brownsville–Harlingen–San Benito TX 33.1 335,227 19.6 26,155 44.8 11.4
95 McAllen-Edinburg TX 35.9 569,463 22.3 24,863 49.5 12.0
Small: MSA pop. ≤ 300,000
Lowest poverty rates
1 Sheboygan WI 5.2 112,646 7.5 46,237 15.6 2.6
2 New London–Norwich CT 6.4 259,088 13.1 50,646 14.0 4.1
3 Rochester MN 6.4 124,277 9.7 51,316 8.9 3.7
4 Cedar Rapids IA 6.5 191,701 6.0 46,206 9.4 3.5
5 Wausau WI 6.6 125,834 5.8 45,165 16.2 3.8
(continued)
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6 Barnstable-Yarmouth MA 6.9 222,230 5.7 45,933 8.2 5.2
7 Green Bay WI 6.9 226,778 8.8 46,447 13.7 3.8
8 Sioux Falls SD 7.1 172,412 6.5 43,374 11.4 2.8
9 Janesville-Beloit WI 7.3 152,307 8.9 45,517 16.1 5.6
10 Kenosha WI 7.5 149,577 11.5 46,970 16.5 5.8
Highest poverty rates
151 Alexandria LA 20.5 126,337 33.8 29,856 25.4 7.1
152 Monroe LA 20.7 147,250 35.6 32,047 21.4 8.2
153 Albany GA 21.4 120,822 53.0 34,554 24.8 8.6
154 Athens GA 21.4 153,444 27.1 34,317 19.9 7.9
155 Merced CA 21.7 210,554 44.2 35,532 36.2 13.1
156 Auburn-Opelika AL 21.8 115,092 26.0 30,952 18.6 5.8
157 Gainesville FL 22.8 217,955 26.5 31,426 11.9 7.0
158 Las Cruces NM 25.4 174,682 32.1 29,808 30.0 9.2
159 Bryan-College Station TX 26.9 152,415 25.4 29,104 18.7 8.5
160 Laredo TX 31.2 193,117 17.8 28,100 47.0 9.3
NOTE:	Large:	MSA	pop.	≥	1	million	in	2000,	avg.	1999	pov.	rate	=	10.6	(std.	dev.	=	2.9).	Medium:	MSA	pop.	>	300,000	&	<	1	million	
in	2000,	avg.	1999	pov.	rate	=	12.7	(std.	dev.	=	4.9).	Small:	MSA	pop.	≤	300,000,	avg.	1999	pov.	rate	=	13.3	(std.	dev.	=	4.3).	Poverty	
rates and median household income are measured for 1999; the other variables are for 2000. Anchorage and Honolulu are not included. 
Percent minority is 100 minus the percentage that consider white/Caucasian to be their single racial group.
a Metropolitan	area	definitions	follow	those	in	place	for	the	2000	census	as	defined	by	the	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis.	For	details,	see	
Chapters 2 and 6.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
  Table 7.3  (continued)
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those that had the largest poverty rate increases (or smallest decreases). 
For the smallest MSAs, those with the greatest declines in poverty rates 
averaged approximately 4 percentage points larger population growth 
than the least successful ones. This pattern is consistent with metro ar-
eas that had the most rapid declines in poverty rates becoming generally 
more attractive to the overall population. Yet, as column (10) shows, it 
was only in the small and medium-sized MSAs that the more rapid aver-
age	population	growth	translated	into	a	significant	advantage	in	average	
employment growth. In these MSAs, it appears that favorable economic 
conditions attracted new migrants while also improving wage and job 
opportunities for the disadvantaged.
There is no clear relationship between the minority population 
share and whether an MSA experienced one of the largest or smallest 
declines in poverty rates. For example, poverty rates declined rapidly in 
Memphis, Tennessee, which had a 47 percent minority population share 
in 2000, and also in Grand Junction, Colorado, which had an 8 percent 
minority population share. The same can be said about metro areas that 
experienced the largest increases in poverty rates. New York and Los 
Angeles are prime examples of cities having high minority population 
shares, while Elmira and Binghamton, New York, have the opposite 
characteristics. But all experienced large increases in poverty rates.
However, a more telling demographic was recent immigrant popu-
lation. Metro areas with the largest poverty rate declines tended to have 
about half the share of recent immigrants as those with the smallest 
declines.6 One surprising pattern is that the MSAs with the most rapid 
declines in poverty rates had approximately the same adult population 
share that did not graduate from high school as those that had the great-
est increases (or slowest declines). Similarly, MSAs with the fastest 
increases in poverty rates tended to have higher median household in-
comes than those with the greatest declines.
The	above	finding	demonstrates	that	economic	conditions	are	im-
portant. MSAs with the largest poverty rate declines consistently had 
lower unemployment rates in 2000 than in 1990, and the opposite ap-
plied for those with the largest increases (or smallest decreases). While 
the link is not as strong, metropolitan areas with the largest poverty rate 
declines tended to have faster job growth.
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Large: MSA pop. ≥ 1 million
Lowest poverty rates
1 Nassau-Suffolk NY 4.2 2,753,913 2,609,212 11.5 51,671 16.8 4.5
2 Middlesex-Somerset-
Hunterdon
NJ 4.2 1,169,641 1,019,835 15.1 48,906 18.2 4.4
3 Monmouth–Ocean City NJ 5.4 1,126,217 986,327 9.1 40,289 20.7 5.5
4 Bergen-Passaic NJ 6.1 1,373,167 1,278,440 18.2 45,119 22.7 5.4
5 Washington DC-MD-
VA-WV
6.6 4,923,153 4,223,485 32.6 46,538 15.7 3.7
Highest poverty rates
57 New York NY 17.5 9,314,235 8,546,846 43.5 32,490 29.7 8.3
58 Miami FL 17.9 2,253,362 1,937,094 26.9 26,909 35.0 7.7
59 Memphis AR-MS-TN 18.5 1,135,614 1,007,306 42.0 26,890 26.9 7.3
60 San Antonio TX 19.5 1,592,383 1,324,749 24.6 26,060 27.5 8.3
61 New Orleans LA 21.3 1,337,726 1,285,270 37.8 24,456 28.1 9.2
Medium: MSA pop. >300,000 & < 1 million
Lowest poverty rates
1 York PA 6.3 381,751 339,574 4.8 32,605 27.2 3.8
2 Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah WI 7.2 358,365 315,121 2.6 32,125 19.1 4.1
Table 7.4  Highest and Lowest Poverty Rates for Large, Medium, and Small Metropolitan Areas, 1989
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3 Ventura CA 7.3 753,197 669,016 20.8 45,612 20.6 4.8
4 Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa CA 7.3 518,821 451,186 27.8 38,539 17.8 5.8
5 Trenton NJ 7.4 350,761 325,824 24.8 41,227 22.9 5.2
6 Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton PA 7.5 637,958 595,081 5.7 31,971 26.5 4.7
7 Wilmington-Newark DE-MD 7.5 586,216 513,293 17.5 38,256 20.5 3.9
8 Santa Rosa CA 7.6 458,614 388,222 9.3 36,299 15.6 4.8
9 Fort Wayne IN 7.6 502,141 456,281 8.4 31,318 20.0 4.8
10 Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle PA 7.8 629,401 587,986 8.6 31,755 23.1 3.8
Highest poverty rates
86 Mobile AL 19.9 540,258 476,923 28.9 23,554 29.2 8.2
87 Huntington-Ashland KY-OH-WV 20.3 315,538 312,529 2.6 21,172 33.3 9.4
88 Fresno CA 21.0 922,516 755,580 35.5 26,493 34.1 9.8
89 Corpus Christi TX 21.6 380,783 349,894 24.1 24,922 32.4 8.6
90 Shreveport–Bossier City LA 22.4 392,302 376,330 35.7 22,822 26.5 10.7
91 Visalia-Tulare-Porterville CA 22.6 368,021 311,921 34.1 24,450 39.8 10.7
92 Lafayette LA 26.6 385,647 344,953 28.4 20,074 36.4 9.5
93 El Paso TX 26.8 679,622 591,610 23.4 22,644 36.3 10.7
94 Brownsville–Harlingen–
San Benito
TX 39.7 335,227 260,120 17.6 17,336 50.0 13.3
95 McAllen-Edinburg TX 41.9 569,463 383,545 25.2 16,703 53.4 14.3
Small: MSA pop. ≤ 300,000
Lowest poverty rates
1 Dutchess County NY 5.4 280,150 259,462 11.5 42,250 20.2 4.2
2 New London–Norwich CT 6.4 259,088 254,957 8.2 37,488 19.1 6.0
(continued)
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3 Sheboygan WI 6.5 112,646 103,877 3.5 31,603 22.6 4.1
4 Rochester MN 6.9 124,277 106,470 4.1 35,789 12.0 3.4
5 Elkhart-Goshen IN 7.0 182,791 156,198 6.3 30,973 27.2 3.7
6 Barnstable-Yarmouth MA 7.5 222,230 186,605 3.8 31,766 11.6 7.1
7 Punta Gorda FL 7.5 141,627 110,975 5.1 25,746 24.3 4.5
8 Sioux Falls SD 7.8 172,412 139,236 2.5 27,850 17.3 2.8
9 Wausau WI 7.9 125,834 115,400 2.6 30,143 24.1 3.9
10 Portland ME 8.0 265,612 243,135 2.0 32,286 15.0 5.2
Highest poverty rates
151 Albany GA 22.8 120,822 112,561 46.7 24,653 32.1 9.4
152 Gainesville FL 23.5 217,955 181,596 22.4 22,084 17.3 5.6
153 Houma LA 23.6 194,477 182,842 19.0 21,601 42.0 8.2
154 Pinebluff AR 23.9 84,278 85,487 43.9 21,322 34.1 9.9
155 Monroe LA 24.7 147,250 142,191 32.0 21,129 28.4 8.7
156 Hattiesburg MS 24.7 111,674 98,738 25.8 19,612 27.5 7.8
157 Auburn-Opelika AL 24.9 115,092 87,146 25.5 21,227 26.8 6.7
158 Las Cruces NM 26.5 174,682 135,510 8.7 21,859 29.6 9.4
159 Bryan–College Station TX 26.7 152,415 121,862 22.2 20,411 20.2 5.7
160 Laredo TX 38.2 193,117 133,239 29.5 18,074 52.2 11.6
Table 7.4  (continued)
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NOTE:	Large:	MSA	pop.	≥	1	million	in	2000,	avg.	1989	pov.	rate	=	10.9	(std.	dev.	=	3.4).	Medium:	MSA	pop.	>	300,000	&	<	1	million	
in	2000,	avg.	1989	pov.	rate	=	13.6	(std.	dev.	=	5.8).	Small:	MSA	pop.	≤	300,000	in	2000,	avg.	1989	pov.	rate	=	14.6	(std.	dev.	=	4.8).	
Poverty rates and median household income are measured for 1989; the other variables are for 1990 or 2000. Anchorage and Honolulu 
are not included. Percent minority is 100 minus the percentage that consider white/Caucasian to be their single racial group.
a Metropolitan	area	definitions	follow	those	in	place	for	the	2000	census	as	defined	by	the	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis.	For	details,	see	
Chapters 2 and 6.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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Table 7.5  Change in Poverty Rates from 1990 to 2000 for Large, Medium, and Small Metropolitan Areas
Rank/MSA countya State
(1)






































Large: MSA pop. ≥ 1 million in 2000
Largest decrease in poverty rates
1 Austin– 
San Marcos
TX −4.8 1,249,763 32.3 4.4 27.6 15.2 48,991 5.9 4.0 28.1
2 San Antonio TX −4.4 1,592,383 16.8 2.1 29.3 22.7 39,059 8.3 5.7 15.7
3 Memphis AR-MS-
TN
−3.1 1,135,614 11.3 1.2 47.1 20.2 40,101 7.3 6.4 11.4
4 New Orleans LA −2.9 1,337,726 3.9 0.8 42.7 22.3 35,784 9.2 6.8 6.5
5 Detroit MI −2.4 4,441,551 3.9 2.0 28.8 17.9 49,249 8.9 5.9 10.0
Largest increase in poverty rates 
57 Bergen-Passaic NJ 1.5 1,373,167 6.9 5.4 27.5 17.9 59,532 5.4 5.1 7.2
58 Orange County CA 1.9 2,846,289 15.3 5.8 35.3 20.5 58,820 4.8 5.0 18.7
59 New York NY 2.0 9,314,235 8.2 7.2 51.2 26.0 42,137 8.3 8.8 12.4
60 Los Angeles–
Long Beach
CA 2.8 9,519,338 6.9 6.3 51.4 30.1 42,189 7.4 8.2 9.6
61 Riverside–San 
Bernardino
CA 2.9 3,254,821 20.5 3.0 38.1 25.4 42,456 7.4 7.9 24.4
Medium: MSA pop. > 300,000 & < 1 million in 2000




TX −6.6 335,227 22.4 4.3 19.6 44.8 26,155 13.3 11.4 18.5
2 McAllen-
Edinburg
TX −6.0 569,463 32.6 5.6 22.3 49.5 24,863 14.3 12.0 27.9
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MS −4.4 363,988 14.2 0.7 24.1 19.8 36,836 8.3 6.4 14.2
5 Mobile AL −3.6 540,258 11.7 0.8 30.7 21.8 35,410 8.2 6.7 11.6
6 Corpus Christi TX −3.4 380,783 8.1 0.9 27.0 26.1 35,761 8.6 7.6 10.6
7 Flint MI −3.4 436,141 1.3 0.4 24.8 16.9 41,951 10.9 7.1 -0.3
8 Provo-Orem UT −3.4 368,536 28.5 2.7 7.7 9.1 45,833 5.2 4.8 25.6
9 Shreveport–
Bossier City
LA −3.2 392,302 4.1 0.3 40.3 21.1 33,079 10.7 8.2 7.8
10 Saginaw–Bay 
City–Midland
MI −3.1 403,070 0.9 0.5 15.3 16.7 40,086 9.8 6.7 5.6
Largest increase in poverty rates




CA 1.6 399,347 7.4 4.3 27.3 20.8 46,677 5.4 6.7 12.5
88 Fresno CA 1.7 922,516 18.1 4.1 44.7 32.8 34,933 9.8 12.0 9.6
89 Syracuse NY 1.7 732,117 −1.4 1.1 11.2 16.2 39,698 5.8 6.2 3.7
90 Modesto CA 1.9 446,997 17.1 3.2 30.9 29.6 40,101 10.0 11.7 17.1
91 Salinas CA 1.9 401,762 11.5 6.6 44.1 31.6 48,305 8.4 8.7 17.4
92 Ventura CA 2.0 753,197 11.2 3.6 30.2 19.9 59,666 4.8 5.2 13.3




RI 2.6 962,886 4.8 2.2 15.6 22.9 41,599 6.7 5.7 7.4
95 Bakersfield CA 3.8 661,645 17.9 3.1 38.6 31.5 35,446 9.7 12.0 12.2
(continued)
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Small: MSA pop. ≤ 300,000 in 2000
Largest decrease in poverty rates
1 Laredo TX −7.0 193,117 31.0 5.9 17.8 47.0 28,100 11.6 9.3 24.3
2 Houma LA −5.7 194,477 6.0 0.4 21.8 33.3 35,085 8.2 5.9 18.7
3 Hattiesburg MS −5.6 111,674 11.6 0.8 28.4 19.4 30,991 7.8 6.6 14.3
4 Pueblo CO −5.4 141,472 13.0 0.8 20.6 18.7 32,775 9.0 6.3 15.5
5 Flagstaff AZ-UT −5.0 122,366 16.8 1.2 35.0 16.1 38,058 8.9 6.9 19.2
6 Grand Junction CO −4.9 116,255 19.9 0.7 7.8 15.0 35,864 7.0 5.7 21.7
7 Lawrence KS −4.7 99,962 18.2 2.4 14.1 7.6 37,547 5.3 4.6 18.4
8 Victoria TX −4.7 84,088 11.6 0.9 25.9 23.8 38,732 6.5 4.7 11.3
9 Sumter SC −4.4 104,646 1.9 0.5 49.8 25.7 33,278 7.9 7.6 6.1
10 Monroe LA −4.0 147,250 3.4 0.2 35.6 21.4 32,047 8.7 8.2 12.1
Largest increase in poverty rates
151 Chico-Paradise CA 0.9 203,171 10.4 1.5 15.7 17.7 31,924 9.5 9.3 12.3
152 Yolo CA 0.9 168,660 16.3 5.8 32.5 20.2 40,769 7.2 7.1 12.4
153 Santa Cruz–
Watsonville
CA 1.2 255,602 10.1 3.7 24.9 16.8 53,998 5.2 6.1 10.9
154 Elmira NY 1.6 91,070 -4.5 0.3 9.3 17.9 36,415 7.3 7.8 7.6
155 Binghamton NY 1.6 252,320 -4.8 1.0 7.3 16.0 36,357 5.7 5.3 5.1
156 Redding CA 1.6 163,256 9.9 0.5 10.9 16.7 34,335 8.8 8.7 11.0
Table 7.5 (continued)
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157 Merced CA 1.8 210,554 15.3 4.2 44.2 36.2 35,532 10.6 13.1 8.8




NJ 2.0 146,438 5.7 1.9 34.2 31.5 39,150 7.4 9.9 4.5
160 Dutchess 
County
NY 2.2 280,150 7.4 1.6 16.5 16.0 53,086 4.2 5.7 9.9
NOTE: Poverty rates and median household income are measured for 1989 and 1999; the other variables are for the period stated in the column headings. 
Anchorage and Honolulu are not included. Percent minority is 100 minus the percentage of persons that consider white/Caucasian to be their single racial 
group. See discussion of census and BEA statistics in Appendix A.
a Metropolitan	area	definitions	follow	those	in	place	for	the	2000	census	as	defined	by	the	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis.	For	details,	see	Chapters	2	and	6.
b Percentage of the population that immigrated to the United States between 1995 and 2000.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e) and Bureau of Economic Analysis REIS data for employment growth (BEA 2002).
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REGRESSION ANALySIS OF MSA POvERTy RATES
Although the general patterns above are suggestive of the deter-
minants underlying metropolitan variation in poverty rates, regression 
analysis	is	needed	to	draw	more	definitive	conclusions.	In	the	remain-
der of this chapter we use the empirical model from Chapter 6, in which 
counties remain one unit of analysis, to further examine metropolitan 
and nonmetropolitan poverty rates. We experimented with using the en-
tire metropolitan area as the unit of observation, but the results were 
completely unsatisfactory.7
Table 7.6 reports regression results that divide the sample into met-
ropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties.8 Columns (1) and (2) report 
the 1989 metro county results, while columns (5) and (6) contain the 
1999 metro county results. Columns (3) and (4) and columns (7) and 
(8) report the corresponding nonmetropolitan county results. The non-
metropolitan results are only reported to facilitate comparison. A full 
assessment of those results will be given in Chapter 8.
The	discussion	stresses	the	1999	findings,	though	the	1989	results	
will be highlighted when there are key differences. Consider the 1999 
results in column (5): after we account for the poverty effects of differ-
ences in their socioeconomic characteristics, big metropolitan suburban 
counties have approximately a half-percentage-point lower poverty rate 
than	single-county	MSAs	(significant	at	the	0.01	level).9 There is evi-
dence that small-MSA (less than one million in population) suburban 
counties have slightly lower poverty, but this is measured imprecisely. 
Along with other results that suggest that poverty rates are positively 
related to overall metropolitan area population (not shown), these re-
sults are consistent with moderate spatial mismatch effects, especially 
in larger MSAs with more accessibility concerns.10
Metropolitan county poverty rates appear to be less affected by labor 
market conditions than nonmetro poverty rates. For example, industrial 
structural change appears to be statistically unrelated to metropolitan 
area poverty rates. This may be a scale effect in that metro areas may 
be large enough for dislocated workers to obtain a suitable employment 
match.	Likewise,	five-year	employment	growth	has	a	very	small	influ-
ence on metropolitan county poverty rates.11 For comparison to Chapter 
6, we assess the impacts of an overall one standard deviation change, 
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which equals 10.1 percent for 1995–2000 employment growth (from 
column	[4]	of	Table	A.1).	This	increase	in	five-year	job	growth	reduces	
short-run metro county poverty rates by 0.07 percentage points, or less 
than half of the corresponding nonmetro response.
As indicated in Chapters 4 and 6, an avenue through which job 
growth reduces poverty rates is by reducing male and female unem-
ployment rates and increasing employment-population rates. The quasi-
reduced form model that omitted the unemployment rate and employ-
ment-population variables was one way to allow employment growth to 
affect poverty rates while allowing the employment and unemployment 
rates to vary. Using this model, a 10.1 percent increase in 1995–2000 job 
growth is now estimated to reduce poverty rates by about 0.13 percent-
age points (t = 2.10), with a long-run impact almost twice as large (see 
Note 8 in Chapter 6). While the quasireduced form results are stronger, 
they still indicate that overall MSA poverty rates are only modestly af-
fected by new job growth.
The	employment-population	rate	and	the	unemployment	rate	find-
ings	also	indicate	a	larger	nonmetropolitan	labor	market	influence	com-
pared to the corresponding MSA models. One difference, however, is 
that the male unemployment rate is relatively more important and the 
female employment rate is relatively less important in affecting MSA 
poverty rates. Holding job growth constant, a one standard deviation 
increase in the female employment rate and a corresponding one stan-
dard deviation decline in the male unemployment rate would reduce 
the typical 1999 short-run MSA-county poverty rate by 0.55 and 0.67 
percentage points.12
This pattern is further supported by the smaller single-mother coef-
ficient	 in	 the	MSA	model,	 compared	 to	 its	 corresponding	 nonmetro-
politan	coefficient	in	Table	7.6.	The	relative	metro	or	nonmetro	female-
headed household share pattern is similar in both the 1989 and 1999 
models, suggesting that it was not caused by welfare reform or other 
policy	changes	such	as	the	EITC	expansion	but,	rather,	reflects	a	factor	
associated with metro areas. Finally, the 1999 MSA female-head share 
response remains smaller than in the 1989 model, which continues a 
pattern that emerged in Chapter 6.
Labor market linkages with surrounding counties are assessed in 
the models reported in columns (2) and (6) by including the previous 
decade’s	surrounding-county	average	poverty	rate,	the	overall	five-year	
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R2 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.93
N 824 824 2204 2204 824 824 2204 2204
NOTE:	The	specifications	follow	those	 in	columns	(1),	 (3),	 (4),	and	(6)	of	Table	6.1,	with	some	of	 the	results	suppressed	for	brevity.	
Blank = not applicable. Absolute values of robust t-statistics	are	in	parentheses.	A	metropolitan	county	is	defined	using	2000	Bureau	of	
Economic	Analysis	REIS	county	definitions.	See	the	notes	to	Table	6.1	for	more	details	on	variable	definitions.
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.
Table 7.6  (continued)
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metropolitan area employment growth rate, and the corresponding share 
of workers that were employed in their county of residence. Focusing 
on the 1999 results, column (6) shows that all three of these measures 
are	statistically	insignificant.	In	terms	of	the	surrounding-county	pov-
erty	rate,	the	insignificance	could	represent	heterogeneity	in	county	re-
sponses. For example, low-income residents from neighboring counties 
may relocate to counties with lower poverty rates, which would tend 
to produce a positive surrounding-county effect. Yet, in other cases, 
wealthier residents of neighboring counties with higher poverty rates 
may	“flee”	those	counties,	reducing	the	poverty	rate	of	the	destination	
county. This can occur if the middle and upper classes want to avoid 
possible	ramifications	such	as	a	deteriorating	tax	base,	declining	public	
services, and falling property values.
In sum, the generally different metro and nonmetro poverty respons-
es illustrate Allard’s (2004) claim that the delivery of public assistance 
programs needs to be differentiated for urban and rural communities. 
For instance, the unemployment results suggest metropolitan programs 
should place more emphasis on disadvantaged men than nonmetropoli-
tan programs. Finally, although the demographic variables will not be 
discussed in detail, note that greater concentrations of minorities are not 
directly linked to higher MSA-county poverty rates (ceteris paribus), 
although	we	find	evidence	that	greater	shares	of	immigration	increased	
1999 (but not 1989) poverty rates.13
SuBuRBAN/CENTRAL COuNTy POvERTy RATE 
DISPARITIES
General Regression Results
The spatial mismatch hypothesis described in Chapter 3 is one rea-
son why different poverty patterns may exist between central counties 
and suburbs. Namely, factors such as limited transportation and infor-
mation about suburban job opportunities reduce the likelihood that dis-
advantaged central city workers will be able to take these positions, 
while affordability, zoning, and housing discrimination limit their abil-
ity to relocate to the suburbs. Yet if employment growth occurs closer 
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to poor communities, the spatial mismatch hypothesis implies that a 
greater share of disadvantaged workers will take these jobs. Hence, 
central county job growth would have stronger impacts on poverty than 
corresponding growth in suburban counties. Conversely, if disadvan-
taged workers lack the requisite hard and soft skills to acquire work 
or to remain in a job, there are fewer reasons to expect that nearby 
employment opportunities will make a noticeable dent in poverty rates, 
regardless of location.
To examine spatial differences within metropolitan areas, we divide 
the MSA sample into the 391 central counties and 433 suburban coun-
ties	using	the	definitions	outlined	in	Chapter	2.14 The corresponding de-
scriptive statistics for key variables are reported in Table 7.7. Table 7.8 
reports the regression results. In it, columns (1) and (2) report the 1989 
suburban county results, followed by the 1989 central county results 
in columns (3) and (4). Columns (5) to (8) report the analogous 1999 
suburban and central county results. As before, most of the emphasis 
will be on the base 1999 suburban and central county results in columns 
(5) and (7).
The considerably smaller lagged 1989 suburban poverty rate coef-
ficient	 suggests	 that	 central	 county	 poverty	 rates	 adjust	more	 slowly	
to socioeconomic shocks, making them more persistent. To put it into 
perspective, a shock to a central county poverty rate would have a half-
life of more than 10 years, while a shock to a suburban county has a 
half-life of more than six years.15 As noted before, this persistence like-
ly	not	only	 reflects	 individual	household	persistence	of	poverty	 rates	
but also “place” persistence, because central county labor markets may 
not adjust as quickly through migration and commuting. While place 
persistence may be generated by individual spatial mismatch factors 
such as a reduced tendency to relocate where there is more vibrant job 
growth, it can be exacerbated by the relocation of jobs to faster grow-
ing	suburbs.	For	example,	in	the	1990s,	firm	relocation	worsened	the	
spatial mismatch between jobs and the residences of African Ameri-
cans (Dworak-Fisher 2004; R. Martin 2004; Raphael and Stoll 2002). 
Consistent with this point, suburban counties in large metro areas have 
about a 0.5-percentage-point lower poverty rate than small metropoli-
tan suburban counties, all else being equal.
Five-year job growth is now weakly associated with reduced sub-
urban poverty rates (at the 0.10 level), though the link to greater job 
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growth is much stronger in central counties (at the 0.05 level). For ex-
ample, a 10.1 percent (one standard deviation) increase in employment 
growth reduces short-run central county poverty rates by about 0.2 per-
centage points, while the suburban response is just over half that size. 
Using	the	lagged	1989	poverty	rate	coefficient,	greater	persistence	in	
central counties suggests that long-run poverty rates would fall about 
0.45 percentage points and that the suburban response would be only 
about one-third that size.16
There appear to be some key gender roles in how labor market ef-
fects are transmitted. First, the short-run poverty-reducing impacts of 
the female employment-population rate are about twice as large in sub-
urban counties as in central counties. Again using the overall one stan-
dard deviation changes reported in Table A.1, a 6.9-percentage-point 
increase in the female employment-population rate reduces short-run 
suburban poverty rates by about 0.9 percentage points, and the cor-
responding response in central-city counties is a little less than half the 
size. Likewise, a 2.9-percentage-point reduction in the male unemploy-
ment rate reduces short-run suburban poverty rates by about 0.84 per-
centage points but central county rates by only 0.35 points.
These	 labor	 market	 findings	 suggest	 that,	 compared	 to	 suburbs,	
central county poverty rates are more affected by job growth than by 
whether	labor	supply	is	tight,	as	reflected	through	their	smaller	respon-
siveness to the male unemployment rate and the female employment 
rate.	These	findings	further	support	those	who	argue	that	public	assis-
tance	policies	cannot	be	a	one-size-fits-all	approach,	as	significant	dif-
ferences even exist within a given metro area. For example, transpor-
tation and household mobility constraints may be why disadvantaged 
persons	in	central	counties	benefit	more	from	employment	growth	than	




job-retention skills as well as improve child care assistance to increase 
labor force participation among disadvantaged females. Since jobs are 
more accessible to suburban dwellers, there is less need to improve 
work transportation.17
In	general,	the	finding	that	minority	shares	are	not	positively	related	
to 1999 poverty rates counters claims that urban poverty is an issue of 
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N 824 341 483 391 433 824 341 483 391 433
NOTE: Unweighted descriptive statistics. Blank = not applicable. For some groups, there are fewer counties than listed, if the census did not report any 
individuals	in	that	category.	A	metropolitan	county	employs	2000	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis	REIS	county	definitions	using	the	MSA	population	from	
the 2000 census. 
a All values are in percentages except for the rows on “Population” and “MSA Population.”
b See	the	text	and	Table	A.1	for	definitions	of	various	MSA	groups.
 SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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R2 0.959 0.960 0.972 0.972 0.956 0.956 0.980 0.980
N 433 433 391 391 433 433 391 391
NOTE:	The	specifications	follow	those	 in	columns	(1),	 (3),	 (4),	and	(6)	of	Table	6.1,	with	some	of	 the	results	suppressed	for	brevity.	
Absolute values of robust t-statistics	are	in	parentheses.	Blank	=	not	applicable.	A	metropolitan	county	is	defined	using	2000	Bureau	of	
Economic	Analysis	REIS	county	definitions.	The	central	counties	include	single-county	MSAs.	See	Chapters	2	and	6	for	details	of	the	
suburban/central	county	definitions.	
a In the central county regressions, the single-county metropolitan area is the omitted category.
b In the suburban county regression, the large metropolitan area suburb is the omitted category.
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.
Table 7.8 (continued)
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race,	not	space.	One	of	the	factors	that	could	be	influencing	the	race	and	
ethnic results is that a disproportionate share of immigrants that arrived 
in the 1990s were Hispanic and thus more likely to be less skilled and to 
face language barriers. Moreover, recent immigrants are considerably 
more likely to concentrate in central counties than in outer suburbs.18 
To examine whether recent immigration affects metropolitan poverty, 
we added the shares of the population that immigrated to the United 
States between 1990–1995 and 1995–2000 to the base 1999 suburban 
and central county models (not shown). Despite the larger share of re-
cent immigrants in central counties, the 1995–2000 central county im-
migrant	 share	was	 insignificant.	 In	 the	 suburban	model,	 there	was	 a	
strong direct relationship in which a 1-percentage-point increase in the 
1995–2000 immigrant population share raised suburban county poverty 
rates by 0.66 percentage points (t = 3.98).19
While a complete explanation for the spatial difference between 
central county and suburban immigration responses is hard to trace, 
one likely reason for the difference is that less-skilled workers are more 
likely to out-migrate in response to greater immigrant competition in 
central counties than they are in the suburbs.20 One possible reason for 
such a differential response is that a labor market–driven relocation 
from the central city to the suburbs is a short move towards what is 
likely greater access to jobs. Yet if one relocates from the suburbs for la-
bor market reasons, the central city may not be an appealing economic 
option, which means that such a person would consider more-distant 
moves. However, the added relocation costs would dampen this migra-
tion response.
The results are robust when the lagged average surrounding-county 
poverty rates, the 1995–2000 metropolitan area job growth rate, and 
the share of workers employed in their county of residence are added 
to the model (shown in columns [6] and [8]). In neither central counties 
nor	 suburbs	 is	 there	 any	evidence	 that	 these	variables	 are	 significant	
determinants of poverty rates, which is consistent with the overall MSA 
results in Table 7.6.
Intrametropolitan Area Differences By Race
Racial composition may alter the way labor market conditions af-
fect poverty rates in both suburban and central county MSAs. For ex-
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ample,	Raphael	and	Stoll	(2002)	find	that	the	spatial	mismatch	between	
employment and residence in metropolitan areas is considerably greater 
for African Americans than for whites. Hispanics and Asians fall almost 
exactly in the middle. Together, this suggests that the responsiveness 
of	 poverty	 rates	 to	 labor	market	 conditions	may	 be	modified	 by	 the	
community’s racial composition.
To examine whether the racial and ethnic composition of the metro-
politan county alters the determination of poverty rates, the base 1999 
suburban and central county regression models were reestimated after 
adding interactions of the race and Hispanic population shares with var-
ious labor market indicators. Panel A of Table 7.9 presents the results 
of	adding	interactions	of	the	population	shares	with	five-year	employ-
ment growth.21 The estimates suggest that job growth reduces poverty 
rates more in counties with higher African American population shares, 
although	only	 the	 central	 county	 coefficient	 is	 significant	 at	 conven-
tional probability levels. Suburban job growth reduces poverty rates 
more when there are greater non–African American minority popula-
tion shares. These are rather large effects considering the scale of the 
share measures.22 By contrast, suburban job growth does not appear to 
reduce poverty rates when the Hispanic population share is above 1 per-
cent. Supporting these results, Weinberg, Reagan, and Yankow (2004) 
also	find	that	job	access	has	smaller	impacts	on	Hispanic	employment	
rates.
Our earlier analysis indicated that the male unemployment rate and 
the	female	employment	rate	best	reflect	the	availability	of	less-skilled	
labor. Panel B reports regression results when we have the race and 
Hispanic shares interact with the male unemployment rate and the fe-
male employment-population rate. The unemployment results almost 
exactly	correspond	to	 the	job	growth	findings.	For	example,	a	higher	
central county unemployment rate has greater adverse poverty effects 
when the African American share is larger.23	The	influence	of	the	sub-
urban female employment-population rate also appears to be strongly 
affected by racial composition, but not in central counties. In particular, 
a greater female employment rate has greater poverty-reducing impacts 
when the suburban county has greater shares of African Americans and 
Hispanics.
In summary, central counties with higher shares of African Ameri-
cans experience greater poverty rate declines as a result of job growth. 
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  Table 7.9  Alternative Metropolitan Labor Market Effects by Race and 
Ethnicity
Panel A: Dependent variable: 1999 county poverty rate
 Suburban Central county





















(p-value) (p = 0.0113) (p = 0.0555)
Panel B: Dependent variable: 1999 county poverty ratea
 Suburban Central county





















(p-value) (p = 0.0138) (p = 0.0293)



















(p-value) (p = 0.0122) (p = 0.5634)
NOTE:	The	coefficients	reflect	the	estimates	when	the	interaction	variables	are	added	
to the model shown in columns (5) and (7) of Table 7.8. In parentheses are the robust 
t-statistics and F-statistic p-values.
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Yet in suburban counties with higher African American shares, poverty 
rates are more affected by having a tighter female labor market than by 
simple job creation (i.e., higher female employment rates). For other 
minorities, greater job growth and lower male unemployment rates have 
stronger poverty-reducing impacts in suburban counties but a smaller 
impact in central counties. Finally, there is evidence that greater job 
growth and lower male unemployment rates have smaller poverty-re-
ducing impacts in suburban counties with greater Hispanic population 
shares.
Stoll’s	(1999)	study	helps	explain	these	disparate	racial	findings.	He	
finds	 that	 increasing	Latino	and	African	American	access	 to	employ-
ment induces more extensive job search but that the impact is much 
greater for Latinos. Stoll’s results are consistent with Latinos already 
having	significant	job	opportunities	in	ethnic	enclave	economies,	which	
would explain why greater job opportunities and tighter labor supplies 
have a smaller impact for Hispanics. He suggests that one possibility is 
that African Americans have weaker skills and less knowledge about 
more distant job opportunities. These tendencies are likely reinforced 
by their greater spatial isolation from employment and by a general 
reluctance to migrate away from family ties (Spilimbergo and Ubeda 
2004). Therefore, creating jobs in central counties may have strong 
poverty-reducing impacts for African Americans. The large male unem-
ployment rate response in central counties with large African American 
populations (holding job growth constant) supports adding structural 
policies, including more job counseling. Moreover, if the suburban re-
sponses relate to a general reluctance of suburban employers to hire Af-
rican	Americans	(Holzer	and	Reaser	2000),	then	enhanced	affirmative	
action policies are needed.
CASE STuDIES OF METROPOLITAN POvERTy TRENDS
The statistical analysis provides an assessment of the typical causes 
of county poverty rates, both on average and for central and suburban 
counties	in	isolation.	For	context	on	these	results	in	specific	instances,	
we examine three metropolitan areas as case studies: Decatur, Alabama, 
an example of a small metropolitan area in the South; Philadelphia, a 
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larger and older metro area in the Northeast; and Phoenix, Arizona, a 
fast-growing western Sun Belt metro area.
Decatur, Alabama
Decatur, a metropolitan area of nearly 150,000 people located in 
northern Alabama, ranked 245 out of 316 metropolitan areas in 2000 
population (U.S. Census Bureau 2006e). It consists of Lawrence and 
Morgan counties; the city of Decatur is the Morgan county seat. Like 
many regions in the South, Decatur’s post–World War II economic 
growth was spurred by startups of chemical plants, paper mills, and 
other factories seeking a nonunionized, low-cost labor force (Davis 
2002). In 2000, 28 percent of employed residents in the Decatur MSA 
worked in manufacturing, compared to an unweighted national metro 
average of 14 percent.
Decatur entered the 1990s economic recovery inauspiciously; its un-
employment rate peaked at 8.1 percent in 1992 and 1993 (BLS 2006a). 
National economic growth appeared to bypass Decatur despite the fact 
that it set aside prime property for industrial development and despite 
its close proximity to rail lines and an interstate highway (Davis 2002). 
Like many areas of the South, Decatur suffered from a less-educated 
labor force and a perceived lack of the amenities that executives de-
mand. Yet as the national economy continued to expand, booming areas 
began to price themselves out of the market. Real estate prices soared in 
these booming areas, which not only directly increased business costs 
but also indirectly increased costs through discouraging workers from 
locating there, creating labor shortages and higher wages. This made 
places	like	Decatur	more	economically	attractive	to	firms	seeking	low-
cost employees.
By 1996, the Decatur metro area unemployment rate had dropped 
to 5.1 percent, and it reached a low of 4.1 percent in 1998 (Davis 2002). 
The	employment	boom	was	fueled	by	high-profile	openings	of	manu-
facturing facilities, such as the one by Trico Steel Company. This was 
accompanied by a boom in the retail and local service sectors, as a re-
sult of which occupancy at Decatur’s only mall jumped from 70 percent 
in 1995 to 90 percent in 2000. 
The tight labor market caused wages to rise. McDonald’s began 
paying new hires $6 an hour instead of the $5.15 minimum wage, while 
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mall security guards saw their starting wages rise 25 percent. Accompa-
nying the increase in wages across occupations were increases associ-
ated with workers moving up the job chain. For example, McDonald’s 
workers reportedly quit to take higher-paying jobs elsewhere or to start 
their own businesses. 
The poverty rate in Lawrence County rose from 16.5 percent in 1989 
to 17.8 percent in 1993, before falling to 16.6 in 1995, 15.2 in 1998, and 
14.0 percent in 2000. Morgan County’s poverty rates rose from 11.5 
percent in 1989 to 12.9 percent in 1993, before steadily falling to 11.1 
percent in 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau 2005b). Thus, Lawrence County 
was left with poverty above national and statewide rates in 2000, while 
Morgan County had lower relative poverty. Median household income 
increased in the two counties; the largest annual increases occurred dur-
ing the 1993–1995 period in both metro counties, and the smallest oc-
curred during the 1998–2000 period. In fact, in Lawrence County the 
median household income decreased at an annual rate of 0.5 percent 
from 1998 to 2000.24 The decline may have been partly attributable 
to falling manufacturing employment. For instance, Courtland Mill, a 
subsidiary of International Paper and the largest employer in Lawrence 
County,	in	1998	began	the	first	of	two	rounds	of	layoffs	that	eventually	
totaled 600 workers (Decatur Daily 2003). Median household income 
growth also may have slowed because of an increased proportion of 
below-average-paying jobs at the end of the 1990s expansion.
Following the national economy, Decatur’s boom ended by 2001. 
In that year its unemployment rate climbed to 7.4 percent in August, 
up from 4.3 percent the previous August (BLS 2006a). Included in the 
layoffs	was	the	shutdown	of	the	Trico	Steel	plant	in	response	to	fierce	
global competition (Davis 2002). Consistent with state and national 
trends, the layoffs in manufacturing were widespread across industries 
and continued into 2003 (ADECA 2006). Manufacturing employment 
dropped to 14,552 in 2002, the lowest it had been since 1982 (BEA 
2006). The unemployment rate rose to an average of 7 percent in 2002, 
its highest rate since 1993. Low-cost advantages relative to the rest of 
the nation were offset by increased globalization and even lower costs 
in developing nations.
Decatur’s large employment share in manufacturing meant that 
losses in that sector greatly affected the secondary economy. Laid-off 
workers who were more experienced, or educated, moved down the job 
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ladder,	squeezing	out	less-qualified	workers	(Davis	2002).	Others	who	
were laid off enrolled in a community college for training in new ca-
reers	such	as	cosmetology	and	child	care.	Yet	the	availability	and	profit-
ability of careers in secondary sectors often depend on basic employ-
ment	sectors	such	as	manufacturing,	making	it	difficult	for	the	region	
to offset the income losses associated with the layoffs. Annual wages 
in the Decatur metro area dropped 1.7 percent from 2001 to 2002, in 
contrast to a 1.4 percent gain nationally (BLS 2002). 
The experience of Decatur demonstrates the importance of strong 
sustained national economic growth for poverty reductions. Poverty 
and welfare caseload declines coincided with reductions in the unem-
ployment rate post-1993, prior to implementation of welfare reforms, 
and did not accelerate after their implementation. Sustained national 
growth	forced	firms	to	move	to	where	there	was	low-cost	labor,	making	
poverty reductions geographically widespread. Conversely, high real 
estate prices and a lack of informal support networks likely precluded 
disadvantaged households from being able to make utility-improving 
moves to booming areas. Thus, the Decatur experience suggests that 
place needs to be taken into account in the design of antipoverty pro-
grams. In addition, sustained growth is required for those at the bottom 
of	the	skill	distribution	to	benefit,	as	workers	move	up	the	job	ladder	
and wage increases occur across occupations. The 2001 recession and 
subsequent jobless recovery have unraveled some of the 1990s’ prog-
ress in reducing poverty rates, particularly in the face of strict work 
requirements in Alabama’s welfare program. Lawrence County’s pov-
erty rate climbed to 15.1 in 2001 before before settling back down to 
14.4 percent in 2002, while Morgan County’s poverty rate climbed to 
12.4 percent in 2001 before inching down to 12.3 percent in 2002 (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2005b).
Philadelphia
Encompassing Greater Philadelphia, the Philadelphia–New Jersey 
metropolitan area (PMSA) was the sixth largest metro area in the coun-
try,	registering	just	over	five	million	people	in	the	2000	census.	Even	so,	
it grew only 3.6 percent in the 1990s.25 Median household income in-
creased 34 percent from 1989 to 1999, while the poverty rate increased 
from 10.4 to 11.1 percent. By comparison, median U.S. household in-
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come increased 40 percent, while the poverty rate decreased from 13.1 
to 12.4 percent. The Philadelphia PMSA unemployment rate began the 
1990s at 4.9 percent and climbed to 7.9 percent in 1992 before dropping 
to 3.9 percent in 2000. At the same time, the U.S. unemployment rate 
dropped more substantially, from 5.6 to 4.0 percent from 1990 to 2000 
(BLS 2006a,d).
In the midst of lackluster growth, the Philadelphia metro area con-
tinued to extend farther from its core in the 1990s (Brookings Institu-
tion 2003a). The suburbs experienced 7.4 percent population growth, 
although population losses occurred in most inner suburbs and the city 
of Philadelphia lost over 4 percent of its population (U.S. Census Bu-
reau 2006b). Among the 10 largest U.S. cities, this made Philadelphia 
just one of two to lose population (Perry and Mackun 2001). A large 
population decline in the 1990s among whites, combined with modest 
increases in other racial categories, changed the racial composition of 
the city from majority white to majority minority (Brookings Institu-
tion 2003a). Nine percent of the city of Philadelphia’s populace in 2000 
was foreign-born, with nearly half arriving in the 1990s (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2006b). This is a lower immigration rate than in most large cit-
ies and may be partly attributable to more than twice as many foreign-
born persons living in the suburbs as do in other metropolitan areas 
(Brookings Institution 2003a). Having lost married-couple families in 
the 1990s, Philadelphia had more single-parent families than married 
couples with children in 2000.
Not surprisingly, the poverty rate in the city of Philadelphia in-
creased from 20.3 to 22.9 percent from 1989 to 1999, while the child 
poverty rate increased from 30.3 to 31.6 percent (Brookings Institution 
2003a). Poverty in excess of 40 percent was present in several neigh-
borhoods. Median household income increased only 25 percent, failing 
to keep pace with the 34 percent increase in the region’s average price 
level and leaving it at 73 percent of the national average (BLS 2006e; 
U.S. Census Bureau 2006b). Only 56 percent of people 16 years and 
older were in the labor force in 1999, down from 58.4 percent in 1989 
(U.S. Census Bureau 2006b). This meant the city of Philadelphia had 
the fourth-lowest labor force participation rate among the 100 largest 
U.S.	cities,	potentially	reflecting	an	increasing	distance	between	inner-
city residents and job growth in outer suburbs (Brookings Institution 
2003a). The unemployment rate for males was 6.8 percent, while it 
Partridge.indb   206 7/27/2006   1:41:51 PM
Poverty in Metropolitan America   207
was 5.5 percent for females (U.S. Census Bureau 2006b). Additional 
evidence of weak central city vitality is that only 9.9 percent of work-
commutes are from the suburb to the central city and more than half 
of metro workers commute between suburbs. Conversely, almost one-
quarter of the city of Philadelphia’s employed residents work outside 
the central city (Brookings Institution 2003a).
A study by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation 
(MDRC) suggests that welfare reforms implemented in Pennsylvania 
had little effect on the city of Philadelphia’s poverty between 1992 and 
2000. The area’s weak economy was listed as a prime factor (MDRC 
2003). The study found that welfare caseloads declined but that this 
began before the implementation of welfare reform measures, suggest-
ing that the economy was the primary impetus for the decline. Although 
TANF appeared to increase the exit rate of long-term recipients, for-
mer recipients experienced marginal work placements, with pay rates 
near	minimum	wage,	few	fringe	benefits,	or	only	part-time	hours.	The	
percentage of women in the MDRC sample that were neither working 
nor receiving welfare doubled with implementation of welfare reform. 
Most women faced multiple barriers to working. Nearly three-fourths 
of the surveyed women did not have a valid driver’s license or access 
to an automobile, which was noted as a sizable barrier considering that 
job creation mostly occurred in the suburbs. 
Employment outcomes were better for those with a high school di-
ploma, a level not attained by nearly 50 percent of the sampled women. 
Some good news was that the high school completion rate increased in 
the 1990s. Despite the dramatic drop in the number of welfare recipi-
ents, those who remained on welfare were geographically and socially 
isolated from nonrecipients. Yet the MDRC found that social conditions 
improved in Philadelphia’s poorest neighborhoods in the 1990s and that 
welfare recipients in high-welfare neighborhoods were just as likely as 
others to work. Jargowsky (2003, p. 18) reports that the percentage of 
people living in neighborhoods with over 40 percent poverty fell by 3.4 
percent in the 1990s; during the same decade, the corresponding drops 
for blacks and Hispanics were 7.5 and 12.1 percent.
The Philadelphia experience points to the importance of the econo-
my for poverty reduction, particularly during a time of welfare reform. 
It	also	highlights	 the	difficulties	for	 inner-city	residents	of	 improving	
their economic fortunes in a large, relatively stagnant, increasingly dis-
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persed metro area. Increased employment and lower poverty are likely 
to follow when there is increased job creation in the inner city, more 
education, or reduced barriers for inner-city residents to gain access to 
jobs in growing suburbs through commuting or relocating.
Phoenix
The city of Phoenix is located within the Phoenix-Mesa metropoli-
tan area, which consists of Maricopa and Pinal counties. Its 2000 popu-
lation of 3,251,876 people made it the twelfth largest metro area in the 
nation. It grew 45.3 percent in the 1990s, eighth fastest among the 316 
MSAs in our sample. Only two of the seven metro areas that grew faster 
than Phoenix-Mesa had populations over one million—Las Vegas, Ne-
vada, and Austin–San Marcos, Texas.
Except for a few neighborhoods in South Phoenix, the entire metro 
area experienced robust growth in the 1990s; the fastest growth (53.8 
percent) occurred in the suburbs (Brookings Institution 2003b). The 
city of Phoenix registered a population of 1,321,045 in the 2000 census, 
making it the sixth largest city in the nation (Perry and Mackun 2001). 
And Phoenix grew 34 percent in the 1990s, making it the fastest grow-
ing city among the 10 largest U.S. cities. 
A recent Brookings Institution (2003b) study highlights several notable 
characteristics of Phoenix MSA residents. Approximately three-fourths 
were employed in the four central cities (Mesa, Phoenix, Scottsdale, 
and Tempe). Slightly over 30 percent of the metro population moved 
there	during	the	five	years	prior	to	the	census.	About	one	in	five	resi-
dents were foreign-born, which is about the same share as in the 100 
largest U.S. cities. However, the number of foreign-born residents tri-
pled in the 1990s, which meant that 6 of 10 foreign-born residents ar-
rived	in	the	1990s.	Thus,	only	one	in	five	of	the	foreign-born	residents	
were naturalized citizens, and three-fourths of the foreign-born origi-
nated from Mexico. In contrast to the Dallas and Denver MSAs, more 
immigrants resided in the city of Phoenix than in its suburbs. Phoe-
nix’s high immigration rate contributed to a younger, less educated, and 
poorer population. Yet nearly two-thirds of its adults were in the labor 
force. Immigration from Mexico during the 1990s grew the Latino pop-
ulation	share	from	one-fifth	to	over	one-third.	Those	over	64	years	old	
disproportionately resided in the suburbs.
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Despite the high immigration rate, during the 1989–1999 period 
median household income in the metro area grew from $30,797 to 
$44,752, a 45 percent increase, while the poverty rate declined from 
12.3 to 12.0 percent. This was accompanied by a decrease in the un-
employment rate from 6.0 to 3.1 percent. The poverty rate was 13.4 
percent in the cities of Mesa, Phoenix, Scottsdale, and Tempe, and 9.6 
percent outside these cities (U.S. Census Bureau 2006b). 
Moreover, the number of people that lived in neighborhoods with 
extreme	poverty—again,	defined	as	 those	with	a	 rate	 in	excess	of	40	
percent—declined by 829, which when combined with population 
growth resulted in a reduction from 15.2 to 10.5 percent of the MSA 
population living in such areas (Jargowsky 2003, p. 18). Even the town 
of Guadalupe in Maricopa County, which then–Secretary of Housing 
and Urban Development Andrew Cuomo described during a visit as an 
example of extreme poverty in America, saw its person poverty rate de-
cline from 40.1 percent in 1989 to 26.7 percent in 1999 (Herbert 1999; 
U.S.	Census	Bureau	2006b).	Yet	the	number	of	neighborhoods	defined	
as having extreme poverty increased from 27 to 30 over the period 
(Jargowsky 2003, p. 18). Most of the commuting occurred from central 
city to central city (57.3 percent); 18.4 percent occurred from suburb to 
central city, and 14.5 percent between suburbs (Brookings Institution 
2003b). 
Median household income grew 40.6 percent in the city of Phoe-
nix from 1989 to 1999. In contrast to the metropolitan area, where it 
dropped slightly, poverty in the city of Phoenix increased from 14.2 to 
15.8 percent during 1989–1999. Related child poverty also ratcheted 
up, from 20.0 to 21.0 percent over the period. In that same time, unem-
ployment declined only 1.0 point, to 5.6 percent, which was less than 
for the entire metro area (Brookings Institution 2003b).
In November 1995, Arizona implemented a set of welfare reforms 
through federal waivers to the AFDC program. The reforms were called 
EMPOWER—Employing and Moving People Off Welfare and Encour-
aging Responsibility (Mills et al. 2001, p. 1). Except for exemptions to 
work requirements, most of the reforms were along the lines of those 
that later became part of the federal welfare reform implemented in 
August 1997. An evaluation of a sample of Phoenix metropolitan area 
welfare recipients when EMPOWER was implemented reveals that, 
while caseloads decreased dramatically and earned income increased 
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significantly,	total	household	income	did	not	increase,	as	earned	income	
simply replaced reductions in cash assistance and Food Stamps (Mills 
et al. 2001, p.8). In addition, caseloads had begun to decrease before the 
implementation of welfare reform measures, suggesting the economy 
was partly responsible for caseload reductions (p. 15). For example, 
metro unemployment declined from a peak of 6.6 percent annual un-
employment in 1992 to 3.5 percent by 1995, eventually reaching a low 
of 2.7 percent in 2000 (BLS 2006a). The reasons listed by welfare re-
cipients for not working included illness, disability, or a desire to stay 
at home to care for their children (Mills et al. 2001, p. 2). This further 
points	 to	 the	benefits	of	 a	 strong	economy	 for	 implementing	welfare	
reform, as well as a continuing need to improve child care supports.
The	 case	 of	 Phoenix	 points	 to	 the	 antipoverty	 benefits	 of	 strong	
growth in a metropolitan area. Yet the poverty rate in the city of Phoe-
nix increased, as did the number of extreme-poverty neighborhoods in 
the metro area. Thus, growth is not a panacea for reducing poverty. 
Overall metro area improvement may mask persistent pockets of pov-
erty and countertrends within it, particularly for an area experiencing 
high immigration rates of younger and less-educated cohorts. Even in 
the midst of this robust growth, welfare reform appears to be more ef-
fective	 at	 reducing	welfare	 caseloads	 and	 increasing	 self-sufficiency	
than at reducing poverty.
A POLICy FRAMEWORk TO ALLEvIATE  
METROPOLITAN POvERTy
The	findings	in	this	chapter	reinforce	the	conclusion	that	the	under-
lying causes of poverty have a strong element of place. Not only are 
average poverty rates about two-thirds higher in central counties than 
in suburban counties, but the gap actually widened slightly in the 1990s. 
Besides these differences, the underlying determinants, such as for job 
growth,	 can	 differ.	The	 influence	 of	 labor	market	 conditions	 is	 even	
affected by county racial composition. The strong persistence of both 
place and person poverty rates suggest that policies need to be tailored 
to	fit	the	community.	
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One conclusion is that job creation in central counties can help re-
duce poverty rates, especially when there are greater African American 
population shares. To be sure, job growth can mitigate poverty rates in 
suburban counties with high non–African American population shares 
as well, but its effects in such cases are more limited. Simple job growth 
will likely be ineffective when there are large shares of Hispanics. Nev-
ertheless,	in	the	cases	where	employment	growth	has	been	identified	as	
being effective, we must ask what the optimal way is to achieve it.
The conventional way of encouraging economic growth is through 
various incentives and business tax breaks.26 For across-the-board tax 
breaks at the state or regional level, Bartik (1991, 2004) contends that 
lost	tax	revenue	can	be	justified	through	enhanced	economic	activity,	
especially when there are underutilized workers and infrastructure. Yet 
our analysis suggests that incentives need to be geographically targeted. 
Since the early 1980s, a common method to target economic growth 
in a local area has been through various types of enterprise zones. The 
incentives are typically state corporate-tax credits for investment and 
jobs, as well as local property-tax abatements (Peters and Fisher 2002). 
These incentives can be used in conjunction with customized training 
and the provision of infrastructure. Initially, enterprise zones were only 
utilized by states and localities, but in 1993 the federal government be-
gan to implement enterprise zones with the Empowerment Zone and 
Enterprise Community Act, passed that year.
Enterprise zones are typically located in distressed communities or 
neighborhoods (Peters and Fisher 2002). A key feature is that their in-
centives	are	aimed	at	encouraging	firms	to	 locate	 in	particular	places	
that have seen economic distress, but they generally provide few in-
centives	 to	 actually	 employ	 the	 specific	 residents	 of	 these	 distressed	
zones. For this and other reasons, spatially targeted enterprise zones 
have come under attack in recent years.
Peters and Fisher provide the most cogent criticism of enterprise 
zones. First, they argue that they are expensive: using early 1990s data, 
they	find	 that	 the	present	discounted	value	of	 subsidies	costs	at	 least	
$52,000 per induced job (Peters and Fisher 2002, p. 230). Peters and 
Fisher argue that more cost-effective programs could be developed for 
disadvantaged workers, including programs that raise their skill level 
and enhance their mobility. A second criticism the authors level at a 
typical	enterprise	zone	is	 that	 it	has	a	design	flaw	that	usually	favors	
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the use of capital over labor, which runs counter to the goal of hiring 
disadvantaged workers. Third, they say that in the 75 enterprise zones 
they examined, the vast majority of zone residents worked outside of 
the zone, while the vast majority of those working in the zone resided 
outside of it. The diffusion of economic activity has already been dis-
cussed in the case of generic job creation. This disappointing outcome 
likely	relates	 to	 the	lack	of	restrictions	that	would	force	firms	to	hire	
residents of the enterprise zones. Overall, Peters and Fisher contend 
that it is much better to focus efforts on directly helping the people in 
need	rather	than	on	targeting	firms.27
Notwithstanding, we believe an effective policy aimed at reduc-
ing poverty rates must have some orientation toward place in terms of 
creating more job opportunities in distressed areas. Our primary ratio-
nale is that poverty rates are geographically persistent and low-income 
households are less mobile. Indeed, there is evidence that high-pov-
erty areas actually have net in-migration of low-income households, 
which further exacerbates the already high poverty rates (Nord 1998).28 
Although efforts to induce residential relocation and enhance reverse 
commuting	in	urban	areas	have	potential	benefits,	we	are	skeptical	that	
they	ever	can	be	sufficiently	implemented	to	make	an	appreciable	dent	
in poverty. By contrast, our evidence indicates that certain types of job 
growth can reduce poverty. Moreover, the evidence suggests that while 
standard business tax incentives have modest impacts at the state level, 
they have far larger impacts at the intrametropolitan level.29 Intramet-
ropolitan development efforts have been criticized because it is pre-
sumed they primarily redistribute growth within the region. But this is 
precisely the goal in this case. Simply redistributing growth can reduce 
overall poverty in the broader region. Chapter 9 will provide more spe-
cific	recommendations	for	antipoverty	policies.
CONCLuSION
This chapter has examined trends in inter- and intrametropolitan 
poverty rates found by comparing the 1990 and 2000 censuses. We use 
basic descriptive statistics to conduct regression analysis. The primary 
findings	can	be	summarized	under	the	following	six	headings:
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1. The lowest and highest metropolitan area poverty rates shift-
ed west during the 1990s. The lowest metropolitan poverty rates in 
1989 occurred near New York City, while the highest poverty rates were 
in the Deep South and Texas. By 1999, the lowest MSA poverty rates 
were typically found in the Upper Midwest, and the highest were found 
in Texas and in southern and central California.
2. Across small, medium, and large metropolitan areas, there 
were considerable geographical disparities. Among large MSAs, the 
lowest 1999 poverty rates tended to be in the Northeast. The lowest 
poverty rates in small and medium-sized MSAs tended to be more dis-
persed—in Delaware, Pennsylvania, and the Midwest. Among the 61 
largest metropolitan areas, the two biggest—New York and Los Ange-
les—had	the	first-	and	fourth-highest	poverty	rates	in	1999.	Across	all	
MSA size groupings, many of the highest poverty rates in 1999 were 
clustered in the Deep and Middle South, Texas, central and southern 
California, and a sampling of college-town MSAs. The largest metro-
politan poverty rate declines occurred in some of these same places: 
the	South,	Texas,	and	certain	college	 towns.	 In	what	 likely	 reflects	a	
rebound in the Rust Belt’s economic fortunes, there were also large 
declines in metropolitan areas in Michigan.
3. There are clear socioeconomic patterns for high and low pov-
erty rate metropolitan areas. The largest poverty rate decreases con-
sistently occurred in MSAs that had lower unemployment rates in 2000 
than in 1990. Higher shares of both minorities and recent immigrants 
were associated with higher poverty rates, but this was not universal. 
There was a strong positive link between greater shares of the popula-
tion that did not complete high school and higher metropolitan poverty 
rates.
4. The labor market linkages within metropolitan areas differ 
between central-city and suburban counties. With the exception of 
male unemployment rates, MSA-county poverty rates tend to be less 
affected by labor market conditions. Further investigation suggests that 
suburban county poverty rates are less affected by new job growth, 
while central county rates are less affected by labor supply tightness 
measures such as male unemployment and female employment rates. 
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Hence, new jobs are critical in centralized cores, and efforts to increase 
labor market participation and reduce the length of job searches are 
more appropriate in suburban counties.
5. The racial and ethnic composition of the metropolitan coun-
ties modifies how labor market conditions affect poverty rates. Job 
growth reduced poverty rates more in central counties with greater Af-
rican American population shares. There was evidence that in metro 
counties with larger Hispanic population shares, stronger labor markets 
had smaller poverty rate–reducing effects, especially in the suburbs.
6. Programs aimed at reducing poverty rates need a targeting 
mechanism for the most distressed communities. We argue that a set 
of targeted efforts to reduce poverty in distressed urban cores is a neces-
sary component of an effective antipoverty policy. These efforts should 
focus more on central counties with high African American population 
shares. They should also target residents of the zones rather than en-
courage	firms	 to	 locate	 there.	Examples	of	possible	programs	 that	fit	
these criteria are described in Chapter 9.
We conclude that, in general, metropolitan counties are not dramati-
cally different from other counties. Yet they do vary in terms of the role 
played by labor market conditions, as well as in terms of other factors 
such	as	the	influence	of	female-headed	families.	Moreover,	place-based	
policies appear to be necessary, but they need to be carefully targeted 
to certain parts of metropolitan areas, and they need to consider racial 
composition. More sparsely populated nonmetro counties are also like-
ly to have unique trends that call for their own tailored policies. That is 
the topic of the next chapter.
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Notes









  3. A census track is a reasonably homogenous grouping set up by the U.S. Census 
Bureau and has about 4,000 people on average. Jargowsky (2003) provides more 
discussion on the 40 percent poverty rate threshold and on high poverty rate 
metropolitan-area census tracks.
	 4.	 Berube	and	Frey	(2002)	also	find	regional	distinctions	in	poverty	rate	changes	
for central cities and suburbs during the 1990s. Rust Belt and south Texas central 
cities fared well, but northeastern and California cities did not. Southern suburbs 
tended to fare well, while suburbs in New England, New York, and California 
tended to fare poorly.
 5. By comparison, the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) reports that the con-
sumer price index increased by 34.4 percent between 1989 and 1999. Data can be 
accessed from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2006e) Web site at http://data 
.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?cu (accessed March 30, 2006). Note that there is a 
composition effect, as the precise high- and low-poverty-rate metropolitan areas 
changed between the decades, but this pattern still illustrates trends between the 
two categories. 
 6. Slower population growth and greater recent immigration shares in areas with 
rising poverty rates are consistent with native out-migration, which likely miti-
gated any further poverty rate increases that would have occurred otherwise.
	 7.	 The	regression	coefficients	were	consistently	estimated	with	less	precision	when	
using MSA-level observations. One likely cause is that there are only 316 MSA 
observations, while there are 824 metropolitan counties. Also, as indicated in 
Chapter 2, aggregating metropolitan area counties into one MSA-level observa-
tion loses much of the intra-MSA variation that improves the precision of the 
results. Finally, we also would lose the richness of being able to separately con-
sider central counties and suburban counties.
	 8.	 Key	descriptive	statistics	are	reported	in	Table	7.7.	Variable	definitions	are	de-
tailed in Appendix A.
 9. The interpretation of the county-type results differs from Chapter 6 because the 
omitted county group is now single-county MSAs—in other words, the central-
city	and	suburban	coefficients	are	measured	relative	to	the	effects	of	a	single-
MSA county. The results show no clear evidence that big or small metropolitan 
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area central counties have different poverty rates than single-county MSAs, ce-
teris paribus.
	10.	 The	metropolitan	area	population	coefficient	equals	9.94e	−	8	(t = 2.48). Con-
versely,	the	county	population	coefficient	is	insignificant,	further	indicating	that	




 12. In Table A.1, a one standard deviation change in the overall female employment-
population rate equals 6.9 percentage points, and the corresponding change in 
the overall 1999 male unemployment rate equals 2.9 percentage points.
 13. When the percent of the population that immigrated to the United States between 
1990–1995 and 1995–2000 is added to the metropolitan model, the racial and 
ethnic share variables became even more inversely related to poverty rates (not 
shown). The 1995–2000 immigrant share result suggests that a one-percentage-
point	greater	share	immigrating	in	the	five-year	period	increases	the	MSA-coun-




 14. In interpreting the results, recall that there are 139 metropolitan areas that are 
each	located	in	a	single	county	and	are	thus	classified	as	central	county	MSAs.	
As shown in Table 7.6 and the corresponding results in Chapter 6, poverty rates 
in single-county MSAs are essentially the same as central county poverty rates 
(ceteris paribus). While these MSAs may appear to differ because they are small-
er and more suburban than other central-county MSAs, they are similar in terms 
of	 poverty	 rates.	 Specifically,	 the	 1989	 average	 poverty	 rate	 in	 single-county	
MSAs equals 14.5 percent (std. dev. = 6.0) and the average equals 13.5 percent 
(std. dev. = 5.3) in 1999. This compares to the overall population-weighted aver-
age central county poverty rate of 13.3 percent in 1989 and 13.2 percent in 1999 
(from columns (4) and (9) of Table 2.2).
 15. A “half-life” refers to the period of time that elapses before one-half of the effect 
of a shock dissipates.
 16. To examine whether job growth has additional indirect effects through affecting 
unemployment and employment rates, the quasireduced form model was esti-
mated. It indicates that the direct and indirect effects of job growth through un-
employment and employment rates are about one-third greater than these direct 
figures	(not	shown).
 17. Andersson, Holzer, and Lane (2003) report that the prevalence of medium- and 
high-paying jobs for disadvantaged persons tends to be concentrated in central 
counties. But the overall lack of nearby job creation remains a concern. 
 18. The share of the population that immigrated to the United States between 1995 
and 2000 equaled 2.0 percent (std. dev. = 1.9) in central counties and 1.0 percent 
(std. dev. = 1.2) in suburban counties. Note that this migration pattern is consis-
tent with foreign immigrants locating in central county enclaves where there are 
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already well-established immigrant communities, rather than individual immi-
grants choosing to locate where there are greater job opportunities, which would 
have implied a greater likelihood of locating in the suburbs.
 19. The results suggest that greater 1990–1995 immigrant shares had no statistical 
impact on either suburban or central county poverty rates.When the shares of the 
population that immigrated to the United States between 1980–1985 and 1985–
1990 were added to the 1989 central-county and suburban models, they had an 
insignificant	impact.
 20. To assess this issue, we examined African American migration and residential-
choice decisions during the 1990s. We focused on this group because their popu-
lation share should be much less confounded by new immigrants than the His-
panic	or	other-minority	population	shares.	Specifically,	we	regressed	the	change	
in African American population shares between 1990 and 2000 on the share of 
the population that immigrated to the United States between 1990–1995 and 
1995–2000, on the beginning 1990 African American population share, and on 
the county’s 1990 population. Focusing on the 1995–2000 immigration share, 
for central counties there appears to be almost a one-for-one inverse tradeoff 
between the change in the African American population share and the recent 
immigrant	 share	 (significantly	 different	 from	 zero	 at	 the	 0.01	 level).	This	 re-
lationship applies regardless of whether the regression is or is not weighted by 
the 1990 county population. Hence, African American location decisions almost 
completely offset recent immigration patterns in central counties, which helps 
explain why central county rates on balance were unaffected by recent immigra-
tion. Conversely, there is little statistical evidence that the change in the African 
American suburban population share is related to the 1995–2000 recent immi-
grant share. The lack of an African American migration response in suburban 
counties is consistent with a greater supply of low-skilled workers competing 
for suburban jobs (which likely increased unemployment and reduced wages for 
low-skilled groups).
	21.	 The	F-statistic	suggests	the	three	interactions	are	jointly	significant	at	about	the	
0.05 level in both cases.
 22. The race and ethnic shares are measured in percentages. For a county with a 10 
percent	share	of	one	of	the	groups,	one	calculates	the	influence	of	job	growth	by	
multiplying	the	interaction	coefficient	by	10	and	adding	that	value	to	the	main	
employment growth (or unemployment rate, or employment-population rate) co-
efficient.	Hence,	in	counties	with	large	minority	population	shares,	employment	
growth’s overall effect can vary considerably from the average result.
 23. These racial effects can be rather large. In a suburban county, a 2.9-percentage-
point increase in the male unemployment rate increases the poverty rate by about 
0.65 points when the Hispanic population share is zero (and the other minority 
shares are assumed to be zero), but it reduces the poverty rate when the His-
panic population share rises above 7.7 percent. In this simulation, the other-race 
population shares are assumed to be zero for ease of presentation. In reality, the 
other-race group shares will be greater than zero and their corresponding effect 
will be added to the total effect.
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 24. A study of a four-county region that includes Lawrence and Morgan counties 





text citations of U.S. Census Bureau (2006b) in this chapter.
 26. A general overview of the various business incentives can be found in Bartik 
(1991, 2001, 2004) and in Fisher (2004).
	27.	 The	Peters	and	Fisher	(2002)	view	appears	 to	reflect	a	 large	share	of	 the	eco-
nomic and public-policy profession. However, a recent, widely cited study by 
Greenstone and Moretti (2003) suggests that blockbuster incentive packages 
(e.g., Chicago’s efforts to lure Boeing) are economically worthwhile (see Fisher 
[2004] for a critique).
 28. In terms of central counties, we are also concerned by evidence that job growth 
increasingly became more distant from African American residences in the 1990s 
(Raphael and Stoll 2002).
 29. The general rule of thumb in the literature is that a 10 percent decrease in busi-
ness taxes increases economic activity in a state by about 2–3 percent, while the 
same 10 percent reduction in a small suburb’s taxes increases economic activity 
10–30 percent (see Bartik 1991, p. 43; 2004; Fisher 2004). In more-populated 
central counties, it is less clear whether tax cuts will have as large of an impact on 
business location decisions (Bartik 2004). However, in heavily populated met-
ropolitan areas with relatively small central cities (e.g., Atlanta), a tax cut in the 
central city would be much more effective because that area is just one of several 
possible business locations.
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Poverty in Rural America
Some of the same signs of despair and breakdown that wore out aging 
American industrial cities in the 1960s have come to the rural plains. 
Among teenagers, there is now a higher level of illicit drug use in ru-
ral areas than in cities or suburbs, recent surveys indicate. The middle 
class is dwindling, leaving pockets of hard poverty amid large agribusi-
nesses supported by taxpayers.
—Timothy Egan, “Amid Dying Towns of Rural Plains, One Makes a 
Stand,” New York Times, December 1, 2003
Fundamental structural changes in technology, markets, and organiza-
tions are redrawing our nation’s economic map and leaving many rural 
areas behind.
—Robert D. Atkinson, Reversing Rural America’s Economic De-
cline, Progressive Policy Institute, 2004
Chapter 7 showed that larger population and other characteristics 
help produce different poverty rate patterns and dynamics for metropol-
itan areas than for the nation as a whole. Low population densities and 
differing demographic characteristics also suggest that nonmetropolitan 
patterns may vary from national patterns. These variations likely mean 
that nonmetro regions have different commuting patterns and responses 
to job growth, which translate into different poverty rates. As reported 
in Table A.1, average nonmetro county poverty rates were more than 6 
percentage points higher than metro county poverty rates in 1989, and 
more than 4 points higher in 1999. Yet these averages obscure tremen-
dous diversity in poverty rates across nonmetro counties.1 Some non-
metro counties in the Northeast and Midwest possess very low poverty 
rates, while others, such as those in the South, have persistently high 
poverty rates. This chapter assesses the underlying causes of higher 
nonmetropolitan poverty rates as well the sources of nonmetro coun-
ties’ tremendous diversity.
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WHAT IS DIFFERENT ABOuT RuRAL OR 
NONMETROPOLITAN COuNTIES?
What Is Rural?
The meaning of the word “rural” is ambiguous and is regularly ap-
plied in confusing or contradictory ways that often depend on the user’s 
purpose	or	agenda.	The	U.S.	Census	Bureau	defines	rural	areas	as	being	
those with less than 500 people per square mile (Box 8.1). The U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service says “rural areas 
comprise open country and settlements with fewer than 2,500 residents” 
(ERS	2004a).	However,	this	latter	definition	means	that	relatively	small	
towns	and	communities	would	be	classified	as	“urban,”	which	would	
be misleading in most cases and would be inconsistent with popular no-
tions. Thus, we follow the convention of referring to nonmetropolitan 
counties as rural, and we will use the two terms interchangeably.
Chapter 7 describes how metropolitan areas comprise economically 
linked counties surrounding an urbanized area of at least 50,000 people. 
Outlying counties are included when a 25 percent commuting threshold 
is surpassed. Nonmetro counties are the remaining counties. In 2003, 
the federal government divided nonmetro counties into noncore and 
micropolitan areas.2 Micropolitan areas include an urbanized cluster of 
at least 10,000 people but less than 50,000, while outlying counties are 
included if the 25 percent commuting threshold is exceeded (Box A.1).
Micropolitan counties now account for approximately 60 percent 
of the nonmetropolitan population. During the 1990s, population in 
these counties grew about 10 percent on average, compared to about 
8 percent for the less-populated noncore rural counties. Average metro 
county population grew about 14 percent (ERS 2004b). So while rural 
areas grew less than metropolitan counties during the 1990s, it should 
be noted that even noncore rural counties experienced almost double-
digit growth on average. Yet there is tremendous diversity within that 
category,	as	many	noncore	rural	counties	suffered	significant	popula-
tion loss during the decade.
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Distinctions in Rural Labor Markets and Demographics 
Nonmetropolitan counties possess several distinguishing poverty-
related characteristics. For one thing, depending on household size, the 
official	poverty	rate	threshold	is	a	fixed	nominal	dollar	figure	for	each	
year that applies across the country. Yet rural areas are estimated to have 
a 16 percent lower cost of living than urban areas, primarily because of 
lower housing costs, though housing costs alone would overstate the 
rural/urban difference in cost of living (Nord 2000). A lower cost of 
 Box 8.1  Official Definitions of Rural and Urban
The following is taken from the U.S. Census Bureau (2004f) Web 
page	“Census	2000	Urban	and	Rural	Classification”:
URBAN AND RURAL CLASSIFICATION
For	Census	2000,	Census	Bureau	classifies	as	“urban”	all	terri-
tory, population, and housing units located within an urbanized area 
(UA) or an urban cluster (UC). It delineates UA and UC boundaries 
to encompass densely settled territory, which consists of 
• core census block groups or blocks that have a population 
density of at least 1,000 people per square mile, and 
• surrounding census blocks that have an overall density of at 
least 500 people per square mile. 
In addition, under certain conditions, less densely settled terri-
tory may be part of each UA or UC. 
The	Census	Bureau’s	classification	of	“rural”	consists	of	all	ter-
ritory, population, and housing units located outside of UAs and 
UCs. The rural component contains both place and nonplace ter-
ritory. Geographic entities, such as census tracts, counties, metro-
politan areas, and the territory outside metropolitan areas, often are 
“split” between urban and rural territory, and the population and 
housing	units	they	contain	often	are	partly	classified	as	urban	and	
partly	classified	as	rural.	
Partridge.indb   221 7/27/2006   1:41:52 PM
222   Partridge and Rickman  
living means that rural poverty rates are generally overstated relative to 
urban areas. Low-income rural residents are also believed to be more 
reliant on informal economic arrangements in which individuals agree 
to do unpaid work for each other, which also suggests that measured 
rural poverty rates are overstated (Harvey et al. 2002).3
Despite these advantages, low-income nonmetropolitan residents 
can suffer from the effects of living in an area with low population den-
sity. Low population density means that workers may have to commute 
long distances for work. Commuting is further hampered by the lack of 
public transportation, making owning a reliable automobile paramount. 
Small population and low density can limit the quantity and quality 
of child care; licensed centers are especially scarce in poor nonmetro-
politan areas (Gordon and Chase-Lansdale 2001; Whitener, Weber, and 
Duncan 2002). Child care solutions are further complicated because 
workers may have to travel longer distances not only to work but also 
to their care provider. Key social services for training, disabilities, and 
health care are also more dispersed or, worse yet, nonexistent. Hence, 
rural low-income families and households that are already under tre-
mendous	stress	may	find	it	more	difficult	to	escape	poverty.
Rural labor markets have offsetting factors that both hinder and 
improve the well being of low-income households. On one hand, we 
expect that job growth has stronger poverty-reducing effects in rural 
communities, especially when those communities are more isolated. 
This follows because rural migration and commuting responses are 
relatively muted in response to labor demand shocks compared to such 
responses in metro areas (Renkow 2003; Renkow and Hoover 2000). 
If fewer commuters and migrants take the new jobs, more of the jobs 
go to disadvantaged rural residents. One reason for this outcome may 
be that potential workers are less informed about a given rural county’s 
economic conditions, while a larger metro area’s economic conditions 
(e.g., Las Vegas’s) may be well known. For example, in the case of a 
city with 1 million total jobs and a town with a total of 1,000 jobs, it 
would	be	big	news	if	a	new	firm	created	10,000	jobs	in	the	city	(1	per-
cent of the city’s employment), but it would hardly be known outside 
of	the	county	if	a	new	firm	created	10	jobs	in	the	small	rural	town	(1	
percent of the town’s jobs). Relocation costs are also greater between 
urban and remote regions than between urban and nearby suburban or 
exurban communities.
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On the other hand, despite higher shares of poor rural female heads 
that work either part-time or full-time, there is a larger share of single 
working mothers who are in poverty in rural areas than in metro areas 
(Lichter and Jensen 2002). Moreover, nonmetro residents tend to have 
less educational attainment than their metro counterparts (see Table 
A.1). There is a considerably higher share of the rural adult population 
that did not complete high school, and there is a lower share with a col-
lege degree. Finally, reliance on agriculture and other extractive indus-
tries may exacerbate rural poverty rates (Brown and Warner 1991).
It is not surprising that with lower average education and lower cost 
of living, rural wages are considerably below the metropolitan average. 
For example, in 1993, average nonmetropolitan wages were about 72 
percent of the average MSA wage, and by 2001 they had fallen to 66 
percent.4	For	nonemployed	rural	residents,	finding	a	suitable	employ-
ment match is further hindered because low population density reduces 
the	diversity	 of	 job	opportunities,	meaning	 that	 a	 person	may	find	 it	
harder to obtain a job that requires his or her particular skill set (Gibbs 
2002). Nevertheless, smaller communities may facilitate the formation 
of informal labor market networks that help low-income residents iden-
tify a larger share of suitable employment opportunities over a wider 
geographical area. Simply put, in small communities, disadvantaged 
persons may be more likely to personally know someone employed at 
the	nearby	firms	that	are	hiring	workers.
Overall Trends in Rural Poverty Rates
Poverty rates in rural areas have historically been higher than in 
urban centers. In the late 1950s, nonmetropolitan poverty rates were al-
most 20 percentage points higher.5 But over the next 15 years rural pov-
erty rates declined so dramatically that by the mid-1970s the gap was 
less than 5 points. The gap somewhat increased in the 1980s because of 
the economic fallout in the resource and farm sectors, but subsequent 
improvements in the rural economy reduced the gap to 3.1 percentage 
points in 2001.
In that year, nonmetropolitan poverty tended not only to be highest 
in the South, at 17.6 percent, but the gap between rural and metropoli-
tan poverty rates was also greatest in that region of the country, at 5.4 
percentage points (ERS 2004a). The West had the second-highest rates 
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in both categories, followed by the Northeast. The Midwest’s nonmetro 
poverty rate was only 9.8 percent, and the rural/metropolitan gap was 
a barely perceptible 0.6 percentage points. Among racial groups, the 
rural/metropolitan poverty gap was largest among black non-Hispanics 
(at more than 10 percentage points) and “other” minorities (at about 
13 points). The metro/nonmetro gap was only 3 percentage points for 
Hispanics.
Another trait is the persistence of pockets of extreme rural poverty. 
The Economic Research Service of the USDA uses a 20 percent thresh-
old	in	defining	a	high	poverty	county.	Miller	and	Weber	(2004)	report	
that out of just over 3,000 counties, a remarkable 382 had 20 percent 
or greater poverty rates in 1959, 1969, 1979, 1989, and 1999 (using 
income from the year preceding the decennial census). Only 19 of these 
are metropolitan area counties. The remaining 363 persistent-poverty 
counties are nonmetropolitan, and 229 of them are not adjacent to an 
MSA. There are 2,248 total nonmetropolitan counties. Thus, about one-
sixth (363 out of 2,248) rural counties have struggled with consistently 
high poverty for at least the last 40 years.
Figures 2.8 through 2.12 showed the tremendous diversity in non-
metropolitan poverty outcomes over the 1979–1999 period. The pock-
ets of highest rural poverty are generally found in the Southeast, and 
the lowest nonmetro poverty rates are centered in the northern Great 
Plains and the Upper Midwest. Further illustrating the diversity, by 
1999 there were even pockets of low poverty in the Piedmont regions 
of North Carolina and Virginia, despite those areas being near high pov-
erty counties. In the 1979–1999 span, rural poverty increased the most 
in	the	Mountain	and	Pacific	states;	it	also	rose	in	central	Appalachia	and	
New England. The largest reductions occurred in the Upper Midwest 
and the Southeast. Highlighting the tremendous variations that occurred 
even among stronger performing states like Iowa, there were isolated 
counties that experienced marked increases in poverty rates.
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CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGH AND LOW POvERTy RATE 
RuRAL COuNTIES
Tables 8.1 (for 1999) and 8.2 (for 1989) present the 15 counties with 
the lowest and the highest poverty rates among the 2,248 nonmetropoli-
tan counties.6 The counties in the bottom half of the two tables were 
all among the 363 persistently high nonmetro poverty rate counties 
over the 1959–1999 period. Illustrating the depths of their problems, 
all 15 of these counties were just at or above the 40 percent poverty rate 
threshold	used	by	federal	agencies	to	define	chronically	high	poverty	
rates for not counties but neighborhoods.
Focusing on the 1999 patterns in Table 8.1, we see that the 15 lowest 
poverty rate counties were geographically dispersed. In contrast, the 15 
highest poverty rate counties were located in or near Native American 
Indian reservations, areas with high concentrations of African Ameri-
cans or Hispanics, and predominantly white areas of Appalachia. The 
15 lowest poverty rate counties tended to have more inhabitants. Com-
pared to the highest poverty rate counties, the lowest poverty rate coun-
ties generally have lower minority population shares, more than twice 
the median household income, considerably lower population shares 
that did not complete high school, and an average unemployment rate 
about 13 percentage points lower than in the highest poverty rate coun-
ties. Very often, a majority of the population in the highest poverty rate 
counties were members of national minority populations. Nevertheless, 
there is diversity even among the highest poverty rate counties. For 
example, the two Appalachian counties had very few minorities. In an-
other example, Brooks County, Texas, and Owsley County, Kentucky, 
did not suffer from exceedingly high unemployment rates.
Tables 8.3 (for 1999) and 8.4 (for 1989) report the 10 lowest and 
highest nonmetropolitan county poverty rates for the 984 counties ad-
jacent to a metropolitan area, for the 1,264 counties not adjacent to a 
metropolitan area, and for the 243 nonadjacent counties that had a 2000 
population of less than 5,000 (using 2000 population to ensure compa-
rability across decades).7 As before, the counties in the highest poverty 
rate group all were persistently high poverty counties. 
Concentrating	on	the	1999	figures	in	Table	8.3,	we	see	that	the	dis-
tinguishing characteristics between the lowest and the highest poverty 
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1 Loving County TX 0.0 67 17.9 40,000 13.7 0.0
2 Elbert County CO 4.0 19,872 4.6 62,480 7.5 2.4
3 Gilpin County CO 4.0 4,757 7.3 51,942 5.9 2.1
4 Litchfield	County CT 4.5 182,193 4.1 56,273 14.1 3.8
5 Union County OH 4.6 40,909 4.5 51,743 14.0 2.3
6 Grundy County IO 4.6 12,369 0.9 39,396 13.5 3.6
7 McLeod County MN 4.8 34,898 3.1 45,953 15.3 3.8
8 Piatt County IL 5.0 16,365 1.7 45,752 11.3 2.9
9 Iowa County IO 5.0 15,671 1.0 41,222 13.0 2.3
10 Bremer County IO 5.1 23,325 1.9 40,826 12.3 5.8
11 Scott County KS 5.1 5,120 3.5 40,534 15.5 2.2
12 Green County WI 5.1 33,647 1.7 43,228 15.9 3.2
13 Wasatch County UT 5.2 15,215 5.1 49,612 10.7 4.3
14 Morgan County UT 5.2 7,129 2.0 50,273 7.4 3.8
15 Columbia County WI 5.2 52,468 3.0 45,064 13.8 3.5
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Highest poverty levelb
2234 Bennett County SD 39.2 3,574 58.6 25,313 28.7 10.5
2235 Sioux County ND 39.2 4,044 83.2 22,483 21.5 23.3
2236 Clay County KY 39.7 24,556 6.4 16,271 50.6 10.7
2237 Wilcox County AL 39.9 13,183 72.6 16,646 40.5 15.2
2238 Brooks County TX 40.2 7,976 24.3 18,622 50.1 8.5
2239 East Carroll Parish LA 40.5 9,421 68.7 20,723 42.1 15.0
2240 Corson County SD 41.0 4,181 62.3 20,654 24.0 13.2
2241 Holmes County MS 41.1 21,609 79.6 17,235 40.3 17.3
2242 Zavala County TX 41.8 11,600 35.5 16,844 56.6 16.7
2243 Owsley County KY 45.4 4,858 0.9 15,805 50.8 8.8
2244 Todd County SD 48.3 9,050 86.2 20,035 25.9 18.4
2245 Ziebach County SD 49.9 2,519 73.5 18,063 28.6 17.4
2246 Starr County TX 50.9 53,597 12.0 16,504 65.3 20.9
2247 Shannon County SD 52.3 12,466 95.0 20,916 30.0 33.0
2248 Buffalo County SD 56.9 2,032 83.3 12,692 36.1 21.7
NOTE: All 1999 Non-MSA unweighted avg. poverty rates = 15.4 (std. dev. = 6.7); avg. lowest pov. = 4.5; avg. highest pov. = 44.4. Poverty 
rates and median household income are measured for 1999 and the other variables are for 2000, excluding Alaska and Hawaii. Percent 
minority is 100 minus the percentage of persons that consider white/Caucasian to be their single racial group.
a Nonmetropolitan-area	definitions	follow	those	in	place	for	the	2000	census	as	defined	by	the	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis.	For	details	
see Chapters 2 and 6.
b All	counties	on	this	page	are	persistent-poverty	counties,	defined	as	having	a	20	percent	or	higher	poverty	rate	in	1959,	1969,	1979,	1989,	
and 1999.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e). 
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1 Loving County TX 0.0 107 16.8 26,563 44.0 0.0
2 Litchfield	County CT 4.0 174,092 2.1 42,565 19.1 4.7
3 Merrimack County NH 5.5 120,005 1.3 35,801 16.8 5.9
4 Clark County KS 5.6 2,418 3.4 24,003 16.5 0.5
5 Steuben County IN 5.6 27,446 0.8 29,203 21.0 4.8
6 Nantucket County MA 5.7 6,012 2.8 40,331 10.6 2.1
7 Putnam County OH 5.8 33,819 1.8 32,492 22.5 3.8
8 Piatt County IL 6.1 15,548 0.2 31,369 17.0 4.4
9 Dubois County IN 6.1 36,616 0.5 31,227 27.8 3.2
10 Roberts County TX 6.2 1,025 2.8 30,203 18.6 3.2
11 Pitkin County CO 6.3 12,661 3.4 39,991 5.3 3.4
12 Belknap County NH 6.5 49,216 0.7 31,474 19.6 6.9
13 Moore County TN 6.5 4,721 3.9 28,056 33.3 2.7
14 York County NE 6.6 14,428 1.4 25,722 18.2 3.0
15 Ottawa County OH 6.6 40,029 2.7 31,360 24.1 7.7
Highest poverty levelb
2234 Sioux County ND 47.4 3,761 75.9 14,838 31.7 23.0
2235 Sharkey County MS 47.5 7,066 66.7 13,304 48.7 10.1
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2236 Presidio County TX 48.1 6,637 15.7 13,016 56.1 10.3
2237 Dimmit County TX 48.9 10,433 27.1 12,222 60.2 13.7
2238 Issaquena County MS 49.3 1,909 56.4 13,005 56.3 10.0
2239 Todd County SD 50.2 8,352 82.9 13,327 32.8 20.6
2240 Zavala County TX 50.4 12,162 47.0 11,822 61.4 19.7
2241 Maverick County TX 50.4 36,378 34.7 12,262 64.3 21.1
2242 Ziebach County SD 51.1 2,220 64.4 14,129 37.5 15.6
2243 Owsley County KY 52.1 5,036 0.1 8,595 64.5 17.2
2244 Holmes County MS 53.2 21,604 76.0 9,809 52.0 15.8
2245 East Carroll Parish LA 56.8 9,709 65.3 9,791 50.9 24.1
2246 Tunica County MS 56.8 8,164 75.6 10,965 54.1 17.0
2247 Starr County TX 60.0 40,518 38.1 10,182 68.4 18.8
2248 Shannon County SD 63.1 9,902 94.9 11,105 40.6 30.5
 
NOTE: All 1989 Non-MSA unweighted avg. poverty rates = 18.4 (std. dev. = 8.0); avg. lowest pov. = 5.5; avg. highest pov. = 52.4. Poverty 
rates and median household income are measured for 1989 and the other variables for 1990, excluding Alaska and Hawaii. Percent mi-
nority is 100 minus the percentage of persons that consider white/Caucasian to be their racial group.
a Nonmetropolitan	area	definitions	follow	those	in	place	for	the	2000	census	as	defined	by	the	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis.	For	details	
see Chapters 2 and 6.
b All	counties	on	this	page	are	persistent-poverty	counties,	defined	as	having	a	20	percent	or	higher	poverty	rate	in	1959,	1969,	1979,	1989,	
and 1999.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e). 
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1 Elbert County CO 4.0 19,872 4.6 62,480 7.5 2.4
2 Gilpin County CO 4.0 4,757 7.3 51,942 5.9 2.1
3 Litchfield	County CT 4.5 182,193 4.1 56,273 14.1 3.8
4 Union County OH 4.6 40,909 4.5 51,743 14.0 2.3
5 Grundy County IO 4.6 12,369 0.9 39,396 13.5 3.6
6 McLeod County MN 4.8 34,898 3.1 45,953 15.3 3.8
7 Piatt County IL 5.0 16,365 1.7 45,752 11.3 2.9
8 Iowa County IO 5.0 15,671 1.0 41,222 13.0 2.3
9 Bremer County IO 5.1 23,325 1.9 40,826 12.3 5.8
10 Green County WI 5.1 33,647 1.7 43,228 15.9 3.2
Highest poverty levelb
975 Macon County AL 32.8 24,105 86.2 21,180 30.0 12.3
976 Luna County NM 32.9 25,016 25.6 20,784 40.2 17.1
977 Tunica County MS 33.1 9,227 73.0 23,270 39.5 9.3
978 Willacy County TX 33.2 20,082 29.4 22,114 51.3 13.8
979 Bullock County AL 33.5 11,714 73.6 20,605 39.5 8.6
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980 Greene County AL 34.3 9,974 81.2 19,819 35.2 13.1
981 Hudspeth County TX 35.8 3,344 12.8 21,045 53.9 8.2
982 Zapata County TX 35.8 12,182 14.8 24,635 46.9 11.1
983 Holmes County MS 41.1 21,609 79.6 17,235 40.3 17.3
984 Starr County TX 50.9  53,597 12.0 16,504 65.3 20.9
Nonadjacent to MSA
Lowest poverty level
1 Loving County TX 0.0 67 17.9 40,000 13.7 0.0
2 Scott County KS 5.1 5,120 3.5 40,534 15.5 2.2
3 Dubois County IN 5.3 39,674 2.2 44,169 19.8 2.5
4 Leelanau County MI 5.4 21,119 6.3 47,062 9.3 5.0
5 Daggett County UT 5.5 921 5.8 30,833 16.3 7.7
6 Wyandot County OH 5.5 22,908 2.2 38,839 17.5 2.9
7 Putnam County IL 5.5 6,086 2.4 45,492 16.2 4.9
8 Polk County NE 5.8 5,639 0.7 37,819 13.4 1.8
9 Grand Traverse County MI 5.9 77,654 3.8 43,169 10.7 4.6
10 Dickinson County IO 6.0 16,424 1.1 39,020 10.8 2.8
Highest poverty levelb
1255 Wilcox County AL 39.9 13,183 72.6 16,646 40.5 15.2
1256 Brooks County TX 40.2 7,976 24.3 18,622 50.1 8.5
1257 East Carroll Parish LA 40.5 9,421 68.7 20,723 42.1 15.0
1258 Corson County SD 41.0 4,181 62.3 20,654 24.0 13.2
1259 Zavala County TX 41.8 11,600 35.5 16,844 56.6 16.7
(continued)
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1260 Owsley County KY 45.4 4,858 0.9 15,805 50.8 8.8
1261 Todd County SD 48.3 9,050 86.2 20,035 25.9 18.4
1262 Ziebach County SD 49.9 2,519 73.5 18,063 28.6 17.4
1263 Shannon County SD 52.3 12,466 95.0 20,916 30.0 33.0
1264 Buffalo County SD 56.9 2,032 83.3 12,692  36.1 21.7
Small nonadjacent to MSAc
Lowest poverty level
1 Loving County TX 0.0 67 17.9 40,000 13.7 0.0
2 Daggett County UT 5.5 921 5.8 30,833 16.3 7.7
3 Hooker County NE 6.9 783 2.2 27,868 10.3 1.3
4 Roberts County TX 7.2 887 2.1 44,792 10.0 1.3
5 Hinsdale County CO 7.2 790 3.2 37,279 6.9 2.2
6 Ouray County CO 7.2 3,742 3.5 42,019 6.6 3.6
7 Logan County KS 7.3 3,046 2.5 32,131 13.3 3.8
8 Gosper County NE 7.9 2,143 1.2 36,827 11.1 0.8
9 Wahkiakum County WA 8.1 3,824 6.5 39,444 15.8 8.1
10 Garfield	County UT 8.1 4,735 3.8 35,180 14.2 8.1
Table 8.3  (continued)
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Highest poverty levelb
234 Edwards County TX 31.6 2,162 14.7 25,298 32.9 4.9
235 Issaquena County MS 33.2 2,274 63.9 19,936 41.2 13.5
236 Mellette County SD 35.8 2,083 55.1 23,219 21.9 11.5
237 Jackson County SD 36.5 2,930 50.3 23,945 17.3 15.7
238 Bennett County SD 39.2 3,574 58.6 25,313 28.7 10.5
239 Sioux County ND 39.2 4,044 83.2 22,483 21.5 23.3
240 Corson County SD 41.0 4,181 62.3 20,654 24.0 13.2
241 Owsley County KY 45.4 4,858 0.9 15,805 50.8 8.8
242 Ziebach County SD 49.9 2,519 73.5 18,063 28.6 17.4
243 Buffalo County SD 56.9 2,032 83.3 12,692 36.1 21.7
NOTE: Adjacent-to-MSA unweighted average 1999 poverty rate = 14.5 (std. dev. = 6.1). Nonadjacent-to-MSA unweighted average 1999 
poverty rate = 16.1 (std. dev. = 7.0). Small nonadjacent-to-MSA with 2000 pop. < 5,000 unweighted average 1999 poverty rate = 15.8 
(std. dev. = 7.2). Poverty rates and median household income are measured for 1999 and the other variables for 2000, excluding Alaska 
and Hawaii. Percent minority is 100 minus the percentage of persons that consider white/Caucasian to be their single racial group.
a Nonmetropolitan	area	definitions	follow	those	in	place	for	the	2000	census	as	defined	by	the	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis.	For	details	
see Chapters 2 and 6.
b All	counties	listed	under	“highest	poverty	level”	category	are	persistent-poverty	counties,	defined	as	having	a	20	percent	or	higher	pov-
erty rate in 1959, 1969, 1979, 1989, and 1999.
c For	consistency,	small	nonadjacent	nonmetropolitan	counties	are	defined	as	having	a	population	of	less	than	5,000	in	2000.	Note	that	the	
243 small nonadjacent counties are a subset of the 1,264 nonadjacent counties.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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1 Litchfield	County CT 4.0 174,092 182,193 2.1 42,565 19.1 4.7
2 Merrimack County NH 5.5 120,005 136,225 1.3 35,801 16.8 5.9
3 Steuben County IN 5.6 27,446 33,214 0.8 29,203 21.0 4.8
4 Putnam County OH 5.8 33,819 34,726 1.8 32,492 22.5 3.8
5 Piatt County IL 6.1 15,548 16,365 0.2 31,369 17.0 4.4
6 Belknap County NH 6.5 49,216 56,325 0.7 31,474 19.6 6.9
7 Ottawa County OH 6.6 40,029 40,985 2.7 31,360 24.1 7.7
8 Kosciusko County IN 6.6 65,294 74,057 1.9 31,666 22.5 3.6
9 Dodge County WI 6.6 76,559 85,897 2.4 29,166 27.7 4.3
10 Adams County PA 6.8 78,274 91,292 2.5 30,304 30.0 3.9
Highest poverty levelb
975 Clay County WV 39.2 9,983 10,330 0.1 12,855 50.6 19.9
976 Yazoo County MS 39.2 25,506 28,149 53.0 14,234 46.6 9.4
977 Zapata County TX 41.0 9,279 12,182 28.0 14,926 49.9 14.5
978 Claiborne County MS 43.6 11,370 11,831 82.5 12,876 41.3 20.3
979 Willacy County TX 44.5 17,705 20,082 21.8 14,590 57.1 15.1
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980 Greene County AL 45.6 10,153 9,974 80.6 11,990 46.2 10.5
981 Lee County AR 47.3 13,053 12,580 58.2 11,949 55.8 14.9
982 Holmes County MS 53.2 21,604 21,609 76.0 9,809 52.0 15.8
983 Tunica County MS 56.8 8,164 9,227 75.6 10,965 54.1 17.0
984 Starr County TX 60.0 40,518 53,597 38.1 10,182 68.4 18.8
Nonadjacent to MSA
Lowest poverty level
1 Loving County TX 0.0 107 67 16.8 26,563 44.0 0.0
2 Clark County KS 5.6 2,418 2,390 3.4 24,003 16.5 0.5
3 Nantucket County MA 5.7 6,012 9,520 2.8 40,331 10.6 2.1
4 Dubois County IN 6.1 36,616 39,674 0.5 31,227 27.8 3.2
5 Roberts County TX 6.2 1,025 887 2.8 30,203 18.6 3.2
6 Pitkin County CO 6.3 12,661 14,872 3.4 39,991 5.3 3.4
7 Moore County TN 6.5 4,721 5,740 3.9 28,056 33.3 2.7
8 York County NE 6.6 14,428 14,598 1.4 25,722 18.2 3.0
9 Mercer County OH 6.7 39,443 40,924 0.9 29,618 24.5 4.7
10 Dukes County MA 6.7 11,639 14,987 7.7 31,994 9.6 6.1
Highest poverty levelb
1255 Presidio County TX 48.1 6,637 7,304 15.7 13,016 56.1 10.3
1256 Dimmit County TX 48.9 10,433 10,248 27.1 12,222 60.2 13.7
1257 Issaquena County MS 49.3 1,909 2,274 56.4 13,005 56.3 10.0
1258 Todd County SD 50.2 8,352 9,050 82.9 13,327 32.8 20.6
1259 Zavala County TX 50.4 12,162 11,600 47.0 11,822 61.4 19.7
1260 Maverick County TX 50.4 36,378 47,297 34.7 12,262 64.3 21.1
(continued)
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1261 Ziebach County SD 51.1 2,220 2,519 64.4 14,129 37.5 15.6
1262 Owsley County KY 52.1 5,036 4,858 0.1 8,595 64.5 17.2
1263 East Carroll Parish LA 56.8 9,709 9,421 65.3 9,791 50.9 24.1
1264 Shannon County SD 63.1 9,902 12,466 94.9 11,105 40.6 30.5
Small nonadjacent to MSAc
Lowest poverty level
1 Loving County TX 0.0 107 67 16.8 26,563 44.0 0.0
2 Clark County KS 5.6 2,418 2,390 3.4 24,003 16.5 0.5
3 Roberts County TX 6.2 1,025 887 2.8 30,203 18.6 3.2
4 King County TX 7.3 354 356 12.1 27,625 21.8 2.0
5 Haskell County KS 7.6 3,886 4,307 11.8 26,761 23.9 2.4
6 Gosper County NE 8.5 1,928 2,143 0.1 25,669 20.9 2.0
7 Greeley County KS 9.2 1,774 1,534 5.0 25,709 17.6 1.4
8 Clark County ID 9.3 762 1,022 10.6 24,583 25.3 1.9
9 Ouray County CO 9.6 2,295 3,742 2.5 27,500 12.5 7.0
10 Hemphill County TX 9.6 3,720 3,351 5.8 28,697 27.1 4.1
Highest poverty levelb
234 Guadalupe County NM 38.5 4,156 4,680 25.9 13,350 42.2 6.4
235 Jackson County SD 38.8 2,811 2,930 42.5 17,246 31.1 10.6
Table 8.4  (continued)
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236 Mellette County SD 41.3 2,137 2,083 47.0 14,539 32.0 7.8
237 Edwards County TX 41.7 2,266 2,162 6.7 14,639 41.7 4.6
238 Corson County SD 42.5 4,195 4,181 48.7 14,324 36.7 14.8
239 Buffalo County SD 45.1 1,759 2,032 77.7 14,566 38.8 20.4
240 Sioux County ND 47.4 3,761 4,044 75.9 14,838 31.7 23.0
241 Issaquena County MS 49.3 1,909 2,274 56.4 13,005 56.3 10.0
242 Ziebach County SD 51.1 2,220 2,519 64.4 14,129 37.5 15.6
243 Owsley County KY 52.1 5,036 4,858 0.1 8,595 64.5 17.2
 
NOTE: Adjacent-to-MSA unweighted average 1989 poverty rate = 17.4 (std. dev. = 7.4). Nonadjacent-to-MSA unweighted average pov-
erty rate = 19.1 (std. dev. = 8.3). Small nonadjacent-to-MSA with 2000 pop. < 5,000 unweighted average 1989 poverty rate = 18.6 (std. 
dev. = 8.1). Poverty rates and median household income are measured for 1989 and the other variables for 1990, excluding Alaska and 
Hawaii. Percent minority is 100 minus the percentage of persons that consider white/Caucasian to be their racial group.
a Nonmetropolitan	area	definitions	follow	those	in	place	for	the	2000	census	as	defined	by	the	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis.	For	details	
see Chapters 2 and 6.
b All	counties	listed	under	“highest	poverty	level”	category	are	persistent-poverty	counties,	defined	as	having	a	20	percent	or	higher	pov-
erty rate in 1959, 1969, 1979, 1989, and 1999.
c For	consistency,	small	nonadjacent	nonmetropolitan	counties	are	defined	as	having	a	population	of	less	than	5,000	in	2000.	Note	that	the	
243 small nonadjacent counties are a subset of the 1,264 nonadjacent counties.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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rate counties are the same in all three subgroupings as they were for 
the overall nonmetropolitan poverty rates. There is considerable geo-
graphical diversity in the lowest poverty rate category, although there 
are	fewer	representatives	from	Southern	and	Pacific	Coast	states.	There	
is more spatial concentration in the highest poverty rate counties. Adja-
cent counties with the highest poverty rates tend to be those with high 
shares of African Americans or Hispanics and are located in Gulf Coast 
states or the Southwest. Conversely, the highest-poverty-rate nonadja-
cent	counties	include	five	in	South	Dakota	with	high	shares	of	Native	
Americans and one primarily white Appalachian county.
The lowest- and highest-poverty-rate adjacent rural counties tend to 
have lower poverty rates than their nonadjacent counterparts, illustrat-
ing	the	benefits	of	being	closer	to	larger	labor	markets.	Nonetheless,	as	
shown in the high poverty rate group, being near a metro area is not a 
guarantee of economic prosperity. In this group, the average median 
household income hovered in the $20,000 range, the average 2000 un-
employment rate was about 13 percent, and the average high-school 
noncompletion rate was about 44 percent. There are few differences in 
the characteristics of the lowest poverty rate counties, regardless of ad-
jacency to metro areas. Two exceptions are that low-poverty-rate adja-
cent counties tend to have about twice the population and about $7,000 
more in median household income for 1999.
The nonadjacent group with less than 5,000 people is included so 
we can examine the 243 rural counties whose isolation and small scale 
mean	that	many	are	unlikely	to	have	sufficient	critical	mass	to	attract	
and retain businesses. Their small population also may mean they have 
fewer cultural and urban recreational amenities to retain young adults 
and professionals. Nevertheless, with an average poverty rate of about 
6.5 percent, the 10 lowest poverty rate counties illustrate that it is pos-
sible to have low poverty despite some locational disadvantages. The 
lowest poverty rate counties tend to be agricultural and in the Great 
Plains. While their median household incomes are relatively low, they 
tend to have greater high school completion rates and relatively low 
unemployment rates. Despite their success in some measures, it is not 
clear whether most of these counties have a viable future, given their 
reliance on a declining farm base. It is possible that many unemployed 
and low income residents leave these counties relatively quickly, which 
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would contribute to the counties’ “success” in having low poverty and 
unemployment.
Among the 10 nonadjacent less-populated high poverty rate coun-
ties, seven are in the Dakotas and have high shares of Native Americans. 
They tend to have low median household incomes and relatively high 
unemployment rates, although their high school noncompletion rates 
are often not very high. Nevertheless, their small size, geographical iso-
lation, and inherent risk for any private sector investor mean that most 
of these counties cannot realistically expect lower poverty rates without 
policy intervention. Either the policies need to encourage relocation of 
low income residents, or they need to create a positive stimulus for job 
creation. Likewise, as is the case for most high poverty rural counties, 
these areas need help in improving their community’s capacity to offer 
services, such as transportation and child care, and their ability for gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental governance. And, they may need to be 
better integrated into their larger economic regions to achieve a critical 
economic mass.
Improving institutional cooperation between the various levels of 
government	would	help	ensure	a	more	efficient	use	of	resources	and	a	
more certain direction for private investment. Likewise, by better gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental coordination across larger economic 
regions, these counties can more fully participate in economic growth 
that may be taking place outside their boundaries. Finally, given the 
economic	 and	 social	 duress	 in	 these	 counties,	 their	 nonprofit	 service	
organizations	 and	other	 nongovernmental	 arrangements	may	need	fi-
nancial and organizational assistance.
CHANGES IN 1989–1999 RuRAL POvERTy RATES
To help us consider the underlying causes for large declines or in-
creases in poverty rates, Table 8.5 presents various characteristics of 
counties that experienced the 10 largest poverty rate declines and the 10 
largest increases over the 1989–1999 period, using the same three ad-
jacent/nonadjacent categories used in Table 8.3. The best news in Table 
8.5 is that seven of the ten largest declines in adjacent county poverty 
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Table 8.5  Change in Poverty Rate from 1989 to 1999 for Adjacent, Nonadjacent, and Small Nonadjacent  





































Largest decrease in poverty rate
1 Tunica Countyb MS −23.7 9,227 11.5 73.0 39.5 23,270 9.3 17.0 52.9
2 Lee Countyb AR −17.4 12,580 −3.8 57.1 43.8 20,510 13.3 14.9 6.3
3 Karnes Countyb TX −14.6 15,446 19.4 32.2 40.9 26,526 6.5 8.9 10.8
4 Concho County TX −13.9 3,966 23.2 11.9 40.7 31,313 3.6 4.0 24.8
5 West Feliciana Parish LA −13.9 15,111 14.5 51.3 46.7 39,667 5.6 9.5 7.9
6 Elliott Countyb KY −12.1 6,748 4.3 0.6 47.4 21,014 10.5 17.6 0.3
7 Holmes Countyb MS −12.1 21,609 0.0 79.6 40.3 17,235 17.3 15.8 −12.7
8 Clay Countyb WV −11.7 10,330 3.4 2.1 36.3 22,120 11.5 19.9 18.0
9 Madison County TX −11.5 12,940 15.5 33.7 27.2 29,418 5.8 6.4 4.4
10 Lafayette Countyb AR −11.4 8,559 −12.7 37.9 34.7 24,831 7.9 10.6 -0.8
Largest increase in poverty rate
975 Colusa County CA 2.8 18,804 13.4 35.9 36.0 35,062 10.7 8.3 14.0
976 Ulster County NY 2.9 177,749 7.0 11.0 18.3 42,551 6.3 5.0 11.0
977 Sullivan County NY 2.9 73,966 6.3 14.7 23.8 36,998 9.2 6.3 5.5
978 Liberty County FL 3.2 7,021 20.7 23.4 34.4 28,840 5.0 3.5 −0.9
979 Oldham County TX 3.7 2,185 −4.3 9.2 19.5 33,713 6.9 1.9 18.0
980 Skamania County WA 3.7 9,872 16.0 6.5 14.1 39,317 11.1 10.7 9.9
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981 Chouteau County MT 4.2 5,970 8.7 15.7 12.9 29,150 5.7 3.5 8.8
982 DeSoto County FL 4.3 32,209 25.9 25.7 36.5 30,714 5.3 5.9 7.8
983 Hendry County FL 5.2 36,210 28.8 33.4 45.8 33,592 7.8 7.9 14.6
984 Judith Basin County MT 6.0  2,329 2.0 1.4 12.4 29,241 2.5 2.6 12.7
Nonadjacent to MSA 
Largest decrease in poverty rate
1 San Saba County TX −17.2 6,186 12.7 16.9 30.0 30,104 3.7 5.2 15.3
2 McPherson County NE −16.9 533 −2.4 2.3 11.4 25,750 0.0 0.0 −3.7
3 Guadalupe Countyb NM −16.8 4,680 11.2 45.6 31.7 24,783 7.7 6.4 −0.5
4 Billings County ND −16.8 888 −24.8 0.3 22.2 32,667 2.8 4.8 −8.2
5 East Carroll Parishb LA −16.4 9,421 −3.1 68.7 42.1 20,723 15.0 24.1 1.8
6 Issaquena Countyb MS −16.1 2,274 16.1 63.9 41.2 19,936 13.5 10.0 23.5
7 Dimmit Countyb TX −15.6 10,248 −1.8 22.9 45.7 21,917 14.2 13.7 9.1
8 Maverick Countyb TX −15.6 47,297 23.1 28.9 57.9 21,232 17.6 21.1 26.0
9 Mason County TX −14.6 3,738 8.4 8.5 21.9 30,921 1.6 1.8 5.2
10 Dickens County TX −13.9 2,762 6.9 22.0 29.4 25,898 5.1 8.1 9.1
Largest increase in poverty rate
1255 Rock County NE 6.4 1,756 −15.0 2.2 12.6 25,795 2.3 1.1 −4.7
1256 Modoc County CA 6.4 9,449 −2.4 15.2 22.9 27,522 11.9 10.6 9.1
1257 Hidalgo County NM 6.5 5,932 −0.4 15.4 31.2 24,819 9.7 7.0 −23.5
1258 Wheeler County NE 6.6 886 −7.0 1.8 9.2 26,771 3.2 0.5 11.6
1259 Clark County KS 7.1 2,390 −1.2 3.9 12.6 33,857 2.6 0.5 16.0
1260 San Juan County CO 8.0 558 −33.5 3.6 7.9 30,764 3.0 10.2 5.0
1261 Clark County ID 10.5 1,022 25.4 28.6 36.0 31,576 6.1 1.9 3.0
(continued)
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Largest increase in poverty rate
1262 Buffalo Countyb SD 11.8 2,032 13.4 83.3 36.1 12,692 21.7 20.4 4.7
1263 King County TX 13.3 356 0.6 3.9 21.9 35,625 0.0 2.0 10.9
1264 Echols County GA 14.0 3,754 37.8 22.7 39.5 25,851 3.7 4.1 61.8
Small nonadjacent to MSAc
Largest decrease in poverty rate
1 McPherson County NE −16.9 533 −2.4 2.3 11.4 25,750 0.0 0.0 −3.7
2 Guadalupe Countyb NM −16.8 4,680 11.2 45.6 31.7 24,783 7.7 6.4 −0.5
3 Billings County ND −16.8 888 −24.8 0.3 22.2 32,667 2.8 4.8 −8.2
4 Issaquena Countyb MS −16.1 2,274 16.1 63.9 41.2 19,936 13.5 10.0 23.5
5 Mason County TX −14.6 3,738 8.4 8.5 21.9 30,921 1.6 1.8 5.2
6 Dickens County TX −13.9 2,762 6.9 22.0 29.4 25,898 5.1 8.1 9.1
7 Towner County ND −12.6 2,876 −26.1 2.8 18.1 32,740 2.3 3.3 −5.6
8 Cottle County TX −11.4 1,904 −18.0 16.9 33.9 25,446 5.8 5.9 8.3
9 Kent County TX −11.3 859 −17.6 5.7 21.9 30,433 3.8 3.6 7.1
10 Quitman Countyb GA −11.1 2,598 15.0 47.1 42.2 25,875 5.8 11.5 20.4
Largest increase in poverty rate
234 Forest County PA 4.7 4,946 2.9 4.4 20.6 27,581 7.1 7.1 13.6
235 Butte County ID 4.7 2,899 −0.7 7.1 17.4 30,473 5.8 2.7 5.4
236 Rock County NE 6.4 1,756 −15.0 2.2 12.6 25,795 2.3 1.1 −4.7
Table 8.5  (continued)
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237 Wheeler County NE 6.6 886 −7.0 1.8 9.2 26,771 3.2 0.5 11.6
238 Clark County KS 7.1 2,390 −1.2 3.9 12.6 33,857 2.6 0.5 16.0
239 San Juan County CO 8.0 558 −33.5 3.6 7.9 30,764 3.0 10.2 5.0
240 Clark County ID 10.5 1,022 25.4 28.6 36.0 31,576 6.1 1.9 3.0
241 Buffalo Countyb SD 11.8 2,032 13.4 83.3 36.1 12,692 21.7 20.4 4.7
242 King County TX 13.3 356 0.6 3.9 21.9 35,625 0.0 2.0 10.9
243 Echols County GA 14.0 3,754 37.8 22.7  39.5 25,851 3.7 4.1 61.8
NOTE: Poverty rates and median household income are measured for 1989 and 1999 and the other variables for the period stated in the column headings. 





adjacent counties are a subset of the 1,264 nonadjacent counties.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e) and Bureau of Economic Analysis REIS data for employment growth (BEA 2002). 
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rates	 and	five	of	 the	 ten	 largest	 declines	 in	 nonadjacent	 counties	 oc-
curred in persistent-poverty counties. Furthermore, some of the largest 
declines occurred in counties that had been persistent-poverty counties 
but had dropped below the 20 percent high-poverty threshold in 1999. 
For both adjacent and nonadjacent counties, the largest declines tended 
to occur in counties with high shares of African Americans or Hispan-
ics in Texas or in nearby states in the Deep South. A couple of special 
cases are the two counties bordering Appalachia that experienced large 
poverty rate declines and two nonadjacent counties in the Great Plains. 
However, it is discouraging that none of the largest declines occurred 
on Native American reservations.
In the adjacent group, there are some unexpected differences be-
tween the declining and increasing poverty rate categories. Foremost 
of these is that the largest declines occurred in relatively less populated 
counties that experienced about a 7.5 percent population increase on 
average during the 1990s. In contrast, the largest increases in poverty 
rates occurred in counties where the population increased by an average 
of 12.5 percent, illustrating that migration was not evening out regional 
poverty differentials. Likewise, adjacent counties with the largest de-
clines tend to have higher minority shares, larger shares of high-school 
noncompletion, and lower median household income. This pattern also 
extends to the two nonadjacent categories. It is heartening that poverty 
rates	took	their	sharpest	drops	in	what	appear	to	be	significantly	disad-
vantaged counties.
In adjacent rural counties, relatively strong economies appear to 
be driving the largest poverty rate declines. Their unemployment rates 
declined by about 3 percentage points between 1990 and 2000, on aver-
age, while the unemployment rates of adjacent rural counties with the 
largest poverty rate increases rose. However, despite a relatively large 
population growth advantage for counties with the largest poverty rate 
increases, they only experienced about a 10 percent average increase 
in 1995–2000 employment growth, which is approximately the same 
as counties with the largest poverty rate declines. Thus, the newly cre-
ated jobs in the adjacent counties with the largest poverty rate declines 
appear	 to	have	been	filled	more	 from	 the	 ranks	of	 the	nonemployed.	
It is also striking that the employment growth gap was only about 1 
percentage point, on average, between the best and worst performers 
in terms of poverty rate changes. Hence, even the worst-performing 
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counties tended to have job growth, suggesting other structural causes 
of poverty.
Among rural counties that are not adjacent to a metro area, the 
average poverty rate fell about 16 percentage points for the 10 coun-
ties with the largest poverty rate decreases, and it rose an average of 9 
points for the 10 with the largest increases. Both groups tend to have 
small populations, which exceed 10,000 in only two of the 20 possible 
cases. Surprisingly, nonadjacent counties with the largest poverty rate 
declines from 1995 to 2000 typically had slower employment growth 
(7.8 vs. 9.4 percent) even as they had faster average population growth. 
The only feature that seemingly favored the nonadjacent counties with 
the greatest poverty rate declines is that their unemployment rate fell 
about 1.4 points between 1990 and 2000, as opposed to counties with 
the largest poverty rate increases, whose unemployment rate increased 
slightly. The patterns illustrate the complex nature of characterizing lo-
cal poverty rate trends.
For the least-populated nonadjacent rural counties, those with the 
largest decreases in poverty rates tended to have declining population 
over the decade, while the counties with the largest increases tended 
to have slight gains in population, which is consistent with labor sup-
ply–driven changes in poverty. It appears disadvantaged persons dis-
proportionately left the counties with falling poverty rates because of a 
lack	of	job	opportunities;	this	lack	is	reflected	by	the	low	employment	
growth in most of these counties. In sum, the distinctions between those 
who had sharp increases in poverty rates and those who had sharp re-
ductions are even less clear among small, nonadjacent rural counties. 
Thus, we need regression analysis to help sort out the underlying causes 
of nonmetropolitan poverty.
RuRAL REGRESSION FINDINGS
To examine whether the determinants of nonmetropolitan poverty 
rates differ from the metropolitan averages from Chapter 7, we estimate 
the regression models described in Chapter 6 using the 2,204 nonmet-
ropolitan counties. Key descriptive statistics are reported in Table 8.6, 
and Table 8.7 reproduces a regression table from Chapter 7. The base 
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the USDA’s Economic Research Service (2003a).
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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1989 and 1999 nonmetropolitan poverty rate models are reported in 
columns (3) and (7), and most of the discussion centers on the 1999 re-
sults. Columns (4) and (8) contain the nonmetropolitan models, which 
include variables accounting for conditions in neighboring counties. To 
facilitate comparison between MSA and nonmetro counties, columns 
(1) to (2) and (5) to (6) report the corresponding estimates from the 
specifications	that	use	the	824	MSA	counties.
Turning	 to	 the	 results	 in	Table	 8.7,	 the	 coefficient	 on	 the	 lagged	
nonmetropolitan county poverty rate is of smaller magnitude than it 
is for metropolitan counties, indicating slightly less persistence for ru-
ral poverty rates in terms of responsiveness to exogenous shocks. The 
degree of persistence in nonmetropolitan counties declined during the 
1990s. Thus the results indicate that rural counties typically adjust more 
quickly to changes in socioeconomic conditions.
As	noted	in	Chapter	7,	rural	counties	are	generally	more	influenced	
by labor market conditions than are MSA counties. First, industrial 
structural change has a stronger impact on nonmetropolitan poverty 
rates. Their thinner labor markets make it harder for displaced work-
ers	who	are	less	skilled	to	find	suitable	reemployment.	The	descriptive	
statistics from Table A.1 show that a one standard deviation change in 
the 1995–2000 industry restructuring measure is associated with a 0.14 
percent increase in the poverty rate for the typical rural county when 
evaluated at the mean nonmetro county population of 24,682. When the 
rural county population is less than 5,000, the structural change effect 
approximately doubles. Hence, if a small rural county was struggling 
with a loss of employment in, say, the natural resource sector, the pov-
erty rate would increase not only because job growth declined but also 
because labor market frictions induced by the industry restructuring 
would slow reemployment for some workers. Regarding the industry 
structure, a greater agricultural share is most associated with higher ru-
ral poverty rates (not shown).
Greater job growth has a much larger poverty-reducing impact on 
nonmetro county poverty rates than on MSA counties. To ensure com-
parability with Chapters 6 and 7, we continue to use the overall one 
standard deviation change in the variables from Table A.1. Using the re-
sults reported in column (7) of Table 8.7, we see that a 10.1 percent (one 
standard deviation) change in 1995–2000 employment growth reduces 
the typical nonmetropolitan county poverty rate by about 0.2 percent-
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age	points,	unlike	the	insignificant	impact	it	has	on	MSA	poverty	rates.	
As was described above, we expected a larger rural impact because of 
dampened migration and commuting responses.
Employment growth also indirectly reduces the poverty rate by 
lowering the unemployment rate and increasing the employment-popu-
lation ratio. Thus, following our methods in Chapters 6 and 7, we esti-
mated the quasireduced-form model that omits the unemployment-rate 
and employment-rate variables to more fully capture the direct and 
indirect effects of job growth (not shown). In this case, a 10.1-point 
increase	 in	five-year	employment	growth	reduces	 the	poverty	rate	by	
about 0.25 percentage points on average, which is a little greater than 
when the unemployment and employment rates were held constant.
While the effects of greater job growth are not large in terms of re-
ducing	poverty	rates,	job	growth	may	be	more	beneficial	if	it	is	targeted.	
For example, as described in earlier chapters, if nonmetro employment 
growth is concentrated in sectors that are faring well nationally, we 
anticipate a dampened migration response. Hence, a larger number of 
disadvantaged original residents would take the newly created jobs. To 
examine this possibility, we replaced 1995–2000 job growth with the 
corresponding measures of industry-mix and competitiveness employ-
ment growth; in results not shown, industry-mix job growth had more 
than a fourfold greater impact than generic job growth.8 Thus, by target-
ing economic development efforts toward sectors that are doing well 
nationally, successful policies for job creation can mitigate rural pov-
erty—more	so	than	in	urban	areas.	Indeed,	the	benefits	are	likely	larger	
when the targeting is further narrowed to employing the disadvantaged 
and to focusing on distressed rural communities.
Because rural areas have transportation and child care constraints, 
which interact with each other, we expect female labor market partici-
pation to take on an even larger role in nonmetropolitan counties. More-
over, low rural wages likely mean that female employment is more vi-
tal in raising married-couple households above the poverty threshold. 
Thus, it is not surprising that a higher 2000 female employment rate 
had more than twice the effect in reducing poverty rates in rural areas 
than in metropolitan areas. In fact, using the results in column (7), a one 
standard deviation 6.9-point increase in the female employment-popu-
lation ratio would reduce the typical nonmetropolitan county poverty 
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R2 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.93
N 824 824 2204 2204 824 824 2204 2204
NOTE:	The	specifications	follow	those	 in	columns	(1),	 (3),	 (4),	and	(6)	of	Table	7.1,	with	some	of	 the	results	suppressed	for	brevity.	
Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Blank means the variable was not included in the regression model. A metro-
politan	county	is	defined	using	2000	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis	REIS	county	definitions.	See	the	notes	to	Table	7.1	for	more	details	
on	variable	definitions.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
Table 8.7  (continued)
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rate by a rather large 1.4 percentage points, indicating the importance of 
facilitating job opportunities for women in reducing rural poverty.
Male unemployment has a modestly smaller role in rural areas than 
in	metropolitan	areas.	Along	with	 the	 insignificant	male	employment	
rate	coefficient,	 these	results	suggest	that	the	economic	well	being	of	
men—either directly, or indirectly through factors such as the marriage 
market—plays a relatively small role in affecting nonmetropolitan pov-
erty.
As is consistent with arguments that transportation and child care 
constraints present more challenging hurdles in rural areas, both the 
share of households headed by single mothers and the share headed by 
single fathers have a much stronger adverse effect on nonmetro pov-
erty rates. Low rural wages are probably another reason for this large 
rural poverty rate effect. Nonmetro county poverty rates are negatively 
related to the percentage of the population that is African American or 
Hispanic	(significant	at	the	0.05	level)	after	accounting	for	other	socio-
economic characteristics. The non–African American minority share is 
also negatively related to poverty rates, but the result is statistically 
insignificant.
The models shown in columns (4) and (8) of Table 8.7 capture 
the broader neighboring-county effects by including the average sur-
rounding-county	poverty	rate,	 the	five-year	commuting-zone	employ-
ment growth, and the percent of workers employed in their county of 
residence. Illustrating how labor market access and information about 
nearby counties is important, a greater share of workers employed in 
their county of residence was positively related to poverty rates in the 
1999 model.9 Likewise, the average surrounding-county poverty rate 
is	positively	related	 to	nonmetropolitan	poverty	rates	but	 is	 insignifi-
cant in the metropolitan models. As is consistent with Figures 2.8–2.10, 
these	findings	further	support	the	notion	of	poverty	clustering	in	rural	
counties, where there are spillovers across neighboring counties in resi-
dential location decisions and labor market conditions. 
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RuRAL POvERTy AND PROxIMITy TO METRO AREAS
Being	near	a	metropolitan	area	can	provide	significant	advantages	
to a rural county. The close proximity may enhance the delivery of gov-
ernment services for the disadvantaged, and there may be more acces-
sible child care. Close proximity also helps provide additional ameni-
ties that can help attract a professional workforce that in turn creates 
other employment opportunities. The larger labor market scale also 
greatly	mitigates	 the	 problems	 a	 person	may	 face	 in	finding	 suitable	
labor market matches. Perhaps more importantly, closer proximity 
greatly increases the accessibility of jobs for the disadvantaged. Com-
pared to nonadjacent counties, adjacent counties had faster employment 
growth and greater commuting-zone job growth (Table 8.6). Thus it is 
not surprising that a greater share of workers in counties that are adja-
cent to metro areas commuted longer distances and to other counties. 
With improved access, the average person poverty rate in adjacent non-
metropolitan counties was 2 to 3 percentage points below the average 
nonadjacent-county person poverty rate (see Table 2.3).
Because many adjacent nonmetropolitan counties are at least partly 
in the exurban fringe, their characteristics likely fall somewhere be-
tween those of metropolitan and nonadjacent rural counties. Table 8.8 
reports the results of various nonmetropolitan regressions that split the 
sample into counties that are and are not adjacent to metropolitan areas. 
Columns (1) and (2) contain the 1989 adjacent-to-metropolitan models, 
columns (3) and (4) contain the 1989 nonadjacent models, and columns 
(5) through (8) report the corresponding models for 1999.
Focusing on the 1999 adjacent and nonadjacent results in columns 
(5) and (7), we see that there are subtle differences in key results. For 
example, at least in less populated counties, industry restructuring has 
a stronger positive impact on nonadjacent poverty rates, most likely be-
cause	these	labor	markets	are	thinner.	Moreover,	five-year	employment	
growth has a slightly stronger poverty-reducing impact in nonadjacent 
counties. The larger impact is expected because nonadjacent counties 
would likely attract fewer urban migrants and commuters than adjacent 
nonmetro counties, leaving more new job opportunities for the disad-
vantaged.
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The greater isolation of nonadjacent counties should make them 
better suited for place-based policies aimed at generating employment 
because of the larger poverty-reducing response. To assess possible 
gains from targeting growth, the 1995–2000 industry-mix and competi-
tiveness-employment growth variables were considered (not shown). 
For	adjacent	counties,	the	industry-mix	results	were	insignificant,	sug-
gesting a more modest role for targeting growth. Nevertheless, for non-
adjacent nonmetropolitan counties, greater industry-mix employment 
growth has a marked poverty-reducing impact.10 In this case, a 10.1 
percentage-point increase in industry-mix employment reduces poverty 
rates by 1.3 points, indicating that targeted job growth can be an effec-
tive tool in more isolated nonmetropolitan counties. Further targeting of 
hiring towards the disadvantaged in conjunction with policies that en-
hance labor force participation of women and single parents will likely 
produce even larger effects.
Supporting the belief that transportation and child care pose greater 
obstacles	to	employment	in	more	isolated	rural	counties	is	the	finding	
that the female employment rate has a slightly stronger poverty-reduc-
ing effect in nonadjacent counties. Likewise, the share of single-par-
ent households with children has a more deleterious poverty impact 
in nonadjacent counties. These results are consistent with the notion 
that improving job opportunities, especially for women, and enhancing 
child care and transportation can have a stronger impact in nonadjacent 
counties. Also, if rural areas that are isolated are associated with even 
lower male wages than rural areas in general, then raising female labor 
force participation may be even more important for avoiding poverty 
for married families.
The importance of agriculture and other resource-extractive indus-
tries for many isolated rural counties appears to have increased pov-
erty because these sectors are associated with more seasonal employ-
ment and more volatile business cycles. The typical nonadjacent county 
poverty	rate	increases	a	statistically	significant	0.25	percentage	points	
when the farm employment share rises by 1 percent with a correspond-
ing decrease in the public administration share (not shown in Table 
8.8). In metro-adjacent rural counties, poverty rates rise by only 0.15 
points after a similar increase in agricultural employment (not shown). 
Moreover, a 1 percent increase in the goods employment share and a 
corresponding decrease in public administration is associated with a 
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R2 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93
N 974 974 1230 1230 974 974 1230 1230
NOTE:	The	specifications	follow	those	 in	columns	(1),	 (3),	 (4),	and	(6)	of	Table	6.1,	with	some	of	 the	results	suppressed	for	brevity.	
Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Blank means the variable was not included in the regression model. A nonmetro-
politan	county	is	defined	using	2000	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis	REIS	county	definitions.	See	Appendix	A	for	more	details	on	variable	
definitions.	See	Chapter	2	for	the	definition	of	“adjacent/nonadjacent	to	a	metropolitan	area.”
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e).
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statistically	 significant	 0.08-percentage-point	 increase	 in	 the	 typical	
nonadjacent county poverty rate, vs. an imperceptible change in the ad-
jacent county poverty rate. Hence, the act of diversifying isolated rural 
economies	appears	to	have	important	antipoverty	benefits.
Surrounding-county spillovers are examined in the 1999 adjacent 
and nonadjacent models in columns (6) and (8). Both rural county 
types are about equally affected by surrounding-county poverty rates. 
Yet adjacent county poverty rates are not statistically associated with 
commuting-zone employment growth or the percentage of workers em-
ployed in their county of residence. Nonadjacent county poverty rates 
are positively related to the share of workers employed in their county 
of	 residence.	This	 finding	 indicates	 that	 employment	 accessibility	 in	
broader labor markets is one factor that can ameliorate poverty in non-
adjacent counties.
Recent immigration can adversely affect rural poverty if the new 
arrivals compete against low-skilled natives. This possibility was con-
sidered by reestimating the models in columns (5) and (7) after adding 
the percentage of the population that had immigrated between the pe-
riods of 1990–1995 and 1995–2000 (not shown). The 1995–2000 for-
eign	immigrant	share	had	a	positive	and	significant	impact	on	poverty	
rates,	whereas	the	early	1990s	immigrant	share	was	insignificant.	For	
both adjacent and nonadjacent counties, a 1-percentage-point increase 
in the recent immigrant share is associated with a 0.4-point increase 
in the poverty rate. The poverty rate may increase because of higher 
poverty rates among immigrants and because low-income rural natives 
may bear some costs resulting from labor market competition with the 
new immigrants.11
To	summarize	the	findings,	poverty	rates	in	nonmetropolitan	coun-
ties that are not adjacent to metropolitan areas are more responsive to 
labor market conditions than their adjacent counterparts, especially for 
women. Likewise, other factors, such as greater adverse impacts from 
structural change and larger farm and goods employment shares, sug-
gest a need to diversify the employment opportunities in nonadjacent 
rural counties.
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CASE STuDy: SCOTTS BLuFF COuNTy, NEBRASkA
Scotts Bluff County is in the panhandle of Nebraska, located on the 
western border with Wyoming. It is two counties north of Interstate 80 
and derives its name from a nearby plateau that marks the beginning 
of the geologic transition between the Great Plains and the Rockies 
(Curtis 2003). Scotts Bluff County contains six communities, the two 
largest being the cities of Scottsbluff and Gering, the county seat (ePo-
dunk 2006). According to the latest census, 36,951 people resided in 
the county in 2000, including 14,732 in Scottsbluff and 7,751 in Ger-
ing (U.S. Census Bureau 2006c). Median household income equaled 
$32,016, 82 percent of the state average (U.S. Census Bureau 2006d).
As is consistent with the national reversal of the 1980s population 
decline in nonmetropolitan areas, Scotts Bluff County’s population in-
creased 2.6 percent in the 1990s, though its 2000 population was still 
3.6 percent below that of 1980 (U.S. Census Bureau 2006c,e). Popula-
tion growth in the 1990s was due to foreign immigration and to natu-
ral increase through propagation. Population growth in all Nebraska 
nonmetro areas equaled 2.3 percent in the 1990s, while metro areas 
experienced 13.9 percent growth (ERS 2006). With one exception, Ne-
braska counties adjacent to Scotts Bluff lost population in the 1990s. 
Box Butte, Sioux, and Banner counties lost 7.4, 4.8, and 3.9 percent of 
their populations, while Morrill County eked out a 0.3 percent popula-
tion gain. Just across the border in Wyoming, Goshen County posted 
population growth of 1.3 percent.
Scotts	Bluff	County’s	population	increase	masks	significant	net	out-
migration from the county over the decade. Intercensal estimates sug-
gest that the county saw a net loss of 1,275 people to other states and to 
other Nebraska counties in the 1990s, while the 2000 census suggests 
a net loss, both in-state and out-of-state, of 1,625 for 1995–2000 alone 
(U.S. Census Bureau 2002c). Of this net migration of 1,625 people, a 
net of 802—almost half—migrated to other counties in Nebraska (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2003). Despite overall net out-migration in the 1990s, 
Scotts Bluff experienced a net gain of 60 people from the four Nebraska 
counties that border it and 147 people from Goshen County, Wyoming. 
Also somewhat potentially offsetting the net out-migration between 
Scotts Bluff and other counties was an increase of 640 foreign-born 
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residents in the 1990s (U.S. Census Bureau 2005c). In fact, 17.2 percent 
of the population in Scotts Bluff is listed as being of Hispanic or Latino 
origin in the 2000 census, compared to 5.5 percent for the state; 13.7 
percent of the population speaks a language other than English at home 
(U.S. Census Bureau 2004d). Partly related to its recent immigration, 
Scotts Bluff’s share of the adult population possessing a college degree 
was 17.3 percent in 2000, compared to 23.7 percent for the state. The 
corresponding	figures	for	high	school	completion	were	79.6	and	86.6	
(U.S. Census Bureau 2004h).
The person poverty rate in Scotts Bluff County declined from 15.5 
percent in 1989 to 14.5 percent in 1999, but its child poverty rate barely 
inched down, from 22.2 to 22.0 percent (U.S. Census Bureau 2004i). 
The Hispanic poverty rate was 30.1 percent in 1999, approximately 
the same as in 1989, while the Hispanic child poverty rate increased 
from 37.9 to 41.2 percent. These high shares put upward pressure on 
the overall person poverty rate, particularly as the county gained His-
panic population. Person poverty rates also decreased in the bordering 
Nebraska counties: 16.4 to 15.4 in Sioux, 21.8 to 13.6 in Banner, 14.8 to 
14.7 in Morrill, and 11.7 to 10.7 in Box Butte. By comparison, the least 
populated rural areas in the nation had the largest reduction in poverty 
in the 1990s, declining from 17.9 to 14.9 percent (Jolliffe 2003).
Scotts Bluff County serves as a regional center for agriculture, 
manufacturing,	medical	services,	 information	technology,	finance,	re-
tail, education, tourism, and recreation (Twin Cities Development As-
sociation 2003). Prominent manufacturers include beef and sugar-beet 
processors, which are associated with having high shares of recent 
immigrants (Bodvarsson and Van den Berg 2006). Serving as a retail 
center, Scotts Bluff’s Walmart Super Center employs 450 people. A no-
table tourist attraction is the Scotts Bluff National Monument, at which 
the Oregon Trail Museum displays pioneer and natural history exhibits 
(Western Nebraska Tourism Coalition 2006). The Economic Research 
Service of the USDA rates Scotts Bluff County as a 4 on a scale of 7 for 
amenity attractiveness, which it reports as being positively associated 
with rural U.S. population growth (McGranahan 1999).
Labor force participation remained roughly unchanged at 64 per-
cent, while unemployment fell from 5.8 to 5.1 percent between the 
1990 and 2000 censuses (U.S. Census Bureau 2004i). As an example 
of the connectedness between nonmetro counties, the 2000 census re-
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ported that 1,622 people commuted into Scotts Bluff County and 847 of 
its residents commuted out, producing a net of 775 in-commuters (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2004e). The vast majority of the in- and out-commuting 
was with the four neighboring Nebraska counties and Goshen County, 
Wyoming.
An evaluation of Nebraska’s welfare reform initiative, Employment 
First, implemented statewide during July 1997, reveals a number of dif-
ferences in program success between rural and urban counties (Ponza, 
Meckstroth, and Faerber 2002). The study consisted of a sample of 
January 2000 TANF recipients, for which the communities of Colum-
bus, Gering, and Scottsbluff comprised the study’s rural areas. Among 
its	findings	was	that	rural	Nebraska	recipients	reported	more	personal	
obstacles to working, yet were more likely to work and less likely to be 
dependent on welfare. This may be evidence of greater peer pressure, 
preservation of middle class values, and better social support systems. 
But	rural	recipients	also	were	less	likely	to	find	jobs	that	paid	well	or	
offered	health	benefits,	 and	were	more	 likely	 to	experience	 job	 turn-
over and nonstandard work shifts. This occurred despite the emphasis 
of Nebraska’s welfare reform on matching recipient interests and needs 
with economic opportunities, as opposed to simply placing them im-
mediately into employment. The report recommended expanded offer-
ings of education, job training, and career counseling to former rural 
recipients.
Scotts Bluff County’s population remained virtually unchanged 
from April 1, 2000, to July 1, 2003, while Sioux County experienced 
slight growth and Banner, Box Butte, Goshen, and Morrill counties reg-
istered	significant	 losses	 (U.S.	Census	Bureau	2006f).	After	 reaching	
a low of 4.0 percent in 2001, Scotts Bluff’s unemployment rate rose 
in both 2002 and 2003, reaching its highest level (5.0 percent) since 
its 1990s peak of 4.8 percent in 1996 (BLS 2006a). Job losses in 2003 
were broad-based, occurring in agriculture, construction, manufactur-
ing, and services (BLS 2004). Thus, it is not surprising that, following 
broader U.S. trends, the faltering Scotts Bluff economy led to the pov-
erty rate increasing by 1.2 percentage points over the 2000–2002 period 
(U.S. Census Bureau 2005d).
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POLICy IMPLICATIONS FOR FIGHTING RuRAL POvERTy
The discussion in Chapter 7 noted that most economists have reser-
vations about the effectiveness of place-based strategies as a tool for lo-
cal economic development. In particular, such policies are often viewed 
as expensive, wasteful, prone to help those who are less in need than 
others, and apt to slow market adjustments that would eliminate adverse 
shocks or conditions. However, we contend that targeted policies may 
be effective in reducing poverty if tailored to localities where job acces-
sibility appears to be the largest hindrance.
We argued in Chapter 7 that targeted tax breaks and infrastructure 
enhancements could be effective in central counties of metro areas. The 
findings	in	this	chapter	suggest	an	even	stronger	potential	role	for	such	
place-based strategies in reducing rural poverty—especially in more 
isolated rural communities—assuming the strategies are cost-effective. 
Providing greater job growth and improved opportunities for women 
has much larger effects in nonadjacent counties than in others, while 
stimulating sectors that are growing faster than the national average 
appears especially effective at reducing their poverty rates. Additional 
benefits	from	such	policies	include	diversifying	to	get	away	from	reli-
ance on the farm and goods sectors, which reinforces the poverty rate 
reductions and better sets the stage for sustainable economic develop-
ment.
There have been numerous efforts to aid rural economies through 
such seemingly helpful means as farm supports or policies aimed at 
encouraging mining and lumbering. Yet these policies are narrowly fo-
cused on a declining share of the rural population and are not broad 
enough to support a general revitalization. These sectors simply no lon-
ger employ the large numbers they once did. The federal government 
has spent countless billions of dollars supporting agribusiness in the 
Great	Plains	region	without	stemming	the	population	outflow.	Though	
it is not clear how expensive it would be to boost local rural job growth 
rates compared to the expense of boosting local urban growth rates, it 
is not hard to imagine that broader-based rural development policies 
would be more effective than the current narrow industry-based rural 
policy—especially in industries that are declining nationally.
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To achieve long-term economic vitality, rural communities often 
need	an	 influx	of	modern	 infrastructure,	 including	roads,	water,	 sew-
age, and educational facilities. The digital divide suggests that many 
rural communities lag in their information and telecommunications in-
frastructure. Related government programs such as those administered 
by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development have an 
urban bias, and federal and state governments often do not provide suf-
ficient	revenue	sharing	for	rural	communities	to	build	or	maintain	in-
frastructure. Yet in many cases it seems more cost-effective to retain 
rural population where most of the necessary infrastructure is already in 
place, rather than build an entirely new infrastructure as this population 
relocates to urban areas in large numbers. It also reduces sprawl.
The potential effectiveness of place-based rural policies is further 
enhanced by dampened in-migration and commuting responses in small-
er or more isolated economies, which leaves more jobs for the intended 
disadvantaged recipients (Renkow 2003). The fact that impoverished 
families and households tend to move to areas with already-high pov-
erty rates reinforces the need to stimulate job growth in these locations 
(Nord 1998). Finally, the tendency for rural poverty to be clustered in 
larger regions means that there are fewer employment opportunities 
within driving distance. 
The new-jobs tax credits and wage subsidies that will be described 
in Chapter 9 give one grounds to believe that targeting the most dis-
tressed, isolated rural areas will have favorable returns. In fact, there 
is evidence that poverty rates in the highest-poverty rural counties are 
more than twice as favorably affected by employment growth as in the 
remaining counties, illustrating the potential effects of targeting dis-
tressed counties.12 However, in this targeting process, it should be noted 
that there are rural communities that do not have a critical mass of eco-
nomic activity to sustain their current population. Putting scarce gov-
ernment resources into these communities would be wasteful and the 
funds would be better spent elsewhere, particularly in nearby regional 
centers. Likewise, there are many rural counties, especially on the Great 
Plains, that have experienced large, irreversible population losses for 
the past few decades. Such counties are undergoing an adjustment in 
which their disadvantaged people, along with the rest of their popula-
tion, are naturally relocating to greener pastures. In these counties, it 
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would be better to wait until the population stabilizes, as the resources 
would likely be of better use elsewhere.
The regression analysis suggested that rural county poverty rates, 
especially in more isolated counties, are mitigated by improved em-
ployment prospects for women and by fewer single-parent households. 
Hence, policies that facilitate improved access to child care would seem 
especially	beneficial	in	rural	America,	particularly	the	farther	away	one	
gets from metropolitan centers. Likewise, given the low population 
density and the clustering of poverty in rural areas, transportation en-
hancements	would	be	beneficial.
The greater importance of the informal economy in rural America 
also suggests that traditional human-capital training needs to be broad-
ened. For example, improving basic business skills and increasing en-
trepreneurship might help take informal enterprises into the mainstream 
economy as well as help provide an alternative or a bridge for the un-
deremployed. Programs aimed at developing business plans, market-
ing, identifying niche domestic and foreign markets, and providing and 
brokering	financing	may	have	larger	payoffs	than	merely	teaching	ba-
sic skills. Indeed, such programs may directly confront the problem of 
outside investors being reluctant to invest in more distant rural areas 
with uncertain economic prospects. Trends in globalization and out-
sourcing accentuate the need for greater entrepreneurship to ensure that 
the engine of growth is more homegrown and stable. Nevertheless, this 
does not rule out the need for upgrading of skills in rural areas, because 
those areas tend to have lower average educational attainment. Hence, 
customized training could also be used to facilitate the attraction of new 
business startups. 
It should be noted that, except in regions that have been undergoing 
persistent population losses, it is not clear whether relocation assistance 
policies will be effective in rural America. Unlike their metropolitan 
counterparts, disadvantaged rural households would often have to relo-
cate much farther away and in larger centers than they are used to. Such 
moves are likely more expensive, both in terms of pecuniary costs and 
in the nonpecuniary, emotional costs of leaving behind friends and fam-
ily, who serve as support systems. In some rural counties dominated by 
African Americans, Hispanics, or Native Americans, the costs of fami-
lies leaving their informal networks may be prohibitive (Spilimberg and 
Ubeda 2004). It would likely take too many resources, which are scarce 
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to begin with, to successfully encourage relocation of disadvantaged 
rural families.
SuMMARy
This chapter follows up on Chapter 7 by assessing the degree to 
which the underlying causes of poverty differ for nonmetropolitan 
counties as opposed to other types of counties. Lower population densi-
ties are expected to produce different poverty rate outcomes, both be-
cause rural labor markets differ from others and because there are likely 
fewer, or less-accessible, government services in rural markets. Good-
quality child care also is lacking in many rural communities, which 
further strains single and married parents’ ability to fully participate in 
labor market activities.
Descriptive analysis indicates a strong persistence to rural poverty. 
In all cases, the highest poverty rate counties were persistent-poverty 
counties that had 20 percent or higher poverty in 1959, 1969, 1979, 
1989, and 1999. Compared to nonmetropolitan counties with the low-
est poverty rates, the highest poverty rate counties tend to have greater 
shares of minorities and high-school noncompletion, lower median 
household income, and higher unemployment rates. The good news is 
that rural counties that experienced the greatest declines in poverty rates 
tended to have these same characteristics, suggesting that the most dis-
advantaged rural counties can improve under the right conditions. Yet 
one nagging problem with this premise is the persistence of extremely 
high poverty that is found on many Native American reservations.
Nonmetropolitan county poverty rates tended to respond more to 
employment growth, especially in the more isolated nonadjacent coun-
ties. In fact, job growth, when concentrated in sectors that are growing 
rapidly nationally, tends to markedly reduce poverty rates in nonadja-
cent counties, suggesting potential gains from place-based strategies. 
Increasing female employment also has larger poverty-reducing effects 
in nonmetro counties, especially in the more isolated ones. Finally, hav-
ing a greater share of single-parent households increases poverty more 
in rural America than in metropolitan areas. Together, these results sug-
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gest that efforts to improve work supports for women can have a greater 
impact in nonmetro counties than elsewhere.
Given the larger role of key economic and demographic factors 
in nonmetropolitan counties, we argue that targeted, place-based eco-
nomic-development and work-support policies can be more effective 
in rural America than in large urban centers. In fact, these policies are 
likely to be most effective in counties that are nonadjacent to metropoli-
tan areas. Hence, we believe the type of employment zone–targeted tax 
credits	and	wage	subsidies	described	in	the	final	chapter	should	be	used	
as a tool in reducing rural poverty. Nevertheless, we caution that some 
rural counties are simply so isolated or in such a downward spiral that 
expending additional resources on them would be fruitless.
We also recommend a large expansion in support for child care in 
rural communities, especially for centers that provide hours of service 
that can facilitate the various types of shift work that entry-level dis-
advantaged workers often use as stepping stones. Moreover, we sup-
port some forms of added training to augment the relatively low levels 
of	rural	human	capital.	But	rural	areas	would	likely	also	benefit	from	
broader programs aimed at increasing entrepreneurship. Such programs 
would allow for more of the value added in production to be captured 
as area income.
Critics of place-based economic development policies have offered 
a host of concerns, described in Chapter 7. In terms of rural Amer-
ica, it is likely these critics would argue that much effort and many 
resources have already been expended, with seemingly few results in 
helping	to	stem	population	outflows.	While	it	is	true	that	rural	America	
has received hundreds of billions of dollars in agriculture and related 
resource subsidies, it is unclear whether those subsidies have promoted 
economic vitality, let alone whether they have trickled down to lower 
income groups. Indeed, one could ask whether they have harmed the ru-
ral	economy	by	helping	to	maintain	an	undiversified	economic	structure	
that is under persistent stress. Instead, if these billions were redirected 
to promoting industries with better long-run prospects as well as to im-
proving the infrastructure and human capital of rural America, we be-
lieve	there	would	be	significant	gains	for	the	health	of	the	overall	rural	
economy and for those places’ disadvantaged residents.13
The premise that most of rural America is in a downward spiral and 
cannot be saved is misguided. In the 1990s, nonmetropolitan population 
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increased by 10.3 percent, which represents an increase from the 1980s. 
Net-migration—likely the best indicator of quality of life—was posi-
tive for nonmetropolitan counties during the 1990s.14 Even in nonadja-
cent nonmetropolitan counties, population growth averaged 7.8 percent 
during the decade (Table 8.6). In the rural West, more people made a 
lifestyle choice to migrate to isolated and sparsely settled counties with 
fewer natural amenities (Cromartie and Wardwell 1999). Thus, reports 
that rural America is dead are premature. To help the disadvantaged and 
general population in rural counties, it is not necessarily more funds 
that are required, but a reallocation of resources away from policies 
targeted	at	 specific	 industries.	Of	course,	 such	policy	changes	would	
take	 considerable	 political	will,	 and	vested	 interests	will	 surely	fight	
such changes. Nevertheless, improving the plight of the rural poor and 
the larger rural population demands a new approach.
Notes
The two epigraphs to this chapter come from Egan (2003) and Atkinson (2004).
 1. Table A.1 reports that the standard deviation of poverty rates in nonmetropolitan 
counties is about 2 percentage points higher than in metropolitan counties.
 2. Figure A.1 goes into more detail.
  3. Blank (2005), Mosely and Miller (2004), and Weber and Jensen (2004) summa-
rize the place-based differences in rural areas and some of the research on rural 
poverty rate differentials.
  4. In 2001, average noncore rural earnings were 62 percent of metropolitan average 
earnings, while the corresponding share in micropolitan areas was 69 percent 
(ERS 2003d).  
 5. For more details on the metropolitan/nonmetropolitan poverty gap, see ERS 
(2004a).
		6.	 Following	 the	convention	of	earlier	chapters,	we	define	 the	metropolitan/non-
metropolitan	counties	as	they	were	defined	in	the	2000	census.
  7. Note that the 243 isolated nonadjacent counties are a subset of the 1,264 nonad-
jacent counties.
		8.	 The	 respective	 coefficients	 for	 industry-mix	 and	 competitiveness-employment	
growth were 0.079 (t = 1.83) and 0.015 (t = 2.60), compared to 0.017 for generic 
employment growth. Note that the industry-mix employment growth variable is 
likely measured with more error in nonmetro counties, which would bias its co-
efficient	to	zero.	Greater	nonmetropolitan	measurement	error	arises	because	the	
county	industry	employment	figure	that	is	used	to	derive	the	industry-mix	mea-
sure had to be interpolated when there was missing data in the original Bureau of 
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Economic Analysis employment series. Because of nondisclosure requirements, 
missing data was more prevalent in nonmetro counties, requiring more interpola-
tion.	Likely	reflecting	the	effects	of	measurement	error,	the	null	hypothesis	that	
the	industry-mix	and	competitiveness-employment	growth	coefficients	are	equal	
can only be rejected at the 15.2 percent level.
		9.	 Comparing	column	(8)	to	column	(4),	we	find	that	from	1989	to	1999	a	reversal	
occurs	in	the	statistical	significance	of	commuting-zone	job	growth	and	percent	
employed in county of residence, though the underlying implications are simi-
lar.
  10. The adjacent-to-metropolitan-area industry-mix and competitiveness-employ-
ment	growth	coefficients	were	−0.042	(t	=	0.75)	and	−0.015	(t = 1.93), in which 
the	null	hypothesis	that	the	two	coefficients	were	equal	could	not	be	rejected	at	
any	reasonable	level	of	significance	(p = 0.63). To be sure, measurement error 
may have biased these industry-mix and competitiveness results to zero. The cor-
responding	coefficients	for	counties	not	adjacent	to	metro	areas	were	−0.13	(t = 
1.95)	and	−0.016	(t	=	1.67),	in	which	the	null	hypothesis	that	the	two	coefficients	
are equal could be rejected at the 0.10 level.
  11. In neither the adjacent nor the nonadjacent case are the farm employment share 
and Hispanic population share results strongly affected when the immigration 
shares are added to the model. Likewise, following the patterns of Chapters 6 
and	7,	the	recent	foreign	immigrant	share	had	a	statistically	insignificant	impact	
on 1989 poverty rates.
 12. To consider this, we divided the nonmetropolitan sample into the 527 counties 
that had poverty rates greater than 20 percent in both 1979 and 1989 and the 
1,677	counties	that	did	not.	The	1995–2000	employment	growth	coefficient	was	
−0.049	(t	=	3.49)	in	the	high	poverty	sample	and	−0.022	(t = 3.59) in the remain-
ing rural counties. In order to focus on the total effects of employment growth, 
the	 specification	did	not	 include	 the	employment	 rate,	unemployment	 rate,	or	
mobility variables.
  13. Atkinson (2004) presents an approach that could form a framework for redirect-
ing current federal resources and subsidies toward reinvigorating rural America.
		14.	 These	figures	use	the	1990	definitions	of	metropolitan	counties.	For	more	details	
on rural population change, see ERS (2004b).
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How to Win the Local Poverty War
Summary and Policy Recommendations
Forty years of movement of people and jobs away from the city have 
taken a toll on Philadelphia’s revenue base; abandoned properties, de-
teriorating infrastructure, and increasing poverty and social distress 
have exacerbated the need for government intervention. 
—Manpower Research Development Corporation, Welfare Reform in 
Philadelphia, 2003 
The rural Great Plains has been losing people for 70 years, a slow de-
mographic collapse. Without even the level of farmers and merchants 
that used to give these areas their pulse, many counties are also losing 
their very reason to exist. 
—Timothy Egan, “Amid Dying Towns of Rural Plains, One Makes a 
Stand,” New York Times, December 1, 2003
 
Just as effective causal stories focus on the simultaneous role of mul-
tiple and interactive causal factors, so effective policy solutions require 
attention to multiple strategies. 
—Rebecca Blank, “Poverty, Policy, and Place,” International Re-
gional Science Review, October 2005
SyNOPSIS
After weakening in the 1980s, the link between economic growth 
and poverty reduction tightened again during the record expansion of 
the 1990s, particularly near the end of the decade. Yet strong economic 
performance also coincided with several public policy initiatives, in-
cluding efforts to reform state and federal welfare programs. Regres-
sion and case study analysis of state-level data in Chapters 4 and 5, 
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however, reveal little evidence to support welfare reform as reducing 
overall poverty; instead it appears the economy was primarily respon-
sible for poverty reduction.
In	particular,	 the	 state-	 and	national-level	findings	 indicate	 that	 a	
given degree of employment growth reduces poverty more when the 
national	 economy	 is	 strong.	The	findings	also	 suggest	 that	 economic	
development efforts targeted at industries that nationally are growing 
rapidly reduce poverty more than broad-based attempts to accelerate lo-
cal growth. These two factors lead to better poverty outcomes because 
local	commuting	and	migration	flows	are	dampened	in	response	to	the	
acceleration	of	regional	employment	growth,	producing	greater	benefits	
for disadvantaged current residents. Better labor market outcomes for 
females are more important for reducing poverty than better outcomes 
for	males.	This	 is	 true	even	after	 accounting	 for	 the	 influence	of	 job	
growth on female labor market outcomes, which implies that other fac-
tors such as access to good-quality child care are important for females 
in obtaining work.
Despite the reduction in the overall poverty rate at the national lev-
el, persistent geographic pockets of poverty remain. Persistent pockets 
of poverty include areas in central Appalachia, the Mississippi Delta, 
the historic Cotton Belt in the Southeast, areas along the Rio Grande 
and the Mexican border, and Native American reservations in the West 
and	the	Great	Plains.	These	pockets	of	extreme	poverty	reflect	a	general	
pattern of persistence in which areas that had high (or low) poverty in 
the middle of the twentieth century often have high (or low) poverty 
in	the	early	twenty-first	century.	In	general,	poverty	remains	higher	in	
nonmetropolitan, or rural, counties, particularly those more isolated 
from metropolitan areas. Higher-than-average poverty also exists in 
large metropolitan areas (i.e., those with a population exceeding one 
million). Within metropolitan areas, higher poverty occurs in central 
cities, whereas poverty generally is appreciably lower in the more eco-
nomically vibrant outer suburbs.
While strong natural, historical, and cultural forces likely underlie 
many of the poverty differences across areas, county-level regression 
and case study analysis in Chapters 6–8 indicate that economic factors 
also	substantially	influence	place-based	poverty.	Yet	because	of	likely	
greater cross-county migration and commuting, the link between coun-
ty-level employment growth and poverty is weaker than the growth-
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poverty link at the state and national levels. This cautions against im-
plementing generic job creation policies on a small geographic scale. 
Broader geographical spillovers of economic growth on poverty across 
regions suggest that there should be fewer economic development ef-
forts, but that those efforts should be centered on larger regions encom-
passing more people.
Nevertheless,	as	is	consistent	with	state-level	findings,	we	find	that	
employment growth attributable to a county having a composition of 
nationally fast-growing industries reduced its poverty rate more than 
broad-based employment growth derived from all (or most) industries 
in the county growing faster than their respective national counterparts. 
We hypothesize that because the nationally fast-growing sectors are do-
ing well everywhere, there is less inducement for employed workers 
already tied to these sectors through education or training to commute 
or migrate into the county from other regions.
Poverty in central cities, particularly among African Americans, 
appears to be affected by the trend of relocating jobs from inner core 
areas to newer suburbs, which creates a spatial mismatch between jobs 
and people. Spatial mismatch occurs when inner-city residents do not 
completely adjust to net job losses through relocation or increased com-
muting. Case studies suggest that this is most likely to occur in large, 
slower-growth, mature cities. Metropolitan poverty is particularly af-
fected by male unemployment, even after controlling for the general 
influence	of	job	growth,	which	suggests	that	additional	causes	beyond	
merely a lack of jobs are linked to male unemployment.
We	find	a	number	of	differences	in	the	relationship	between	pov-
erty and the economy in nonmetropolitan counties, particularly for iso-
lated rural areas. Compared to metro counties, rural poverty rates are 
more dependent on employment growth, presumably because of lower 
migration and commuting propensities. In what is also likely related 
to lower migration and commuting tendencies, targeting growth to-
wards industries that are doing well nationally has especially strong 
effects on rural poverty. Increasing female employment likewise has 
larger poverty-reducing effects in nonmetro counties. A greater share 
of single-parent households increases poverty more in nonmetro areas 
than in metro areas, which we note as being potentially attributable to 
low rural wages and the greater need for two incomes for families to 
rise above poverty. Nonmetropolitan counties are also more affected by 
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shifts in industry structure. This is likely related to nonmetro counties’ 
greater dependence on a few industries and to their inhabitants’ greater 
reluctance to relocate. Finally, poverty also appears to be more spatially 
clustered in nonmetro areas, with the level of poverty in each county 
contingent on the economic vitality of its neighbors. 
POLICy RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the spatial dimensions of poverty, we cannot imagine an ef-
fective poverty-reduction program that does not aggressively address 
the place-based barriers that underlie the severe pockets of poverty. 
While helping individuals to be self-reliant is laudable, recognition 
needs to be given to the many root causes of poverty that exist in local 
communities.	Besides	a	host	of	deficiencies	in	a	community’s	capacity	
to offer services, such as inadequate transportation and child care, many 
areas	 simply	 do	 not	 have	 sufficient	 job	 opportunities	 for	 less-skilled	
individuals. Clearly, healthy doses of personal values and individual re-
sponsibility cannot be expected to fully overcome problems that origi-
nate at the community level. Thus, policy initiatives need to be tailored 
to place, recognizing each region’s particular circumstances.
Our analysis points to a number of policies that could potentially re-
duce localized poverty. Both place-based and person-based policies are 
needed,	and	policy	design	should	reflect	their	interplay.	As	evidenced	
in the quotation by Rebecca Blank at the beginning of the chapter, the 
complexity of place-based poverty requires simultaneous implemen-
tation of multiple strategies—implementation of an incomplete set of 
policies will likely prove fruitless. Finally, regional policies also must 
be optimally designed within the context of the national economic and 
policymaking	 environment.	 Policies	 consistent	with	 our	 findings,	 in-
cluding both those currently used in practice and new ones that we pro-
pose, follow below.
Macroeconomic Policies
Because a rising tide has once again been found to lift all boats, 
poverty reduction should become an explicit goal of macroeconomic 
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policymaking. In particular, our analysis of the 1990s experience sug-
gests that poverty reduction is more likely to occur when economic 
growth is sustained. Local poverty-reducing impacts of growth accumu-
late over time. Sustained national growth pushes unemployment rates 
and labor force participation rates to points where those with the least 
education and job skills have time to move out of poverty. Prolonged 
economic	growth	helps	ensure	that	disadvantaged	workers	gain	suffi-
cient	experience,	confidence,	and	other	soft	and	hard	skills	 to	remain	
employed on a consistent basis. Likewise, sustained national growth 
helps ensure that prosperity becomes geographically widespread, as 
booming areas eventually bump up against supply-side constraints, 
causing demand to shift to lagging regions. An example of how macro-
economic policymaking could incorporate poverty concerns would be 
for the Federal Reserve district banks to provide information on the 
antipoverty	benefits	of	continued	growth	in	their	regions,	which	could	
be	weighed	against	general	inflation	risks.
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
The federal EITC has been lauded for greatly increasing labor force 
participation (if not hours of work) and reducing welfare roles (Hotz 
and Scholz 2001; Grogger 2003). Given its success, the EITC should 
be	simplified	and	made	more	generous	at	the	federal	level	and	expanded	
at the state and local level. For example, in 2004 there were 18 states 
with their own versions of the EITC. Beyond states, targeted EITCs 
should be used in distressed substate regions. Examples of local EITCs 
are found in Montgomery County, Maryland, and in one used in the 
city of Denver during 2002.1 Given that an EITC tax credit is directly 
based on income, it more directly helps those most in need. The EITC 
is an attractive alternative to state and local minimum wage and living 
wage laws, which, besides deterring employment growth, are much less 
focused on needy households and thus can go to workers who are in 
families well above the poverty threshold (Turner and Barnow 2003).
Along with job-creation strategies such as targeted tax breaks, wage 
subsidies, or public employment, an EITC targeted at a distressed area 
would provide disadvantaged workers with a supply-side carrot to en-
courage employment. It should be prescribed for a limited period, such 
as two years, to induce disadvantaged workers to gain enough experi-
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ence and human capital to ensure long-lasting employment. Further, it 
should be limited to people who have resided in the targeted area for 
some set time period (say, one year) to deter people from relocating to 
be eligible for the credit. Such a spatially focused supply-side induce-
ment may be the needed impetus to ensure that geographically targeted 
employment growth programs are successful. Moreover, along with 
wage subsidies targeted to residents of distressed zones, an EITC that 
is focused on the zone’s disadvantaged residents would also provide an 
inducement for them to seek suitable employment outside of the zone.
Metropolitan and urban Economic Development Policies
Because there is an apparent lack of jobs in the core of most large 
metropolitan areas, we believe that an effective metropolitan (urban) 
antipoverty strategy should encompass spatially targeted enterprise 
zone	policies	that	chiefly	benefit	the	residents	of	the	zone.	Some	char-
acteristics of these policies are as follows:
• They would be primarily targeted at central counties, especially 
those with greater African American population shares.
• Targeting efforts should emphasize industries that are growing 
faster than the national average, because such growth induces 
smaller	in-migration	flows	(and	likely	smaller	commuter	flows).	
That is, if the industry is faring well everywhere, then growth 
in one location will likely attract fewer workers from elsewhere 
because they are already likely to be employed. Efforts should 
also consider targeting sectors that employ less-skilled work-
ers at higher wages—i.e., in industries known to have positive 
pay differentials even after accounting for occupational structure 
(Andersson, Holzer, and Lane 2002, 2003; Foster-Bey and Rawl-
ings 2002).
• The incentives and wage subsidies should be almost entirely tar-
geted at new hires who reside within the enterprise zone. Ex-
ceptions—hires from outside the enterprise zone—must only be 
made for disadvantaged persons: for example, TANF recipients 
or unemployed workers from low-income households (Peters and 
Fisher	2002).	The	breaks	should	not	simply	go	toward	the	firms	
locating in these areas because, more often than not, the newly 
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created jobs will end up going to people who reside outside of the 
targeted zone.
• The incentive mechanism should be consistent with recent New 
Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) and targeted wage subsidy (TWS) pro-
posals (Bartik 2001; Schweke 2004).2 One distinction is that we 
believe they should be further targeted to residents of the zone. 
Specifically,	 an	 NJTC	 would	 provide	 about	 a	 30-percent	 tax	
credit	on	wages	up	to	about	$15,000	when	a	firm	hires	additional	
employees beyond some benchmark. Subsidies would only take 
effect when employment rises above 102 percent of the previ-
ous year’s employment. That means subsidies are for new jobs, 
not	existing	jobs.	For	residents	who	are	certified	by	a	workforce	
board,	the	TWS	would	subsidize	wage	and	benefits	up	to	an	aver-
age rate of about $8.50 an hour for 26 weeks. The TWS program 
would be structured to allow a community workforce board to 
pick potential employers who have a track record of retaining 
disadvantaged	workers.	A	central	benefit	 is	 that	both	programs	
target less-skilled workers, not capital.
• As is consistent with the incentive programs, there is further need 
for	community-based	placement	agencies	and	the	so-called	first-
source programs (Andersson, Holzer, and Lane 2003; Schweke 
2004;	Shelton	et	 al.	2002).	These	nonprofit	groups	first	 screen	
and train disadvantaged workers and then place them in good 
employment matches. Such organizations likely have better 
community networks and may be more credible with businesses 
than a government agency. There remains a need for government 
programs, in which efforts to improve current programs such as 
the one-stop career centers are good steps.
Nonmetropolitan Economic Development Policies
The lack of well-paying jobs in many rural areas suggests the need 
for the same kind of enterprise zone policies there that we advocate 
for central-city counties. Chapter 8 describes how targeting place-based 
economic-development and work-support policies can be more effec-
tive in rural America than in large urban centers. These policies are 
likely to be most effective in counties that are farthest away from met-
ropolitan areas. 
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Enterprise zones for rural areas have been part of federal and state 
rural development efforts. For example, in 1996 Nebraska implemented 
an	Enterprise	Zone	Act	in	which	economic	distress	was	defined	as	pop-
ulation loss in excess of 10 percent between the two most recent cen-
suses, and an unemployment rate twice the state average or a poverty 
rate in excess of 20 percent (Nebraska State Statutes 1996). Businesses 
are eligible to receive income and sales tax credits for new employ-
ees hired at a qualifying wage, and for investment expenditures above 
a certain threshold. The program’s eligibility requirements for metro-
politan areas differ from those of rural areas (Nebraska Department of 
Revenue 2006). 
At the federal level, stemming from legislation in 1993, numerous 
empowerment zones and enterprise communities were created in rural 
areas in 24 states, with most concentrated in Appalachia, in areas across 
the South with high black poverty, and in Hispanic communities across 
the Southwest (Reid 1999). High poverty rates are the primary require-
ment for designation as either an empowerment zone or an enterprise 
community, and most of the areas have poverty rates in the 25–35 per-
cent range. The primary difference between an empowerment zone and 
an enterprise community is that, in the former, business tax credits and 
other tax incentives are available.
Empowerment zones and enterprise communities should consider 
the	following	recommendations,	which	are	specific	to	nonmetropolitan	
areas:
• Nonmetropolitan areas that serve, or can serve, as regional cen-
ters	for	economic	activity	should	be	identified	and	targeted.	The	
poverty	benefits	of	a	growing	economic	center	will	spill	over	into	
less-developed neighbors. Regional centers also serve as a com-
muting	magnet	that	benefits	residents	far	away.	Empirical	results	
in Chapter 8 show the importance of these regional spillovers in 
reducing rural poverty. However, expending resources on com-
munities that do not possess a critical mass of businesses will 
be wasteful, as residents of these small communities will simply 
purchase goods and services from larger centers. In fact, Stabler 
and	Olfert	 (2002)	find	 that	financial	 injections	 into	 small	 rural	
communities	typically	end	up	benefiting	higher-order	cities	more	
than the intended community. 
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• Regional economic development cooperatives or corporations 
should be designed for commuting zones. The advantages of 
organizations that encompass a broader geographic scope than 
just an individual city or county include pooling of resources and 
greater	internalization	of	the	larger	regional	benefits.	And	region-
al efforts would likely be better monitored for their progress than 
state or federal efforts and adjusted accordingly.
• For urban areas in nonmetro counties, targeting industries that 
are faring well nationally helps reduce migration and increases 
the	benefits	to	existing	local	residents.
• As recommended for metro areas, tax credits should be provided 
for newly created jobs for workers who reside in the zone. For 
example, under the Nebraska Enterprise Zone Act, higher tax 
credits were awarded for residents hired from the zone (Rogers 
1998).
• Rural counties that are simply too isolated, or are in such a down-
ward spiral that expending additional resources on them would 
not	produce	tangible	results,	should	be	identified	and	made	in-
eligible. In particular, peripheral regions that are part of larger 
commuting zones for regional economic centers should not be 
targeted for job growth. Rather, efforts should be directed at indi-
viduals in these areas to assist them in obtaining suitable employ-
ment, through either commuting or relocating.
• Empowerment zones also may need to provide infrastructure and 
customized training. Unlike capital tax subsidies, customized 
training	programs	can	provide	lasting	benefits	to	zone	residents	
even	if	targeted	firms	close.	North	Carolina	has	been	praised	for	
its strong emphasis on the customized training provided by com-
munity and technical colleges (Bartik 2001), which is a feature 
of recent Bush administration proposals (White House 2004).
• Credits and subsidies should be given to encourage entrepre-
neurship that takes advantage of nonmetropolitan informal 
economies. Such entrepreneurial activities may allow for more 
value added in production to be retained as area income. Thus, 
the credits can be based on contribution to regional income, but 
this	needs	 to	be	closely	monitored	 to	ensure	 sufficient	 income	
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is trickling down to the lower part of the income distribution. 
A trend in encouraging entrepreneurship is microlending, which 
began internationally in the 1980s.3	Microlending	is	now	finding	
its way into rural empowerment zones and enterprise communi-
ties. It provides individuals who possess human capital but lack 
financial	capital	with	funding	to	start	small	businesses.	From	in-
ternational applications, communities have learned to use peer 
groups in making approval decisions, rather than basing such 
decisions purely on the amount of collateral the loan applicant 
can offer. This type of approach works best in rural areas, where 
inhabitants’ greater familiarity with one another facilitates the 
use of of peer groups. Thus, microlending would have its great-
est impact where skills are most underutilized or business is most 
undercapitalized (Wallace 1999).
• Empowerment zones should facilitate and broker funding for 
broadband infrastructure and other investments needed to support 
firms	dependent	upon	digital	technology.	In	more	remote	areas,	
such investment should focus on wireless and satellite technol-
ogy.	Some	states	should	consider	creating	a	twenty-first	century	
counterpart	 to	 the	 Rural	 Electrification	Administration,	 which	
brought electric service to remote regions in the mid-twentieth 
century.
•	 Empowerment	zones	should	also	financially	support	research	to	
develop promising products and services most suited for produc-
tion in rural areas, such as wind power (Atkinson 2004). 
• Zones should decentralize the location of government facilities, 
moving them away from high-cost urban areas to lower-cost 
rural areas, and particularly to rural areas located near regional 
economic centers (Atkinson 2004; Blank 2005).
• Another challenge that distressed communities and cities often 
face is a declining tax base and a deteriorating or crumbling infra-
structure. These disadvantages can lead to municipalities impos-
ing	a	heavier	tax	burden,	which	would	further	deter	firms	from	
locating in these communities. Hence, an additional way to aid 
distressed areas is through state and federal sources sharing more 
of their revenue (Bartik 2004). Addressing infrastructure needs 
has been a principal part of the federal government’s strategic 
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plans for rural empowerment zones and enterprise communities 
(Reid 1999).
• Particularly in disadvantaged urban and rural communities, there 
is often a lack of community capacity to provide services, such as 
transportation and child care. This capacity is the necessary glue 
that holds communities together, making long-term economic 
growth possible. A certain level of community stability is nec-
essary to reduce the inherent risk before private investment will 
begin	to	take	hold.	Thus,	our	final	strategy	relates	to	the	need	for	
community capacity-building, enhanced community organiza-
tions, and greater social capital, all of which help enforce social 
stability, appropriate individual behavior, and property rights 
(Blank 2005). Not only should efforts focus on building gover-
nance structures, they also should ensure that the resulting insti-
tutions are transparent and accountable to the entire population. 
Proper governance ensures that the needs of the entire community 
are met, rather than simply those of local elites. Administrators 
of state and federal economic development and antipoverty pro-
grams could foster and monitor progress in this area.
Metropolitan Person-Based Policies
Although we believe place-based proposals are needed, they are not 
intended to replace necessary person-based policies. Below, we sum-
marize some of our preferred approaches for metropolitan areas.
• Enhanced transportation incentives to facilitate reverse commut-
ing to job-rich suburbs are worthwhile. Good examples of cur-
rent efforts include funds to repair automobiles and improvement 
of	public	transport	or	shuttle	services.	In	fact,	there	is	sufficient	
evidence to support additional pilot projects for providing disad-
vantaged households with a serviceable automobile (Waller and 
Hughes 1999; Raphael and Rice 2002).4
• We believe encouraging disadvantaged households to relocate 
to areas that have a greater availability of jobs has some prom-
ise. Chicago’s Gautreaux program of the 1970s is often cited as 
a program that produced long-term payoffs (Rosenbaum and 
DeLuca 2000). Following up on that program’s success, the U.S. 
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Department of Housing and Urban Development implemented 
the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program in the mid-1990s 
to help households in high-poverty neighborhoods relocate to 
more prosperous neighborhoods (Shroder 2001). Early evidence 
shows	that,	with	sufficient	counseling	and	assistance	in	finding	
housing, it may be possible to improve a disadvantaged house-
hold’s economic and social well-being through relocation.5 Yet 
we are concerned that, even under the best of circumstances, dis-
advantaged households would be reluctant to relocate. Already 
there are great incentives to leave poor neighborhoods without 
any assistance, but such wide-scale migration has not occurred. 
One likely reason is that, by moving, a household would leave 
behind friends, family, and contacts that often provide needed 
support, including child care. Another is that the poor may not 
be able to move to lower poverty areas because of the lack of af-
fordable housing. Also, minorities may face discrimination from 
potential landlords and other obstacles in their new setting. In 
sum, programs such as MTO are likely only a small piece of the 
puzzle.
• There is an ongoing need to provide skills upgrading and train-
ing to all disadvantaged groups. However, human capital pro-
grams have a long history, and, given their cost and marginal 
effectiveness (Carneiro and Heckman 2003), we think that these 
programs	are	not	sufficient	without	complementary	increases	in	
employment opportunities. Moreover, a useful supplement is 
counseling in job-search skills, in employment information, and 
in workplace expectations, as well as ongoing mentoring to en-
courage	retention.	Community	nonprofit	organizations	should	be	
more intensively utilized in delivering these programs.
• Disadvantaged residents need more information regarding job 
opportunities, and they need counseling to improve job-search 
skills and to retain jobs. In terms of channeling scarce resources 
to	where	they	will	do	the	most	good,	Chapter	7’s	findings	indi-
cate that these programs will likely have greater impacts in cen-
tral-city counties.
• We found that greater minority population shares are not a deter-
mining factor behind higher poverty rates. Rather, we found that 
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other factors that may be related to race, including the lack of 
access to good jobs and a larger share of single mothers, underlie 
higher minority poverty. Yet to improve access to jobs, especially 
for	African	Americans,	more	effective	Affirmative	Action	pro-
grams in housing may offer gains.
• Some possible reforms for helping dislocated or unemployed 
workers include improving the federally supported one-stop ca-
reer centers, which Congress created in 1998 to provide more 
flexible	training	assistance	and	job-hunting	tips	such	as	resume	
preparation (Wessel 2003). The Bush administration proposed 
reforming the 1998 Workforce Investment Act by reducing over-
head and red tape and by providing more attention to actual skills 
that are being demanded by employers (White House 2004). The 
administration	 also	 wants	 to	 create	 more	 individual	 flexibil-
ity through $3,000 Innovation Training Accounts—personal ac-
counts that would give workers the choice of using this funding 
at community colleges, community organizations, businesses, or 
private-training providers. A similar initiative is the $4,000 New 
Economy Work Scholarship proposal by the Progressive Policy 




White House 2004). For example, in 2004 the Bush adminis-
tration proposed a $50 million pilot project to provide $3,000 
personal reemployment accounts for unemployed workers, to be 
used for child care, transportation, training, and job-search assis-
tance. An individual could keep the balance of the account once 
he or she obtained work. Of course, in these latter proposals, 
policymakers	need	to	weigh	the	tradeoff	of	the	potential	benefits	
of encouraging unemployed workers to take employment versus 
the costs incurred if unsuccessful job seekers and their families 
fall below the poverty threshold.
Rural Person-Based Policies
While many of the person-based policies suggested for metropoli-
tan areas also apply to nonmetropolitan areas, different emphases may 
Partridge.indb   281 7/27/2006   1:42:00 PM
282   Partridge and Rickman
be	required	to	address	needs	specific	to	these	areas.	Particular	emphasis	
should be given to the following activities:
• Child care subsidies appear to have particularly large payoffs 
for increasing female labor force participation (Blau and Tekin 
2003), which we found to be strongly linked to reducing pov-
erty in nonmetropolitan areas. Moreover, in nonmetropolitan 
areas workers rely more on family day care than on child care 
centers (Gordon and Chase-Lansdale 2001). This may limit the 
geographic scope of the search for employment. Additional as-
sistance, either in the form of direct cash payments to families or 
in the form of subsidies and tax credits, may increase the num-
ber of child care centers, allowing parents to expand their search 
and	find	better	jobs.	Rural	areas	particularly	need	child	care	cen-
ters that provide the hours of service that can accommodate the 
various types of shift work that entry-level disadvantaged rural 
residents	often	find	themselves	in.	One	way	to	marry	place-based	
policy with person-based policy is to leverage rural schools to 
provide additional before- and after-school day care programs.
Such programs could further utilize the school district’s resourc-
es in terms of its transportation capacity, by allocating buses to 
help disadvantaged parents.
• Even though rural residents are more likely to own cars because 
their area has no public transportation, some may not be able to 
afford a car, which can limit their employment options. Programs 
that have been mentioned for metropolitan areas for assisting in-
dividuals in obtaining reliable automobile transport may be even 
more effective in nonmetropolitan areas.
• The low pay that is characteristic of rural areas suggests that ca-
reer counseling could be more important there than in urban ar-
eas for obtaining employment with higher wages. Because gov-
ernment	and	nonprofit	counseling	services	are	probably	widely	
scattered, added effort is required to make them better known 
and more accessible to rural residents.
• More training to augment the relatively low levels of rural hu-
man capital is needed. Firms requiring a higher level of skills are 
unlikely to locate in rural areas lacking human capital. Of course, 
to induce rural residents to improve their human capital, a simul-
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taneous	strategy	of	attracting	higher-skilled	firms	would	need	to	
be in place. The human-capital programs would then need to fo-
cus	on	the	needs	of	the	firms	being	targeted.
Welfare Reform Policies
Welfare reform should place more emphasis on reducing poverty 
than on reducing caseloads. Programs should de-emphasize placing re-
cipients immediately into any form of employment regardless of the 
poverty consequences, and emphasize instead moving welfare recipi-
ents permanently above the poverty line. As evidenced in many states, 
this may be more expensive in the short run, but over the longer run 
both welfare caseloads and poverty would likely be reduced. Nonethe-
less, the programs would still need to contain strong work incentives 
such as earnings disregards, sanctions for noncompliance with program 
directives,	and	time	limits	on	benefits	for	those	assessed	as	being	able	
to	obtain	gainful	employment.	The	financial	support	required	to	reduce	
poverty likely includes the following actions, some of which overlap 
with needed supports for the working poor in general.
• Attempt to train recipients and best match their skills and abili-
ties with the job placement, such as in the state of Washington.
• Continue career counseling after the initial job placement un-
til the recipient obtains employment with adequate wages and 
health	benefits.
•	 Provide	sufficient	subsidies	for	child	care	expenditures.
• Financially assist current and recent recipients with transporta-
tion needs. For example, such assistance could be in the form of 
cash rebates or low-interest loans for purchase of automobiles.
•	 Provide	housing	subsidies	until	the	family	is	at	a	sufficient	level	
above poverty, and focus on subsidizing housing in areas with 
stronger job growth.
• Subsidize health care until recipients obtain employer-provided 
health	benefits.
• Match the most disadvantaged, such as those suffering from 
mental illness, substance abuse, or spousal abuse, to appropriate 
social service agencies, since some individuals may be able to 
become	self-sufficient	with	assistance.
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CONCLuSION
We began this book by noting that society has much to gain from 
alleviating	poverty,	and	that	the	benefits	extend	well	beyond	the	direct	
beneficiaries.	We	describe	how	helping	children	 in	poor	 families	can	
produce	 strong	 intergenerational	 benefits.	 In	Chapter	 6,	we	 find	 that	
children appear to gain more from a strong local economy than do other 
age groups. Another theme that we put forth is that the likelihood that 
a given family or household experiences poverty is greatly affected by 
where they reside. Poverty is simply not uniformly distributed across 
the nation. It can be rather high in central cities and in more-isolated ru-
ral communities, and it usually is low in exurban areas and in the better-
off suburbs. Even within these categories, there is tremendous diversity. 
Not only is poverty unevenly distributed across our communities, its 
incidence is very persistent. The high-poverty areas of the mid-twenti-
eth century were generally the high-poverty areas at the beginning of 
the	twenty-first	century.
The complex set of circumstances that underlies the spatial distri-
bution of poverty necessitates multiple, concurrent antipoverty policies 
tailored	to	place.	Augmenting	individual	skills	or	other	personal	defi-
ciencies alone will be inadequate when the root causes are at the com-
munity level. Antipoverty policies need to be focused and coordinated; 
they need to be mutually reinforcing and not working against each oth-
er. One solution at the federal level would be to consolidate economic 
development programs (Atkinson 2004), while at the same time giving 
policymakers enough freedom to avoid having to conform to one-size-
fits-all	solutions.	Federal	efforts	could	then	be	better	coordinated	with	
state and local efforts as the various levels pooled expertise, resources, 
and funds.
Economic development initiatives need to be informed more by 
research related to broader societal objectives than are the current pro-
grams, which tend to be infused with politics and power brokering. Rural 
America is probably the most prominent example of this—a geography 
where misguided industry-level subsidies are too often passed off as 
broader economic development. These programs have not stabilized the 
rural economy and may have even undermined it. Simple reallocation 
of	 resources	could	pay	significant	dividends;	 industry-level	 subsidies	
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should only be used as part of a broader strategy to reinvigorate local 
economies. Only by focusing policy on broader societal interests such 
as poverty reduction can we get the best use out of the billions of dollars 
that make their way through the labyrinth of government economic-
development and industry-support programs. Nevertheless, because the 
potential gains that would result from better focusing our efforts are so 
large, we are guardedly optimistic that the public will eventually de-
mand that the necessary changes be made.
Notes
The epigraphs at the opening of this chapter come from Michalopoulos et al. (2003), 
Egan (2003), and Blank (2005).
 1. The Montgomery County’s EITC matched the Maryland EITC, which was 15 
percent of the federal credit in 2001. Details of the EITC can be found on the 
Montgomery County Web site, http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/mc/
news/press/00-33.html (Montgomery County 2000). Denver’s 2002 EITC gave 
a maximum credit of $788 for low-income families with children. The program 
was funded through the federal allocation of TANF funds. More details of the 
Denver EITC program can be found on the City of Denver’s Web site, http://
www.denvergov.org/newsarticle.asp?id=3647 (Denver 2002).
 2. The NJTC is based on a similar federal program from the late 1970s, and the 
TWS program mimics a similar Minnesota program of the 1980s (Bartik 2001).
 3. Microlending typically involves the provision of small loans made to micro-
enterprises by noncommercial organizations such as government agencies or 
nonprofits.	These	normally	employ	a	few	people	at	most	and	have	limited	or	no	
access to commercial credit.
 4. Even so, we believe that transportation initiatives alone will have a limited im-
pact on poverty. Especially in areas with heavy congestion, it will be challenging 
to induce disadvantaged individuals to add hours of commuting time for a low-
wage job when they are already struggling with child care and other issues of 
survival.
	 5.	 Katz,	Kling,	and	Liebman	(2001)	find	evidence	that	the	MTO	program	improved	
outcomes such as health and safety for the relocated households, but they did 
not	find	statistically	significant	evidence	that	MTO	improved	short-run	earnings	
and employment or reduced welfare receipt. Kling, Ludwig, and Katz (2004) 
find	evidence	that	MTO	has	led	to	less	crime	among	girls	of	the	households	that	
move,	but	they	find	more	mixed	effects	on	the	criminal	activity	of	boys	belong-
ing to such households.
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Appendix A
Derivation of the County 
Poverty Rate Empirical Model
The underlying partial-adjustment model used in the empirical analysis as-
sumes that in year t, county i possesses an equilibrium poverty rate, povit
*, that 
is a function of the county’s socioeconomic characteristics Xit. By equilibrium, 
we mean that there are forces that push the poverty rate back to povit
*. This 
process is shown in Equation (A.1):
(A.1)  povit
* =	βXit , 
where	β	maps	the	relationship	between	the	factors	in	Xit and the equilibrium 
poverty rate povit
*. Dropping the subscript i for convenience, the actual poverty 
rate in year t (povt ) only partially adjusts from the previous period some frac-
tion	α	(0	≤	α ≤	1)	towards	the	equilibrium	rate:
(A.2)  povt −	povt-1 =	α(povt
* −	povt-1).
Equation (A.2) simply states that the change in poverty rate is some partial 
fraction of the deviation of the past poverty rate from the county’s equilibrium 
poverty rate.
If we combine Equations (A.1) and (A.2), the actual poverty rate in year t 
can be written as
(A.3)  povt = (1	−	α)povt-1	+	αβXt .
The short-run poverty response to a change in one of the X variables is 
αβ,	which	is	the	coefficient	for	the	explanatory	variable	in	a	regression	of	the	
poverty rate in year t on the lagged poverty rate and the X variables.1	By	defi-
nition, in long-run equilibrium, povt equals povt-1. Hence, the long-run equi-
librium	response	to	a	change	in	the	explanatory	variable	is	αβ/α,	in	which	α	
is	simply	derived	from	the	 regression	coefficient	on	 the	 lagged	poverty	 rate	
variable.	Because	α	is	less	than	one,	the	long-run	response	of	a	particular	vari-
able is greater than the short-run response, illustrating the sluggish adjustment 
process.	A	larger	regression	coefficient	on	povt-1	implies	either	a	smaller	α	or	a	
slower adjustment to the equilibrium poverty rate.
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An alternative approach would be to follow Levernier et al. (2000) and as-
sume an equilibrium process. This is represented in Equation (A.3) by simply 
omitting the lagged poverty rate term and assuming that the current poverty 
rate is solely a function of the other explanatory variables. That is, the current 
poverty rate equals the equilibrium poverty rate, implying that the adjustment 
is rapid. An equilibrium process can be tested in Equation (A.3) by examining 
the	statistical	significance	of	the	lagged	poverty	rate	term.	In	our	results,	we	
generally	find	 that	 the	 lagged	poverty	 rate	 is	 highly	 statistically	 significant,	
meaning that a disequilibrium process is supported by the data. In fact, the 
labor market results vary greatly, depending upon whether equilibrium or dis-
equilibrium adjustment is assumed.
Following from Equation (A.3), Box 6.1 on page 134 provides an overview 
of	the	actual	empirical	specification.	The	explanatory	variables	used	in	the	model	
shown	in	Box	6.1	include	the	five	dummy	variables	in	the	cty_type vector for 
1) whether a county contains the central city of a large MSA, 
2) whether the county is a suburb in a large MSA, 
3) whether a county contains the central city of a small MSA, 
4) whether the county is a suburb in a small MSA, and 
5) whether the county is a single-county MSA. 
So that the equation can be statistically estimated, the nonmetropolitan county 
indicator	 is	 omitted.	Hence,	 the	MSA	county-type	 regression	 coefficients	 are	
measured relative to the typical nonmetropolitan county. Following from the 
discussion of the descriptive statistics in Chapter 2, a 2000 MSA population of 
1,000,000 is used as the division between large and small MSAs.
All else being equal, poverty should be higher in central-city counties rela-
tive to suburban counties if mismatches in job skills and neighborhood effects 
exist. These mismatches especially apply if transportation constraints limit the 
ability of central-city county residents to commute to suburbs where there is 
greater job creation. For similar reasons, poverty is expected to be higher in 
nonmetropolitan counties than in suburban counties. How poverty rates differ 
between nonmetro counties and central-city counties is affected by the relative 
strengths	of	their	specific	types	of	labor	market	mismatches	and	neighborhood	
effects.
We caution that many central-city counties also include a large suburban 
population, which acts to make various MSA county groupings appear more 
homogenous. Yet the descriptive statistics discussed in Chapter 2 clearly show 
that suburban and central-city counties (combined with single-county MSAs) 
significantly	differ	in	terms	of	economic	and	demographic	characteristics.	In	
particular, the central-city counties often include older inner-ring suburbs that 
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are under stress, whose lagging performance in recent decades indicates a con-
vergence with the central city (Hudnut 2003; Jargowsky 2003; Katz 2003). By 
contrast,	the	suburban-county	classification	almost	always	includes	the	new-
er, faster-growing (sprawling) suburbs on the fringe of the metropolitan area 
(Lucy and Phillips 2001). Hence, the suburban demarcation in this study tends 
to	reflect	the	fastest	growing	parts	of	metropolitan	areas.
County and metropolitan-area population are also included in the cty_type 
vector. To capture separate population scale and density effects related to pro-
ductivity and job accessibility, we include the entire MSA population for metro-
politan counties and a separate variable measuring the interaction of the nonmet-
ropolitan county indicator with county population. The interaction variable will 
capture any differing population-scale effects for nonmetropolitan areas.
Economic factors (econ) include several county-level measures of labor 
market strength. It is an empirical issue whether job growth affects poverty im-
mediately or whether it is a cumulative process over several years. Thus, us-
ing Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) REIS data, employment growth over 
two-,	five-,	and	 ten-year	periods	was	separately	considered	(i.e.,	 for	1988–90	
Box A.1  The 2003 Definition of Metropolitan and Micropolitan Areas
Metro	and	nonmetro	areas	are	defined	by	the	Office	of	Management	and	
Budget	(OMB).	In	2003,	OMB	defined	metro	areas	as	comprising	two	
types of counties: 1) central counties with one or more urbanized areas, 
and 2) outlying counties that are economically tied to the core counties, 
as measured by workers commuting. Metropolitan areas are centered on 
urbanized areas of at least 50,000 people. Outlying counties are included 
if 25 percent of workers living in the county commute to the central 
counties, or if 25 percent of the employment in the county consists of 
workers coming out from the central counties—the so-called reverse 
commuting pattern. Nonmetro counties are outside the boundaries of 
metro	areas	and	are	further	subdivided	into	two	types.	The	first	is	mic-
ropolitan areas, centered on urban clusters of 10,000–50,000 people. As 
in metro areas, outlying counties are included in a micropolitan area if 
the percentage of workers commuting to the central county is 25 percent 
or higher, or, vice versa, if 25 percent of the employment in the outlying 
county is made up of commuters from the central county. All remaining 
nonmetropolitan counties form the second type of nonmetro counties, 
called noncore counties.
SOURCE: ERS (2003b,c); U.S. Census Bureau (2004g).
Partridge.indb   289 7/27/2006   1:42:01 PM
290   Partridge and Rickman
and 1998–2000, 1985–90 and 1995–2000, and 1980–90 and 1990–2000).2 A 
negative	sign	for	the	employment	growth	coefficient	would	support	the	hypoth-
esis that stronger labor markets reduce poverty. As discussed in Chapter 6, the 
five-year	measure	of	job	growth	performs	best,	suggesting	a	lag	between	initial	
job growth and poverty rate declines.
The male and female unemployment rates are included as additional labor 
market measures. Similarly, the county’s employment-population ratios by gen-
der are also included in econ. Given the inclusion of job growth, the employment 
rate	coefficients	should	reflect	effects	beyond	labor	demand.	We	also	conduct	
simulations to capture the fact that greater job growth not only has direct effects 
on poverty but also has indirect effects through changing the unemployment and 
employment-population rates.
Also included in econ is recent industrial structural change (ISC). Similar 
to the measure used for states in Chapter 4, the ISC is simply a dissimilarity 
index measured as the sum of the absolute changes in the 11 BEA one-digit in-
dustry employment shares between two periods, divided by two.3 For example, 
the 1995–2000 ISC measures what share of the workforce would have to shift 
one-digit sectors such that the two periods would have the same sectoral com-
position. Theory does not provide guidance as to the length of time it may take 
structural change to affect poverty. Thus, for both 1989 and 1999, we experi-
mented	with	both	the	two-year	and	five-year	measures	of	structural	change	(i.e.,	
1988–90 and 1998–2000, and 1985–90 and 1995–2000). In general, the two-
year (1988–90) measure appeared to be superior in the 1989 poverty rate model, 
and	the	five-year	(1995–2000)	measure	appeared	to	work	best	in	1999.4
A	positive	ISC	coefficient	would	suggest	adjustment	costs	in	the	realloca-
tion of labor across sectors that worsen economic outcomes at the lower end 
of the skill distribution through increased unemployment, withdrawal from the 
labor force, and lower wage rates. However, restructuring is likely to have a 
smaller impact when there is a greater diversity of job opportunities in a labor 
market,	because	nonemployed	or	laid-off	workers	can	find	jobs	that	more	read-
ily match their skills and experience. Thus, an interaction of the ISC measure 
with the county’s population is also added to the model, in which the improved 
job-matching	hypothesis	suggests	a	negative	coefficient.
Labor market and other characteristics in surrounding counties may spill 
over and affect a county’s poverty rate. First, job growth in nearby counties 
may create employment opportunities for a county’s low-skilled residents, or, 
alternatively, slower job growth in neighboring counties may increase the sup-
ply of low-skilled individuals crossing into the county for employment. Thus, 
for	some	models	we	include	the	MSA	five-year	employment	growth	for	met-
ropolitan counties,5	and	for	nonmetropolitan	counties	we	include	the	five-year	
job growth rate for the county’s commuting zone.6
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Second, the percentage of workers employed in the county of residence is 
included as a proxy for nearby employment accessibility. After controlling for 
county employment growth, we expect that poverty rates should be positively 
associated with this measure, as it signals a lack of accessible job opportunities 
in nearby counties and may relate to housing discrimination and transportation. 
Similar accessibility measures have been utilized in spatial mismatch studies 
(Kain 1992; Madden 1996). Finally, to capture neighborhood spillovers, near-
by migration patterns, and the supply of low-skilled workers in neighboring 
counties, the ten-year lagged average poverty rate of the immediate surround-
ing counties is included in a sensitivity analysis.
One-digit industry shares of employed county residents are included in econ 
to	capture	the	influence	of	industry	composition	on	county	poverty.	Because	the	
omitted	category	is	public	administration,	these	coefficients	measure	an	indus-
try’s effect relative to public administration. Each industry-share regression co-
efficient	is	interpreted	as	the	response	of	increasing	that	industry’s	employment	
share by 1 percent (or 0.01) while reducing the public administration share by 
1 percent (0.01).
Demographic variables (demog)	 include	five	educational	attainment	cat-
egories ranging from high school graduate to bachelor’s degree. Each variable 
is measured as the percentage of the population greater than 24 years old with 
the	attainment	defined	by	that	category.	The	percentage	that	are	high	school	
dropouts	is	the	omitted	group,	so	the	education	coefficients	are	measured	rela-
tive to the effects of an equivalent offsetting change in the high school non-
completion share. Poverty is expected to be lower in counties with greater 
educational attainment. Yet we expect educational attainment to have a declin-
ing marginal effect in reducing poverty. That is, at low educational attainment 
levels, increases in education can lift many households from below poverty 
status into the middle class. However, a greater share of college graduates pri-
marily moves middle class families further above poverty, and there may be 
anomalies in college towns in which measured poverty rates will be higher 
even as there are high shares of recent college graduates.
Two other key demographic factors in the model are the percentage of 
households that are female-headed with children and the percentage that are 
male-headed with children. Such families are the primary recipients of wel-
fare, which has a positive effect on income but negative effects through labor 
market disincentives. Hence, given major policy changes, any difference in the 
single-parent-share	coefficients	between	the	decades	should	partially	relate	to	
changes in incentives due to welfare reform. For one thing, if welfare reform 
increased labor market participation among single parents, then the size of the 
female-	and	male-head	coefficients	would	be	smaller	in	1999,	as	these	groups	
would appear more like the general population.
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Five age-share categories are included to capture differing effects due to 
age.	The	coefficients	are	measured	relative	to	the	omitted	prime	age	(25–59)	
category,	meaning	the	age	coefficients	are	measured	relative	to	an	offsetting	
change in the 25–59 category. In particular, the question of whether greater 
concentrations of children and seniors are associated with differing poverty 
rates is of policy importance. However, we expect that greater concentrations 
of young adults aged 18–24 will be positively related to poverty rates, as that 
group likely possesses less work experience and is generally less attached to 
the labor market because of higher college enrollment.
Two racial categories are included to assess the differing effects for mi-
norities: 1) percentage of the population that is African American, and 2) per-
centage of the population that is minority but not African American.7 Likewise, 
the percentage of the population that belongs to the Hispanic ethnic group is 
added to the model. Note that because Hispanic is an ethnic group, its mem-
bers are also included in one of the racial groups. The interpretation of the 
Hispanic	coefficient	is	more	complex	because	Hispanics	are	more	likely	to	be	
recent immigrants, although we also consider some models that account for 
immigration. 
Besides commuting to more distant jobs, another way for at-risk house-
holds to avoid poverty is to migrate to areas with more favorable economic 
conditions. Residential mobility is associated with economic growth in gen-
eral as migrants move to areas with superior labor market conditions. With 
job growth and other labor market indicators included in the model, migration 
rates	should	mostly	reflect	 the	mobility	preferences	of	 the	population.	Thus,	




ties only). If these variables serve as a proxy for lower geographical mobility in 
the population, they should be positively related to the poverty rate.
SIMuLATING THE INDIRECT EFFECTS OF JOB GROWTH
The total effect of job growth on reducing poverty rates may be under-
stated to some degree when including unemployment and employment rates 
because these rates are implicitly held constant. In Table A.1, we consider this 
possibility with four simulations of how job growth indirectly affects poverty 
through	 these	 other	measures.	The	 first	 scenario	 assumes	 that	 five-year	 job	
growth does not have any indirect effects on employment-population rates or 
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Table A.1  Direct and Indirect Changes Due to Investment in 
Employment Growth (%)
 1989 1999
 Short run Long run Short run Long run
No change in the employment/population and unemployment rates 
Employment growth −0.20 −0.37 −0.14 −0.23
Indirect effects:  
Employment/population — — — —
Unemployment rate — — — —
Total −0.20 −0.37 −0.14 −0.23
One-fifth	of	the	new	jobs	taken	by	original	residents
Employment growth −0.20 −0.37 −0.14 −0.23
Indirect effects:  
Employment/population −0.31 −0.58 −0.23 −0.38
Unemployment rate — — — —
Total −0.51 −0.95 −0.37 −0.61
Quasireduced form omit: unemployment and employment/population rates 
Employment growth −0.35 −0.88 −0.20 −0.40
Total −0.35 −0.88 −0.20 −0.40
Direct estimate from employment/population and unemployment rate modelsa 
Employment growth −0.20 −0.37 −0.14 −0.23
Indirect effects:  
Male employment/population insig.	≈	0 insig.	≈	0 0.01 0.02
Female employment/population −0.09 −0.17 insig.	≈	0 insig.	≈	0
Male unemployment rate −0.04 −0.07 insig.	≈	0 insig.	≈	0
Female unemployment rate −0.02 −0.04 insig.	≈	0 insig.	≈	0
Total −0.35 −0.65 −0.13 −0.21
NOTE: Table shows the changes in poverty rates after a one standard deviation change 
in 1985–1990 and 1995–2000 employment growth. A one standard deviation change 
= 12.2 and 10.1 percent, respectively.
a The employment rate and unemployment rate responses are derived as follows. First, 
using the results in Table A.3, the change in the respective employment-population 
and	unemployment	rates	were	calculated	after	a	one	standard	deviation	change	in	five-
year employment growth. Then, using Table 6.1, the respective changes in poverty 
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on unemployment rates, which is the assumption we use in most cases. This 
scenario	is	consistent	with	Blanchard	and	Katz’s	(1992)	finding	that	migration	
responds	sufficiently	quickly	that,	after	about	five	years,	all	newly	created	jobs	
are taken by new residents, implying that the employment-population ratio and 
the unemployment rate are approximately unchanged. Because Blanchard and 
Katz considered states rather than local labor markets, they did not measure 
commuters from outside the county who also take many of the newly cre-
ated jobs, making the authors’ result even more plausible at the county level. 
Hence, most of the results presented in Chapters 6 through 9 are consistent 
with Blanchard and Katz’s assumption for the long run, in that they assume 
no	indirect	effects.	The	first	group	of	values	in	Table	A.1	shows	only	the	di-
rect poverty rate reduction that is due to greater job growth, since there is no 
change in the employment/population and unemployment rates.
Blanchard and Katz’s (1992) long-run conclusions have been questioned 
for a variety of reasons. Representative of this alternative literature are Bartik 
(1991,	1993b)	and	Partridge	and	Rickman	(2006),	who	find	that	in-migrants	
take	about	30–50	percent	of	newly	created	jobs	in	the	first	year.	That	figure	
rises	 to	 about	80	percent	 after	 about	five	years.8 These migration responses 
suggest that, at least in the short run, the remaining new jobs are taken either 
by unemployed original residents or by nonemployed original residents who 
were not previously part of the labor force. This research suggests that after 
about	five	years	most	of	 the	original-resident	 response	 is	 through	attracting	
additional people into the labor force, in the end producing little net change in 
the long-run unemployment rate.9 Thus, each locality appears to have its own 
equilibrium unemployment rate to which the local labor market returns after 
an economic shock (Bartik 1993b; Blanchard and Katz 1992; Partridge and 
Rickman 1997b,c).
A	 rough	 approximation	 of	 the	 indirect	 effects	 of	 five-year	 employment	
growth, then, can be derived by assuming that there is no change in the male 
and	female	unemployment	rate,	and	that	about	one-fifth	of	the	newly	created	
jobs come through changes in the male and female participation (or employ-
ment) rate (Bartik 1993b). Because a one standard deviation increase in the 
1985–1990 and 1995–2000 job growth rates equals 12.2 and 10.1 percent, this 
implies that the corresponding employment growth attributable to changes in 
the employment-population ratio equals 2.4 and 2.0 percent.
Assuming that the share of men and women in the workforce remains 
unchanged, a 2.4 percent (not percentage point) increase in the 1989 employ-
ment-population ratio would have reduced the short-run poverty rate by an ad-
ditional 0.31 percentage points and the long-run poverty rate by an additional 
0.58 points.10 Thus, the total decline in the 1989 poverty rate from the direct 
and indirect effects of employment growth equals 0.51 percentage points (0.20 
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+ 0.31) in the short run and 0.95 points (0.37 + 0.58) in the long run. For 1999, 
a 2 percent greater male and female employment-population ratio would have 
reduced the short-run poverty rate by an additional 0.23 points and the long-
run rate by an additional 0.38 points. The total direct and indirect effects from 
a one standard deviation increase in 1995–2000 employment growth would be 
a 0.37-point (0.23 + 0.14) decline in the short-run poverty rate and a 0.61-point 
(0.23 + 0.38) reduction in the long-run rate. The responses are summarized in 
the second gorup of values in Table A.1, which shows the results when one-
fifth	of	the	new	jobs	are	taken	by	original	residents.
We see that even though original residents take only a modest 20 percent 
share of the newly created jobs, if we allow job growth to also affect the em-
ployment-population rate it more than doubles the poverty rate response to an 
acceleration	of	five-year	job	growth.	This	pattern	suggests	that	while	greater	
job growth may directly increase wages and allow disadvantaged workers to 
gain needed work experience, the indirect response of increasing the share of 
the population at work can be important.
A weakness of the approach in Panel 2 is that it arbitrarily uses estimated 
employment-population and unemployment rate responses that come from 
studies primarily based on state and MSA data, not on county data. Thus, these 
estimates could be inaccurate for our purposes. To address this concern, we try 
two other alternatives in estimating the indirect effects of employment growth. 
In both cases, we assume that employment growth is what drives changes in 
the unemployment rate and the employment-population rate; this assump-
tion is consistent with the causality used in many VAR studies (Bartik 1991; 
Blanchard and Katz 1992).
The	first	alternative	is	to	estimate	a	quasireduced	form	poverty	rate	model	
by removing the two unemployment rates and the two employment-population 
rates	from	the	base	specification	in	columns	(1)	and	(4)	of	Table	6.1	on	page	
136. In this case, the unemployment rate and the employment-population ra-
tio	are	no	longer	held	constant,	and	the	regression	coefficient	on	employment	
growth	can	reflect	the	indirect	impacts	through	changes	in	these	variables.	The	
model in the third part of Table A.1 shows the results of this exercise. For 1989, 
the total short- and long-run job growth effects on poverty increase by twofold 
compared to the base results in row 1. The total short- and long-run responses 
increase by about one-half in the 1999 model.11
The second alternative approach in allowing the employment-population 
and unemployment rates to indirectly affect poverty rates is through a series 
of	 auxiliary	 regressions.	Specifically,	 for	both	periods,	 the	male	 and	 female	
unemployment rates and the employment-population rates were regressed on 
the same control variables as in the reported poverty-rate models in Table A.2, 
with the exception that these auxiliary models omitted the ten-year lagged pov-
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Table A.2  (continued)
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N 3028 824 2204 3028 824 2204
NOTE:	Unweighted	descriptive	statistics.	A	metropolitan	county	is	defined	using	2000	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis	REIS	county	defini-
tions. Standard deviations are in parentheses. A blank means the variable was not included in the regression model. 
a Single-county MSA/PMSA with the exception of Los Angeles and San Diego, which are included as central-county MSAs.
b “Central	county”	includes	the	county	(or	counties)	of	the	named	central	city	(or	cities)	in	the	MSA	definition	in	a	multiple-county	MSA.	
Suburban counties do not include any of the central city (or cities). A large MSA had a 2000 population of greater than one million.
c The structural change index is the share of the county’s employment that would have to change sectors in each year so that there would be 
an	equivalent	industry	structure	in	the	two	years.	It	is	a	similarity	index	defined	as	one-half	the	sum	of	the	absolute	value	of	the	difference	
in one-digit industry employment shares between the two years.
d For	nonmetropolitan	counties,	the	broader	labor	market	employment	growth	was	defined	using	1990	commuting	zone	definitions	from	
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Rurality/lmacz).
e For	multiple-county	MSAs,	the	broader	labor	market	employment	growth	was	defined	using	the	entire	metropolitan	area.
f “Hispanics” is an ethnic category, and Hispanics are included in the white, African American, and other race groups. Individuals who 
classified	themselves	as	belonging	to	two	or	more	racial	categories	in	the	2000	census	are	classified	in	the	“other	race”	group.	Because	
of	the	two-or-more	racial	category	in	the	2000	census,	the	1990	and	2000	figures	are	not	comparable.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2006e) and 1969–2000 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis REIS data (BEA 2002).
Table A.2  (continued)
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erty	rate	and	the	three	measures	of	five-year	household	mobility	(so	as	to	not	
hold migration constant).12	Because	we	are	 trying	 to	examine	how	five-year	
job growth rates directly and indirectly affect poverty, we do not consider job 
growth measured over shorter periods. Yet, as described below, more-immedi-
ate employment growth does have a larger effect because potential migrants 
would not have had time to fully respond.
In	 a	 surprising	 outcome,	 Table	 A.3	 shows	 that	 five-year	 employment	
growth reduced the male employment-population rate in both 1990 and 2000, 
although	this	relationship	was	only	significant	in	the	2000	model.	Actually,	the	
negative response even runs counter to any potential endogeneity concerns. 
Consistent with expectations, the female-employment population ratios are 
lifted	by	greater	five-year	 job	growth,	but	 this	effect	was	only	significant	 in	
the 1990 model. To be sure, even in the case of female employment-popula-
tion	rates,	a	1-point	increase	in	five-year	job	growth	only	increased	the	1990	
employment-population rate by about 0.04 points. While it was expected that 
migrants	and	commuters	would	eventually	fill	most	of	any	newly	created	jobs,	
the negative response for men was still unexpected.13 One possible reason for 
the	unexpected	male	result	is	that	a	shock	to	labor	supply	created	significant	
competition for less-skilled men. For example, jobs that many less-skilled men 
vied for were disproportionately taken by less-skilled women, many of them 
pushed into the labor market by welfare reform. This type of behavior is con-
sistent with the large national increase in the labor force participation of female 
heads of households. Yet this possibility should be a focus of further research.
Table A.3 shows that a 1-percentage-point increase in the 1985–1990 em-
ployment growth rate reduced the 1990 male and female unemployment rate by 
about 0.02 points. However, a 1-point increase in 1995–2000 job growth had an 
insignificant	impact	on	2000	male	unemployment	rates,	and	it	would	only	have	
reduced the average 2000 female unemployment rate by 0.01 points. As before, 
there	is	evidence	that	current	employment	growth	has	a	much	larger	influence	
in reducing unemployment rates.14 Hence, while short-term job growth does re-
duce	 unemployment	 rates,	 after	 about	five	 years	 equilibrium	 forces	 push	 the	
typical county’s unemployment rate back to its original level.
Using the auxiliary male/female employment-population and unemploy-
ment rate models, estimated changes in the employment-population and un-
employment rates were derived after a corresponding one standard deviation 
change in 1985–1990 or 1995–2000 employment growth. Then, using the coef-
ficients	from	the	poverty	rate	models	in	Table	6.1,	the	estimated	changes	in	the	
employment-population and unemployment rates were used to derive the indi-
rect changes in the poverty rate due to job growth.15 These indirect responses are 
reported in Panel 4 of Table A.1. Generally, these indirect responses are consid-
erably smaller than the estimates in Panels 2 and 3. In fact, the indirect responses 
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1985–90 empl. growth −0.012 0.045* −0.019* −0.023*
(1.29) (4.99)* (4.18)* (5.18)*
1988–90 structural change −14.290* −14.949* 8.465* 6.088*
(2.64)* (2.91)* (3.40)* (2.50)*
Pop. × structural change −3.7e−5 4.5e−5* 4.1e−5* 3.9e−5*
(0.93) (1.81)* (2.83)* (3.02)*
N 3028 3028 3028 3028
R2 0.76 0.77 0.66 0.63
2000 models
1995–2000 empl. growth −0.032* 0.004 −0.005 −0.013*
(2.93)* (0.60) (1.14) (3.10)*
1995–2000 structural change −4.397 −4.094 1.216 6.681*
(1.24) (1.59) (0.80) (4.45)*
Pop. × structural change 1.7e−5 1.6e−5 7.5e−6 2.2e−6
(0.80) (1.59) (0.86) (0.34)
N 3028 3028 3028 3028
R2 0.80 0.81 0.63 0.65
NOTE: Table shows the auxiliary regression model using the dependent variable re-
ported	in	the	column	heading.	The	specification	is	the	same	as	in	Table	6.1	except	that	
the	lagged	poverty	rate,	employment-population	rates,	unemployment	rates,	and	five-
year residential mobility variables are omitted. Absolute values of robust t-statistics 
are	in	parentheses.	*	=	significant	at	the	0.10	level.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, U.S. Census Bureau (2006e), and 1969–2000 U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis REIS data (BEA 2002).
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in the 1999 model are approximately zero, and the indirect responses in the 1989 
model a little larger.
Averaging the total direct and indirect responses across Panels 2-4 of Table 
A.1 suggests that a one standard deviation increase in job growth decreased 
short-run poverty rates by about 0.4 percentage points in 1989 and by about 0.8 
points in the long run. This result means that about half of the 1985–1990 em-
ployment growth response was indirect, through reducing unemployment rates 
and increasing employment-population rates (especially the latter). However, 
the average total short-run response to the 1999 poverty rate after a one standard 
deviation increase in 1995–2000 employment growth is about one-quarter of a 
point, and the long-run response is only about four-tenths of a point. 
The relatively modest direct and indirect poverty response to local job 
growth suggests that in-migrants, commuters, or nonemployed members of fam-
ilies above the poverty threshold eventually take many of the new jobs. Thus, if 
not targeted, local job growth policies such as enterprise zones will only have 
a modest impact on poverty rates. These results support Bartik’s (2001) con-
clusion	that	the	benefits	of	generic	local	economic	growth	are	quite	dispersed	
throughout the income distribution, not concentrated on lower income groups. 
These	findings	reaffirm	the	need	to	concentrate	economic	development	policies	
on disadvantaged residents to ensure that growth trickles down.
THE ROLE OF COMMuNITy DEMOGRAPHIC ATTRIBuTES
Not surprisingly, the regression results in Table 6.1 reveal that the demo-
graphic characteristics of the population strongly relate to the community’s 
average	poverty	rate.	Medium	levels	of	education	are	particularly	influential	
in reducing poverty rates. The education results suggest that, relative to the 
high-school dropout share, a one-point increase in the share of the population 
having a high school degree, or some college, but not an associate degree, re-
duced the short-run poverty rate by 0.12–0.18 percentage points in 1999 (and 
by correspondingly larger long-run impacts). Clearly, these results point to 
the importance of reducing high-school dropout rates and encouraging some 
postsecondary education. Such educational attainment appears to increase the 
chances	of	obtaining	stable	employment	with	sufficiently	high	wages	to	ensure	
that a worker and his or her family can remain above the poverty line. In im-
plementing	such	a	policy,	while	“first	chance”	programs	designed	to	increase	
high-school completion may be expensive, they are likely to be more success-
ful than “second chance” programs like GED programs and training programs 
(Carneiro and Heckman 2003).
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The bachelor’s degree effects are surprisingly small in both decades. It 
may	be	that	this	small	response	reflects	a	university-town	effect	in	which	the	
college graduate share also relates to a large number of low-income students. 
A college degree also may simply boost the income of those already in the 
middle class and have a marginal impact, if any, on poverty rates. Thus, policy 
aimed at enhancing support for individuals to attain their four-year college 
degree should be based on other reasons than reducing poverty.
Female headship is one of the strongest predictors of community poverty 
rates. A one standard deviation increase in the female-head share with chil-
dren is associated with a 1.40-percentage-point short-run increase in the pov-
erty rate in 1999 and with a slightly larger effect in 1989.16 Bear in mind that 
these responses are derived after holding labor market conditions constant. By 
contrast, the response to a one standard deviation increase in the male-head 
share with children is only about one-tenth the size of the female headship 
response.
Both the male and the female headship response point to the simple fact 
that	single-parent	families	have	fewer	financial	resources.	Yet	the	significantly	
larger	female	response	indicates	that	there	are	significant	constraints	faced	by	
female-headed households in fully participating in the labor market. Thus, the 
results	are	suggestive	of	a	need	to	facilitate	ways	to	help	single	parents	find	
employment and earn higher salaries. In particular, there is a need for bet-
ter and more accessible child care, though other assistance, such as enhanced 
counseling for job retention and programs for skills augmentation is also need-
ed	for	the	least-educated	group	of	single	mothers	(Moffitt	2002).	The	particu-
larly	 large	positive	 influence	played	by	 female	headship	could	also	 indicate	
employer discrimination toward single mothers—perhaps related to fears that 
these women will miss work for child-related reasons.
The	magnitude	of	the	single-parent	coefficients	is	somewhat	smaller	in	the	
1999 model. One possible reason is that employers may have been more will-
ing to work around constraints faced by single parents because of the severe 
labor shortages of the late 1990s.17 Another potential reason is that the 1996 
federal welfare reform pushed many low-skilled single parents into the labor 
market, meaning these demographic groups behaved more like other low-
skilled	groups.	Yet	these	results	are	good	news	in	that	if	there	were	significant	
welfare reform labor-supply spillovers on other low-skilled workers, then the 
single-parent	coefficients	would	not	have	greatly	changed	(i.e.,	 there	merely	
would have been a redistribution of who was in poverty, from single parents to 
other low-skilled workers).
The national data show that average poverty rates are much higher for 
racial	and	ethnic	minorities.	The	findings	in	Table	6.1	suggest	that	it	is	not	nec-
essarily race that matters. For example, in both 1989 and 1999, the percentage 
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of the population that is African American was negatively associated with pov-
erty rates (at the 0.10 level). Also, compared to 1989, both the other-race share 
and the Hispanic share measures became more associated with less poverty in 
1999.	To	be	sure,	because	of	classification	changes	in	the	2000	census,	the	race	
results are not directly comparable. Yet they suggest that, at least in 1999, after 
accounting for socioeconomic characteristics, concentrations of racial and eth-
nic minorities did not produce higher county poverty rates.
The race and ethnicity results suggest that the causes of higher minority 
poverty rates are not so much due to direct factors as they are to concentrations 
of minority groups being more likely to be found in locales with weak labor 
markets or where the population has lower labor market skills. Nevertheless, 
the results are not consistent with overt labor market discrimination and thus 
support	the	finding	by	Holzer	et	al.	(2003)	that	employer	hiring	discrimination	
based on race apparently declined during the 1990s. These results do not rule 
out other types of discrimination, such as in the housing market, in education, 
or	 in	 certain	firms	 avoiding	 locating	 in	 areas	with	greater	minority	 concen-
trations.	Yet	 even	 in	 the	 case	 of	where	firms	 choose	 to	 locate,	 there	 is	 evi-
dence that the spatial mismatch between jobs and residence of minority groups 




sponses is the presence of recent foreign immigrants. In other analysis, greater 
concentrations of foreign immigrants had strong adverse effects on local pov-
erty rates in 1999.18 In fact, concentrations of recent immigrants appear to have 
had a much more adverse effect on local poverty than concentrations of mi-
norities did. 
It	is	not	immediately	clear	why	the	five-year	recent-immigrant	share	had	
such	an	adverse	effect	on	1999	poverty	 rates.	For	example,	 an	 insignificant	
effect would imply that, after accounting for other factors, either there is no di-
rect immigrant effect, or there is offsetting native out-migration such that there 
was little net change in low-skilled labor supply (Borjas et al. 1996). Perhaps 
the	late	1990s	cohort	had	fewer	labor	market	skills	and	more	language	difficul-
ties than earlier cohorts, or perhaps welfare reform changes reduced transfer 
payments to recent immigrants. Yet there is some evidence that recent foreign 
immigrants were increasingly competing with native low-skilled workers for 
jobs	that	would	lift	poor	households	out	of	poverty.	Specifically,	in	counties	
with	higher	recent	immigrant	shares,	five-year	job	growth	had	a	smaller	influ-
ence on reducing 1999 poverty rates.19 Welfare reform’s labor market emphasis 
may be one cause of this pattern, because the lowest-skilled natives would 
be	more	likely	to	compete	against	immigrants,	and	their	lack	of	financial	re-
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sources would limit any offsetting migration response to the increase in labor 
market competition.20
Turning to the age composition of the population, the strong positive as-





half of the 1990s not only greatly increased worker anxiety, but it dispropor-
tionately hit middle-aged and older workers in terms of fewer reemployment 
opportunities and reduced reemployment earnings (Evans and Behr 1997; 
Farber 1997; Kletzer 1998; Mandel 1996). The problem is particularly acute 
for many in the 60–64 age cohort because they are not prepared to retire yet are 
in the least-likely cohort to be reemployed.
The household mobility results support the contention that greater mo-
bility (after controlling for labor market conditions) is one way to alleviate 
poverty. For example, using Table 6.1, we see that a one standard deviation 
increase	in	the	share	of	the	population	that	lived	in	the	same	house	five	years	
before, and in the share of the population that changed houses but remained 
in the same county, together increased the 1999 short-run poverty rate by 0.63 
percentage points. In other analysis, because job growth may affect residential 
mobility, and because mobility may be endogenously related to poverty, we 
experimented with the base 1999 model in column (4) of Table 6.1 by omit-




prefer to control for residential mobility because of its important implications 
for poverty clustering and neighborhood effects.
Welfare reform led to a host of diversion programs to encourage possible 
enrollees to stay in the labor market (Blank 2002). The household-mobility/
migration results suggest that a potentially effective diversion would be to sub-
sidize moving costs to counties with either stronger labor markets, better job 
accessibility, or a history of lower poverty rates (i.e., less persistence and better 
neighborhood effects). Although relocation support policies are easy to discuss 
in the abstract, successful relocation requires disadvantaged households to ob-
tain a host of supports beyond merely information regarding opportunities in 
their new labor market (Allard 2004). These additional supports include child 
care, as poor households often rely on relatives for these arrangements, along 
with other anchors that are often provided by relatives, long-time friends, and 
institutions such as religious organizations (Spilimbergo and Ubeda 2004). In 
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addition,	there	are	other	obstacles:	as	white	flight	to	the	suburbs	demonstrates,	
suburban residents may resist these relocation initiatives.
Notes
 1. For those who prefer examining the change in poverty rates, Equation (A.3) can 
be interpreted in that fashion by simply subtracting povt−1 from both sides: 
  povt	−	povt−1	=	−αpovt−1	+	αβXt.
  2. BEA employment data is based on the number of jobs in the county, meaning 
that it measures labor conditions among the county’s employers. Note that be-
cause the data includes 1990 or 2000, there is a one-year lead in the employment 
growth	measures.	This	formulation	follows	Levernier	et	al.	(2000)	and	reflects	
the notion that local labor markets are both forward- and backward-looking in 
that	migration	flows	are	much	more	strongly	affected	by	shocks	that	are	expected	
to be permanent (Topel 1986).
  3. The ISC terms are constructed using the 11 industries in the BEA 2000 REIS 
(Regional Economic Information System) data. In their derivation, for many 
counties, employment was not reported for all industries in a given year because 
of disclosure restriction. In these cases, industry employment was interpolated 
and extrapolated, while ensuring that the sum of employment in the 11 industries 
equaled total county employment.
  4. As in the case of employment growth, structural change is measured one year 
into the future to capture the likely possibility that labor market participants have 
some foresight as to future structural changes in the local labor market.
  5. The MSA employment growth rate is only included if the MSA contains at least 
two counties, because the county’s job growth would equal the MSA job growth 
in single-county MSAs.
	 6.	 The	commuting	zones	are	from	the	USDA’s	Economic	Research	Service	defini-
tions for 1990 (ERS 2003a).
 7. The 2000 census created a new category, in which the respondent could indi-
cate that he or she is a member of two or more racial categories. This multirace 
group is included in the non–African American category for 2000. However, this 
change means that the 1989 and 1999 race results are not directly comparable.
		8.	 Blanchard	and	Katz	(1992)	find	a	much	larger	long-run	response	by	migrants	to	
employment	growth.	One	reason	these	long-run	findings	have	been	questioned	
is that measurement error could bias the response (Rowthorn and Glyn 2003). 
Likewise, Blanchard and Katz’s assumption of stationarity for the VAR model 
somewhat forces the long-run outcome. Others have questioned their choice of 
specification,	including	their	particular	lag	structure	(Bartik	1993b;	Partridge	and	
Rickman 2006).
  9. The employment in a region E can be represented as
  E = E/LF × LF/pop × pop ,
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  where LF is the labor force and pop is the noninstitutionalized population. E/LF 
equals 1 minus the unemployment rate (UR) when measured in ratio form, and 
LF/POP is the labor-force participation rate. After taking logs, totally differenti-
ating, and multiplying by 100, we derive the following for small changes:
	 	 (A.4)		%ΔE	=	%Δ(1	−	UR)	+	%ΔLF/pop	+	%Δpop.
  After noting that LF equals E+UNEP (number unemployed) and assuming that 
the unemployment rate is approximately unchanged in the long run, Equation 
(A.4) can be rewritten to observe that the employment growth rate will equal the 
labor force growth rate:
	 	 (A.5)		%ΔE	=	%Δ(1	−	UR)	+	%ΔE/pop	+	%Δpop.
 10. From Equation (A.5) in Note 9, we see that if the unemployment rate is un-
changed,	 then	 the	first	 term	on	 the	 right	hand	side	approximately	equals	0.	 If	
the percentage change in 1985–1990 and 1995–2000 employment growth equals 
12.0	 and	 10.0	 percent,	 and	 one-fifth	 of	 these	 changes	 come	 through	 the	 em-
ployment-population ratio, then the employment-population ratio respectively 
changes by 2.4 and 2.0 percent in 1990 and 2000. Thus, using Table A.2, a 2.4-
percentage-point increase in the 1990 average female and male employment-
population ratios corresponds to increases of 1.16 and 1.58 percentage points 
(i.e., 0.024 × 48.5 and 0.024 × 65.8). The corresponding 2000 changes in the 
female and male employment-population rates after a 2 percent increase are 1.03 
and 1.27 percentage points. For 1989, using the results in column (1) of Table 
6.1, the short-run change in the poverty rate after a 1.16 and a 1.58 point in-
crease in the female and the male employment-population ratio approximately 
equals	0.31	percentage	points.	After	dividing	through	by	0.53	(1	−	0.47	using	the	
lagged	poverty	rate	coefficient),	 the	 long-run	indirect	reduction	in	 the	poverty	
rate approximately equals 0.58. For 2000, using the results from column (4), the 
short-run change in the poverty rate after a 1.03 and a 1.27 point increase in the 
female and the male employment-population ratio approximately equals 0.23 
percentage	points.	After	dividing	by	0.61	(1	−	0.39	using	the	lagged	poverty	rate	






0.048, t = 8.79). But it was only a little over half again as large as the reported 
1999	effect	in	column	(4)	(β	=	0.023,	t = 4.11). Thus, this upper-bound estimate 
suggests that faster job growth had relatively strong long-run effects in reducing 
poverty in 1989 but smaller effects in 1999.
 12. These auxiliary regressions also did not control for the other employment-popu-
lation or unemployment rates. 
 13. To examine the possibility that employment growth has greater short-run ef-
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fects before commuters or migrants can fully respond, the two-year 1998–2000 
employment growth rate was added to the auxiliary employment-population rate 
models.	It	was	positive	and	significant	at	about	the	15	percent	level	in	the	case	
of	men,	while	it	had	a	statistically	significant	large	positive	short-run	effect	for	
women (not shown). Hence, short-term employment growth appears to have a 
much	larger	influence	on	employment-population	rates.
 14. This was examined by including 1998–2000 job growth in the 2000 male and fe-
male unemployment models. In regard to the two-year job growth variable, there 
was	a	large	negative	response	that	was	statistically	significant	(not	shown).




was assumed to be zero.
 16. The corresponding 1989 and 1999 long-run responses from a one standard devia-
tion increase in the female headship share are 3.17 and 2.30 percentage points.
 17. To examine whether there was a smaller single-parent effect in areas with strong 
labor markets, the male head with children and the female head with children 
shares were placed in interaction with the male and female employment-popula-
tion ratio. When these interactions were added to the 1989 and 1999 models, the 
male	interaction	was	insignificant,	but	the	female	interaction	was	negative	and	
significant,	with	a	modestly	stronger	effect	 in	 the	1989	model.	Similar	 results	
were	also	obtained	when	these	single-parent	shares	were	interacted	with	the	five-




population that immigrated between 1990–1994 and 1995–2000 (not shown). 
The	1995–2000	immigrant	share	was	positive	and	significant	(t = 4.65) in the 
1999	model	(the	1990–94	immigrant	share	was	insignificant).	A	one	standard	de-
viation, 1.3-percentage-point increase in recent immigrants was associated with 
a more-than-0.5-point increase in short-run poverty rates. In addition, the race 
and	Hispanic	coefficients	all	became	more	inversely	related	to	poverty	rates	and	
significant	 at	 the	 0.05	 level.	 Conversely,	 the	 corresponding	 immigrant	 shares	
were	statistically	insignificant	in	the	1989	model.
 19. Namely, when an interaction of the 1995–2000 foreign immigrant share with the 
1995–2000 job growth variable was added to the 1999 model, it was positive and 
significant	at	the	0.07	level	(t = 1.86).
 20. The possibility of an offsetting domestic resident labor-supply response was as-
sessed by regressing the percent change in domestic population on the percentage 
of the population that are foreign immigrants who arrived in the previous decade, 
and other controls described below. The results suggest that for every 1 percent 
of the population that immigrated in the previous decade, domestic population 
fell by 0.80 percentage points in 1990 but by only 0.58 points in 2000. Thus there 
is some evidence that the offsetting low-skilled native supply response declined, 
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which would be consistent with greater competition among natives and recent 
immigrants	for	jobs	that	require	fewer	skills.	The	other	controls	were	state	fixed	
effects, the MSA county-type indicators, the previous decade’s population (1980 
or 1990), and, to proxy for deaths and births, the population shares for ages 6 
years and under, 7 to 17 years, and 65 and over. The percentage change in domes-
tic	population	was	defined	as	the	actual	percentage	of	population	change	during	
the previous decade minus the percentage of the population that had immigrated 
during the previous decade.
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